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Abstract 
This thesis analyses those differences In 
interpretation which occur when separate literary-
----.~."---~-'-
theoretical approaches are applied to biblical texts. Hans 
Frei suggests that the biblical texts describe the world in 
a way which he calls "realistic narrative". Paul Ricoeur's 
hermeneutic recognises the disclosive power of the text and 
translates the subject matter of the text into a "way-of-
being-in-the-world". Thus, the primary identity disclosed 
by the biblical narratives differs. For Frei, it is the 
identity of Jesus which is disclosed; for Ricoeur, it is 
"our corrrrnon human Christian identity". 
These two thinkers have usually been compared 
theologically. However, I contend that the theological 
investigations of both Frei and Ricoeur have been 
influenced by the literary approaches which guide their 
theological work. I give an exposition of this relationship 
in chapter one. In chapter two, I sketch out the 
implications of this relationship, focusing on the lssue of 
narrative identity. In the final chapter, critiques of 
both systems are investigated as I attempt to deal with the 
force of these objections. 
This dissertation investigates Frei's and Ricoeur's 
construals of narrative identity (as constructed through 
the reading of Biblical texts). My working hypothesis is 
that the construals of identity formulated by Frei and 
Ricoeur rely upon formalist, narrative "interpretations ll • 
My thesis contends that in their respective approaches to 
the notion of narrative identity, neither thinker has 
completely abandoned his early literary-theoretical roots 
in his theological proposals. 
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James DiCenso Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth; A 
Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur 
(Charlottesville, Virginia; University of Virginia Press, 
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The main thesis is that "an important contribution to the 
understanding of the experience of truth in an existence-
oriented context is found in the approach to truth as 
disclosure, initially formulated by Heidegger [and] it 
is the hermeneutical dimensions of disclosure that allow this 
approach to truth to function in relation to the problems of 
perspectivalism that trouble traditional approaches" (xiii). 
DiCenso suggests that n ••• Ricoeur provides a corrective to 
the formulations that curtail the scope of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics [and uses this] to provide the conceptual 
framework that delineates the set of issues his hermeneutics 
addresses" (xvii). 
Dicenso traces the continuity of thought through the work of 
these three thinkers and argues that " ... many aspects of 
[Ricoeur's] later work take the form of direct responses to, 
critiques of, and explorations from their insights" (114). 
The value of this work is in DiCenso's exposition of 
Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur on the issues related to 
truth. He concludes that the n ••• quest for truth on [the 
hermeneutical] level, leads us to rethink the interpretive 
patterns that govern our existential activity. It carries us 
beyond the false immediacy of the sUbjective appropriation of 
objects to the processes that are constitutive of 
subjectivity. In this way, there is engendered an 
'unrestricted inquiry' that stimulates the ongolng 
supersession of distorted and closed modes of disclosure" 
(143) . 
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David M. Rasmussen MYthic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical 
Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation of the thought 
of Paul Ricoeur (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971) . 
The main thesis is that a "theory of nwthic-symbolic language 
does not have to begin with the assumption that primary 
symbolic forms are invalid. It does not have to assume that 
modernity is juxtaposed to nwth. The thought of Paul Ricoeur 
sustains that thesis" (114). Rasmussen endeavors to construct 
a series of steps which philosophy of religion can begin to 
take with the thought of Ricoeur in mind. He explores what a 
"positive correlation" might provide: it " ... would affirm 
mythic-symbolic language in its primary form and in its 
secondary (hermeneutically interpreted) form associated with 
a philosophical anthropology, an understanding of man which 
requires such language" (2). 
Rasmussen proposes that Ricoeur's "contribution (to date) is 
not to be found in a consideration of language generally, but 
In the hermeneutic of a special type of language- the 
language of symbol and myth" (5). He recognises that 
"Significantly, Ricoeur has not rejected structuralism, but 
he has seen its neo-positivistic overtones. To that extent 
the present focus has been concerned wi th an attempt to 
conceive of structuralism in the context of the central role 
of the subj ect n (106). He gleans from the various work. 
Ricoeur has engaged in that "the manner in which one treats 
language is affected by implicit assumptions about the nature 
of man" (114) for n [a]ny consideration of language involves a 
related view of the nature of man" (1). 
Mary Gerhart The Question of Belief in Literary Criticism: 
An Introduction to the Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur 
(Stuttgart: Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1979). 
xi 
Gerhart's thesis is formed through three issues which requlre 
addressing in the field of literary criticism: "My 
historical analysis indicates that the problem of belief in 
literary criticism is best set forth in three issues: one, 
an issue of meaning pertaining to the understanding of 
beliefs are they are embodied in literature,; two, an lssue 
of verification involving the truth or falsity of such 
beliefs; and three, an issue of commitment concerning 
investment in such belief" (3 -4) These issues, she 
suggests, are at the crux of related philosophical problems 
within criticism (4). 
Gerhart "suggest[s] that Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory might 
provide the possibility of restating and interrelating the 
issues of the question of belief in literary criticism" 
(249). Ricoeur's theory requires the recognition of prior 
commitments in the hermeneutical endeavor: "In the context 
of Ricoeur's hermeneutical philosophy, the question of belief 
is both essential to and existentially present in literary 
criticism ... [because] belief is intrinsic -- even when only 
implicit -- to all critical judgments insofar as they involve 
the basic structure of human consciousness" (298). This 
conclusion anticipates the work in Oneself As Another, where 
Ricoeur states that there is no such thing as the non-ethical 
work. Gerhart commends Ricoeur I s notion of the act of 
appropriation, where one makes a commitment to the world 
unfolded by the text, noting that this act "occurs only at 
the end of the processes of interpretation" (138). 
John B. Thompson Critical Hermeneutics: A study in the 
thouaht of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
Thompson states in the introduction that the " ... convergence 
on the phenomenon of language provides a point of departure 
for the critical comparison of different traditions. In 
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undertaking a comparative study, I hope to break down some of 
the barriers that continue to stand between diverse 
orientations and disciplines of thought" (3). However, the 
book is not simply a comparison of the work of Ricoeur and 
Habermas. Rather Thompson utilises this analysis in a 
constructive attempt to propose a new methodology for 
approaching the issues raised by both thinkers. 
The relevant sections of the book for this thesis are 
Thompson's critique of Ricoeur framed within the debate 
between Gadamer and Habermas. Ricoeur responded to this 
debate with a series of articles on the issues of ideology 
and hermeneutics. Thompson dismisses Ricoeur' s input as 
irrelevant (Ricoeur does not address Habermas' issues) though 
he does not endorse Habermas' thought uncritically. This 
section of his book in discussed in detail within the thesis 
below. 
John W. Van Den Hengel The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics 
of the Subject of Paul Ricoeur (Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1982). 
The intent of this work is to "examine Paul Ricoeur IS 
position on the human subject" (ix). Van Den Hengel suggests 
that the importance of Ricoeur lay in his constructive 
analysis of the subj ect after a "disassociation of the 
subj ect and consciousness n had been proclaimed by Freud, 
Marx, and Nietzsche: "Ricoeur, for his part, undertakes a 
prolonged study of the wounded subject in an effort to heal 
and recuperate the subject in our time" (xi). Easily the 
most thorough analysis of Ricoeur I s work on the human 
subject, this text is "not a critically analytic reading 
precisely because all the building blocks of a poetics of the 
will are not in place [nor is it] meant to be a critique 
of the total project" (xx). 
xiii 
With the publication of Time and Narrative and Qneself As 
Another, Ricoeur' s investigations into the subj ect 1) 
explored the contributions Anglo-American philosophy might 
make and 2) shifted the discussion from the "subj ect" to 
"identity". The first move expanded the parameters of the 
discussion, broadening its scope to include action. The 
second move recognised the limitations of phenomenological 
analysis and supplements Ricoeur's over-all project with a 
theory of narrative which in turn replaced discussions of the 
"subject" with "narrative identity" and "personal identity". 
Thus, Ricoeur's early investigations into the nature of being 
have been significantly supported and extended by his newer 
work; work which Van Den Hengel could not comment upon. 
David E. Klemm The Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur: A 
Constructiye Analysis (London and Toronto: Associated 
University Presses, 1983). 
The main thesis is to "construct a possibility, which Ricoeur 
himself has not recognized, for defining what is specifically 
theological hermeneutics within Ricoeur' s philosophical 
hermeneutical program" (9). Klemm suggests that a dual 
correspondence (cri tical and reI igious consciousnes s & 
symbolic sense and reference) would n tighten Ricoeur' s 
analysis of the kind of truth involved in poetic language" 
(162). This strategy of reflexivity (of consciousness and of 
the symbol) suggests that "[t]heological hermeneutics can 
then be articulated as the interpretation of religious texts 
with the aid of existential-ontological language" (17). 
The tools for such a construction can be found in the work of 
Ricoeur. Focusing on Ricoeur I s theory of appropriation, 
" [h] ermeneutical awareness of the self as constituted 
through the event of appropriation, is awareness of the 
finitude of self and its understanding of being" (17). Klemm 
recognises the parallel concerns of Heidegger and Bultmann 
xiv 
when constructing his analysis of Ricoeur. He proposes that 
" [r]eligious language could be said to open to an infinite 
dimension of meaning because the mode of being (or 'self-
understanding' in Bultmann's terminology) has the power to 
open a new level of signification- one that is latent In any 
poetic text and manifest in a religious text" (125). 
Ultimately, "[ t] he reflexive consciousness is to take its 
bearings from displays of truth as correspondence between 
reflexive symbols and reflexive consciousness" (163). 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer Biblical narrative in the philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
This book " intends to bridge the gap between those 
treatments of Ricoeur that focus on his philosophy and 
hermeneutics to the exclusion of his theology on the one 
hand, and those that focus on the theological significance of 
his hermeneutics without attending to his larger 
philosophical project on the other" (3). Vanhoozer suggests 
that Ricoeur is a "philosopher of hope" for the "'central 
intuition' of Ricoeur's philosophy is that human existence is 
meaningful" (6). 
Chapter seven explores the relationship between Ricoeur and 
Frei's thought. His " ... thesis is that Ricoeur and Tracy 
are theologians of manifestation and their emphasis on 
manifestation dramatically affects the kind of referent they 
perceive in the Gospels" (166). Vanhoozer suggests that an 
undue n emphasis on manifestation reflects Ricoeur' s 
Copernican reversal: the subject is the hearer rather than 
the speaker of language" (167). His n ••• working hypothesis 
is that Ricoeur and Frei provide valuable insights into the 
question of narrative reference but ultimately do not provide 
an adequate explanation of the nature of the Gospel's 
referent" (165). 
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Vanhoozer argues that "Ricoeur' s more recent theory of 
narrative interpretation is the culmination of a larger 
project which continues the work of Kant and Heidegger by 
seeking to answer the question, 'what is human being?'" 
(276). Thus, any interpretation of Ricoeur which neglects 
this project would be a disingenuous reading of his work. 
Vanhoozer concludes that Ricoeur's theological investigations 
are ultimately unhelpful to the theologian who subscribes to 
"theological realism". This is due to Ricoeur's emphasis on 
"'the idealism of the word event' where new forms of self-
understanding arise in front of poetic metaphors and 
narratives" (279). 
Mark I. Wallace The Second Naiyete; Barth, Ricoeur, and the 
New Yale Theology (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 
1990) . 
The main thesis is "that the hermeneutical programs of both 
Barth and Ricoeur seek to release a thoughtful openness 
toward the 'world' portrayed in the biblical witness" (XIII). 
Wallace suggests that previous approaches which placed these 
thinkers in opposition have failed to adequately (xi) 
understand Barth and Ricoeur. In the fourth chapter, Wallace 
introduces the Yale theologians (Frei, Lindbeck and Holmer) 
to the discussion, arguing that Frei's criticism of Ricoeur's 
Rfoundationalism" is off-centre. I also argue this point, 
noting Ricoeur's comments in Oneself as Another as he relates 
his project to a "non-foundationalism". Also within my 
discussion, I introduce archival material (from Frei) to 
suggest that the foundationalism issue is only one of Frei's 
disagreements with Ricoeur. 
Wallace ends the book with a chapter on theological 
hermeneutics focusing on a re-introduction of the notion of 
revelation into contemporary theology. He argues that "[a] 
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theological hermeneutic for our time will be best served when 
it is clearly informed by an understanding of how God reveals 
God's self to us" (112). He suggests that the Yale 
theologians' refusal to deal with this issue creates "an odd 
and unnerving affinity between their theological 
intertextualism and the free-floating intertextualism of both 
New Critical and deconstructionist poetics: each of these 
theories accents the self-enclosed immanence of figurative 
discourse at the expense of the extra linguistic reality-
claims that are at the heart of great religious classics such 
as the Bible" (112). I discuss this lssue at length in 
chapter one, once again introducing archival material and 
suggesting reasons for Frei J s refusal to deal with the 
doctrine of revelation and suggest Frei's polemical 
association with the New Criticism. 
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Introd uction 
1 
Int roduct ion 
In recent years, there has been a drop-off in first-
order theological reflection. Tracking the reasons is 
difficult if not impossible. 
It has been suggested that Derrida' s 1966 lecture, 
"Structure, Sign and Play"l, began a process which 
effectively ended structuralist readings within the human 
sciences. Likewise, Lyotard's claim of "incredulity towards 
meta-narratives" seemed to be an accurate analysis of the 
"postmodern condition,,2. Philosophical hermeneutics has been 
influenced by the three "masters of suspicion"- Marx, Freud, 
and Nietzsche- and has given birth to a variety of 
interpretive schemes. 
The competing claims of these varied hermeneutical 
theories has led to a rampant pluralism which the modern 
theologian finds him-/herself needing to address 3 . Due to 
1 In Writing and Difference 
Additional Notes by Alan Bass] 
1978) . 
[Translated, with an Introduction and 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2 Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: a report on 
knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
3 Several representative theological works which engage this pluralist 
reality are: David Tracy Blessed Rage For Order: The New Pluralism in 
Theology (NY: Seabury Press, 1975), Lesslie Newbigin The Gospel in a 
Pluralistic Society (Grand Rapids and Geneva: Eerdmanns and WCC 
Publications, 1989), William C. Placher Unapologetic Theology: A 
Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), and Ronald Thiemann Constructing a 
2 
these new developments in the humanities, first-order 
theological reflection has been set aside whilst questions of 
method have come to the fore. 
Both Hans Frei and Paul Ricoeur have attempted to 
address issues of method within this pluralistic arena. What 
is interesting about these two figures is that they begin 
their investigations into theological method embracing a type 
of literary formalism4 ; Frei leaning on the so-called "New 
Criticism", Ricoeur on French Structuralism. However, as 
critiques of formalism within literary readings took root, 
both abandoned their heavy reliance upon formalist readings; 
Frei abandoning New Critical methodol ogy 5 and Ricoeur 
referring to his work as "post-structuralist". 
What is wrong with some scholarship is its inability to 
deal with these thinkers within the context of their own 
work. For instance, Frei is not constructing a "narrative 
Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic Culture (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991). 
4 I use the term "formalist" to describe "any method that remains text-
centred and explicatory" (Robert Detweiler, "After the New Criticism: 
Contemporary Methods of Literary Interpretation" in Orientation by 
Disorientation: Studies in Literary Criticism and Biblical Literary 
Criticism (Essays presented in honor of William A. Beardslee) edited by 
Richard A. Spencer (Pittsburgh, PA: The Pickwick Press, 1980), 4}. 
5 Hans Frei, "The Literal Reading of Biblical Narrative in the Christian 
Tradi tion: Does it Stretch or will it Break?" in Theology and 
Narrative: Selected Essays, edited by George Hunsinger and William C. 
Placher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 141-143. 
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theology" as Michael Goldberg insists 6 , nor does he make a 
hard distinction between 'meaning or truth' as Gary Comstock 
and others suggest 7, nor is a he a systematic theologian. 
Frei was an Anglican theologian specialising in hermeneutics. 
Frei's two published books were The Identity of Jesus 
Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases for Dogmatic Theology and 
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics. The last book he was 
working on was an investigation into various theological 
methodologies and the way Christology was construed8 . 
Two of Frei' s major contributions to theology are 
firstly, his insistence that the biblical texts describe the 
actual world- his notion of realistic narrative, and 
secondly, his first-order theological ref lect ions in The 
Identity maintain that the identity disclosed by the biblical 
texts is Jesus' identity, not human being. 
Paul Ricoeur is a Protestant philosopher who began his 
6 Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative: 
2nd Edition. (Philadelphia: Trinity Press, 
A Critical Introduction, 
1991), 245. 
7 "Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative" in Th.e. 
Journal of Religion (1986); Goldberg, 245. What is even more 
interesting is a letter Frei wrote in response to Comstock's article. I 
will deal with some of the issues Frei raises in it within the body of 
the thesis. 
8 This has been published posthumously as Types of Christian Theology 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
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work in philosophical phenomenology. All of Ricoeur I s 
investigations are at the service of his enquiry into the 
development of a philosophical anthropology, including his 
hermeneutics. He calls his work a "project on human will" 
and all of his writings must be interpreted within this 
framework. Whilst Ricoeur is interested in theological 
issues, he consciously distances himself from engaging in 
first-order theological discussion. In fact, his overarching 
category of reference to the human being is finitude, 
certainly a theological theme. However, he notes that his 
voluminous works comprise investigations (diversions) which 
he has been led into along the way. In this sense, what we 
have of Ricoeur is a sort of Schopenhauerean education. This 
is to say that Ricoeur published his investigations along the 
way to unraveling certain problems. 
Ricoeur calls himself a "post-structuralist". His is an 
investigation into literary theory which recognises both the 
gains and blindspots of structuralism. Postmodernism is, 
for Ricoeur, a necessary corrective to the notion of meta-
narration. The use of "meta-narratives" has led to 
ideologies which could not be critiqued because they are part 
of culture. The holocaust necessitates the fragmentation of 
these narratives because the control of society through these 
"constructs" cannot be uprooted. Ultimately Ricoeur is 
concerned with ethics; an ethics which allows for the 
5 
deconstruction of certain forms of ideology. The employment 
of a discourse analysis, such as Foucault's, allows Ricoeur 
the double edge of acknowledging that what the text does not 
say can be as important as what it does say. Hence the 
hermeneutic of suspicion which allows for the passage toward 
a second naivete and ultimately a hermeneutic of 
restoration 9 . 
The two main differences that I will analyse in this 
thesis are those differences in interpretation which occur 
when separate formalist approaches are applied to the 
biblical texts. For Frei, the text describes the world in a 
way which he calls "realistic narrative". Ricoeur's 
hermeneutic translates the world of the text into a "way-of-
being-in-the-world". Thus, the primary identity disclosed 
by the biblical narratives differs. For Frei, it is the 
identity of Jesus which is disclosed; for Ricoeur, it is "our 
common human Christian identity". 
These two thinkers have usually been compared 
theologically. However, I contend that the theological 
investigations of both Frei and Ricoeur have been influenced 
by the literary approaches which guide their theological 
work. I give an exposition of this relationship in chapter 
9 Ricoeur's project in hermeneutics can be seen within the wider 
tradition of Nietzsche (one needs to smash the idols so that they may 
speak again) and Tillich (the symbol dies yet needs to be replaced with 
another) ("RAF", 88 & 98). 
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one. In chapter two, I sketch out the implications of this 
relationship, focusing on the issue of identity. In the 
final chapter, critiques of the systems are investigated as I 
attempt to deal with the force of these objections. 
Thesis 
This dissertation will investigate Frei's and Ricoeur's 
construals of narrative identity (as constructed through the 
reading of Biblical texts). My working hypothesis will be 
that the construals of identity formulated by Frei and 
Ricoeur rely upon formalist, narrative "interpretations". My 
thesis will be that in their respective approaches to the 
notion of narrative identity, neither thinker has completely 
abandoned his early literary-theoretical roots in his 
theological proposals. 
Both Frei and Ricoeur have focused on "identity" and 
both have utilised formalist tools within their 
investigations. Frei's work in The Identity of Jesus Christ 
focuses on an investigation into Jesus' identity whereas 
Ricoeur's work on identity has tended to focus on the 
identity of the Christian believer. Frei, admittedly, has 
not made Christian identity a focal point and thus, his 
hermeneutic has difficulty in being applied within the sphere 
of praxis. Conversely, Ricoeur's investigations have tended 
7 
to focus on philosophical questions which do not necessarily 
harmonise with Christian theology. 
Significance of the Thesis 
The analysis of Frei's investigations within this thesis 
are significant for the following reasons. Firstly, I have 
accessed material from the Hans Frei archives which has never 
been published. This material is essential for 
understanding Frei's work within the parameters that he had 
set. Indeed, much of this material (which I have included as 
an appendix) 
interpreters. 
directly addresses issues raised by his 
The material "Hermeneutics and Beardslee" 
counters claims that Frei was developing a "narrative 
theology" which he considered to be "foundational". The 
"Letter to Gary Comstock" is a reply to a specific article 
written by Comstock. The significance of this letter lay in 
its complete rejection of Comstock's reading of Frei. Frei 
explicitly counters Comstock's entire article and engages 
Ricoeur's work. The "Letter to William Placher" discusses 
Frei's theological leanings in regards to Placher's 
Unapologetic Theology. The final appended material deals 
with Frei's reaction to narrative theologies. In this piece, 
he sketches what he perceives to be some of the problems 
facing the construal of a narrative theology. I utilise this 
material to counter specific claims that Frei was a 
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"foundational theologian" engaged in a "narrative theology". 
Secondly, Frei's reliance upon the New Critical way of 
reading texts is explored here for the first time. Although 
Stephen Moore has recognised this relationship, he never 
explored how Frei had applied a New Critical agenda to his 
investigations within theology. This relationship is 
explored in detail in chapter 1/1 and assess his relationship 
with the work of George Lindbeck. 
Finally, I have given an exposition of Frei's 
theological work in Types of Christian Theology and Theology 
and Narrative. These works allow access to a more finalised 
form of what Frei's construal of theology as "Christian self-
description" would have looked like. 
this material in chapter 111/1. 
I give an exposition of 
The analysis of Ricoeur' s work within this thesis is 
significant for the following reasons. Firstly, much of the 
work on Ricoeur's thought is now dated. His recent 
publication of Oneself as Another applies much of the theory 
found in Time and Narrati ve to the problem of personal 
identity. Also the publication of Figuring the Sacred has 
shed new light on Ricoeur's specifically theological work. 
Much of the secondary literature does not deal with these 
works for they have been recently published. Thus, much of 
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this secondary literature seems dated. I suggest that 
Ricoeur's work in Oneself as Another is the culmination (the 
fulfilment) of his lifetime work on personal identity (what 
he formerly called "the human subject"). A discussion of 
this text is essential for understanding Ricoeur's project as 
a totality. 
Secondly, Ricoeur's relationship with structuralism 
changed over the years. He spends considerable time in an 
essay "Narrative Time" and within Time and Narrative 
discussing his reliance upon structuralist insights for the 
formation of his hermeneutical theory. In chapter 1/2, I 
discuss this relationship and explicitly demonstrate 
Ricoeur's emendations of several structuralist theories. 
Though he considers himself a "post-structuralist", Ricoeur 
has never abandoned his earlier work within structuralism. 
It has provided a steady system for Ricoeur to work within 
and to emend. This relationship has not been explored (May 
Gerhart's book discusses Ricoeur's earliest literary 
theoretical contributions but does not discuss Time and 
Narrative or Oneself as Another) 
Thus, the exposition in chapter 1/2 sheds light on Ricoeur's 
reasons for moving beyond structuralism whilst acknowledging 
that the theory is still found, albeit sublated, within his 
newer work. 
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Thirdly, this thesis explores the relationship between 
Ricoeur's thought and Nietzsche's thought. There have been 
investigations focusing on the relationship between Ricoeur's 
and Heidegger's thought (Vanhoozer) and Ricoeur's and Barth's 
thought (Wallace). However, no theologians have attempted to 
grapple with the influence of Nietzsche within Ricoeur' s 
thought. Ricoeur calls Nietzsche one of the "masters of 
suspicion" and one of his earliest published lectures on 
"religion" discusses how Nietzsche's thought has influenced 
his theological approach. I draw out this relationship as a 
preface to the discussion of identity in chapter 11/2. 
Finally, Ricoeur's work is often misunderstood by those 
who "dip into" his system. I mean that a proper 
understanding of Ricoeur's contribution can not focus solely 
upon his excursions into a singular discipline. I argue that 
to understand Ricoeur's latest work requires a knowledge of 
his earlier work on human fallibility and the symbolism of 
evil. Many of Ricoeur' s critics seem to disassociate his 
early work from his later work. This, I suggest, is a fatal 
flaw in any interpretive system. In discussing some of the 
critiques levelled in chapter 111/2, I give an exposition of 
those areas of Ricoeur' s earlier work (when necessary) to 
enable the discussion to progress. 
Chapter One: 
The literary-theoretical basis 
1/1 "Hans Frei and the New Criticism" 
1/2 "Paul Ricoeur and Structuralism: A new 
meaning of the notion of truth?" 
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1/1. "Hans Frei and the New Criticism": Traces the New 
Critical agenda of close reading, the unsubstitutability of 
the text ("heresy of paraphrase") and the surplus of meaning. 
Argues that Frei uses the New Critical agenda in a polemical, 
not a foundat ional, way. Deals with Frei' s subsequent 
rejection of New Criticism as a 'false friend' due to an 
implicit agenda. 
I. Introduction 
Stephen Moore states that Hans Frei' s The Eclipse 0 f 
Biblical Narrative is "certainly a major conduit through 
which New Critical ideas have flowed into gospel 
scholarship". He admits however, that "Frei himself scarcely 
acknowledges New Critical influences on his book,,10. Moore 
surmises that perhaps Frei simply took his reliance on the 
New Criticism for granted because American literary criticism 
was dominated by New Critical ideas from the 1950's onward11 . 
If Moore's judgement is correct, then it would certainly 
behove biblical hermeneuticians and New Testament theologians 
to enquire into the methods and aims of the New Criticism. 
Moore proposes the distinctive feature of New Criticism 
was "its rejection of extrinsic approaches to the literary 
text- biographical, historical, sociological, philosophical-
10 Stephen D. Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical 
Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 10-11. Throughout 
the thesis, the source cited will initially appear in the footnotes and 
will then be incorporated into the text. 
11 John Crowe Ransom's The New Criticism was published in 1941. 
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and its advocacy of an intrinsic criticism" (Literary 
Critiism, 9). He suggests that this emphasis ultimately led 
the New Critics to "reconceptualize the poem as an 
autonomous, internally unified organism, the bearer of a 
meaning that must be validated first and foremost by the 
context of the work itself" (Literary Criticism, 9). Moore's 
proposal about the nature of the New Critical enterprise is 
supported by a short citation from Rene Wellek and Austin 
Warren's Theory of Criticism which, as Moore himself admits, 
is a dubious candidate to represent the New Criticism12 . In 
this selection, Wellek and Warren are advancing the argument 
that 
"the natural and sensible starting point for work 
in literary scholarship is the interpretation and 
analysis of the works of literature themselves 
But, curiously enough, literary history has been so 
preoccupied with the setting of a work of 
literature that its attempts at an analysis of the 
works themselves have been slight in comparison 
with the enormous efforts expended on the study of 
the environment" ( Literary Cr it icism, 9: emphasis 
mine) . 
This long quotation combined with two passing references to 
Cleanth Brook's essay "The Heresy of Paraphrase" and William 
Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley's essay "The Intentional 
12 In fact, in his monumental (and somewhat autobiographical) work, A 
History of Modern Criticism, Wellek states that he "refuses to be lumped 
together with the New Critics, though I cannot and do not want to deny 
my sympathy for many of their positions, just as I agree with critics of 
quite different times and countries" (Vol.VI, 158). 
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Fallacy,,13, form the basis of Moore's evidence for his 
conclusions concerning the New Critical agenda. I will show, 
however, that Wellek and Warren were not advocating the 
imbalanced theory that Moore (along with a host of others) 
attributes to them. Rather, they were issuing a plea for a 
more balanced approach to literary-critical studies. 
I believe that Moore's analysis (The Eclipse is a major 
conduit ... ) would more accurately be understood in terms of 
three major "New Critical" tenets: "close readings" of texts 
(a refocusing on the text itself rather than on external 
factors; intertextuality), an outright rejection of authorial 
intention as supplying the interpretative schema, and an 
insistence on the indispensability of the literary work. 
What I will do in this chapter is trace the development 
of Hans Frei' s thought in the area of literary criticism, 
focusing specifically on his relationship with the New 
Critics. In doing so, there are two separate enquiries which 
need to be distinguished from the outset. Firstly, what is 
"New Criticism"; what were its procedures, aims and self-
understanding? Secondly, what was Frei's perception of and 
relationship to this enterprise? 
II. What is New Criticism? 
13 Reference to Brooks, page 9; reference to Wimsatt and Beardsley, page 
12. 
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I . A. Richards' emphasis on "practical 
cri t icism" 14 combined with T. S. Eliot's "close readings" 15 
provided the foundation and conceptual framework for American 
New Critical readings of texts. Eliot insisted that "honest 
criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon 
the poet but upon the poet ry16". This insistence on focusing 
on the poem itself for proper interpretation, is related to 
Eliot's view of the function of the poetry. He maintained 
that "poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape 
from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an 
escape from personality" ("T&IT", 10) The scope of 
interpretation is narrow. In fact, Eliot ascribes a 
descriptive function to the literary critic: "But it is 
fairly certain that "interpretation" is only legitimate when 
14 Wimsatt approvingly quotes I.A. Richards: "the tests for the 
correctness of any interpretation of a set of complex signs are its 
internal coherence and its coherence with all else that is relevant 
this inner and outer coherence is the correctness. When an 
interpretation hangs together (without conflicting with anything else: 
history, literary tradition, etc.) we call it correct". Cited by W.K. 
Wimsatt, "I.A.R.: What To Say About A Poem" in Day of the Leopards; 
Essays in Defense of Poems (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1976), 245. 
15 Austin Warren says of T. S. Eliot: "His characteristic virtue lies 
less in perspective than in that close study of the poetic text of which 
he was, in English, the inaugurator . .. n. It would seem that in the New 
Critical endeavor, the principle of "close reading" has foundational 
warrant in Eliot's style. "Eliot's Literary Criticism" by Austin Warren 
in T. S. Eliot: The Man and His Work, edited by Alan Tate. (New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1966), 288. 
16 T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent", in Selected 
Essays: New Edition. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950 [13th 
printing]), 7. 
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it is not interpretation at all, but merely putting the 
reader in possession of facts which he would otherwise have 
missed,,17. "And any book, any essay, any note which 
produces a fact even of the lowest order about a work of art 
is a better piece of work than nine-tenths of the most 
pretentious critical journalism, in journals or books" ("FC", 
21) . Terry Eagleton surprisingly agrees that the New 
Critical tenet of "close reading" (via Eliot) was a valuable, 
if not necessary, corrective to the abuses of literary 
critics at the time. Eagleton understands "'close reading' 
[as engaging in] detailed analytic interpretation, 
providing a valuable antidote to aestheticist chit-chat ... " 
This focus on a "close readinSJ" of the text itself invoked a 
"limiting badly needed by literary talk which would ramble 
comfortably from the texture of Tennyson's language to the 
length of his beard,,18. In light of these types of readings, 
I will now investigate the challenge which faced literary 
critical studies which in turn generated the "New Criticism". 
Wellek and Warren defined the literary challenge at that 
time (1949) as "the analogous problem of tracing the history 
of literature as an art, in comparative isolation from its 
17 T. S. 
Edition. 
20. 
Eliot, "The 
(New York: 
Function of Criticism" in Selected Essays: New 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950 [13th printing]), 
1 8 Te r ry E ag 1 e ton, ... L""i..\.t~e,-"r,"""aur..,:y>--.... Tllh.S<e-",o,-",r'-<ity~:_-"-,A~n~I..,n'"'-t ..... r=-Q""-""d",,,,u-,",c'"'"t,"",i...,.o~n . ( Ox ford: Bas i 1 
Blackwell, 1983), 44. 
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social history, the biographies of authors, or the 
appreciation of individual works" (Theory of Literature, 
254) . They perceived literary criticism in the earlier part 
of the 20th century as having placed undue emphasis on 
historical reconstruction and the psychological intentions of 
the authors. This perception, viewed in light of Historicism 
and of Freud's influence on critical theory19, was not 
completely unfounded. Thus, Wellek and Warren directed their 
attacks towards both of these tendencies to reconstruct a now 
arguably unavailable past or set of intentions. 
The authors viewed "historical reconstructionists" as 
at tempt ing to reconstruct the orig inal sett ing of the 
literary work. Whilst not an altogether ignoble enterprise, 
Wellek and Warren maintained that this method of 
"reconstruction" would not lead the enquirer to the "meaning" 
of the work. Many theorists maintained it would. Rather, 
their notion of constructive history was much broader than 
the procedure of reconstructing the original Sitz im Leben 
of the inscribed work. They proposed that the "meaning" of a 
work is the "result of a process of accretion, i.e. the 
history of its criticism by its many readers in many ages 
(and so) it seems impossible to declare, as historical 
19 This is broadly described as "detecting the connections between the 
biography of the artist and its product in art or artefact, or to the 
analysis of 'Freudian' imagery, either deliberate or unintentional, 
within a work" (entry on 'Freudian Criticism' in the Oxford Companion to 
English Literature ed. by Margaret Drabble, 5th edition, 370). 
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reconstructionists do, that this whole process is irrelevant 
and that we must return only to its beginning" (Theory of 
Literature, 42). The "meaning" of a text is, for Wellek, 
much broader than simply its meaning in the original setting. 
His maxim, "a text is a text and later generations have the 
right to discover new meanings in it, if they can shown to be 
there", allows for and invites a constant re-reading of texts 
(History, VI, 193). Both Wellek and Warren assert that "if we 
should really be able to reconstruct the meaning (as 
reference) which Hamlet had for its contemporary audience, we 
would merely impoverish it. We would suppress the legitimate 
meanings which later generations found in Hamlet. We would 
bar the possibility of new interpretation" (Theory of 
Literature, 42). Whilst this citation may seem to invite a 
reading of Hamlet similar to that of Freud20 , Wellek and 
Warren nonetheless remained sceptical about this type of 
endeavour. 
Wellek and Warren were also frustrated by the tendency 
to focus on the "intentions" of authors. They affirm that 
the "whole idea that the 'intention' of the author is the 
proper subject of literary history seems quite mistaken. The 
meaning of a work of art is not exhausted by, or even 
equivalent to, its intention" (Theory of Literature, 42). 
20 The most obvious example would be in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
where Freud does analyze the character Hamlet. 
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However, they argued that the obvious absence of the author 
does not invalidate enquiries into intentionality; only the 
abuse of seeking authorial intention as the basis and final 
concluding point of literary studies. Wellek and Warren were 
concerned about the considerable emphasis placed on 
biographies of authors whilst the work itself is given little 
attention. They were pleading for a more balanced approach 
which focused on a "close reading" of the text itself with 
the help of the original setting and the biographical sketch 
of the author filling a minor, rather than the prevailing 
major, role. This latter tendency is the subject of a rather 
influential essay which I will deal with next. 
IIa. The Intentional Fallacy 
William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley are considered to 
be central figures in New Critical theory. Their essay, "The 
Intentional Fallacy" (1954), was a seminal work which helped 
define the aims of New Criticism. The central thesis of the 
essay is stated at the outset as, "the design or intention of 
the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard 
for judging the success of a work of literary art . .. " )21. 
The authors were not denying that a piece of literature is 
causally linked to an author, in fact they affirmed this; "A 
21 "The Intentional Fallacy" in William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, 
The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (London: Methuen, 
1970), 3. 
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poem does not come into existence by accident. The words of 
a poem come out of a head, not out of a hat" ("IF", 4)22. 
Rather, they were concerned about the prevalent tendency to 
judge the quality of a work of art based on the intention of 
its author. In agreement, Wellek asserts that "there seems 
to me a simple truth in the old view that a successful work 
of art is a whole in which the parts collaborate and modify 
one another"23. For Wimsatt, Beardsley, and Wellek there is 
something structural inscribed in the text itself, which 
discloses its quality (or lack of it) as a literary work of 
art. Even though the text is derived from an author, it 
stands alone in assuming the burden of proof as to its 
literary merit. One of T. S. Eliot's more penetrating 
analyses points to the insignificant role of the author t s 
emotive state in the existing work: 
" the poet has, not a "personality" to express, 
but a particular medium, which is only a medium and 
not a personality, in which impressions and 
experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected 
ways. Impressions and experiences which are 
important for the man may take no place in the 
poetry, and those which become important in the 
poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, 
22 In another essay, Beardsley wonders if a poem randomly generated by a 
computer actually has the status of a literary work of art. He 
concludes that since the computer is programmed with certain words, 
phrases, etc. and since the computer randomly inserts these programmes 
into pre-determined sentence structures, the poem is indeed a literary 
work of art due to its initial generation by and its ultimate selection 
of the programmer ("The Concept of Literature", in Frank Brady Literary 
Theory and Structure: Essays in Honor of William K. Wimsatt, 25ff.). 
2 3 Re neWell e k , ,"-OA'---'Hu,..l . .. · ""'s .... t-"'o'-"r ..... y'--""o .... f---=M-"'o"'-d"""""e .. r .... n'------'C""-""-r ... i-"'t'""'i.."c'-"i~s~m=---· ---'V-"o~l~---"V--"I ..... ,_ 
Criticism 1900-1950 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 150. 
American 
20 
the personality" ("T&IT", 9) 24 
Authorial intention plays a minor role, if any, in the 
present status of the literary work. 
A misunderstanding of Wimsatt and Beardsley's position 
occurs when their statements are pulled out of their original 
context and re-applied in a new system. The most obvious 
example would be Ricoeur' s appropriation of the following 
statement: "the poem is not the critic's own and not the 
author's (it is detached from the author at birth and goes 
about the world beyond his power to intend about it or 
control it)" ("IF", 5 ) The original context of this 
declaration is against those who wish to privatise critique 
by appealing to the thoughts and emotions of the author. 
However, in Ricoeur's application of this passage, he ignores 
the original context and the quote comes to "mean" quite 
differently. A central Ricoeurean theme is that the "text's 
career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What 
the text says now matters more than what the author meant to 
say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the 
circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to 
the psychology of its author" (H&HS, 201) The original 
24 In another section of the same essay, Eliot states, "For 
it is not the 'greatness', the intensity, of the emotions, 
the components, but the intensity of the artistic process, 
the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes 
place, that counts" ("T&IT", 8). 
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intent of Wimsatt and Beardsley was polemic; it was against 
those who wished to search for a poem' s literary mer i t 
outside of the work itself. Yet, however extreme the re-
application may seem, Ricoeur is careful to note that he 
holds in tension two separate poles; firstly, what he calls 
the "semant ic autonomy" of the text with secondly, the 
"hypostatizing of the text as an authorless entity" Cl.T, 30). 
To stress one aspect of the origination of a text, that is, 
the text broken from the psychology of its author, without 
remembering that a text originates as discourse, is to err to 
the opposite extreme. This is the extreme which Ricoeur 
understands Derrida to have fallen prey to. He states, "to 
hold, as Jacques Derrida does, that writing has a root 
distinct from speech is to overlook the grounding of both 
modes of discourse in the dialectical constitution of 
discourse" (TI, 26). Ricoeur's theory opposes such systems 
which focus on textual autonomy without recognising the text 
as "sculpted" by a particular "maker" (IT, 33ff). 
It has been alleged by Stephen Moore and others that New 
Criticism errs exactly to this extreme. In an essay 
heralding the benefits of structuralism, Frederick Pottle 
cites a "dictum reported to me many years ago as having been 
made at a meeting of the Modern Language Association,,25. 
25 Frank Brady et al (eds.), 
Honor of William K. Wimsatt 
21, fn.11. 
Literary Theory and Structure' Essays in 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 
22 
This second-hand report asserts that "every poem is 
anonymous; and between the materials of the poem and the poem 
itself the difference is absolute" (Ibid., 7)26. This dictum 
seems to have been generated from a chapter entitled 
"Literature and Biography" in Wellek and Warren's Theory of 
Literature In this chapter, the authors are hesitant to 
ascribe any "critical importance" to the biographies of 
authors in the process of the interpretation of those 
authors' texts. They assert that "no biographical evidence 
can change or influence critical evaluation [of a textl,,27. 
Whilst biographies may help in questions of "literary 
history, i.e. the tradition in which the poet was placed, the 
influences by which he was shaped, the materials on which he 
drew" (Theory of Literature, 79-80), they are otherwise 
unhelpful and may interfere with the proper reading of a 
text 28 . This proper reading would be a reading of the text 
26 Wimsatt also recalls a meeting he attended at the University of 
Indiana which was attended by many literary critics. He recalls that at 
this meeting, "the main theoretical concern was the authoritative 
exploitation of a healthy doctrine that Richards had already asserted 
with emphasis in 1942 ... that a poem has a kind of internal, linguistic 
life of its own, independent of things its author may have intended, or 
thought of, or not thought of, during the process". Instead of ignoring 
this abuse of his work, Richards added that "if a poem has a life of its 
own, even a capacity for self-defense, it is the important job of 
critics and educators to assist that defense by correct interpretation" 
W.K. Wimsatt, "I.A.R.: What To Say About A Poem" in Day of the Leopards: 
Essays in Defense of Poems. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1976), 246. 
27 Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1949), 80). 
28 Wimsatt also acknowledges that certain materials on which the author 
used can be helpful in the understanding of literary work: "Such 
avenues of access to the poet's process of composition [his variant 
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as it exists, not an analysis of the emotions and/or 
dispositions of the author. Paul Elmer More's analysis of 
Byron's poem "Fare Thee Well" is cited as an example of the 
precarious nature of emotive/dispositional analysis, which 
could lead one to commit the "intentional fallacy". In 
More's analys is, he thinks it a "pity" that Byron's poem 
"shows not traces of the tears which fell on it". 
Engaging More's lamentation, Wellek wryly comments that "the 
poem exists; the tears shed or unshed, the personal emotions, 
are gone and cannot be reconstructed, nor need they be It 
(Theory of Literature, 80). For Wellek and Warren, it is 
"Fare Thee Well" which should be subjected to analysis, not 
speculation concerning Byron's emotional state at the time he 
wrote the poem. 
Wimsatt and Beardsley's emphasis on offering a critique 
of the text rather than the author attempted to avoid the 
privatisation of critique and establish a type of open forum 
for adjudicating the possible worth of a particular poem. 
They write, 
"the poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in 
language, the peculiar possession of the public, 
and it is about the human being, an object of 
public knowledge. What is said about the poem is 
subject to the same scrutiny as any statement in 
notebook], a favorite kind of resort for the biographical detective, may 
also I believe be legitimately enough invoked by a teacher as an aid for 
exposition". What To Say About A Poem [C.E.A. Chap Book], (Saratoga 
Springs, NY: Skidmore College and College English Association, 1963), 
12. 
linguistics, or 
psychology" ("IF", 
in 
5) . 
the general 
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science of 
New Critical emphasis on "close readings" kept the literary 
critic focused on the text. This, in turn, allowed 1) all 
interpreters equal access to the work (it truly "belonged to 
the public) and 2) avoided privatisation of the critical 
endeavour. 
lIb. The Heresy of Paraphrase 
The second half of Pottle's remembrance of the "MLA 
dictum" concerns the reportedly indistinguishable 
relationship between the materials of the poem (the 
structure, the way it is written) and the poem itself (the 
words) . An analysis of Cleanth Brook's essay, "The Heresy of 
Paraphrase,,29, can help us to unpack this issue of the 
relationship between structure and content in the literary 
work of art (repres ent ed by the "poem") which would 
ultimately provide the foundation for the New Critical tenet 
of the indispensability of the literary work. 
In this essay, Brooks argues that a poem is judged to be 
meritorious not only because of the subjects discussed (its 
content) but also because of the structuring of the poem 
29 Chapter 11 in The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of 
Poetry, (London: Dennis Dobson, 1947). 
25 
itself. For Brooks, structure is not simply the "metrical 
pattern or the sequence of images". He proposes that an 
understanding of poetic structure needs to be extended to 
include the relationship between the form and its content 30 . 
He suggests, with Kant, that "the structure obviously is 
everywhere conditioned by the nature of the material which 
sets the problem to be solved, and the solution is the 
ordering of the material" (Jl.l:.n, 159). A proper approach to 
the interpretive endeavour must account for this indissoluble 
relationship between structure (form) and content. He 
maintains that this relationship is so inextricable that all 
attempts to paraphrase are merely, "convenient ways to 
referring to parts of the poem. But such formulations are 
scaffoldings which we may properly for certain purposes throw 
about the building" Ul..r..n., 162) Brooks does acknowledge 
certain referential merits of paraphrasing. In an essay 
analysing Eliot's The Waste Land, Brooks refers to the 
process of scaffolding as necessary31. However, he cautions 
that "it is highly important that we know what we are doing 
3 0 Brooks 1 acknowledges his indebtedness here to Kant 1 s Critig;ue of 
Judgement. 
31 "I prefer, however, not to raise just here the question of how 
important it is for the reader to have an explicit intellectual account 
of the various symbols and a logical account of their relationships. 
It may well be that such rationalization is no more than a 
scaffolding to be got out of the way before we contemplate 
the poem itself as poem. But many readers (including 
myself) find the erection of such a scaffolding valuable- if 
not absolutely necessary ... ", from "The Waste Land: Critique of 
the Myth" by Cleanth Brooks in A Collection of Critical Essays on "The 
Waste Land", edited by Jay Martin (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 
1968),59. 
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and that we see plainly that the paraphrase is not the real 
core of meaning which constitutes the essence of the poem" 
(Jlr.n, 160). 
The "heresy of paraphrase" occurs when one fails to 
recognise this essential difference between, to extend his 
metaphor, the scaffolding and the building. This failure can 
lead one to believe that the scaffolding (the paraphrase) 
thrown about the building is more essential (a distillation 
of the poem's 'real' meaning) than the building itself (the 
poem) . When this occurs, reference to the poem itself 
becomes secondary and the primary referent becomes its 
paraphrase32 . This rendering of the paraphrase as primary "is 
to refer it to something outside the poem (thus) doing 
even more violence to the internal order of the poem itself" 
(J.1l::n, 164). If the paraphrase is understood as capturing the 
essence of the poem, then the danger is that the poem itself 
may become dispensable, but not without great cost. The 
focus on the indispensability of the poem finds its 
philosophical justification in his theory of metaphor and in 
his understanding of meter. 
IIc. Theory of Metaphor 
32 A useful parallel can be drawn here with Karl Barth on the 
"provisionality" of theology. Barth insists "Theology guides the 
language of the Church, so far as it concretely reminds her that in all 
circumstances it is fallible human work ... n (Church Dogmatics 1/1, 2). 
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Simply put, Brooks maintains that attempts at 
paraphrasing simply exchange one set of metaphors for 
another. However, since a paraphrase is an exchange of 
metaphor for another metaphor, there is no basis for thinking 
it would be more adequate than the original. The illusion 
occurs in thinking that one can translate metaphors into 
propositions. However, Brooks notes that 
"as his proposition approaches adequacy, [the 
interpreter] will find, not only that it has 
increased greatly in length; but that it has begun 
to fall back upon metaphors of his own in attempt 
to indicate what the poem I says I. In sum, his 
proposition, as it approaches adequacy, ceases to 
be a proposition" Ol . r:.n, 198). 
Indeed, the further paraphrasing moves away from the original 
metaphor, the less adequate it becomes because the secondary 
metaphor can never exhaust the pregnant meaning of the 
primary metaphor. This exchange of metaphors will always 
occur with a lamentable loss of nuanced meaning. 
The influence of this essay can be seen in the work of 
Paul Ricoeur. His "interpretation theory" also depends on a 
strong notion of pregnancy of metaphorical/symbolic meaning. 
He resists the restating of metaphors into propositions 
because of the loss of meaning in the transcription. For 
Ricoeur, metaphors are not merely "ornaments of discourse", 
rather they help re-configure and re-shape our notion of 
reality. They also add to our understanding of reality, 
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rather than re-stating this understanding in a novel way. He 
calls this non-transcribable, metaphoric meaning, the 
"surplus of meaning". He maintains that 
"real metaphors are not translatable. Only 
metaphors of substitution are susceptible of a 
translation which could restore the literal 
signification. Tension metaphors are not 
translatable because they create their meaning. 
This is not to say that they cannot be paraphrased, 
just that such a paraphrase is infinite and 
incapable of exhausting the innovative meaning" 
(IT, 52). 
Just as in Brooks' theory, the metaphor remains indispensable 
because of its resistance to propositional restatement due to 
its "inexhaustibility" or "surplus of meaning". 
lId. Theory of Meter 
Brook's insistence on the indissoluble union between 
structure and content in the poem is explicated in terms of 
meter. He understands the metrical structure of poetry to be 
akin to that of a play. Poems, like plays, are dynamic, and 
within the poem the "playing out" of the tensions leads the 
reader to the conclusion. Brooks states that the "conclusion 
of the poem is the working out of the various tensions- set 
up by whatever means- by propositions, metaphors, symbols. 
The unity is achieved by a dramatic process, not a logical" 
(llLn., 207). The playing out internally of the poem's 
metrical tensions, provides the unity of form and content. 
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The influence of this New Critical "tenet" can be seen 
in the work of Paul Ricoeur. In a recent es say, Ricoeur 
proposes that it is "precisely the narrative composition, the 
organizing of the events in the narrative, that is the 
vehicle for, or better, that foments the theological 
interpretation,,33. Ricoeur notes that there are structural 
clues in the gospel of Mark which point to the redactional 
emphases of the writer. He states that the "most striking 
feature of the gospel narrative lies in the indissoluble 
union of the kerygmatic and the narrative aspects" ("IN", 
239) . This echoes Brook's insistence on the unity of 
structure and content in pushing this link into the 
interpretive process itself. For Brooks, the unity is 
provided in the playing out of the internal, metrical 
tensions within the poem. For Ricoeur, narrative unity is 
provided in the redactional emphases which are viewed through 
the particular narrative structure 34 . 
lIe. Some Major New Critical Tenets 
New Critical (Wimsatt, Wellek, Warren, Brooks) "close 
readings" found their genesis in Eliot's literary theory 
33 "Interpretive Narrative" in The Book and the Text: The Bible and 
Literary Theory, edited by R. Schwartz (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 
238. 
34 I will discuss Ricoeur's exposition of the "followability" of a 
narrative as related to its emplotment and his notion of the "synthesis 
of the heterogeneous" in the second section of this chapter. 
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which focused on the poem rather than the poet for uncovering 
meaning. 
Brooks' essay on the "Heresy of Paraphrase" (1947) 
provided philosophical justification for this redirection of 
critical concern. His appropriation of Kant's discussion on 
form/ content along with his theory of the pregnancy of 
meaning (particularly in metaphors) helped formulate the New 
Critical tenet of the indispensability of the literary work. 
These concerns kept the focus on the structure of the text 
itself. Wellek and Warren I s book, Theory of Literature 
(1949), expanded the previous essay into a literary theory 
which continued the reversal of authorial focus and refocused 
criticism onto the text rather than other external factors: 
biographies, historical reconstruction, or unconscious 
intentionality. Wimsatt and Beardsley's work on the 
"Intentional Fallacy" (1970) continued the reversal of the 
trend to focus on authorial intention as disclosing the 
"meaning" of a text. The text came to be viewed as a 
mater ial entity, an urn or an icon, which was internally 
coherent and provided the necessary clues as to its 
particular literary merit. 
I have also attempted to identify specific instances in 
which these emphases have contributed to Ricoeur's theory of 
interpretation. Ricoeur directly appropriated the essay 
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"Intentional Fallacy" yet counter-balanced it with his notion 
of the "fallacy of the absolute text". Brook's "Heresy of 
Paraphrase" seems to have been more influential than Ricoeur 
acknowledges. It reflects many of the same concerns as 
Ricoeur's own theory of the "surplus of meaning" and his 
insistence on the inexhaustibility of the metaphor. His 
latest work on interpreting theological narratives adds a 
further dimension to the "surplus of meaning" by recognising 
the integral unity between structure and content. This newer 
work also, ironically, brings him close to the concerns of 
theologians interested in narrative, particularly those of 
Hans Frei. 
III. Hans Frei and the New Critics 
Frei recognises his own debt to Karl Barth, Gilbert Ryle 
and Eric Auerbach; three thinkers who have helped him to 
shape his particular hermeneutical approach. In the arena of 
literary criticism, Auerbach's work on mimesis helped Frei 
to formulate the category of "realistic narrative n35 , which 
he subsequently applied to biblical interpretation. He was 
similarly indebted to other literary critical figures whom he 
met initially whilst a student and later a professor at Yale 
University. Several of these figures have been discussed 
35 Frei describes this as "that kind in which subject and social setting 
belong together, and characters and external circumstances fitly render 
each other", The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Stud¥ in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centur¥ Hermeneutics. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974), 13-14. 
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above as "New Critics" (Wellek, Warren, Wimsatt and Brooks), 
whilst others practised "deconstruct ion" (mainly Paul de 
Man) . 
Early in his writing career, Frei was interested in how 
the identity of an agent is known through a narrative. With 
the breakdown of the literal, ostensive reference of the 
biblical text 3 6, re-focusing on the text as "realistic 
narrative" attempts to overcome the problems of reference and 
truth. Firstly, the question of reference is suspended 
initially for an analysis of "what the text says". The 
problem of the equivocation of sense with reference is thus 
overcome by suspending the question of reference. Secondly, 
the question of the truth of a text is a secondary 
consideration to be dealt with after the hermeneutical 
enquiry. The truth-value of a text also does not depend on 
its ostensively referring37 . However, Frei did want to 
assert that in one particular instance, the identity of Jesus 
Christ, the truth-value of the text is dependent on its 
capacity to ostensively refer 38 . What Frei needed to 
36 This was the thrust of his work in Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, "a 
description and explanation of the ways in which the older realistic and 
figurative approaches to these stories broke down" (~, 10). 
37 I will argue similarly in the next section that Ricoeur's engagement 
with French structuralism leads him to a new formulation of the notion 
of "truth". 
38 This is one instance where Frei's having been influence by Barth 
reveals itself. Barth claims that "God's revelation in its objective 
reality is the person of Jesus Christ" (~ 1/2, 172) and that this is a 
"real event accomplished in space and time as history within history" 
(.c.l2. 1/2, 177). The sign of the "Miracle of Christmas" corresponds 
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explain, however, was 1) why only this portion of the 
narrative is ostensively bound and 2) how one can determine 
the 'thrust' of the text. That is, why does Frei privilege 
the reading of the biblical texts as disclosing the identity 
of a part icular character, viz. Jesus. For Frei to be 
consistent, he would also have to offer a defence of why the 
realistic sense of the text is the most obvious 39 . 
Frei's first published work, which was later to be re-
published as The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical 
Bases for Dogmatic Theology, was an early attempt to 
appropriate philosophical terminology for identifying agents 
in a narrative (specifically Jesus in the Biblical 
narrative). Frei followed the philosopher Gilbert Ryle in 
rejecting a dualistic notion of personhood. Ryle's thesis in 
The Concept of Mind is that this mind/body dualism gets its 
impetus due to Descartes' Meditations. This dualistic 
theory, given the t it Ie "Ghost in the Machine", was so 
prevalent that Ryle refers to it as the "accepted theory". 
Ryle's constructive proposal depends on a type of 
"behaviouristic" theory of "mind n and of personhood. From 
"noetically and ontically" with what it signifies, the mystery of 
Christmas (~ 1/2, 182). Furthermore, Barth's Anselm: Fides Ouaerens 
Intellectum (Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of 
his Theological Scheme) demonstrates a correspondence between the Christ 
preached and ostensive referrals to him. 
39 David Kelsey maintains that in personal discussions with Frei on this 
issue, Frei argued that there was something inherent in the structure of 
the text which pointed to a realistic reading (October 1993). 
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this, Frei maintained that characters in a story could be 
identified, based on their actions in a story. The 
categories "intention-action" and "self-manifestation" were 
adopted from Ryle and appropriated for following narrative 
structure. 
In 1967, Frei was invited to deliver a lecture at 
Harvard Divinity School in which he would layout his 
theological leanings. In the text of this lecture 40 , Frei 
indicates specific sympathies in the shaping of his 
hermeneutical approach. Remarking on the field of literary 
criticism, he states that he finds himself "more in agreement 
with the 'newer critics' (like William Empson, William 
Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks) as well as with the more moderate 
representatives of the same group (like Rene Wellek and 
Austin Warren) and with the historians of literary style like 
Eric Auerbach " (T&N,33). He understands the work of the 
"New Critics" and that of Auerbach as concerned with issues 
of normative interpretation rather than with "archetypal 
experiences reflected in literature" (T&N, 33). He cites the 
work of Northrop Frye and Joseph Campbell as dealing with 
this latter issue 41 . 
40 Reprinted as "Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal" in 
Theology and Narrative, 26-44). 
41 The whole discipline of phenomenological hermeneutics could have been 
included in his attack, but reference to this hermeneutical endeavor is 
curiously omitted. 
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Within the realm of "normative" interpretation, Frei 
distinguishes further. Firstly, there are those who are 
concerned with discerning authorial intention, which then 
provides the framework for hermeneutics. Following this 
route would be the work of E.D. Hirsch. Secondly, there are 
those who are concerned with the structure of the narrative 
"as given" which provides the proper framework for 
interpretation. He views the former approach as validating 
interpretation by attempting to uncover the connection 
between the author's intended meaning and the finished 
product, namely the text. Frei finds this endeavour "highly 
speculative" and clearly places his sympathies with the 
latter approach. He views this latter approach as 
maintaining that the "formal structure of the narrative 
itself is the meaning, not the author's intention nor an 
ontology of language nor yet the text's impact" (liN, 34). 
It is this insistence on the primacy of the narrative which 
forms a distinctive feature in Frei's hermeneutics and which 
helped theologies which focus on narratives emerge as a 
viable option on the theological scene. 
The Harvard lecture is important for this study on two 
counts. Firstly it reveals where Frei's specific allegiances 
(which at times are unlikely bed-fellows) tend to lie. 
Secondly, coupled with another early yet obscure essay42, it 
42 Originally published in an obscure journal called The Christian 
Scholar, it is now reprinted as "The Accounts of Jesus' Death and 
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provides the missing conceptual link in Frei' s thought; 
namely, why a reader ought to privilege a reading of the 
Biblical narratives as "realistic narrative". Frei's main 
focus in "The Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection" is 
on how one goes about determining the "unsubstitutible 
identity" of the "crucified Jesus with the risen Lord" (TIN, 
58). He appeals to genre analysis for the identification. 
Frei claims that the form/type of literature of the 
resurrect ion account is " literally not of the type of a 
mythological tale but something much more like the 
realistic novel" (T&N, 59). The focus on form/structure and 
his rejection of authorial intention is a New Critical 
concern, whilst the analysis of "realistic novel" belongs to 
the Auerbachian approach. Several 
immediately with this latter position. 
problems crop up 
The bible is a set of 
religious texts and reading them as one would read a novel, 
realistic or not, does not seem to be an obvious interpretive 
strategy. The texts deal with, as Bultmann says, "magic and 
wonders, supernatural beings .. to read the Bible as any 
other book is not obvious". In addition, there have been many 
objections against a theory of a unity of textual sense; 
namely some Freudian interpretations and specifically, 
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Lacanian exegesis 43 . 
Whilst sharing this New Critical agenda was clearly not 
problematic for Frei in the late 1960's, as early as 1979 and 
culminating definitively in 1986, Frei completely withdrew 
his support for what he perceived the New Criticism to be. 
In an unpublished and undated essay44 the tenuous link 
between Frei and the New Criticism becomes explicit. In a 
short work of remarkable clarity, Frei lays out his 
hermeneutical stance in detail. As usual, he is sceptical of 
wholesale hermeneutical endeavours 45 , a position developed 
Resurrection" in Theology and Narrative (46-91). As to the novelty of 
the essay and the obscurity of the journal, see David H. Kelsey 
"Biblical Narrative and theological anthropology" in Scriptural 
Authority and Narrative Interpretation, ed. Garrett Green, (142, fn. 
10) . 
43 This issue is explored in chapter two with reference to Peter Brooks' 
Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. 
44 Simply titled "Hermeneutics and Beardslee" in Hans Frei Papers, 
Manuscript Group No. 76. Special Collections, Yale Divinity School. I 
believe the essay was written around 1979-1981 because of immediate 
references to Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
45 I have reason to believe that this was due to the influence of his 
friend and literary-critical colleague, Paul de Man. One of de Man's 
more influential works was Resistance To Theory; a manifesto against any 
wholesale attempts at a general hermeneutics. De Man writes that 
literary theory "contains a necessarily pragmatic moment that certainly 
weakens it as theory but that adds a subversive element of 
unpredictability and makes it something of a wild card in the serious 
game of the theoretical disciplines" (Resistance to Theory [Forward by 
Wlad Godzich] "Theory and History of Literature, Vol.33" (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986, 8). As a result, the "resistance 
to theory is a resistance to the use of language itself or to the 
possibility that language contains factors or functions that cannot be 
reduced to intuition" (IBID., 12-13). Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and 
Method also influenced Frei on this issue. 
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explicitly in relation to the work of William Beardslee 46 . 
Frei wishes he could participate in Beardslee's quest for a 
general hermeneutical theory, yet he states that it is 
prec i se ly "a founda tiona 1 endeavour (which) I mistrust 
deeply. I want my hermeneutics to allow me to mean with my 
texts in independence from the reality-bearing of the texts 
and the hermeneutics" ("HB", 6) Frei maintains that general 
hermeneutical theories have difficulty in dealing with 
differing types of texts. He states, 
"the Bible includes all kinds of texts to which 
different hermeneutical rules may apply. For 
example, I may want to read a letter in a different 
way from the way I read a story- non-narratively, 
that is- even if the same person crops up in the 
tale and in the correspondence, viz. Jesus Christ. 
In other words, I hope nobody thinks of something 
called 'narrative sense' as kind of a hermeneutical 
ab sol ute" ( " HB ", 4). 
This citation is important in that Frei consciously resists 
the tendency to view his own hermeneutical theory as a theory 
of narrat i ve. Whilst narrative is certainly an important 
component, Frei wants the liberty to include other 
hermeneutical approaches, including deconstruction 47 , when 
dealing with other types of texts. 
46 The entire essay uses Beardslee' s 
Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
influential book in a fledgling field. 
Literary Criticism and the New 
1970) as a foil. This was an 
47 "And so I take off my hermeneutical hat to Professors Beardslee and 
Ricoeur, but at the same time wave an equally friendly yet arms-distance 
maintaining hello to my structuralist, poststructalist, and 
deconstructionist companions" ("Hermeneutics and Beardslee", 7). 
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Frei traces the root of the Beardslean problem back to a 
statement in which Beardslee proposes that the "transcendent 
is encountered beyond the ethical rather than the aesthetic". 
Frei dismisses this assessment as a "moot question for me. 
Hermeneutically ... I'd rather leave that aside; I don't know 
what the transcendent is doing in the first place messing 
around in my modest second-order rules exhibited in the 
first-order use of language, and nothing but language" ("HB", 
4). Beardslee's error, in Frei's perception, is not only his 
desire for a general hermeneutic but also his desire to link 
hermeneutics to moral enterprises. In this essay, Frei cites 
F .R. Leavis as the "scariest example" of this tendency and 
subsequently, this same indictment is handed down to the "New 
Critics" . Whether or not Leavis is correctly placed in the 
company of the New Critics (or at least seen as a British 
precursor), is debatable. However, Frei' s analysis of the 
link between Leavis/Eliot and the American New Critics on the 
issue of a desire to view narratives as moral enterprises 
holds. I will now turn to an analysis of this link, which 
can be viewed as a sometimes hidden agenda. 
IlIa. A Hidden Agenda? 
I began the chapter with an analysis made by Stephen 
Moore concerning Frei's affiliation with the New Criticism. 
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Moore notes that "Frei himself, scarcely acknowledges New 
Critical influences in his book [The Eclipse]" (Literary 
Criticism, 11). Moore surmises that due to the prevalence of 
New Critical ideas in the United States. during the mid-
1970' s, Frei felt no obvious need to state explicitly a 
commonly held position (Literary Criticism, 11). Frei 
actually had stated his leanings towards New Critical figures 
as early as 1967. However, as noted above, this essay was, 
until recently, practically inaccessible. Similarly, whilst 
Frei did "cautiously" admit his tendency to support New 
Critical ideas, he also recognised that he was "still a babe 
in the woods" in regards to literary theory (T&N, 33). His 
caution may have been partly due to his limited knowledge of 
the field coupled with something about the New Critical 
agenda which made Frei apprehensive about claiming full 
acceptance. I propose that this was precisely the problem 
and it manifested itself in 1986 with a complete disavowal of 
the New Criticism. 
In an essay written in 1986 48 , Frei analyses several 
hermeneutical approaches which claim to rely on a sensus 
literalis in the interpretation of texts. In a section 
captioned, "Prospects for the Literal Sense", Frei aims his 
guns at the New Criticism. His understanding of the New 
48 "The Literal Reading of Biblical Narrative in the Christian 
Tradition: Does it Stretch or will it Break" in Theology and Narrative, 
pp. 117-152. 
Critics is that they 
"claim that the text is a normative and pure 
'meaning' world of its own which, quite apart from 
any factual reference it may have, and apart from 
its author's intention or reader's reception, 
stands on its own with the authority of self-
evident intelligibility" (T..&.N., 140). 
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Frei began to view New Criticism as having moved far from 
being a helpful theory which stressed "close readings" of the 
text whilst insisting on maintaining its narrative structure. 
New Criticism's emphases had led to a view of texts as having 
no reference to reality and thus, as essentially self-
referential. Frei's critique continues by drawing parallels 
between New Criticism and the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur 49 
and its theological application by David Tracy. 
I will now delineate some of Frei's perceptions of the 
New Critical problem. Firstly, he notes the problem of the 
self-referentiality of the text and its failure to imitate 
the world (the mimetic function of texts). Frei calls this 
view "artificial" CI ... &.N, 141) since the biblical texts must 
refer beyond themselves. Theologically, Frei (and 
Lindbeck 50 ) is committed to Barth's view that the text 
49 I have outlined some of the more obvious parallels between Ricoeur 
and the New Criticism above. Frei's drawing out of these parallels and 
his subsequent critique of Ricoeur is one of the focusses of chapter 
III/l. 
50 One thinks of the closing words of The Nature of Doctrine, "Only in 
some does one see the beginnings of a desire to renew in a 
posttraditional and post liberal mode the ancient practice of absorbing 
the universe into the biblical world. May their tribe increase" (MD., 
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invites the reader to dwell in the world it creates. The 
text shapes the world of the reader 51 . If the text does not 
refer to reality in any manner, then it would have no grounds 
for inviting us to enter into its "strange new world". 
Cri t ically, Frei is committed to Auerbach's dist inction 
between Homeric epics and the Bible. Auerbach claims that a 
distinctive feature of the biblical text is that "it insists 
it is the only real world, it is destined for autocracy. All 
other scenes, issues and ordinances have no right to appear 
independently of it the history of all mankind will 
be subordinated to it,,52. The biblical texts claim to 
reference the real world in a way unlike any other type of 
literature; uniquely and definitively. 
Secondly, in the post-Gadamerian world, Frei insists 
that to claim that the act of reading is inconsequential to 
the interpretation of a text would be philosophically naive 
(he calls it "artificial" once again). Frei states, "if a 
narrative should 'not mean but be', avoiding paraphrase as 
the proper means to the realization of this ideal comes close 
to enthroning verbal repetition as the highest form of 
135) . 
51 cf. Karl Barth, "The Strange New World Within The Bible" in 
of God and the Word of Man, translated by Douglas Horton 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1928). 
The Word 
(London: 
52 Eric Auerbach, Mimesis' The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature [Translated by Willard R. Trask] (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1953), 15. 
43 
understanding" (.I..&.ll, 141). This is an adamant rejection of a 
strong notion of the "heresy of paraphrase" and of an 
overemphasis on the consequential doctrine of the "pregnancy 
of meaning". 
Finally, Frei attacks the importation of Christian 
theology into hermeneutical theories. He proposes that the 
New Criticism appeals to a literal reading "because and to 
the extent that it is in fact a disguised Christian 
under standing of them, and not a reading under a genera 1 
theory" (.T.il:l, 143) This is the essence of the complaint that 
Frei made of F.R. Leavis several years before; moral 
theorising cleverly disguised as hermeneutical theory53. 
It is at this juncture that Frei advocates the 
"cultural-linguistic" approach proposed by George Lindbeck54 . 
53 While Eliot was a profoundly religious man, Brooks maintains 
that he never confused religion with poetry. 
"The primary role of poetry is to give us an account of reality, not 
to argue a means for reshaping it. To be more specific: if a culture 
is sick, the poet's primary task is to provide us with a diagnosis, 
not to prescribe a specific remedy. For al.l. of his intense 
interest in the probl.ems of our cul.ture, and in spite of 
the fact that he himsel.f was deepl.y committed to a 
doctrinal. rel.igion, El.iot was careful. never to confuse 
poetry with pol.itics or rel.igion" (nT.S. Eliot: .. . ", 330). 
and he continues in another essay, 
"He is so much a man of his own age that he can indicate his attitude 
toward the Christian tradition without falsity only in terms of the 
difficulties of a rehabilitation; and he is so much a poet and so 
little a propagandist that he can be sincere only as he presents his 
theme concretely and dramatically" ("The Waste . .. , 86). 
54 Lindbeck describes the cultural-linguistic approach in regards to the 
way doctrines are used as "the function of church doctrines that becomes 
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The formal/structural analysis of the texts which had 
previously privileged a "realistic narrative" reading of the 
gospels, gives way to an emphasis on the community's way of 
reading. Frei stands in agreement here with David Kelsey's 
analysis, "to call a set of texts 'scripture' is, in part, to 
say that they ought so to be used in the common life of the 
church as to nurture and preserve her self-identity,,55. 
However, at the end of the "Literal Reading ... " essay, Frei 
curiously appeals to a "Christian" midrash for adjudicating 
among issues of interpretation. This appeal is made out of 
necessity; for once the interpretive power is pulled from the 
text itself, that is, the structure of the text to privilege 
interpretation in a certain way (namely, realistic 
narrative), appeals to either a 'literal sense' or a 'plain 
sense' is a dangerous affair56 . Perhaps this realisation is 
what prompted B.S. Childs to warn against attempts at using 
most prominent ... is their use, not as expressive models or as truth 
claims, but as communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, 
and action" (NU, 18). 
55 David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (London; SCM 
Press, 1975), 150. 
56 Kathryn Tanner's contribution to the Frei festschrift is an example 
of what can happen to these types of appeals. Tanner identifies the 
reading of the text as "realistic narrative" with the "plain reading" 
which over time gained credibility and thus becomes the "traditional 
reading". This traditional reading implies a decision of the community 
to privilege this sense of construing the text. Then in a typical move 
reminiscent of a "hermeneutic of suspicion", Tanner questions why this 
sense ought to be privileged, especially because it is "traditional". 
See "Theology and the Plain Sense" in Scriptural Authority and Narratiye 
Interpretation, ed. Garrett Green, pp. 59-78). 
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midrash "as a text-creating reality"S7. His warning is 
specifically aimed at Frei's proposal. 
IV. Final Conclusions 
Stephen Moore was correct in his judgement that Hans 
Frei was certainly influenced by New Critical ideas. 
However, his proposal as to what constitutes New Criticism 
seems to be slightly off-centre. Similarly, Frei's 
conclusion that New Criticism claims a "normative and pure 
'meaning' world of its own" also seems to be mistaken. 
However, one could argue that Frei's perception of the New 
Critical endeavour, viz. maintaining the autonomy of the 
text's conveyed world, is not without historical foundation. 
Deconstruction in the arena of literary theory followed 
closely on the heels of New Criticism. Loaded with its 
notions of the free play of texts and the self-referentiality 
of language, it seemed to be a natural and/or logical 
progression of the New Critical enterprise. 
Rene Wellek expends considerable effort in his History 
of Modern Criticism, rejecting the charge that New Criticism 
laid the conceptual framework for deconstruction. Countering 
the charge with textual evidence, I will turn once again to 
57 B.S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1993), p.20. 
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the "New Critics" surveyed previously. 
Cleanth Brooks understands the task of the poet to 
"unify experience. He must return to us the unity of the 
experience itself as man knows it in his own experience. The 
poem, if it be a true poem is a simulacrum of reality. " 
( Jl..Ln., 173: emphasis mine) As Wellek maintains, "the 
supposed consequence of any view of the unity, self-
reflexiveness, and integration of a work of art poses a 
false dilemma. A poem may have coherence and integrity 
without losing its meaning or truth. The very nature of 
words point to an outside world" (History VI, 150: 
emphasis mine) New Critical thought clings to a Neo-Kantian 
notion of the nature of language 58 . Brooks in writing of 
T.S. Eliot's vision states, "the primary role of poetry is to 
give us an account of reality, not to argue a means for 
reshaping it 59 ". Ricoeur stays out of the dilemma of the 
self-referentiality of language by appropriating a version of 
a Cassirean notion of "symbol". Whereas metaphor is "a free 
invention of discourse", symbols are "bound to the cosmos" 
(ll, 61). 
58 This would not be so surprising since Ernst Cassirer would have been 
part of the Yale philosophy faculty when the Yale "New Critics" began to 
wri te. I will sketch the parallels between Cassirer and Ricoeur on 
language below. 
59 Cleanth Brooks, 
Man and Hi s Work, 
1966), 330. 
"T.S. Eliot: Thinker and Artist" in T.S. Eliot: The 
edited by Alan Tate. (New York: Delacorte Press, 
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Frei was initially dependent on the New Criticism's 
insistence on the primacy ("indispensability") of the 
literary work, the "close readings" which developed out of 
this and the rejection of authorial intention as a vehicle to 
access the meaning of a work. However, as his thought 
matured, he noticed a tenuous link between New Criticism and 
Christian theology becoming explicit. Whilst Austin Warren 
asserted that "the business of the poet is to produce 
"objective correlatives" for thought, the imaginative 
illusion of a view of life" ("Eliot's. . , 280) , he was 
opposed to the notion of "salvation by poetry". Whilst it 
was true that poets had begun to delve into concerns similar 
to those of religion, most New Critics rejected the notion 
that poetry had replaced religion. And whilst Frei' s 
analysis may not seem well-founded, his perception of the New 
Critical enterprise led to his disassociation from it. 
I have attempted to sketch some of the major concerns of 
New Criticism. This agenda included "close readings" of the 
texts, the indispensability of the literary work and a 
rejection of authorial intention as supplying the main 
interpretive schema. This analysis of New Criticism came as 
an interaction with the statement made by Stephen Moore that 
Frei' s Eclipse was a "major conduit through which New 
Critical ideas have flowed into gospel scholarship" (Literary 
Criticism, 10-11). The second halfof this section sketched 
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the formal relationship that Frei acknowledged with the New 
Critics. I now intend to provide some textual evidence 60 for 
this relationship. 
IVa. The Hermeneutical Rule is New Critical 
Firstly, T.S. Eliot's dictum of "close reading" could 
not find a more proper home than in this continually 
reiterated statement, "the aim of an exegesis which simply 
looks for the sense of a story (but does not identify sense 
with religious significance for the reader) is in the final 
analysis that of reading the story itself" (Ll.C., xv). Frei's 
hermeneutic was a reflection on what he referred to as 
"second-order rules exhibited in the first-order use of 
language" ("HB", 5) As a discipline, Frei understood 
hermeneutics as attempting to uncover the meaning of the 
text rather than its truth-value; viz. either the text's 
claim to reference reality or in its weaker form, its claim 
to true interpretation (cf. "HB", 3). In fact, one scholar 
feels that Frei is so insistent on this point (hermeneutics 
deals with meaning rather than truth) that he accuses Frei of 
a type of formalism: "to accuse Frei of formalism would be 
like throwing Br'er Rabbit into the briar patch. How a story 
means is, on his showing, a function of its specific 
60 The textual evidence will be provided from an analysis of Frei's 
initial work published as The Identity of Jesus Christ: The 
Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology. 
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narrative structure,,61. 
Secondly, Frei's continual insistence on the primacy of 
the narrative is inextricably bound to a New Critical agenda. 
In defending a hermeneutic which is concerned with the 
meaning of a text, Frei states "to do so without regard for 
the narrative pattern would make these convictions as thin 
and uncommunicative as it is to paraphrase the meaning of a 
poem or a novel by distilling it out and separating it from 
its language and imagery or its story and then presenting it 
in a didactic form" (~, 47). It is obvious that the 
thoughts and language here belong to Cleanth Brooks in the 
essay "Heresy of Paraphrase" 62, which likewise is dependent 
on Kant's notion of the inseparability of form and content. 
william Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley's essay, "The 
Intentional Fallacy" (1954), states at the outset that "the 
design or intention of the author is neither available nor 
desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of 
literary art ,,63 In a similar statement, Frei asserts 
61 Stephen Crites, "The Spatial Dimensions of Narrative Truthtelling" in 
Scriptural Authority and Narrative Interpretation, edited by Garrett 
Green (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 99. I deal with the accusations 
against Frei concerning the status of "meaning" and "truth" in chapter 
III. 
62 Brooks states that "it is highly important that we know what we are 
doing and that we see plainly that the paraphrase is not the real core 
of meaning which constitutes the essence of the poem" (1!.m, 160). 
63 "The Intentional Fallacy" in William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, 
The Verbal Icon· Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (London: Methuen, 
1970), 3. 
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that "we are bound to judge the success of a piece of writing 
by the integrity or credulity of the characters" CLlC, 144). 
Brooks also argued in "The Heresy of Paraphrase" that a poem 
is judged to be meritorious not only because of the subjects 
discussed (its content) but also because of the internal, 
formal structuring of the poem itself. Additionally, Frei 
focuses only on the text without any "additional" 
information. This view culminates in an outright rejection of 
authorial intention as a method to access the "meaning" of 
the text 64 . 
64 Frei's opposition to intentionality will be dealt with below since 
this is a ma jor theme in both his and Ricoeur' s work. It could be 
argued that this opposition points to an equally dependent reliance 
outside of the sphere of literary theory, namely on the work of both 
Gilbert Ryle and Peter Strawson. 
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1/2. "Paul Ricoeur and Structuralism: A new meaning of the 
notion of truth?": Traces Ricoeur' s early moves from 
phenomenological analysis of texts dealing with fallibility 
and symbolism towards a focus on hermeneutics. Through an 
emendation of the structuralism of Genette, Gremias and 
narratology, the move to post-structuralism allows for 
'meaning' to exist outside of textuality. A reformulation of 
the notion of 'truth' as disclosed by narratives becomes a 
'way-of-being-in-the-world'; an openness to possibility. 
I. Introduction 
This section will examine the figures involved in the 
development of Ricoeur's exposition of the notions of 
temporality, emplotment and truth in relation to biblical 
texts. The investigation will focus on an analysis of 
Ricoeur's contention that his utilisation of structuralism'S 
insights into temporality, whilst accounting for its 
limitations, combined with certain strands of Germanic 
philosophy, allows for a more balanced account of the 
relationship between textuality and reference. This 
investigation is thus closely linked to the prior chapter 
which uncovered Frei's dependence on the New Criticism and 
his later break with its methodology. 
Paul Ricoeur' s work in Time and Narrative 65 is the 
culmination of years of dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
models of textual interpretation, specifically structuralism. 
65 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, [Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin 
and David Pellaurl, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, vo1.1- 1984, 
vo1.2-1985, vo1.3-1988). 
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His main tenet which threads the volumes together is that a 
structural analysis of a narrative, whilst it is beneficial, 
is nonetheless incapable of dealing with the temporality of 
emplotment within those narratives 66 . Ricoeur traces this 
problem to the "major tendency of a modern theory of 
narrative" which attempts to "dechronologize" and 
"relogicize" all elements of narratives, including the plot. 
However, in Ricoeur's analysis, the attempt to 
"dechronologize" narratives is destined to fail because the 
temporal aspects of narratives cannot be re-configured into a 
purely formal description. Ricoeur' s theory leads him to 
bracket the notion of "truth". It is at this point that this 
chapter turns toward a discussion of how Ricoeur arrived at 
this stance. 
Ricoeur's eclectic literary-critical approach founds 
itself upon the work of t.he French structuralists Gerard 
Genet te and A. J. Gremias. Genette's work on "narrative 
discourse" and Gremias work on "discourse analysis" gives 
Ricoeur the co-ordinates within which temporality can be 
added to his theory of emplotment. However, Ricoeur expands 
Genette's theory by making a crucial distinction (between 
storied time and real time) and by adding another 
66 Ricoeur writes in the preface to Time and Narrative, "The Rule of 
Metaphor and Time and Narratiye form a pair ... the meaning-effects 
produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic 
innovation. In both cases this innovation is produced entirely on the 
level of discourse, that is, the level of acts of language equal to or 
greater than the sentence" (liNI., preface ix) . 
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(temporality) . These two emendations are ultimately what 
allows for the world of the text to connect up with the world 
of the reader (at least in theory) whilst dealing with the 
problem of emplotment. 
Ricoeur's self-understanding is that of a philosopher. 
This can be understood in terms of two separate 
methodological pre-suppositions. Firstly, Ricoeur wishes to 
be understood as working within the confines of philosophical 
analysis, not theological investigation. Secondly, he wishes 
to keep the two disciplines separate and distinct. This 
chapter will analyse two of his investigations into biblical 
narratives, namely "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of 
Revelation" and "The Bible and the Imagination". The 
question to focus the investigation will be "To what extent 
does Ricoeur succeed in keeping the two disciplines 
separate?" I propose that his ideal is difficult to sustain 
(tenuous at best) since his stance towards certain literary-
critical methodologies (especially structuralism) and to some 
degree his reliance upon Nietzsche and Heidegger has pre-
determined the final form of his work on narrative 67 . I will 
now turn to an analysis of the work of Gerard Genette and 
Ricoeur's subsequent expansion of Narrative Discourse. 
67 The philosophical issue of Ricoeur' s reliance upon Nietzsche and 
Heidegger will be dealt with in the second chapter. 
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II. Gerard Genette's structural analysis 
Gerard Genette's Narrative Discourse: An Essay in 
Method 68 has been hailed as "one of the central achievements" 
of structuralism and as t.he "centerpiece of the study of 
narrative.,69. Jonathan Culler also wrote in 1980 that the 
book is ., invaluable because it fills [the] need for a 
systematic theory of narrative" (N.B.Ll, 7). The book along 
with its companion volume, Narrative Discourse Reyisited, are 
important for this study because Genette is one of the major 
figures within French Structuralism with whom Ricoeur 
dialogues 70. 
Genette's analysis begins with a distinction within the 
analysis of narrative temporality, namely "story time" and 
"narrative time,,71. Genette proposes 
"to use the word story for the signified or 
narrative content, to use the word narrative for 
the signifier, statement, discourse or narrative 
text itself, and to use the word narrating for the 
68 Gerard Genette, Narratiye Discourse: An Essay in Method. [Translated 
by Jane Lewin, Forward by Jonathan Culler], Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1980. 
69 Jonathan Culler in Gerard Genette, Narratiye Discourse: An Essay in 
Method, 8. 
70 This can be found especially wi thin T &NI I, chapters 3,4, and 
conclusion. 
71 Genette bases this distinction on Gunther Muller's essay "Erzahlzeit 
und erzahlte Zeit", the former being narrative time and the latter story 
time. 
producing narrative action and, by extension, the 
whole of the real or fictional situation in which 
that action takes place" (N.R.Q., 27). 
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Thus, "story time" is that time which is followed and lends 
to a reading in succession whereas "narrative time" is that 
time within the story which does not necessarily happen 
coincidentally with the "story time,,72. 
Genette argues that there are three connections which 
determine the relation between story time and the 'pseudo-
time' of the narrative. These are order, duration and 
frequency73. I will focus on the category, order, which 
Genette uses to deal with the phenomenon of anachrony in the 
story since this is what distinguishes Ricoeur's work from 
that of "classical French structuralism". The category 
'order' consists of anachronies such as flashback, 
fo reshadowing, and beginning a story in medias res. 
Genette recognises that the procedure of attempting to 
categorise these 
"narrative anachronies (as I will call the 
various types of discordance between the two 
orderings of story and narrative) implicitly 
assume[s] the existence of a kind of zero degree 
72 Seymour Chatman's analysis of time in narratives begins with a 
similar distinction between "discourse-time-- the time it takes to 
peruse the discourse-- and story-time, the duration of the purported 
events of the narrative", Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in 
Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 62. 
73 Within his analysis of "story-time", 
categories of order, duration, and 
significant modification. 
Seymour Chatman adopts Genette's 
frequency with little or no 
that would be a condition of perfect temporal 
correspondence between narrative and story. This 
point of reference is more hypothetical than real" 
(NRD , 35 - 3 6) 7 4 . 
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He argues that the entire corpus of Western literature uses 
anachrony as a literary device and thus is a proper subject 
of enquiry. 
Genette initially distinguishes between two types of 
anachronies, prolepsis and analepsis. Prolepsis is 
defined as the "narrating or evoking in advance an event that 
will take place later". Analepsis is defined as "any 
evocation after the fact of an event that took place earlier 
than the point in the story where we are at any given moment" 
(NRD, 46). These anachronies are sometimes referred to as 
flashforward (prolepsis) and flashback (analepsis). 
Genette identifies a "first narrative" and a 
"subordinate narrative" within every anachronic narrative. 
Some analepses are related to the first narrative by either 
enriching it or adding information to it whereas others must 
merge their temporality into that of the first narrative (the 
"subordinate narrative") Genette calls the former 
analepses, external, the latter internal (NRD, 49-50). 
74 Seymour Chatman argues in a similar vein: "These 
distinctions [anachrony] are based on the assumption of a 
single story-strand, which bears the temporal center of 
gravity (so to speak)", (Story and Discourse, 66: emphasis 
mine) . 
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Within internal analepses, Genette makes a further 
distinction. Completing analepses are "pure and simple, 
that is, breaks in the temporal continuity" (N.EJ:l, 51). They 
function to elaborate on the section of the narrative 
referred to in the text. Paralipses are partial ellipses 
which "do not skip over a moment of time but [they] 
sidestep a given element" (N.EJ:l, 52) of the narrative. 
Genette also distinguishes between complete and partial 
prolepses. Completing prolepses are "those that fill in 
ahead of time a later blank" whereas repeating prolepses 
"double a narrative section to come" (.NE..Q, 71) However, he 
concedes that he "find[s] hardly any examples of 
completeness, and it seems in fact all prolepses are of the 
partial type" (NRD, 77). 
Seymour Chatman's analysis of the forms of anachrony 
generally follows that of Genette with a significant 
modification. Chatman argues that "[e]xposition is a 
function rather than a sub-class of analepsis or prolepsis. 
That function is to provide 'necessary information concerning 
characters and events existing before the action proper of a 
story begins' It 75 . His analysis identifies analepses and 
prolepses (both internal and external) as functions of the 
75 Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Fiction (New 
York, 1959), p. 684 cited in S. Chatman Story and Discourse, p.67. 
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form of anachrony rather than a form itself. 
In the above section, I have attempted to layout the 
theoretical matrix within which a large section of Ricoeur's 
work in Time and Narrative: Volume 2 (fictional literature) 
operates. This matrix is important for three reasons. 
Firstly, both Genette and Ricoeur rely on "close readings" of 
French novels (particularly those of Marcel Proust) to derive 
the ir findings. Secondly, both theor ists as sume that 
"narrative" is meaningful and this "meaning" can be accessed, 
if only partially, through structural analysis. Finally, and 
most importantly for the larger project, in incorporating 
Genette's structuralist work into his broader theory of 
narratology, Ricoeur proposes "the interpretation" of a 
Proustian novel (T&NII, 135: emphasis mine). This statement 
is significant because it is partly through the application 
of structural insights that Ricoeur arrives at what he 
considers "the correct interpretation" of a work. If 
Ricoeur's theory can be shown to de-limit the boundaries of 
interpretation that a work can itself service, then it would 
be a valuable tool against the excesses of a view which 
posits the self-referentiality of language. 
III. Ricoeur's Analysis of Genette 
Ricoeur begins his assimilation of Genette's 
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st ructuralism by focusing on those aspects of the matrix 
which he wishes to emend. He directs his objections at the 
foundation of Genette' s system; namely, the distinction 
between "story time" and "narrative time". While Ricoeur 
accepts this as a necessary distinction, he criticises 
Genette's failure to link up these two conceptions of time 
with "real time". He writes, "First, the Zeiterlebnis 
(temporal experience) is set out of bounds. All that remain 
are the relations internal to the text between utterance, 
statement, and story (or diegetic universe)" (T&NII, 82). 
Ricoeur proposes that within this model, a polarity is 
created in Genette' s matrix between the diegetic mode (pure 
narrative) and the dramatic mode (instantiation of 
experience) Because of this polarity, Genette can refer to 
the "narrative's capacity for autonomy" (l:I.EJ2., 85) However, 
Ricoeur maintains that Genette' s polarity sets up a false 
dichotomy. Narratology can be employed to answer not only the 
"How?" of literature (the diegetic mode) but also the "What?" 
(the dramatic mode) Admittedly, Ricoeur postpones the 
analysis of this procedure until he specifies exactly where 
Genette's theory is mistaken. For now, it will suffice to 
state that Ricoeur needs to expand the prevailing 
understanding of the role of narratology which he can then 
mesh with a radically altered theory of truth. Only after 
this emendation will he argue that his advances upon 
Genette's structural analysis allow his theory to break the 
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threat of an autonomous textual world and ultimately, 
correlate with and expand human experience. 
IIIa. Remembrance of Things Past 
Ricoeur uses Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past 
to analyse the fictive experience of time with Genette's 
matrix in mind. He proposes that "Proust ian analysis is not 
a gratuitous game. It is governed by the meaning of the work 
as a whole" (T&NII, 83) For obvious reasons, Genet te' s 
matrix and its inability to link the textual world with the 
real wor ld (Zei terlebnis) makes Ricoeur "uneasy" (T&NI I, 
86). Ricoeur identifies the failure in Genette' s system as 
this: 
" for lack of a notion like that of a world of 
the text [Genette's) recourse to the notion of 
narrative voice is not sufficient to do justice to 
the fictive experience the narrator-hero has of 
time in its psychological and metaphysical 
dimensions" (T&NII, 86). 
Ricoeur proposes that the experience of the fictional 
narrator connects up with the "real" world through the world 
projected by the text. Ricoeur can maintain this position 
(although he must propose a schema in which this coheres) 
whereas Genette's matrix cannot because of the prior decision 
to place Zeiterlebnis outside of the scope of narratology 76. 
76 Ricoeur writes, "To pose this question is to ask whether we must not 
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Ricoeur concludes his analysis of the major inadequacy of a 
pure structuralist analys is with an enigmatic statement 
involving the intention of the author of the Proustian 
text: 
"Over and above the discussion of the 
interpretation of Remembrance proposed by Genette, 
the question remains whether, in order to preserve 
the meaning of the work, it is not necessary to 
subordinate the narrative technique to the 
intention that carries the text beyond itself, 
toward an experience, no doubt feigned but 
nonetheless irreducible to a simple game with time" 
(T&NII, 87). 
So, what is Ricoeur appealing to here? It is important to 
recognise that Ricoeur distinguishes between textual 
intention, which is the author's intention inscribed in the 
text, and mental intention, which is the psychological 
intention of the author. Authorial intention is detectable 
in a text as textual intention (the shape the text takes) 
whereas mental intention is inaccessible and thus, not 
detectable 77. Ricoeur is arguing that Proust intended to 
convey an experience, not simply to create a textual world 
which, ultimately, he would have difficulty connecting up 
with the "real" world. 
do justice to the dimension that Muller, recalling Goethe, named 
Zeiterlebnis, and that narratology, by decree and as a result of its 
strict methodology, sets out of bounds" (NNI.I., 87). 
77 This highly controversial area of Ricoeur's thought has been recently 
attacked (cf. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections 
on the claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), chapter 8). 
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These concerns about authorial intention are founded 
upon the analysis in Interpretation Theory 78. Ricoeur 
maintains this stance toward discourse: "A message is 
intentional, it is meant by someone, the code is anonymous 
and not intended" (ll, 3). "To mean is both what the speaker 
means, i. e., what he intends to say, and what the sentence 
means, i.e., what the conjunction between the identification 
function and the predicative function yields. Meaning, in 
other words, is both noet ic and noematic" UI, 12). However, 
there is a distancing which occurs between the author and the 
discourse when it becomes inscribed. "Discourse is ~. event 
of language ... Events vanish while systems remain" (ll, 9). 
Ricoeur calls this phenomenon, distanciation. He argues that 
a recognition of distanciat ion requires the position that 
"mental meaning can be found nowhere else than in discourse 
itself. The utterer's meaning has its mark in the utterance 
meaning" Cll, 13) While the author t s marks are still 
contained within the discourse, they are really only 
recognisable in the crafting; the form the discourse 
ultimately takes. The link between author and text is left 
tenuous: " (t) he utterance meaning points back towards the 
utterer's meaning thanks to the self-reference of discourse 
to itself as an event" (IT, 13). Discerning what the author 
"meant" in a "non-psychological" sense becomes the Ricoeurean 
78 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse Theory and the 
Surplus of Meanin~. Fort Worth, Texas: T.e.U. press, 1976. 
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problem of hermeneutics; this is what leads to the "conflict 
of interpretations,,79. 
Within this theory of discourse, Ricoeur proposes that 
"time lost-regained" is "the interpretation" (T&NII, 135) of 
Remembrance of Things Past. Ricoeur recognises initially 
that Proust uses the theme "time lost-regained" in three 
separate yet related senses: 
"time regained, we might say, is the metaphor that 
encloses differences 'in the necessary links of a 
well-wrought style' 80. It is also the recognition, 
which crowns stereoscopic vision. Finally, it is 
the impression regained, which reconciles life and 
literature" (T&NII, 151) 
It is this final sense of temporality which successfully 
connects the world of the text to the world of the reader: a 
fusing of both horizons. It is this final connection of 
temporality which, Ricoeur proposes, transcends the 
1 imi tat ions of st ruct ural analys is. This supplement to 
structuralism requires the reader to recognise the text as 
confrontational and not simply a reflection of one's own 
interpretive bias. 
79 The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics 
(Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential 
Philosophy) [translated by several authors and with an introduction by 
the editor Don Ihde 1 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974). 
80 An obvious allusion to Cleanth Brooks' essay, "The Well-
Wrought Urn". 
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In the above section, I have discussed Ricoeur's 
analysis of the shortcomings of Genette's temporal matrix. 
In particular, Ricoeur focuses on Genette' s failure to 
incorporate Zeiterlebnis into the matrix which only includes 
"story time" (erzahlte Zeit) and "narrative time" 
(Erzahlzeit) 81. This fai lure, while restricting the scope 
of narratology to a diegetic investigation, has had enormous 
consequences in recent literary history. I will demonstrate 
below that this notion of the autonomy of the text can lead 
one to posit a purely self-referential view of language and 
ultimately leads to a radical deconstruction. I also propose 
that Ricoeur recognises this very danger and proposes that 
fictive texts link up with the "real world" through narrative 
world projections. We shall now turn to Ricoeur's expansion 
of the role of narratology. Later, I will investigate 
Ricoeur's alternative theory of truth which combined with 
narratology's expanded role, attempts to save textuality from 
self-referentiality by fusing the world of the text with the 
world of the reader. 
IIIb. Ricoeur' s adaption of the role of narratology 
In Ricoeur's work in Time and Narrative, volumes I & II, 
the configuration of both history and fiction has been 
81 Seymour Chatman also maintains Gunther Muller's distinction between 
Erz~hlzeit and erz~hlte Zeit which had been adopted by Genette. 
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investigated as the "art of composition" (T&NII, 156) . 
However, Ricoeur wants to merge the two investigations into 
an understanding of narratology extended beyond the limits 
imposed by Todorov (1969). He contends that the current work 
in historiography, particularly in the work of Hayden White, 
allows narratology to be extended to the genre of history. 
Ricoeur asserts, "(h)istoriography and literary criticism are 
both called upon and are invited together to form a grand 
narratology, where an equal right would be given to 
historical narrative and fictional narrative" (T&NII, 156). 
The configuration of time Leads to a "grand narratology" for 
three reasons. Firstly, people use narratives in ordinary 
discourse 82 . Secondly, bot.h fiction and history depend on 
emplotment to configure timt~. Finally, there is a "kinship 
bet ween methods of der i va \- ion" due to "new narrat i ve 
practices" (T&NII, 157). !\icoeur 1 S investigations into 
configuration in both hi~31 or:ical narrative and fictional 
narrative was based on a ])1- ior "plea for the precedence of 
narrative understanding over narratological rationality" 
(T&NII, 156). While involved in this exposition, he has 
consciously bracketed the enquiry into "truth" while his 
82 This conclusion correspond::; with the work of Hayden White who 
maintains that "[s]o natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is 
the form of narrative for any report on the way things really happened, 
that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which 
it was absent- or, as in some domains of contemporary Western 
intellectual and artistic culLure, programmatically refused". "The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" in The Content of 
the Form· Narrative Discourse andLHistorical Representation (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1987), 1. 
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concern has been focused on the "meaning" of the text. 
Ricoeur concludes that in his investigations, "the universal 
character of the formal principle of narrative configuration 
was thereby confirmed, to the extent that what this 
understanding confronts is the emplotment, taken in its most 
extreme formality, namely, the temporal synthesis of the 
heterogeneous" (T&NII, 158). This ability to understand is a 
recognition that temporality is fused with emplotment. This 
in turn helps the interpretive process by giving a framework 
within which a valid interp r <'tat ion can be posited. 
I wi 11 now map the rou te by which Ricoeur expands and 
thus reformulates the role of narratology. He takes as his 
"guiding concept" (T&NII, ]54) the mimesis of action. He 
understands mimesis as not :>trictly the imitation of action, 
but as incorporated into the larger Greek notion of muthos. 
It is through understandi ng mimesis as muthos that one 
arrives at a broader notion of emplotment. He writes, 
"I claim that the mod(::rn novel demands of literary 
criticism much more tha.n a subtle reformulation of 
the principle of the synthesis of the 
heterogeneous, by which I formally defined 
emplotment. It (thE~ modern novel] produces in 
addition an enrichment of the very notion of 
action, proportional to that of the notion of 
emplotment" (T&NII, 156). 
The problem, as Ricoeur proposes, is that a narrow definition 
of emplotment (the synthes is of the heterogeneous) cannot 
allow for the various types of anachrony identified by 
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Genette's analysis. Ricoeur expands his definition of 
emplotment to include "discordant concordance", thus allowing 
for the various forms of ellipses, including partial 
ellipses. By this expansion, Ricoeur can now extend the 
overarching category "mimesis of action" to sections of 
emploted temporal narrative (Erzahlzeit) which do not follow 
chronologically the erzahlte Zeit, or storied time. 
While Genette asserted that all of Western literature 
contains anachrony, Ricoeur focuses rather on the analysis 
which provided the distinction between narrator and character 
in the novel. This analysis 
distinction between point of 
allowed critics to posit the 
view (narrator) and narrative 
voice (character). This distinction is crucial for it led to 
a distinction in genre; between the epic and the novel. 
Goethe, Schiller, Hegel and the recent work of Mikhail 
Bakht in, analyse the ep ic: as a high form of 1 i terat ure, 
removed from everyday life whereas the novel is a low form of 
literature I contemporary wi th everyday, modern life (T&NI I, 
155). However, Ricoeur notes Northrop Frye's observation that 
both forms of literature are still classified as fiction. 
Furthermore, Aristotle would recognise the mimetic quality of 
both genres, because both lmitate history regardless of high 
heroic status, the equality of the hero or comedic value. 
Ricoeur places the distincLi on between the two genres on the 
level of the narrator. The novelist is a "creator of tales" 
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which requires "rigorous formCll discipline" whereas the "epic 
storyteller" relates a narrative that contains "its own 
internal complet ion" (T&NI1, 155-156). Yet Ricoeur maintains 
that the novel contributes t.o an "enrichment" of the mimesis 
of action; that is, it corresponds to reality. 
IV. Ricoeur on the problem of temporality in narrative 
In an essay entitled "Narrative Time,,83, Ricoeur wished 
to explore what a contribut ion a theory of narrative could 
offer to a phenomenology of time experience and vice versa. 
This essay laid the ground work for the investigations in 
Time and Narrative. Ricoeur proposes that "my suspicion is 
that both anti-narrativist epistemologists and structuralist 
literary critics have overlooked the temporal complexity of 
the narrative matrix constituted by the plot", ("NT", 167). 
It is necessary to firstly examine the sequential phases of 
development in the thought of one prominent "structuralist" 
critic which Ricoeur utilises, namely, A.J. Gremias. In many 
ways, Gremias 1 journey has been one which has been seminal 
for the n a r rat i ve a n a 1 y s i ~; 0 f P au 1 Ric 0 e u ran d I will 
therefore spend some time elaborating Gremias 1 journey 
through structuralism into post-structuralist thought. 
83 Paul Ricoeur, "Narrative Time" in On Narrative. (Edited by W.J.T. 
Mitchell). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
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IVa. A. J . Gremias "On Meaning" 
Gremias' seminal essay "On Meaning"S4 is a series of 
comments on his approach known as 
begins by distinguishing between 
"discourse analys is" . He 
North American and French 
structuralist approaches to interpretation. In what he calls 
"North America", Gremias maintains that structuralism asserts 
the existence of meaning but that one cannot speak about it. 
In contradistinction to this position, the French 
structuralists maintain t hat "meaning happens to be the 
essential dimension of language" ("OM", 539). Gremias then 
argues that the French position is thus a post-structuralist 
position due to its anti-agnostic presuppositions. Gremias 
is identified as a structuralist because he has been 
interested with meaning as identified through structure. He 
develops this thought as "meaning defined first of all as 
translation or transcoding I h(~n as orientation or intention" 
("OM", 539) Upon analys inq this terminology, I understand 
Gremias to be asserting that meaning is firstly a recognition 
of the essential structure" inherent in the text. This is 
certainly the early emphas i:3 in his career. However, as 
Gremias understood the limitations inherent in his position, 
he incorporated into his theory a dimension which could 
account for temporality in narratives. 
84 New Literary History, Volume 20 (Spring 1989), 539-551. 
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In the es s ay "On Mc'an ing" , Gremia s not e s severa 1 
significant steps in his construction of a universal semiotic 
theory. He maintains that his theory, based on the 
"Saussurian postulate of a structured world, apprehensible in 
its significations can, indeed, contribute to the elaboration 
of a unified methodology for the Humanities and Social 
Sciences" ("OM", 541). His initial move was a unification of 
the work of Levi-Strauss and Vladimir Propp. From Levi-
Strauss, Gremias took th<? paradigmatic structure of his 
anthropological methodology; from Propp he took the 
"syntagmatic" or "syntact Le" component. This unification 
allowed Gremias in 1970 to formulate a universal semiotic 
theory which he believed would encompass the ability to 
comprehend the deep structu Les inherent in all narratives. 
Another component in Gremias' theory is the interest in the 
modal and aspectual functioning of verbs in what he calls the 
"narrative syntax". This position entails the recognition 
that any type of narrative qrammar must be a "modal grammar". 
In fact, he expounds his t.heory as "the whole grammar is 
composed of modalities; the rest is simply content, 
semantics" ("OM", 542). BpCduse of his pre-occupation with 
the modalities inherent in the semiotic system, he analyses 
Propp's theory 
manipulation, 
into three ~emiotic parts: 
2) semiotics of action, 
1) semiot ics of 
3) semiotics of 
sanction. Gremias has recently focused most of his attention 
on this second concern wh Lch deals with the conditions 
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necessary for the performance of an action. This recent 
focus has led Gremias to assert that in post- structuralist 
investigations "[nJarrativity was seen as not simply 
narrativity but as the syntactic form of the organization of 
the world. This is the decisive turn which separates us from 
semiologists, who continue to analyse literary texts and who 
then are transformed into Derrideans and Foucaultians, for 
example" ("OM", 543). The "us" whom Gremias has in view is 
specifically his colleague Roland Barthes and himself. 
IVb. Ricoeur' s extension of Gremias 
Ricoeur makes signifLcant advances on Gremias' 
conclusions by proposing that the major problem anti-
narrativists and structural i"ts face is what he calls the 
"illusion of sequence". This problem is eminent owing to the 
observation that in narrill. i ves, sequence is not always 
equated with chronology. Ricoeur's basic premise in 
"Narrative Time" is that narrativity and temporality are 
related in a language game or form of life. He asserts 
"[iJndeed, 
existence 
I take tempor21 L ity to be that structure of 
that reaches Language in narrativity and 
narrativity to be the langu(lcw structure that has temporality 
as it s ultimate referent" ("NT", 165 ) Thus, a 
phenomenological ana 1 y s i :3 of narrative starts from 
temporality and moves through degrees of temporal 
72 
organisation. Ricoeur's observations are based on part one 
of Being & Time where Heidegger locates the phenomenon of 
time as a series of linea r "nows". In "Narrative Time", 
Ricoeur notes three dist inct yet intertwined levels of 
temporality: 
A) time as that "in" which events take place. 
B) Historicality: an emphasis on the past and the 
subsequent extension of life through repetition. 
This continuity allows objective history to be 
grounded in historicaljty. 
C) "plural unity of future, past, and present" 
which is the deepest .Level of time. This analysis 
is rooted in Heidegger' s notion of "care" which 
coheres the various tenses of temporality. 
Ricoeur's analysis of Heiciegger culminates in the proposal 
that the role of narrativity is determined by the narrative 
plot. He defines "plot" d.~; "the intelligible whole that 
governs a succes s ion of even t s in any story" ("NT", 167). 
Ultimately it is the plot wl1ich stands at the intersection of 
time and narrative. Thus, in Time and Narrat i ve, Ricoeur 
focuses most of his energi(~s on synthesising the temporal 
aspect of narrative into a construal of emplotment. 
v. The status of 'Truth' 
Picking up on his bracketing of the notion of "truth", 
Ricoeur proposes that if his tor ical narrat i ve is "true" (as 
opposed to fiction) then on one question, namely the 
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configuration of time, they merge. Turning to the 
Itdysemmetries", he notes that fiction is "richer in 
informat ion about time" than is history (T&NI I, 158). He 
proposes that this claim can be substantiated in two 
correlative ways. Fir st ly, history at tempt s chronology; 
rarely using anachrony. Placing this within Genette IS 
terminology, one can say that historical narrative rarely, if 
ever, uses the internal analepsis, paralipsis. Secondly, 
historical narrative attempts to make "time-spans and their 
corresponding speeds extremely heterogeneous It (T&NI I, 158-
159) . I understand this to mean that fictional literature is 
both a chronological and an anachronied reverie 85 . I will 
now turn to Ricoeur I S prel tmLnary sketch of the notion of 
"truth". 
Ricoeur asserts that the boundary between configuration 
and refiguration is crossed when the world of the work 
intersects the transcendence immanent in the text. His 
revised notion of truth is thus expanded to include 
"transformation" and "disclosure" of the "actual" world of 
action. This potential of texts to transform and/or 
disclose the "real world" (Zeiterlebnis) occurs in the 
confrontation between text dnd reader: "at the intersection 
of the world projected by Ul<:' text and the life-world of the 
85 Ricoeur puts it eloquently: "Everything [in fictional narrative 1 
occurs as though fiction, by c~eating imaginary worlds, opened up an 
unlimited career to the manifestatjon of time" (~, 159). 
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reader" the literary text 86 acquires not only meaning but 
"asserts its claims to truth" (T&NII, 160). Thus, the 
refiguration of time occurs where the "referential intentions 
of the historical narrative and the fictional narrative 
interweave" (T&NII, 160). Ricoeur has thus sketched new 
parameters within his agenda; a reformulation of the notion 
of "truth". 
What are the implicdt ions of both Genette's and 
Ricoeur's analyses for bib 1 i ca 1 narra t i ve? The impact of 
this study will turn tOWd rds an analysis of biblical 
narrative and its components. Simply put, does biblical 
narrative have the components of a modern novel or does it 
fit into the simpler notion uf emplotment as the "synthesis 
of the heterogeneous "? Wh i 1 st it is clear that biblical 
narrative contains peripeteiCl H7 and recognition (both combine 
to form Aristotle's deflnit.ion of 'plot') and certain 
instances of anachrony, can (Ine properly distinguish between 
the novelist (the creator of tales) and the storytellers of 
86 For Ricoeur, the category, "literary texts", would include both 
fictional narrative and histori'>ll narrative. John Searle also asserts 
that "the literary is continuous with the nonliterary. Not only is there 
no sharp boundary, but there is not much of a boundary at all. Thus 
Thucydides and Gibbon wrote works of history which we mayor 
may not treat as works of literature" John Searle, "The logical 
status of fictional discourse" j n Expression and Meaning": Studies in 
the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), 
59. 
87 "Peripeteia" is defined by Ari.'3totle as "the reversal of the fortunes 
of the characters" (On Poetry and Music, Translated by S. H. Butcher, 
Edited by Milton C. Nahm. [New York: Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts, 
1956]),9. 
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the biblical narratives? How does Ricoeur' s distinction 
relate to biblical narrative? 
In the above section, I have attempted to sketch both 
the similarities and dissimilarities between fictional and 
historical narrative. Ricoeur privileges fictional 
literature through structuralist analysis. Because of it s 
use of the entire range of anachronistic devices he asserts 
not only that fiction is "richer" than historical narrative 
but that it also may access "truth" in its transforming and 
disclosing power. 
Va. Poetics: the link between literariness and 
scripture 
Ricoeur's decision to subsume scripture into the 
category of poetics has its genesis in the work of French 
literary criticism. For Ricoeur, the category "poetics" is 
used to "designate the totality of [literary] genres" 
("HR" 100). In French literary theory, poetics is defined as 
"a discipline dealing with these kinds of studies which are 
not connected with the idiosyncratic properties of individual 
works, and which can only be a general theory of literary 
forms,,88. Thus, the realm of investigation in poetics is "the 
88 Gerard Genette, "Criticism and Poetics" in French Literary Theory 
Today [edited by Tzvetan Todorov, translated by R. Carter], (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 9. 
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general laws which govern the functioning of literature, its 
forms and var iet ies" 8 9 . The implication of introducing 
poetics as a discipline is that it is "opposed to 
interpretation or criticism,,90. Within the discipline of 
poetics, the object of study is the literary text itself and 
solely investigates literary discourse as opposed to other 
forms of discourse. Todorov maintains that "[iJt is not the 
literary work itself that is the object of poetics: what 
poetics questions are the properties of that particular 
discourse that is literary discourse,,91 Peter Brooks 
understands "poetics" as a sort of meta-critical discipline: 
"Poetics must offer a systematic understanding of literary 
discourse as that which comprehends its individual 
manifestations, and it must understand in systematic fashion 
its own discourse on literature,,92. This focus on literary 
discourse as such prompts Ricoeur to assert that 
"the literary genres of the Bible do not constitute 
a rhetorical facade which it would be possible to 
pull down in order to reveal some thought content 
89 Tzvetan Todorov, "Introduction" to French Literary Theory Today 
[edited by Tzvetan Todorov, translated by R. Carter], (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 2. 
90 Tzvetan Todorov, "Introduction" to French Literary Theory Today 
[edited by Tzvetan Todorov, translated by R. Carter], (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 2. 
91 Tzvetan Todorov, Introduct ion to Poetics, [Translated by Richard 
Howard, Forward by Peter Brooks], (Brighton: Harvester Press Limited, 
1981), 6. 
92 Peter Brooks in Tzvetan Todorov, Int roduction to 
[Translated by Richard Howard, Forward by Peter Brooks], 
Harvester Press Limited, 1981), ix. 
Poetics. 
(Brighton: 
that is indifferent to its literary vehicle '" the 
confession of faith expressed in the biblical 
documents is directly modulated by the forms of 
discourse wherein it is expressed" ("HR", 91). 
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Placed within this conceptual framework, Ricoeur's continual 
react ions against at tempts to "subl imate" and "rat ional ize II 
the meaning of biblical narratives seems justified. Jonathan 
Culler writes, "poetics asserts that interpretation is not 
the goal of literary study. Though the interpretation of 
works may be fascinating and personally fulfilling, the goal 
of literary study is to understand literature as a human 
institution, a mode of signification,,93. Poetics is 
ultimately concerned with how "meaning" is made possible in 
language. 
Vb. Ricoeur and Referentiality 
Ricoeur understands the function of hermeneutics to be 
discerning the "meaning" of the text. It is "only the 
meaning [that] rescues the meaning, without the contribution 
of the physical and psychological presence of the author" 
(HHS., 200)94. Thus, textual meaning is ~ to be understood 
93 Jonathan Culler in Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose [Translated 
by R. Howard, Forward by Jonathan Culler], (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1977),8. 
94 Ricoeur suggests that even for the writer of a text, there is an 
obvious distance from the author and what was inscribed at a particular 
time ("distanciation"). Ricoeur proposes that once it is written, the 
text has taken on a life of its own, and 
.. . the text's career escapes the finite horizon 
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as the result of authorial intention but is rather a 
reference to a world disclosed by the text (most often, the 
"world in front of the text"). Many scholars stop reading 
Ricoeur at this point and conclude that he is referring to 
all texts as bearing this "disclos ing" ("poet ic") funct ion. 
However, I contend that he clearly rejects this extension. 
Ricoeur's rejection of authorial intention should more 
correctly be understood as a rejection of "Romantic" 
hermeneutics which found fertile soil in Dilthey as a 
"ps ycholog i zing and histor iciz ing" hermeneut ic (Hli.S.., 140). 
While a Ricoeurean hermeneutic is interested in "renouncing 
any attempt to grasp the soul of an author", he asks "shall 
[we] restrict ourselves to reconstructing the structure of a 
work?" (HRS.., 140). Ricoeur wants to avoid structuralist 
excesses of looking only at the linguistic system without 
dealing with the questions of sense and reference. 
Ricoeur follows Frege in distinguishing sense as "ideal 
object which the proposit ion intends, and hence is purely 
immanent in discourse" (HRS.., 140). The reference is "the 
lived by its author. What the text says now matters 
more than what the author meant to say, and every 
exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference 
of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the 
psychology of the author (~, 201). 
What allows the reader to understand the "meaning" of the text is, more 
correctly, the "meaning" of the words. The intentions of the author can 
no longer be held to bear on what this particular text "means". 
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truth value of the proposition, its claim to reach reality" 
(illi.S.., 140). Thus, "the world of the text designates the 
reference of the work of discourse, not what is said, but 
about what is said. Hence the issue of the text is the world 
the text unfolds before itself" ("HR" , 100) This 
distinction avoids excesses in interpretive schemes which 
focus solely on the text in relation to itself. Yet, he 
admits that "only discourse (as opposed to language 95 ) 
intends things, appl ies it se lf to reality, expresses the 
wor ld" (RRS., 140) 
Ricoeur differentiates between two types of discourse, 
oral and written. In oral discourse, "reference is 
determined by the ability to point to a reality common to the 
interlocutors" (.l:i.illi, 141). Even if this "reality" is not 
present, the interlocutors are able to project its presence 
spatio-temporally. In writ ten discour se, Ricoeur assert s 
that there is 1) "no longer a situation conunon" to the reader 
and author and 2) there are "no longer the concrete 
condit ions of the act of point ing present" (H.H..S., 141). He 
95 This is Ricoeur's essential difference between language and 
discourse: language is the system of words, discourse is the 
application of the system so that the language "intends things". In an 
essay, "The Problem of Double Meaning", Ricoeur notes that "a sign does 
not have, or is not, a fixed signification but a value in opposition to 
values: it results f rom the relation between an identity and a 
difference" (lI, 69). Thus, discourse finds its limits only in relation 
to the other words which help establish a type of "transcendable" 
univocity due to the "surplus of meaning". Another distinction which 
could be drawn is that discourse situates itself temporally, while 
language is atemporal. 
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concludes that the "role" of "most" literature is to destroy 
the ostensive world and create a "new" world for the reader 
to inhabit. He defines this two-edged function (destructive 
and creative) of literature as the "poetic" function. 
However, he is clear that the poetic function is not merely a 
class or genre of literature but a function of "most" written 
works. 
Ricoeur notes that the poetic function of language 
"seems to glor ify i tse 1 fat the expense of the referent ial 
function of ordinary discourse. Nevertheless, there is no 
discourse so fictional that it does not connect up with 
reality" CHli.s.., 141). Whi le it may seem that Ricoeur is 
equi vocat ing the referent ia 1 function with an ostens i ve 
reference, he is, in fact, not. He speaks of the "eclipse of 
ostensive or descriptive reference" and maintains that this 
is 1) "not the abolition 0 E a 11 reference for 2) discour se 
cannot fail to be about something" (ll, 36). The reference 
or "something" of written discourse could be the "world in-
front-of the text". 
Ricoeur suggests that there are two "orders of 
reference". First order reference is "descriptive, 
constative, didactic discourse". In terms of myth, Ricoeur 
calls this the "invitation to gnosis" (s.E., 165). The myth 
helps us to understand our reality. While it may put a 
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different spin on "reality", it makes reference to our world 
nonetheless. Second order reference is the world "not only at 
the level of manipulable objects, but a type of 'being-
in -the-wor ld '" (H.H.S., 141). Second order reference is to a 
world offered or painted by the text which invites the reader 
to inhabit. This projected world is the "world proper to 
this unique text" (liH.S., 142). Furthermore, language, "in its 
poetic function abolishes the type of reference 
characteristic of such descriptive discourse, and along with 
it the reign of truth as adequation and the very definition 
of truth in terms of verification ... " ("HR", 101) Applied 
to symbol and metaphor, Ricoeur states that "the symbol gives 
rise to thinking" (.s.E., 349). 
Ricoeur's emphasis on the poetic function of texts has 
led him into a difficult position concerning ostensively 
referring texts. Ricoeur clarifies the types of texts which 
he recognises as able to funct ion on the "second order" of 
reference. He states that it is 
"through fiction and poetry, new possibilities of 
being-in-the-world are opened up ... fiction is the 
privileged path for the redescription of reality; 
and that poetic language is par excel.lence that 
which effects what Aristotle, reflecting on 
tragedy, called the mimesis of reality. For 
tragedy imitates reality only because it recreates 
it by means of a mythos, a 'fable', which reaches 
the profoundest essence of reality" (H.H.S., 142). 
and 
... all fictional literature whether 
lyrical or narrative (are poetic texts which] ... 
speak about the world. But not in a descriptive 
way. [ ... ] We ought to enlarge our concept of the 
world, therefore, not only to allow for non-
ostensive but still descriptive references, but 
also non-ostensive and non-descriptive references, 
those of poetic diction. [ ... ] It is this 
enlarging of our horizon of existence that permits 
us to speak of the references opened up by the text 
or of the world opened up by the referential claims 
of most texts (1974:37, emphasis mine). 
82 
Ricoeur speaks solely about fictional literature here. He 
also implies (via the phrase "enlarging our horizon") the 
possibility of three types of texts. There are 1) fictive 
texts which non-ostensively refer yet still have a 
descriptive function; 2) fictive texts which non-ostensively 
and non-descriptively refer (poetry); and 3) non-fictive 
texts which ostensively refer. While initially it seemed as 
if Ricoeur wanted to assert that all discourse breaks all 
ostensive reference (via the poetic function of texts), he 
makes exceptions in the cases of the 1) "descriptive 
referential function of ordinary language" and 2) "above all, 
scientific discourse" ("HR" , 1 0 0) Furthermore, his 
cont inual use of the word "most" (H..H..S.., 141) and the 
qualifying category "fiction" (l.bi.d..; "HR", 101)) at least 
implies the possibility of the existence of other types of 
texts (i.e. those without a poetic function, namely non-
fictional texts which ostensively refer) . 
Those texts which Ricoeur has, at least, allowed the 
possibility of existence would, I submit, be classified as 
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"historical" or scientific. In distinguishing between 
demythologization and demythization, Ricoeur states the 
difference as demythologizing as the application of criticism 
to the myth. In doing so, there is "an irreversible gain of 
truthfulness, of intellectual honesty, and therefore of 
objectivity" (.s.E., 350,352). Demythologization separates the 
"histor ical and the pseudo-historical" without dispens ing 
with the myth in narrative (lhid.). 
It is in Ricoeur's magnum opus (Time and Narrative) that 
we can view the unfolding of these fine distinctions in his 
thought. That is, one can Look at how his distinction among 
text-types plays out on the narrative level and observe 
whether or not he makes a1.1owance for a truly "ostensively-
referential" text. 
In speaking of Ar i stot le 's Poet ics , Ricoeur de fine s 
three levels of mimetic funct ion. Mimesis-l involves the 
recognition that "the composition of the plot is grounded in 
a pre-understanding of thE' world of action, its meaningful 
structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal 
character" (T&NI, 54). Mimesis-2 is a reading of 
narratives, as if they had a histor ical reference 96. 
96 Mimesis-2 bears close resembl Clnce to what Frei calls the "history-
likeness" of texts. As George Hunsinger notes, 
.. . for Frei, the category "fictjon-like" is strictly 
a formal category which as such remains non-committal 
about the narrative's truth or fiction. To say "fiction- like" is 
thus not quite the same as sayinq "fictional 
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Mimesis-3 is "the intersect. ion of the world of the text and 
the world of the hearer or reader 97 ; the intersection, 
therefore, of the world configured by the poem and the world 
wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific 
temporal i ty" (.T..&lil., 71) These three forms of mimesis apply 
to texts with poetic functions. 
Ricoeur traces many of the problems of ostensive 
referencing back to Locke and Reid (T&NII, 11-14). They 
sought to "purge every f i gu rat i ve and decorative element" 
from language and it could thus be used in its proper sense, 
"to convey the knowledge 0 f things" (T&N 11, 11). Ricoeur 
suggests this view culminat~ed in the theory that "the art of 
fiction then turns out to be the art of illusion" (T&NII, 
13) . The upshot of this position was that for a piece of 
literature to be non-illu~30ry, it had to be ostensively-
referential. Frei' s The Ecl ipse of Biblical Narrative also 
details the disastrous ef fects the Lockean project had on 
Biblical hermeneutics. 
yet true", especially if the latter could be construed 
as meaning "historically fictional, yet theologically true" 
(cited in "Hans Frei as Theologian: The Quest for a Generous 
Orthodoxy" in Modern Theology (8:2, April 1992), fn. 12.). 
Thus, one can say that the biblical narrative may be history-like but this has 
no bearing on whether or not the narrative is "historically factual". For 
Frei, the literal sense of a realistic narrative does not mean that the 
narrated event has actually OCCUI: red; the only exceptions being the 
narratives of the passion and resurrection of Jesus. These 
narratives are factual occurrences reported closely to the way they happened. 
Yet, it is important to note that Fre.i proposes that the interpreter assumes 
historical factuality of the other narratives unless evidence is given to the 
contrary. Ricoeur does not. 
97 This bears resemblance to Gaclamer's phrase, "fusion of horizons". 
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It is at the end of the third volume that Ricoeur 
finally deals with the di fficult problems that historical 
narrative presents. He admits "indeed, only historians can, 
absolutely speaking, be said to refer to something 'real', in 
the sense that that about which they speak was observable to 
witnesses in the past [ostensively refer to events]" (T&NIII, 
157) . However, he feels uncomfortable with the term 
"reference" because of wh.3.t he calls the "interweaving of 
history and fiction" (T&NI 1 I, 180ff). This "interweaving" 
describes the process of the re-figuration of the past by 
historians. That is, no historian objectively reports facts 
that correlate purely with t.he ostensive world. In English, 
the phrase, "the winners write the history books" seems to be 
the sense of this "interweaving". Thus, "in order to signify 
something like productive reference in the sense of a 
productive imagination, the problematic must free itself once 
and for all, from the vocabulary of reference" (T&NIII, 158). 
What then is the function of history if it is not to report 
facts and events from the past? 
In describing this relationship between fiction and 
history, Ricoeur notes that history provides a type of 
framework in which to emplot. a fictive narrative within time 
and space. Similarly, fiction allows the historian to "re-
configure" spatio-temporal events. "Fiction is placed in the 
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service of the unforgettable. It permits historiography to 
live up to the task of memory" (T&NIII, 189). We could 
describe the former as historicized fiction, the latter as 
fictive history. 
For Ricoeur, fictive history ought to be viewed "not 
only from the angle of what is done, unchangeable, and past" 
(T&NIII, 216) but as opening possibilities for the present. 
He refers to this as "the idea of being-affected by the past" 
(T&NIII, 221). What does the past refer to: "the past is 
revealed to us through the projection of a historical horizon 
that is both detached from the horizon of the present and 
taken up into and fused with it" (T&NI I I, 220). It is 
tradition which insures "reciprocity between effective-
history and our being-affected-by-the-past" (T&NI I I, 227). 
Tradition functions as a "presumption of truth" Clb..is:i.) which 
bridges the problems of communication and understanding. 
Tradition purports to advance truth-claims while historical 
research acts as a verifying body. History is able to be re-
shaped by the analysis of critique of ideologies present in 
the texts and by the fruits of historical research. 
Tradition and historical research are thus complementary 
partners. Following Gadamer, Ricoeur asks "how could 
hermeneutics carry out its task if it did not make use of 
historiographical objectivity as a means for sifting through 
dead traditions ... " (T&NIII, 224). The job of the 
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hermeneutician is thus to "understand in a different way ... 
[with] a historical consciousness" (T&NIII, 224). 
I now turn to an analysis of some of the problems 
associated with the conf iguration of emplotment in other 
writers. I will locate the problem of narrative temporality 
and the configuration of the plot in the work of several 
narrative writers, namely Peter Brooks, and Hayden White. I 
begin with an analysis of the problem of temporality in 
Ricoeur for in the next chapter, I will discuss how this is 
related to his construal of identity. I will then place 
Peter Brooks within the discussion of the problem of 
temporality within the larqer discussion of emplotment and 
then analyse Hayden Whitt?' s application of a form of a 
"hermeneutic of suspicion" to the status of narratology in 
general. I will conclude with an analysis of John Searle's 
challenge to Ricoeur's dismissal of authorial intention as a 
key to discerning emplotment. 
VI. Peter Brooks' analysis of emplotment with reference to 
With concerns paralleling those of Ricoeur, Peter 
Brooks' final chapter in Eeading for the Plot; Des ign and 
Intention in Narrative 98 argues in retrospect that certain 
98 Peter Brooks, Reading forLhe Plot; Design and Intention in 
Narrative. Cambridge: Harvard Unjversity Press, 1984. 
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formalist approaches to interpreting literature, viz. 
'narratology' 99, "do not provide- and generally do not seek 
to provide- an understanding of the dynamics of narrative, of 
what impels its movements of transformation, and thus its 
engagement with human memory and desire and its status as a 
form of thinking" (E.£, 319). Whilst the observations made by 
literary st ruct ural i st s G remias, Genet te and Propp are 
invaluable and necessary, they fail to account for the 
psychic needs and motivations of readers. Specifically, 
structuralism cannot aCC011nt for the phenomenon of the 
followability of a narrativE' (Ricoeur) or the emergence of a 
plot in a narrative (Brook:;) Structuralism has "neglected 
the temporal dynamics that shape narrative in our reading of 
them, the play of desire in time that makes us turn pages and 
strive toward narrative <"neis" (R£., xiii). Brooks' work 
endeavours to demonstrate t.hat "plot is the principal 
ordering force of those mean Lngs that we try to wrest from 
human temporality" (R£., xi) What is notable about this 
analysis is that Brooks maintains several positions 
coincidental with and by extension can be used to supplement 
the work of Ricoeur. I W L 11 now focus on these paralle 1 
concerns. 
Firstly, plot always e;.:ists in narratives even if it is 
99 Narratology is defined by Brooks as the "organized and coherent 
analysis of narrative structures and discourse" (xiii). 
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consciously made arbitrary by the author. Thus, even a novel 
devised with an ambiguous p lot such as Faulkner's Absa 10m, 
Absalom! has a followable narrative though the plot appears 
in a very fragmented form. Brooks maintains that even in 
instance s of 1 i tera t ure wh i ch are conscious ly ant i-plot, 
there is a residual of 'plot' which attempts to "disappoint 
the reader 1 s normal expectations concerning the plotted 
narrative, yet nonetheless carrying reading forward by way of 
plotted narrative element:3" CRl2., 315). Brooks' notion of 
plot is articulated as: 
"Plot is, first of all, a constant of all written 
and oral narrative, in that a narrative without at 
least a minimal plot would be incomprehensible. 
Plot is the principle of interconnectedness and 
intention which we cannot do without in moving 
through the discrete elements-incidents, episodes, 
actions-of a narrative" (.R£, 5). 
It is, thus, impossible for d narrative to exist without some 
form of plot. His concerns run parallel to those of Ricoeur 
who also understands plot as the intersection of time and 
narrative, and that which yields characterisation. 
Secondly, intentionality in texts extends to the reader 
as well as to the author. Brooks adopts Mikhail Bakhtin's 
concept of dialogism to include author and reader in the 
plotting of the narrative's intent. The reader is "forced to 
engage in plotting, if not toward the creation of meaning, at 
least in exploration of the conditions of narrative meaning" 
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(E..E, 316). Incorporating the work of Walter Benjamin, Brooks 
also recognises that some p lots are only fully discernable 
after the completion of the narrative. This does not point to 
the non-existence of the plot but rather indicates that a 
plot is intricate and only fully realised in retrospect; that 
is, after the decided ending point of the author. This ending 
of narrative was seen in the 19th century to be the 
fulfilment of the narrative plot, however, postmodernity has 
given up this assumption a~ naive and literary endings are 
now often viewed as arbi t ra 'Cy. 
difference of the postmodern is 
Brooks maintains that "the 
a greater explicitness in 
the abandonment of mimetic claims, a more overt staging of 
narrative I s arbitrariness and lack of authority, [and] a more 
open playfulness about fictionality" (E..E, 317). Whilst Brooks 
does not understand this new understanding to diminish the 
teleological drive of narrative, it does concur with a main 
tenet of deconstruction. Both of these positions intersect 
with Ricoeur I s theory of the surplus of meaning and the 
inexhaustibility of the symbol. If endings are viewed as 
arbitrary stopping points, then the semiotic system cannot 
have exhausted meaning because the narrative is never finally 
and exhaustively interpreted. The text continues to 
challenge the reader becau~)e it is ultimately the reader who 
finds the significance of the plot (albeit through narrative 
devices of emplotment) . 
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Finally, the psycho-analytical research of Sigmund Freud 
has a potentially enormous significance for the study of 
literature. Indeed, Brooks cites Freud's Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle as a 'masterplot' which he then uses to formulate a 
dynamic model of plot. Brooks maintains that Freud IS 
insights into the cause-effect relationship within the 
psychological states of his patients is equally applicable to 
the process of discerning plots in narratives. As in 
psychoanalysis, certain events trigger certain reactions 
whilst in retrospect these events can be tagged as signposts. 
Brooks argues that a similar pattern works on the level of 
the narrative. These signposts can, in turn, be followed to 
formulate a plot even if the plot is not discernable until 
after such-and-such events have occurred. This abi Ii ty of 
hindsight (as well as foreshadowing, flashback and other 
narrative devices) allows for a dynamism in the text not 
accounted for by many structuralist theorists. 
Ultimately, Brooks is concerned with essentiality of 
both narrative and plots. "Narrative is one of the ways in 
which we speak, one of the large categories in which we 
think. Plot is its thread of design and its active shaping 
force, the product of our refusal to allow temporality to be 
meaningless, our stubborn insistence on making meaning in the 
world and in our lives" (ll, 323). This conclusion reflects 
the similar position of Hayden White who maintains that "to 
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raise the question of narrative is to invite reflection on 
the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature 
of humanity itself"lOO. 
In conclusion, "plot" is recognised by both Ricoeur and 
Brooks as the intertwining of time and narrative. It is the 
temporal dimension which gives narrative it dynamism and its 
teleological drive. Both theorists agree that structuralism 
has "neglected the temporal dynamics that shape narrative in 
our reading of them, the play of desire in time that makes us 
turn pages and strive toward narrative ends" (B.£, xiii). 
VII. Hayden White's view of emplotment in historical 
narrative 
Hayden White contends in his book MetahistorylOl that 
the writing of history "contains a deep structural content 
which is generally poetic, and specifically linguistic, in 
nature, and which serves a:3 the precritical paradigm of what 
a distinctively 'historical' explanation should be" (ix 
[preface1) . Furthermore, "the historian performs an 
essentially poetic act, in which he prefigures the 
100 "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" in The 
Content of the Form· Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987), 1. 
101 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973). 
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historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to 
bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain 
'what was really happening' in it" (Metahistory, x 
[preface] ) . This content ion maintains that the act of 
"writing history" is a misunderstanding. It is partly a 
misunderstanding on the part of the reader who reads 
'historical accounts' as 'true' and partly a misunderstanding 
on the part of the writer who fails to account for his/her 
situatedness in relation to that event. 
After his close analysis of Nineteenth-century history 
writing, White concludes that the modes possible in any form 
of historical writing "are in reality formalizations of 
poetic insights that analytically precede them and that 
sanction the particular theories used to give historical 
accounts the aspect of an 'explanation'" (Metahistory, xi-xii 
[preface]) . This position contends that there is no 
epistemological reason for favouring one version of a 
historical account over another. They are both equally valid. 
Rather, as White contend~), we prefer one construal of 
'history' over another for purely aesthetic or moral reasons. 
I find myself in disagreement with White on two issues. 
Firstly, I am dissatisfied with White's emphasis on 'history 
writing' as a 'poetic act'. I rather insist on a distinction 
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between what I have calLed previouslyl02 "historicized 
fiction" and "fictive history". To make this distinction 
between these two representations of reality with a 
historical interest is integral to this discussion. 
Secondly, I am concerned about the implications of White's 
methodology: viz. a radical "hermeneutic of suspicion". I 
will deal with this issue later in the analysis. I propose 
that the biblical narratives can provide us with an example 
of both "historicized fiel. ion" and "fictive history". 
Initially, The Book of ,JClnah reads like a historically 
accurate account of a later Jewish prophet's encounter with 
the Ninevites and ultimately, God. However, in light of 
archaeological data recovered from the ancient city of 
Nineveh, modern readers now know that Nineveh was not so 
enormous as described in the book 103 . In fact, the city was 
not very significant in terms of size. This prompts the 
question, "why did the wri ter exaggerate the size of the 
city"? A li terary-cr it iea 1 approach may help provide an 
102 In my analysis of Paul Ricoeur's theory of referentiality in textual 
interpretation, I noted that he distinguishes between what I have called 
'historicized fiction' and 'fictive history'. History provides a type of 
framework in which to emplot a fictive narrative within time and space. 
This would be the theoretical explanation of "historicized fiction". 
Conversely, fiction allows the historian to 'reconfigure' spatio-
temporal events. As Ricoeur states, "fiction is placed in the service 
of the unforgettable. It permits historiography to live up to the task 
of memory" (T&NIII, 189). Thi.s approach I have labelled "fictive 
history". 
103 The relevant passage is Jonah 3:2-3: "'Arise, go to Nineveh, that 
great city, and proclaim to it that message that I tell you'. So Jonah 
arose and went to Nineveh, according to the word of the Lord. Now 
Nineveh was an exceedingly great city, three days' journey in breadth". 
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answer to this question. In each of the four "chapters" in 
the book, the word trans la ted as "great" appears only once. 
This literary device lends emphasis to the main nemesis of 
Jonah in each chapter. While this may satisfy the 
hermeneutician interested in literary approaches to 
narratives, it effectively throws into doubt the entire 
question of the ostensively reliable historicity of the book 
of Jonah. As a result, several Biblical scholars read this 
text primarily as historicized fiction. 
On the other hand, t he Acts of the Apostles reads 
similarly to a "historical account". However, it is not 
necessarily the way the book reads that is important, it is 
the data collected about t~he events in the narrative which 
ultimately adjudicates the claims. Thus, following the 
coherence of Paul's journeys and the viability thereof (at 
least in sequential probability; that is, one could pass 
through y on the way to z from x within a certain spatio-
temporal framework but not z on the way to y from x) one can 
piece together a coherent narrative that fits into the 
ostensive world. The infusion of fictive elements into the 
narrative are merely literary devices which do not impinge on 
the credibility of the nar-rative. Incorporate into this 
procedure ce rta in archat;() 1 og ica 1 evidence, intra- and 
intertextual verification, dnd then one is prepared to weigh 
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the evidence. If the narrative is plausible on these counts, 
then it may be fictive history. One' s beliefs about the 
author must also come to bear. If I believe that the author 
of the Acts of the Apostles was a disingenuous utilitarian 
who was creating these narratives to trick me into believing 
him, then I would probably dismiss them as historicized 
fiction. However, if I think the author is primarily sincere 
and probably credible, then I may also be persuaded that 
these narratives are fictive history. 
The difficulty arises when one recognises that a text 
may contain both historicized fiction and fictive history. 
One reason could be the conflation of sources; another the 
poisoning 
keeping. 
of primary sources through inaccurate record-
Yet another valid reason could be dogmatic. The 
point is that the author's commitment to the credibility of a 
text needs to be examined. This entire procedure, being so 
long and arduous, would probably only be employed on texts 
dealing with issues of "ultimate concern". Most often, only 
sections of this method of scrutiny would be employed. 
Both Frei and Ricoeur dismiss authorial intention as 
the primary hermeneutical focus. In doing so, they leave the 
text as the ultimate arbitrator of what consists a "good 
interpretation" . What would motivate such a concern? From 
the outset, Frei would have dismissed the entire question as 
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off-centre. This is not to say that inquests into the 
historicity of all narratives are arbitrary and the questions 
surrounding this are irrelevant, but it is rather a defining 
of the parameters by which these inquests are made. Thus, 
Frei I s decis ion to apply the "historicity" question is 
dependent on the weightiness of the claim. For Frei, within 
the biblical narratives, only the 
passion/ crucifixion/resurrection sequence fits into this 
category. Cashing out the category "weightiness of the 
claim" proves difficult for Frei's theory because he provides 
no ground rules. In terms of the biblical texts, it is may 
be because our faith is of "maximal concernment" (Locke) or 
of "ultimate concern" (Tillich). He is not clear about this. 
Yet, he concedes that when reading a story (including the 
biblical story), we ought to suspend judgement concerning the 
ostensively referential character and treat the text as a 
coherent pro jected wor ld. The questions concerning the 
historicity of the account based on the weightiness of the 
claims made therein are rather introduced subsequent to the 
reading of the story. 
Ricoeur goes even further than Frei. His distinction 
bet ween ostens i ve ly referent ial text s and "poet ic n texts, 
although it can be made, recognises most texts, 
literary texts, as "poetic". Thus, for Ricoeur, 
including all 
all biblical 
texts are "poetic" in the sense that they do not refer to the 
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ostensive world, though they may incorporate ostensive 
references their story. However, I find this to be a main 
weakness in Ricoeur's theory. Because of his judgement to 
view all literary texts as poetic, he cannot suspend 
judgement on the biblical texts since he has pre-judged them 
as "poetic". He also cannot fall back on authorial intention 
as providing a clue since most texts, certainly all literary 
texts, roam free of their author. 
VIII. John Searle on intentionality 
John Searle would focus his concerns on another aspect, 
namely the intentionality behind the narrative. The 
authorial intent is what supplies the clue to the 
"weightiness of the claims" made in the text. For Searle, 
one decides on the effect of the claim dependent on the 
author's stance toward the text, an illocutionary act he 
calls an assertion 104 . Assertions follow a specific set of 
rules. These are 
1) the essential rule: 
assert ion commits himself to 
expressed proposition, 
the 
the 
maker 
truth 
of an 
of the 
104 An assertion is outlined by Searle as "the point or purpose of the 
members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying 
degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed 
proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable 
on the dimension of assessment which includes true and false" (John 
Searle, "A taxonomy of illocutionary acts" in Expression and Meaning": 
Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 12). 
2) the preparatory rules: the speaker must be 
in a position to provide evidence or reasons for 
the truth of the expressed proposition, 
3) the expressed proposition must not be 
obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer 
in the context of utterance, 
4) the sincerity 
himself to a belief in 
proposition" 105 
rule: the speaker commits 
the truth of the expressed 
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Applying these rules in terms of how one discerns whether a 
writer "commits himself" (rules 1,4) and/or is "in a position 
to provide evidence or reasons" (rule 2) is more difficult. 
For Searle, a f i c t ion a 1 w r it e r is not co mm itt edt 0 a 
statement made in a novel. The author is not committed to 
these assertions because she cannot meet the qualifications 
set forth in the rules. Yet she is, at face-value, making an 
assertion or rather, she is "pretending to make an 
assertion in the second sense of 'pretend', to pretend to 
do or be something is to engage in a performance as if one 
were doing or being he thing and is without any intent to 
deceive" ("LSF", 65) It is precisely at this point that 
Searle's view assumes the very thing that White's theory 
effectively rejects, namely the sincerity of the author. 
Searle's contention is that the author is pretending to make 
an assertion. From this, Searle derives the conclusion that 
since the verb "pretend" implies intent on behalf of the 
105 John Searle, "The logical status of fictional discourse" 
in Expression and Meaning· Studies in the Theory of Speech 
~ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), 62. 
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author, "the identifying criterion for whether or not a text 
is a work of fiction must of necessity lie in the 
illocutionary intentions of the author. There is no textual 
property, syntactical or semantic, that will identify a text 
as a work of fiction l06 " ("LSF", 65). There are rather "a 
set of extra-linguistic, non-semantic conventions" ("LSF", 
65) which "suspend the normal operation of the rules relating 
illocutionary acts and the world" ("LSF", 66). The intention 
of the author is to invoke these "non-semantic conventions" 
to the aid of the interpretation of the text, which in this 
case, is fictional. This raises the question "how does one 
recognise that the author is pretending, thus invoking these 
conventions which suspend authorial commitment to the text?". 
Searle is unusually quiet about this but does compare the 
theory to a Wittgensteinian language-game. These conventions 
are recognisable because they violate the normal rules of the 
non-fictional textual game. So, ultimately, it is these non-
semant ic, extra-l inguist ic conventions (the context?) which 
rescue the sense. 
In another essay entitled "Literal Meaning,,107, Searle 
106" the illocutionary act is pretended, but the utterance act 
is real ... [thus], the utterance acts in fiction are indistinguishable 
from the utterance acts of serious discourse, and it is for that reason 
that there is no textual property that will identify a stretch of 
discourse as a work of fiction" ("LSF", 68). 
107 John Searle, "Literal Meaning" in Expression and Meaning: Studies in 
the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979) . 
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clearly defines the context as the device of closure of the 
sense of a narrative. He writes, "there seems to be no way 
to eliminate the contextual dependence of literal meaning 
since it is built into other forms of intentionality on which 
literal meaning depends" ("LM", 136). Intentionality in 
reference to pretending to make an assertion is cashed out as 
the semiological context of the semantical claim. Thus, for 
Searle, "there is no way to eliminate the contextual 
dependence of the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' without 
breaking the connections between that sentence and the 
perception that the cat is on the mat, or the belief that 
the cat is on the mat, and it is on such connections that the 
meaning of the sentence depends" ( "LM" , 136) . These 
connections are broken by the non-semantic conventions 
employed by the author. However, as noted by Searle, these 
conventions cash out as the context. So, while Sear le is 
clear that there is fiQ textual property which defines fiction 
as such, it is the context of the assertions made which leads 
one to question the commitment of the author to this stance. 
Returning to a point made above, namely that Searle 
assumes the very premise that White attacks- the sincerity of 
the author, I will now turn to elaborating the implications 
of White's theory. If, as White contends, all "history" 
writing is ultimately "poetic", then instead of what we call 
history, we have a tradition of historians acting both 
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consciously and unconsciously, disingenuously. Indeed, one 
of White's concerns is that the "historian" lay bare the pre-
suppositions he/she is working with. However, if all history 
is ultimately jettisoned into a broader theory of fiction, 
this hardly seems necessary. The writing of history within 
this framework, would be an attempt to persuade the reader 
that the historian's construal is not only accurate but that 
it reflects reality. However, if all history is ultimately 
historicized fiction, this plea from White to lay bare one's 
pre-suppositions becomes meaningless since the goal of the 
"historian" would be to persuade others that one's construal 
is 'the' accurate representation of reality. 
White may reply by agreeing but by making the 
distinction that these pre-suppositions may be unconscious 
and thus, unintentional. The procedure of laying bare one's 
pre-suppositions would allow the reader to be more informed 
about the author and his/her ideological positioning. This 
declaration would focus mainly (almost exclusively) on one's 
political positioning 1 0 8 . In distinction from Frei and 
Ricoeur and in agreement with Searle, authorial intention 
bears heavily on the interpretation of the text. It would 
likewise be the duty of the reader to recognise the author's 
108 Following Karl Mannheim's analysis in Ideology and Utopia, White 
recognizes "four basic ideological positions: Anarchism, Conservatism, 
Radicalism, and Liberalism" (Metahistory, 22). 
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methodology of configuration109 , form of argument 110 , and 
choice of emplotment lll . These categories all impose a 
certain form on the data being conveyed: a form which White 
recognises as always arbitrary and sometimes manipulative 112 . 
My concern with White's proposal is with the implications of 
this theory. Simply put, "why extend the historian's 
manipulative configuring to political positioning yet not 
extend this to all areas of life namely, race, gender, 
colour, religion, etc.?". It would seem plausible that if it 
is possible to both consciously and unconsciously manipulate 
the writing of history, then all factors impinging upon 
human-situatedness must be taken into account. Following 
this implication, all texts would then be mono-perspectival; 
somewhat autobiographical. Indeed, the implications are 
disastrous for narratives which are an essential part of 
being human l13 . Viewed in this manner, all discourse could 
109 White identifies "four principal modes of historical consciousness 
on the basis of the prefigurative (tropological) strategy which informs 
each of them: Metaphor, Synecdoche, Metonymy, and Irony" (Metahistory, 
xi) . 
110 White lists the "modes of Formism, Organism, Mechanism, and 
Contextualism" (Metahistory, x). 
111 Following Northrop Frye's analysis in Anatomy of Criticism, White 
lists "at least four different modes of emplotment: Romance, Tragedy, 
Comedy, and Satire" (Metahistory, 7). He concedes that there may be 
more modes of emplotment, "such as the Epic", but recognises these four. 
112 White writes, "I should also stress that a given historian's 
emplotment of the historical process or way of explaining it in a formal 
argument need not be regarded as a function of his consciously held 
ideological position" (Metahistory, 24: italics mine). 
113 "To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite 
reflection on the very nature of culture, and, possibly, even on the 
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be seen as discourse ultimately with the self- the dialectic 
never extending beyond the horizon of the writer. Human 
communication would then be viewed as a manipulative 
enterprise which has as its telos, manipulation and 
ultimately domination of the other. 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
Ricoeur and Brooks both recognise the major limitation 
of a structuralist account of narrative is its failure to 
account for the "fluidity of temporality" or the "flux of 
time" . White locates the problem inherent in structuralism 
as a misunderstanding of the nature of narrative itself. 
These two competing models overlap in one essential area, the 
role of the author in the interpretation of the narrative. 
Ricoeur dismisses authorial intent as a key to uncovering the 
psychological motivations of authors. Brooks' is less 
hesitant to hold such an extreme position, recognising that 
Freud's work bears on the question of authorial intent. 
White picks up the unconscious psychological motivations of 
the author as the "key" to interpreting texts. However, 
whereas White is inherently suspicious of these authorial 
motivations, Searle is less sceptical. Searle understands 
nature of humanity itself" (Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in 
the Representation of Reality" in The Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1987], 1). 
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authorial intent to cash out into a series of extra-
linguistic, non-semantic conventions recognised by the rules 
of language. These issues bring the discussion of intent to 
a higher level, namely, "can authorial intent be understood 
as 'textual intent'''? Ricoeur uses this terminology and it 
occurs, albeit sublated, within Searle's theory. 
Chapter Two: 
Application of the methodology to 
"narrative identity" 
11/1 "Frei and Narrative Identity" 
11/2 "Ricoeur and Narrative Identity: Is 
emplotment the key or the problem?" 
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11/1. "Frei and Narrative Identity": This chapter focuses 
mainly on IJC where Frei argues that Jesus' unsubstitutable 
identity is rendered by the text. Frei borrows from Strawson 
and Ryle to formulate an intention-action and self-
manifestation rubric (however, the latter breaks down into 
the former). The identity of Jesus is determined by enacted 
intention and subsequent 'revelation' through the 
passion/crucifixion/resurrection sequences. It is here that 
Jesus is "most fully himself'. Frei, however, wavers in the 
conclusion: "Better to think of Jesus as resurrected than not 
to" . 
The chapter includes an extended dialogue with Maurice Wiles, 
Stephen Crites, Michael Goldberg and Ronald Thiemann (an 
extens ion of Frei' s hermeneut ic to include 'God' in the 
disclosed ident i ty) . 
I. Introduction 
In my critique of Frei in chapter one, I challenged his 
assertions that the text is ostensively bound in disclosing 
the identity of Jesus in the passion/crucifixion/resurrection 
sequence whereas in other sections of the gospel narrative, 
it is merely "history-like" and does not necessarily 
ostensively refer. I maintained that for Frei to be 
consistent, he would have to offer a defence of why the 
realistic sense of the text (at this juncture) is the most 
obvious. I concluded the study with Frei's claim that the 
form/type of literature of the resurrection account is 
"literally not of the type of a mythological tale but 
something more like the realistic novel" (liN, 59: emphasis 
mine) I noted that two problems cropped up immediately with 
this position. Firstly, the Bible is a religious text and 
the strategy of reading it as one would read a novel, 
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realist ic or not, does not seem to be obvious. The texts 
deal, as Bultmann says, with "magic and wonders, supernatural 
beings .. to read the Bible as any other book is not 
obvious" . 
Secondly, I wish to address another issue which arose 
implicitly from the research; namely, is Frei guilty of 
special pleading in the case of the resurrect ion account? 
These are the two of the issues I intend to deal with in this 
section. I will discuss Frei' s construal of narrative 
identity. Then I will also fill out the discussion with two 
other major types of narrative proposals for understanding 
theology; namely those of Ronald Thiemann and Stephen Crites. 
Finally, I will deal with some critiques of narrative 
theologies and I will ascertain the validity of them in light 
of the research. 
II. Frei's construal of narrative identity, viz. Jesus Christ 
This, then, is the identity of Jesus Christ. He is 
the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his 
helplessness, in perfect obedience enacting their 
good in their behalf. As that same one, he was 
raised from the dead and manifested to be the 
redeemer. As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he 
cannot not live, and to conceive of him as not 
living is to misunderstand who he is (~, 149}114. 
114 This sounds strikingly similar to Karl Barth who writes: 
"The Lord whose memory [the Gospels) enshrine is not a dead 
Lord. He is not only unforgettable for the community, but it 
thinks of Him as the one who still is what He was" (CUIV/2, 
163). I will explore the relation of Frei's thought and its 
relation to both Barth and the ontological argument in 
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Frei's seminal work on the issue of narrative identity 
was The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases 
for Dogmatic Theology. The essay was initially concerned 
with making the notion of Christ's "presence" intelligible 
without appealing to a doctrine of "revelation". He asserts 
that 
" .. ' revelat ion' is not a wholly unambiguous or 
satisfying central concept for stating what 
Christianity is all about it is construed by 
Neo-Orthodox Theologians as a way of 
intellectualizing the relation between God and man 
by riveting it to the phenomenon of consciousness 
or one of its several derivatives then 
'revelation' turns out to be so non-informative as 
to lack all content" (.I.E, viii). 
It is enough to say that Frei viewed his endeavour to 
introduce the category of "presence", as a failure l15 . 
Ironically, the usefulness of the essay never lay in his 
promotion of the new category of "presence" but rather in 
Frei's careful exposition of how a reader comes to view Jesus 
as the "unsubstitutable identity" focused on by the gospel 
narratives. 
further detail below. 
115 Writing the preface of the essay issued as a book in 1975, Frei's 
says of the category "presence": "If I [now] found in the process of 
theological reflection about Jesus Christ that I had to refer to 
"presence" as a technical category, I would confine myself to saying 
that if one thinks about him under this rubric one cannot conceive of 
him as not being present. Further than that I would not go" (~, ix). 
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Frei acknowledges his debt to the formulation of his 
category of personal identity to Gilbert Ryle and P. F. 
Strawson. In his 1959 volume, Individuals l16 , Strawson 
argued that "identification rests ultimately on location in a 
unitary spatio-temporal framework of four dimensions, to the 
conclusion that a certain class of particulars is basic 117 in 
the sense I have explained" (Indiyiduals, 39). In addition, 
the "framework" for object identification is part of the 
object itself, it is not extraneous. However, not every 
category lends to the composing "framework" of the object. 
"Material bodies const i tute the framework" ( Individuals, 39) 
because they are observable and endure through time. Thus, 
for Strawson, material bodies are the basic particulars (cf. 
Indiyiduals, 87). He continues to draw out the implications 
of this theory by proposing that the concept of the person is 
"primitive". He maintains that "the concept of the pure 
individual consciousness cannot exist as a pr imary 
concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be 
explained or analysed" (Individuals, 102) Thus, the concept 
of a "per son" combine s both states of consciousne ss and 
states of affairs (bodily characteristics, movements, etc.). 
Strawson's theory is affirmed in basic 
116 P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 
(London: Methuen and Co. LTD, 1959). 
117 Strawson uses the word "basic" to mean "ontologically prior" or "not 
caused". 
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formulation of personal identity: "the specific uniqueness of 
a person [is] the very 'core' of a person toward which 
everything else is ordered", (.L.ll:, 37). However, Frei was not 
interested in developing a speculative account which 
formulated notions of identity via states of consciousness, 
ontology, etc. He viewed these speculative enterprises as 
erring in two differing ways. Firstly, he was wary of 
theological constructions which attempted to explain what it 
is like to be a person. Frei understood the work of 
Bultmann and Tillich as following this manner of 
investigation. Frei contends that these existential 
theologies ultimately fail because the ontological question 
overrides the investigation into the storied character, viz. 
Jesus Christ. Thus, identity description moves beyond a 
formal question and into the arena of speculative ontology. 
For Frei, this is a secondary concern and is not the primary 
concern of hermeneutics which deals solely with the "meaning" 
of the text. 
Secondly, following the work of Strawson and Ryle, Frei 
is aware of attempts to explain the consistency of Jesus' 
actions by reference to the consistency of his inner 
disposition. He contends that this endeavour also operates 
outside of the realm of formal questioning because it 
attempts to reconstruct an unavailable set of intentions; it 
adds information to the story that the narrative does not 
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contain. He cites the failed "quests" to reconstruct the 
historical Jesus as examples of this misguided approach l18 . 
Frei contends that a character's narrative identity is 
much more accessible to the reader than originally thought. 
He states that the parameters of enquiry are "from within 
belief and, in regard to this as well as other philosophical 
quest ions, purely formal and descriptive. We take the 
presence and identity of Jesus for granted, just as we do 
human presence and identity", CLI.G., 42: emphasis mine; also 
63) . Within narratives, "a person's identity is the self-
referral, or ascription to him, of his physical and personal 
states, properties, characteristics, and actions", CLI.c., 38). 
Thus, what count s as n ident i ty" is the disclosure of Jesus 
via events in the narrative, which become most sharply 
focused in the passion-resurrection sequence. 
Frei proposes an intention-action and self-manifestation 
scheme to help answer the formal questions of 'What is the 
person like?' and 'Who is he?,l19. His exegetical method for 
discerning Jesus' identity is one "that looks for the 
Gospel's significance in the narrative structure itself", 
118 Frei focuses on James M. Robinson's New Quest of the Historical 
Jesus (liN, 37ff.) as the most drastic attempt to reconstruct the 
historical Jesus. 
119 This is derived from Henry James' remark in The Art of Fiction, 
"What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident 
but the illustration of character?". 
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(l...J.C.., 47). Wi thin the narrat i ve, intent ion-act ion takes as 
its central premise that a "person is what he does centrally 
and most significantly", (LlC., 92). Admittedly, Frei finds 
himself at a loss to explain how external factors help shape 
the identity of a person but he admits that these factors do. 
He states, Jesus' identity " is given in the mysterious 
coincidence of his intentional action with circumstances 
partly initiated by him, partly devolving upon him.", CLI.c., 
94) . This function of identity description is provided by 
the other axis of self-manifestation. "Self-manifestation 
description tries to point to the continuity of a person's 
identity throughout the transitions brought about by his acts 
and life's events", (.LI..C., 127) The persistence (self-
continuity over a period of time), elusiveness (the 
maintenance of past events in the development of character), 
and ultimacy (the ascription of characteristics to a specific 
person) complete the identification procedure via intention-
action descriptions. I will now turn to an exposition of how 
this theory works when applied to narratives. 
The goal of " .. knowing the identity of any person 
involves describing the continuity of the person who acts and 
is acted upon through a stretch of time. But it also 
involves describing the genuine changes, sometimes to the 
very core of a person's being, that occur both in that 
person's character and in the circumstances of a story", 
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(~, 88) . This function is performed by the self-
manifestation description which, via sequential time-
narration, holds the continuity of the character together. 
Frei formulates the axiom as such: " the hermeneutical 
rule for irreducible ident i f icat ion in a narrat i ve text [is 
that] you follow the diachronic, not the synchronic line, you 
narrate him or her because he/she is not a separable 
subject/substance from his/her depiction in or as his/her 
s tor y" (" HB ", 5). 
Frei's intention-action schema is indebted to Karl 
Barth's way of viewing Jesus. Like Frei, Barth's theology is 
indebted to Anselm. He writ.es of the significance of the 
ontological argument in the second Preface to ~A~nus~e~l~mw;~~F~l~'d~e~s 
Quaerens Intellectum, " in this book on Anselm I am 
working with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding 
of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more 
and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to 
theology,,120. Barth argues that Anslem's "proof" is not the 
argument for the existence of God, but rather the "proof" 
comes after understanding: 
"As intelligere is achieved it issues in 
probare. Here we can give a general def ini t ion; 
what to prove means is that the validity of certain 
propositions advocated by Anselm is established 
120 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum (Anslems' Proof of 
the Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme) [trans. 
by Ian W. Robertson] (Pittsburgh, PA: Pickwick Press, 1975), 11. 
over against those who doubt or deny them; that is 
to say, it means the polemical-apologetic result of 
intelligere" (Anselm, 14). 
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The resulting implications of this way of understanding 
theology is that "there is for [the Gospel writers] no post-
Easter Jesus who is not absolutely identical with the one to 
whose pre-Easter existence this limit [of humanity] belonged" 
(Q2IV/2, 250). Thus, Barth challenges the reader to think of 
a unified Jesus Christ: "If we are to think of the speaking 
of Jesus as understood in the Gospel tradition, we must 
abandon completely the current distinctions between logos and 
ethos, or speaking and act ion, behind which there usually 
lurk the differentiations of knowledge and life, theory and 
practice, truth and reality" (Cll.IV/2, 194). For Barth, the 
character 'Jesus' in the biblical narratives is the same as 
the 'personality' Jesus; "his life ~ his act, and it has 
therefore the character 0 f history" cern V /2, 193). Jesus 
enacts his intentions which are, in a strong sense, speech-
acts; "This man does not only speak. He accomplishes what he 
says. He makes actual what he declares to be true" (CDIV/2, 
192: exegesis on Mt. 11:28). Both Frei and Barth identify 
the "Jesus of the narrative" with the "actual personality 
Jesus". They are one and the same, and as I argue below, Frei 
extends this to all depictions of Jesus, biblical or not. 
IIa. Genre 
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Frei understands the major difference between the 
literary account given in the Gospels concerning a dying-
rising Saviour and those given in Gnostic and other literary 
accounts is to be that of genre. He maintains that the genre 
of the passion-crucifixion-resurrection sequence is unlike 
that of Gnostic accounts, mythological tales or contemporary 
literary "Christ-like figurE'5" in that the Gospel accounts 
fully identify Jesus as I~he one who was crucified and 
resurrected. Jesus is the same person both before and after 
the narrated sequence 121 . 
Firstly, Frei maintains that the Gospel narrative is not 
a "Gnostic" account for two reasons: 1) it deals simply and 
exclusively with the story of Jesus of Nazareth, whether it 
is fict ional or real and 2) the manner of Jesus' act i vi ty 
(Jesus was not guilty, he was not self-alienated, there was 
salvific efficacy because of Jesus' death, and the obedient 
helplessness of Jesus redeems others) is unlike the Gnostic 
accounts. 
The passion-crucifixion-resurrection sequence is also 
not a mythological account~. "The Gospel story [and its 
121 Karl Barth suggests, "It is a tribute to the power of this self-
revelation that it could shape the recollection of His life and death as 
it undoubtedly did, and to such an extent that we cannot separate in 
practice between a pre-Easter and a post-Easter picture of this man in 
the New Testament" (Ql IV/2, 159). 
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literary structure of the account] is a demythologization of 
the saviour myth because the saviour figure in the Gospel 
story is fully ident if ied wi th Jesus of Nazareth", CLI1:;., 59: 
[cf.140)). As Frei continues to develop this thought in the 
Identity, he attempts to show that Jesus' identity is 
singular and cannot be substituted for anyone else. After 
laying out this argument, he uses it against those who would 
identify the Gospel sequence as myth by affirming that 
"unsubstitutable identity gained in unsubstitutable 
circumstances is simply not the stuff of mythological tales", 
(Ll.C., 139). Last ly, hi~; use of the category real i st ic 
narrative bolsters the defence against a mythological reading 
of the sequence. He maintains (against Strauss 122 ) that "the 
realistic or history-like quality of the narrative, whether 
historical or not, prevents even the person who regards the 
account as implausible from regarding it as mere myth" (LIC., 
143 ) Furthermore, "myth:> refer not to specific events but 
to general cultural conditions and kinds of group 
consciousness" (E.B.N, 239) 
122 Frei understands D. F. St.r:auss to have been affiliated with the 
"'mythical school' which represented with the greatest consistency one 
hermeneutical extreme- that of the completely historical understanding 
of an author" (E.E.N, 234). st: rauss' conclusions derive from this 
contention that the [gospel] writers' intention was indeed literal .. . 
but that this intention itself has to be understood historically ... It 
(~, 234-5). Thus, the disconnection in Strauss' Life of Jesus between 
the 'historical Jesus' and the 'Christ of faith'. This was disastrous 
for the reading of biblical narrative, the meaning of which became 
associated with " ... the time-conditioned consciousness from which it 
was written and which it expresses" (~. 235). Ultimately, Frei 
contends, "the real meaning of the narrative biblical texts [sic] for 
Strauss was the mythical rather than realistic consciousness they 
expressed ... " (Ellli, 237). 
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Finally, the Biblical narrative cannot simply be a 
literary account because "redemption is cosmic in scope [via] 
certain stylized elements" (L.LC.., 63). These stylistic 
feat ures of the text inc lude Mess ianic t it les, miracles, 
preaching, death, and resurrection. "The Gospel story is 
different from both because its 'type' is wholly derived from 
the specific and unsubst it utable ident i ty of Jesus Chr ist" 
(Ll..C., 82). I take this stat ement to be an indirect reference 
to C.S. Pierce's distinction between "type" and "token". 
Simply put, a sentence "type" could be something like "Jesus 
was a man". The "token" would be an instantiation of this 
sentence "type". Thus, if I use the sentence in a context 
other than that of the C;ospels, I would be using this 
sentence as a "token". If my analysis is correct, I read 
Frei as wanting to maintain that all sentence "types" making 
reference to "Christ-like figures" are really "tokens" and 
derive their intelligibility specifically from the Gospel 
narrative. 
IIb. Special Pleading? 
Another point is raised concerning the status accorded 
by Frei to the nature of the passion/crucifixion/resurrection 
narrative. Frei understands this section to be ostensively 
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referential 123 , raising questions concerning historical 
factuality. Frei concludes in the study that"... at the 
crucial climax of the resurrect ion, f ict ional descript ion, 
providing direct knowledge of his identity in, with and 
through the circumstances, merges with factual claim, whether 
justified or not" CLl1:., 145). This enquiry will be concerned 
with the possibility of Frei "special pleading" in the case 
of this sequence. 
Frei contends that "[Jesus'] identity is revealed in the 
mysterious unity of his own decision and determination with 
the circumstances and events of his passion and death" (..I.E., 
105) . The background for Frei's theory is found in 
Concept of Mind. It was here that Gilbert Ryle concluded 
that "I find out most of what I want to know about your 
capacities, interests, likes, dislikes, methods, and 
convictions, by observing how you conduct your overt doings, 
of which by far the most important are your sayings and 
writings,,124. Frei, in appropriating Ryle's theory, does not 
search for Jesus' identity .. in back of the story nor supply 
123 It is in the "third and last stage in the story's structure ... this 
part is most generally agreed to reflect actual events with considerable 
(though not absolute) accuracy"(LK., 132-133). 
124 The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 
61. It is important to note that in the entire Frei corpus, he very 
rarely quotes Ryle yet Ryle's arguments found in ~ are imbedded heavily 
in Frei's hermeneutic. An example of Frei's obvious reliance on Ryle 
(and Austin): "A person's identification with his words [his 1 
'performative utterances', is perhaps the most acute form of the unity 
between subject and his self-manifestation"(~, 97). 
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it from ext raneous analyt ical sources" (.LlC., 138). Rather, 
Frei proceeds in identifying what was "most characteristic" 
about this storied character Jesus. After a close analysis 
of the narrative, Frei concludes that Jesus was 
"fundamentally obedient" (LIC, 107)125. 
Frei also appropriates Strawson 1 s theory that not all 
characteristics are suitable for the framework of individual 
identity depiction, only those which are endure through time. 
Frei couples his theory with Ryle 1 s formulation of self-
manifestation which incorporates persistence, elusiveness and 
ultimacy as those enduring categories for identity depiction. 
Thus, in accordance with these two theories, "if obedience is 
to be understood as specific enactment of an intention, one 
needs a sequence of cumulative, unbroken events within a 
story" CLl.c., 109) Frei proposes that it is in the last 
section of the Gospel narrative where the identity of Jesus, 
as obedient to the will of the Father, becomes most clear. 
Frei states that" (i)f we regard the Gospel narratives simply 
as such- i. e. as a story (whether fictional or real) - the 
individual, specific, and unsubstitutable identity of Jesus 
125 Although this path is not developed by Frei, viewing Jesus as 
fundamentally obedient is of critical importance for doctrinal 
formulation. Firstly, if Jesus' obedience can be viewed as an unbroken, 
continuous sequence, it can help to dispel adoptionist Christological 
formulations. Secondly, this sequence can help to refute views that 
Jesus was merely the victim of bad fortune. That is, the circumstances 
around him were uncontrollable, he was murdered and then divine 
characteristics were ascribed to him by his followers. 
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in the story is most fully set forth in his resurrection 
appearance" (.LI..C.., 49) . The self-manifestation of a 
character requires a time-sequence to verify that the 
characteristics narrated are not simply aberrations of 
character. Frei maintains that a close reading of this 
"unbroken narrated time-sequence" discloses Jesus' character 
unlike any other section of the Gospel narrative 126 . He 
concludes that "the narratives' increasing stress on the 
rising curve or dominance of God's activity over that of 
Jesus reaches its apex, not in the account of Jesus' death, 
but in that of his resurrection (LlC., 120). This is the 
point in the narrative where Jesus is seen to be "most fully 
himself". Frei concludes that it is the realistic nature of 
these narratives which ultimately points to their likelihood 
in history. However, his explanation of the way the 
narrative shifts from a stylized form to a highly realistic 
form does not provide adequate justification for 
understanding this section as ostensive or "true". Rather, 
Frei's conclusions seem to repudiate his own method and his 
appeal to the mergence of the story with questions of 
factuality ("justified or not") seems logically unfounded. 
III. Ronald Thiemann: Reyelation and Theology 
126 Karl Barth would not agree with Frei as to the "difference" posited 
during the passion-crucifixion-resurrection sequence. He asserts, "For 
all its glaring contrast, the story is seen by [the Evangelists] as a 
single whole. And in spite of the change of setting, the approach and 
occurrence of the passion do not involve any basic change in the 
narrative, not even a change of narrative style" (~IV/2, 251). 
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Thiemann is a "post liberal theologian" whose account of 
narrativity is admittedly, heavily dependent on the prior 
work of Frei. His work on the gospel of Matthew, is in many 
ways, a close reading of the gospel within the interpretive 
matrix set out by Frei in The Identity. However, Thiemann 
makes several advances on Frei' s conclusions which are 
important when studying the influence of literary theory on 
theological investigation. 
Thiemann notes two specific gains associated with the 
use of narrative within theological construction. Narrative 
"integrates a central literary genre in scripture with an 
organizing theological image". Narrative also "provide (s) 
the language by which we specify personal identity,,127. 
Thiemann's construal of narrative identity closely follows 
Frei's analysis in The Identity. Firstly, he employs Frei's 
"intention-action" model, while discarding the "self-
manifestation" axis. Thiemann maintains that the "intention-
act ion" schema does the ent ire work of both axes and 
therefore, "self-manifestation" is an unnecessary and 
ultimately, problematic category128. Secondly, Thiemann is 
127 Ronald Thiemann, Revelatio~ and Theology (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1985), 112. 
128 Cf. (E£..T., f.n.1, pp.182-183): "If we are seeking formal tools of 
personal identification, the intention-action model seems to allow talk 
of the 'ascripti ve center' and thus of the self's persistence and 
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as insistent as Frei on a close reading of the text itself 
before importing any extraneous categories into the 
hermeneutical enquiry. He states that a "close textual 
analysis guided by clear textual warrants requires in 
turn a limitation of the material to be discussed" (RU, 
113) . Consequently, his examination of the Gospel of Matthew 
is "text driven" in regards to narrative identification; he 
follows the "story" of Matthew's narrative as closely as 
Frei's constant focus on the passion/crucifixion/resurrection 
sequence. However, whereas Frei did not focus on a specific 
"Gospel" story, Thiemann sticks solely to Matthew's 
account 129 . 
Thiemann's central thesis can be construed as this: by 
following the Matthean narrative, God's identity as the God 
of Promise can be ascertained. While this is admittedly a 
different focus on the text than that of Frei (Frei was 
concerned with the identity of Jesus Christ), I can see no 
essential methodological difference between either 
writer's close readings. In fact, at times, Thiemann's 
language is indistinguishable from Frei's language. I will 
now turn to his analysis. 
ultimacy ... However interesting such speculation [concerning the self's 
elusiveness] might be it seems necessary neither for the task of 
personal identification not for the broader task of theology". 
129 Thiemann's account could be seen as the exegetical application of 
Frei's second-order reflections on narrative. 
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Thiemann's narrative analysis departs from the 
observation that the Gospel of Matthew "begin (s) with the 
most general and stylized depictions of Jesus and progresses 
toward greater specificit.y until Jesus' identity as a 
particular individual who uniquely fulfils the role Son of 
God becomes clear in the crucifixion and resurrection 
sequence" (Ril, 114). This continual movement towards a 
"realistic" narration sequence culminates in those events 
which constitute narrative insight into Jesus' 
unsubstitutable identity which transcends purely formal 
identification of the character Jesus. Jesus' identity is 
depicted in those narratives which focus on his 1) obedience 
to the Father and 2 ) powerlessness to affect the 
circumstances which ultimately led to his crucifixion. 
The first locus of Jesus' depicted identity (his 
obedience), Thiemann specifically attributes to the narrative 
insight given in the Garden of Gethsemane scene. He notes 
that this is "one of the few times in the Gospel the interior 
life of Jesus [is portrayed] and serves as an important 
source of the claim that he is the obedient Son of God" (.R£..T., 
127). Frei also maintains that in the "Garden of Gethsemane" 
pericope, we are allowed a glimpse into Jesus' interior self. 
He states, "what we are given in this narrat i ve, then, is 
access to the storied Jesus' intention at a crucial point" 
(.LlC., 114) Frei's enigmatic statement raises the question, 
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"Who is thi s 'storied Jesus'?" Frei is once again 
reiterating that the formal identity depiction of Jesus does 
not involve any assertions concerning factuality. Thus, it 
is only through the story that the reader has access to a 
situation in which the character Jesus struggles with being 
obedient. Although he does not explicitly state this, pure 
obedience in the midst of the circumstances on the part of 
the storied Jesus would be unrealistic, thus making the 
account seem created or fabricated. The second locus of 
identity depiction is in Matthew's account of the 
powerlessness of Jesus. Thiemann states that "Jesus' 
character becomes most sharply articulated when he no longer 
controls his own action. His purposive and obedient exercise 
of mission bring him to Jerusalem when he no longer controls 
his own action" (E.£J::., 130). Both Frei and Thiemann lean 
conceptually on Auerbach's exposition of "historical 
forces,,130. In this section, there is a "'mergence' between 
divine action and the 'hL;torical forces' at their common 
point of impact- Jesus' =iudgement and death" CLLc.., 116). 
These historical forces are those that are outside of the 
control of Jesus and which along with the workings of the 
130 This phrase "historical fo[ces" belongs to Eric Auerbach and is 
used in reference to the passion sequence of Jesus. Auerbach writes, "A 
tragic figure from such a background, a hero of such weakness, who yet 
derives the highest force from his very weakness, such a to and fro of 
the pendulum, is incompatible with the sublime style of classical 
antique literature" Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 42. 
Frei could have also used this concept to bolster his argument for 
the distinctiveness of the Bibli.cal genre. 
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Father, help to define and shape his character. 
Thiemann advances Frei's construal of narrative identity 
by teasing out a conclusion which is only implicit in Frei's 
work. Both authors conclude that Jesus' actions via his 
obedience to the Father enact both his and the Father's 
intentions. Frei maintains that this intention-action scheme 
coupled with Jesus' self-manifestation disclosed within the 
continuity of the narrative persuades one to consider Jesus 
as "factually raised, bodily if you will, than not to think 
of him in this manner" eLlc., 150). Thiemann pushes this 
conclusion further in adding that "to call God 'Father' is to 
identify him as the one who raised Jesus from the dead" (E.£..T., 
134) . Indeed, if God's intention to raise Jesus was enacted, 
then Thiemann is correct to speak of God the "Father" as 
"prevenient". The immediate impact of this move has enormous 
consequences for theology. If one takes the narratives as 
providing the theological matrix for Christian doctrine, 
then theological investigation remains intrinsically bound to 
the canonical texts themselves. 
The influence of Karl Barth lies behind this method of 
theological investigation. Thus, Thiemann sounds strongly 
Barthian when he states: 
"Theology would be well advised to follow the 
logic of Matthew's identifying description by 
locating its justificatory account of God's 
prevenience neither in the prolegomena to 
theology nor in a separate doctrine of 'God's Word' 
but within its account of God's identity. The 
doctrine of revelation ought to be a subtheme 
within the doctrine of God" (R&T, 137)131. 
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Rather than importing extraneous disciplines into Christian 
theological constructions (especially philosophical 
frameworks), Barth and Thiemann insist on the primacy of 
theology done as textual investigation within the Christian 
church. 
At the out set, I explained Frei' s unease with the 
concept "revelation". This led him to propose another 
category "presence" which he ultimately felt was equally 
inadequate. Frei rejected the notion that conceptual 
terminology could be formulated as a type of meta-
131 Barth writes about God's revealing of himself: "Even in 
the form he assumes when he reveals himself God is free to 
reveal himself or not to reveal himself. In other words, we 
can regard his self-unveiling in every instance only as his 
act ... Revelation always means revealing even in the form 
or means of revelation. The form as such, the means, does 
not take God's place. It is not the form, but God in the 
form, that reveals, speaks, comforts, works and aids ... The 
fact that God takes form means that God himself controls not 
only us but also the form in which he encounters us. God's 
presence is always God's decision to be present" (ill 1/1, 
321) . 
And again: "God is who he is, the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, Creator, Reconcilor and Redeemer, supreme, the 
one true Lord; and he is known in this entirety or he is not 
known at all. There is no existence of God behind or beyond 
this entirety of his being" (CQ 11/1, 52). Both quotations 
are cited in George Hunsinger, How To read Karl Barth: the 
shape of his theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 77 & 79. 
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language 132 . Rather, the "truth to which we refer we cannot 
state apart from the biblical language which we employ to do 
so The narrative description there is adequate. 'God in 
Christ was reconciling the world to himself' is an adequate 
statement for what we refer to, though we cannot say 
univocally how we refer to it" ("Response", 210). Thiemann's 
proposal concerning the status of a doctrine of revelation 
would seem to be congenial to Frei. Subsumed within a 
doct r ine 0 f God, "revelat ion" becomes dependent on the 
narrative depictions referring to God. For example, Thiemann 
makes reference to the "hiddenness of God" as "not some 
elusive self lurking behind or beyond the narrative 
depiction. Rather, God's hiddenness is simply a quality of 
God which the shape of the narrative itself indicates" (R&T, 
139) . This insistence on the primacy of the narrative 
depiction as the focal point of theological assertions is one 
shared by both Frei and Barth. 
In conclusion, I would maintain that Thiemann's account 
of narrative identity (vi 7. • Jesus Christ) is virtually 
synonymous with that of Frei. However, I would argue that 
Thiemann expands Frei's work in two distinct areas. Firstly, 
Thiemann allows the passion/crucifixion/resurrection sequence 
132 "I do not think the concept 'fact' ... (or) 'probability' is theory-
neutral I think those terms are not privileged, theory-neutral, 
trans-cultural, an ingredient in the structure of the human mind and of 
reality always and everywhere for me ("Response to Narrative 
Theology" in Theology and Narrati~, 211). 
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to provide an account of God as well as depicting the 
identity of Jesus. This is significant because it pushes the 
limits of Matthew's "stOLY" and ultimately requires the 
reader to formulate a concept ion of what God may be like; 
"storied" or actually. If, as Thiemann argues, the narrative 
depicts God as "prevenient:", this necessarily implies that 
God can fulfil his promises 133 . Conversely, "to acknowledge 
the biblical narrative as God's promise is to believe that 
the crucified Jesus lives .. 134 . Thiemann teased out the 
implications of Frei's work on the identity of Jesus into a 
doctrine of God. In this way, Thiemann's work is an extension 
and a complement to Frei's investigation. 
Secondly, Thiemann's refurbishment of the concept 
"revelation" seems to fit Frei's criteria of adequacy 
precisely because it sticks to the narrative depiction and 
does not claim to be meta-linguistic. In the background of 
this theological proposal is the Barthian concern with 
philosophy usurping theology. The major gain associated 
with a theology which generates from the narrative and does 
not claim to be linguistically infallible is that it can 
adapt itself to the changing conceptual apparatuses adopted 
133 Thus the subtitle of Thiemann's book, "The Gospel as Narrated 
Promise". 
134 "Radiance 
Authority and 
(Philadelphia: 
and Obscurity in Biblical Narrative" in Scriptural 
Narratiye Interpretation, edited by Garrett Green 
Fortress Press, 1987), 38. 
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by the church135 . 
IV. Stephen Crites: "The NQ __ rrative Quality of Experience" 
Stephen Crites' account of narrativity begins with the 
universality of cultural forms. For Crites, these cultural 
forms are "a necessary mark of being human, i. e. capable of 
having a history They are the conditions of historical 
existence; their expressions are moulded in the historical 
process itself into def j n i te products of particular 
cultures,,136. Crites proposes that one of these cultural 
forms is the story137. The story provides the necessary 
framework for the articulatio!) of human experience. Hence, 
Crites proposes that the "formal quality of experience 
through time is inherently narrative" ("NQE", 66) He is not 
alone in this proposal. Hayden White states that 
"to raise the question of the nature of narrative 
is to invite reflection on the very nature of 
135 This point is argued forcefully by George Lindbeck in chapter four 
of The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 
pp.73-90. 
136 "The Narrative Quality of Experience" in Why Narrative?, edited by 
Stanley Hauerwaus and L. Grego r.y Jones, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmann t s, 
1989), 65. 
137 Crites seems uninterested in attempting to "prove" the viability of 
his background theory of cultural forms. It is an assumption he admits; 
"1 do not know how to go about probing any grandiose thesis. To me, 1 
confess, it seems self-evident, in the sense that once the appropriate 
distinctions are made it becomes obvious" ("Narrative Quality of 
Experience", 6-66). 
culture and, possibly, even on the nature of 
humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to 
narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for 
any report of the way things really happened that 
narrativity could appear problematical only in a 
culture in which it was absent ... or refused"138. 
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An analysis of Cr ites' account is difficult since he 
gives few clues as to the genesis of this theory of cultural 
forms. It seems, however, that he depends heavily upon two 
philosophers; namely Kant and the Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. 
Kant argued in the Critiqu(,'_ Qf Pure Reason that the human 
consciousness structures thE' sense-data of experience. Thus 
there is no such thing as unmediated or pure experience; all 
sense-data is mediated through the consciousness. I will now 
analyse how Cassirer applied Kant's thought to his theory of 
cultural forms. 
Ernst Cassirer, in hi:3 three-volume work The Philosophy 
of Symbol ic Forms 139, enqll i red into this ability of the 
consciousness to struct ure :;ense-data. In these vol urnes, 
Cassirer notes that in the history of the problem of being, a 
shift occurred within the philosophy of perception. He 
states, "the fundamental concepts of each science are 
regarded no longer as passive images of something given but 
138 "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of 
Reality" in On Narrati:.L~, edited by W.J.T. Mitchell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 1. 
139 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms vols. I-III (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, ]953-1957). 
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as symbols created by the intellect itself" (.ES.IT, 75). This 
new understanding destroyed the prevailing "copy theory" 
model. It was through Kant~' s "revolution in method" (.£..S.il, 
78) that we came to real ise that the "Ding-An-Sich" was 
essentially unknowable; though Cassirer maintained that the 
thing-in-itself does exist. Rather, all knowledge was seen 
to be filtered through the "categories" which are present as 
a type of grid in the mind. It follows that if my linguistic 
creations represent more than what is "just there", then I am 
creating a symbolic system. Following Charles Hendel, he 
propose S that, " in stead u f assuming that our know ledge 
represents absolutely what is real, suppose we proceed with 
the idea in mind that whatever reality we do know is 
precisely such as 'conforms to' our human ways of knowing" 
( .£..S.E..l, 3 ) Thus, through perception, my mind receives the 
sense-data from outside myself and configures it according to 
this "Kantian" grid ("laws") in my mind. 
On this model, it follows then, that all beings live in 
a mediated reality. However, a being can live without being 
conscious of reality beinq mediated. Thus, Cassirer 
maintains that a person can never achieve unmediated 
reflection: "No longer can man confront reality immediately; 
he cannot see, as it were, face to face. Physical reality 
seems to recede in proport i on as man's symbolic activity 
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advances,,140. Even within conceptualisation (the highest 
form of the activity of the consciousness), no person can 
achieve pure, unmediated knowledge. He states, the 
"perception of life is not exhausted by the mere perception 
of things, the experiencE' of the 'thou' can never be 
dissolved into an experience of the mere 'it', or reduced to 
it even by the most complex conceptual meditations" (PSFIII, 
62-3) . Reality is always mediated and expressed in the 
symbolic forms. The symbol 1S something that exists in its 
own right and yet refers beyond itself to something else. 
Thus, for Cassirer, all reality is mediated and any 
reflection upon reality (conceptualisation) is likewise 
mediated. He finds this liberating: "Human nature as a whole 
may be described as the p("()cess of man's progressive self-
liberation. Language, art, re 1 igion, science, are var ious 
phases in this process. In all of them, man discovers and 
proves a new power- the power to build up a world of his own, 
an 'ideal world'" (Essay On J'1an, 228). 
Crites' account follows a similar pattern. He proposes 
that "every sacred story is a creation story: not merely one 
that may name creation of world and self as its 'theme' but 
also that the story itself creates a world of consciousness 
and the self that is orienU'cJ to it" ("NQE", 71). This view 
140 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on ~ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1944), 25. 
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i s r a d i call y d iff ere n t f r< )[n Au e r b a c h 's a n a 1 y sis t h at the 
biblical world is "tyrannicdl- it excludes all other claims" 
(Mimesis, 14). Rather, the "sacred story does not transpire 
within a conscious world. It forms the very consciousness 
that projects a total wor.Ld horizon, and therefore informs 
the intentions by which actions are projected into that 
world" ("NQE", 71). It i!; on the basis of this "projected 
world horizon" that the myth creates sense for human 
existence. The basis for Crites' construal of the necessity 
of the narrative form of the myth is based on his view of the 
modalities inherent within time. 
This 
"I want to suggest that the inner form of any 
possible experience is determined by the union of 
these three distinct modalities [past, present, 
fut ure 1 in every moment of experience. I want 
further to suggest that the tensed unity of these 
modalities requires narrative forms both for its 
expression (mundane stories) and for its own sense 
of the meaning of its internal coherence (sacred 
stories)" ("NQE", 77). 
statement finds it:; foundation in Cassirer who 
maintained that the artLculation of temporal-spatial 
exper iences depends on lang uage; although not neces sar ily 
narrative forms. 
Crites understands Ricoeur to hold the position that 
"symbols are in some sense primitive in experience, and that 
myths and other narrat i ve f () ems are secondary construct ions 
that assemble the primal :;ymbolic material into stories 
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[however] such a view seems to presuppose an atomism of 
experience" ("NQE", 81: fn. 12). Crites' analysis is based on 
his reading of The Symbolism of Evil. I contend, however, 
that in re lat ion to other wr it ers on myth (Levi -Strauss, 
Eliade, Jung, Freud, Bultmann), Ricoeur has the most balanced 
view of myth. He advocates "demythologization" but not 
"demythization": "What [needs to be] deconstructed here is 
not so much myth as the secondary rationalization that holds 
it capt i ve, the pseudo-loq'l:; of myth" 141 . While advancing 
this deconstruct i ve method, I~ i coeur stres ses that the myth 
must never be separated ("dl::;Lilled") from its narrated form. 
The myth and its narrated form are indissolubly bound. 
Crites' view is striking ~;iJnLlar when he asserts that "the 
truth of a story is in its narration" ("SO" , 114) . 
Ricoeur's methodology att(~f1lpts to preserve the myth while 
advancing past the mythi(:a 1 worldview (its etiological 
function) which he finds (dlong with Bultmann) to be no 
longer tenable. He write~;, "Demythologization is the 
will to shatter the fal:;<" scandal constituted by the 
absurdity of the mythologicdL representation of the world by 
a modern man and to make appClrent the true scandal, the folly 
of God in Jesus Christ, which is a scandal for all men in all 
times,,142. Although the myth loses its power of explanation, 
141 "The Demythization of Accusation" (Translated by Peter McCormick) 
in The Conflict of Interpr-etat LODS (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 335-336. 
142 "Preface to Bultmann" (TIclnslated by Peter McCormick) in T.h..e. 
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it gains an explorative funct jon. Myth is then viewed as a 
symbol which gives rise to thinking143. This allows humans 
to find meaning in life and overcome the ambiguities of life 
(Tillich via Heidegger) When myth is not taken literally 
and is viewed as a way of making sense out of life, then the 
myth is effective. This theory is conceptualised by Ricoeur 
as the "second naivete" (cf. SE., 352-354). 
I propose that criticism would be more 
accurately aimed at Bultmann who reinterprets myth in terms 
of existential categories. The problem with his programme of 
"demythologization" is that it attempts to "demythicize" the 
myth. That is, he distil~) the "truths" from the myths and 
re-casts them in other language. However, like art, myt h 
resists such quick interpretation. Ricoeur's notion of the 
"surplus of meaning" inherent in language and myth does not 
allow either to be easily translated into another, more 
propositional form. In fact, in Ricoeur' s "Preface to 
Bultmann" he notes the flaw in Bultmann' s programme as the 
failure to distinguish between demythologizing and 
demythicizing144 . 
Conflict of Interpretations. 
1974), 389. 
(EvrlTlston: Northwestern University Press, 
143 The concluding chapter in Ric()(O'ur's The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1967) is entitled "The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought" 
(pp. 347-357) . 
144 "Preface to Bultmann" 
Conflict of Interpretations. 
1974), 388. 
('('tilnslated by Peter McCormick) in .I.h.a 
(EvdTlston: Northwestern University Press, 
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v. Critiques 
Va. Maurice Wiles 
Having looked at three distinct construals of theologies 
concerned with narrative, three objections still need to be 
dealt with. Firstly, Maurice Wiles objects that narrative is 
an inadequate rubric for constructing theological 
investigation. He maintains that "narrative" is too 
constricting a category and will not allow theology to adapt 
to the changing needs of Christian theology. I contend that 
Frei (and by association, Thiemann) does not advocate 
narrative or any other cilleqory as a "universally" valid 
rubric. Wiles' critique would be much more applicable to 
more "foundational,,145 the{Hies of narrative, viz. Crites. 
Secondly, I recall my inil idl dissatisfaction with Frei's 
failure to provide a coherent theory concerning the 
"followability" of the narrated world of the text. While 
Thiemann does address thE:' issue, his theory also seems 
inadequate. Crites does n{)t address this concern. He 
presupposes narrative "fo 1 1 owability" because of his view 
that narrative is a necessa I~y expression of human existence. 
Finally, Michael Goldberg, d Jewish Rabbi and theologian, 
145 I mean "foundational" here i [I I he sense that Crites views narrative 
as a necessary expression of huntd n c.'xi stence. 
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launches a critique against narrative theology on the grounds 
that it ignores the cha I-acter of YHWH in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. He focuses on t.he discontinuity of God between 
the "testaments". Hi s n()n - founda t ional theory of truth 
allows him to maintain that the Scriptures are unintelligible 
outside of their cultura I. context unless a form of a 
"hermeneutic of suspicion" I:, employed. His final objection 
is directed towards Frei .l[ld his failure to re-link the 
discipline of hermeneutics wi I h questions of facticity and 
ultimately truth. 
Maurice Wiles reacts strnnqly against those theologians 
who wish to use the concept "narrative" as the central rubric 
for a new form of theology 146. Wi les maintains that it 
should be the "canon" tha t LS given "distinctive status". 
This would allow Scr ipt ure l: () "stand apart in it s historic 
singularity from the changJnq patterns of Christian belief, 
and so to serve as a potent ial source of prophetic correction 
over against the ever-preo:I'nt danger of Christians' being 
carried along uncritically by the beguiling streams of 
contemporary thought" ("Narrative Limits", 54). While it is 
true that Frei advocated d close reading of narratives, 
especially in terms of ident.ifying agents within them, it is 
146 Maurice wiles, "Scriptural Authority and Theological Construction: 
The limitations of Narrative Interpretation" in Scriptural Authority and 
Narrative Interpretation, ed. I:;arrett Green (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1987), 42-58. 
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not true that Frei wanted to formulate what others have 
described as a "narrative theology". In fact, Frei distances 
himself from such efforts 147 . In one passage, Frei actually 
dismisses the view that narrative is a universal 
hermeneutical rule applied regionally: 
"I am deeply concerned about the specificity of 
narrative texts. There a~e all sorts of texts, and 
the Bible includes a 11 kinds of texts to which 
different hermeneut ied 1 ru les may apply In 
other words, I hope nobody thinks of something 
called 'narrative sensc,' as a kind of hermeneutical 
absolute" ("HB", 4). 
Frei's hermeneutical content ion is rather that "it is not 
likely that we shall be ab i.e to get beyond the descriptive 
accounts presented to U~) I n the Gospels concerning the 
resurrect ion and the re lat j (HI 0 f God's and Jesus' act ions" , 
(.IE, 125). As a result, (11)(' major limitation of narrative 
is that one will never be db le to discern much about the 
historical Jesus, outside uf the text itself. Jesus' 
"identity is grasped only by means of the story told about 
him" CLI.c., 87). 
Vb. Is a story followable? 
The weakest link in I hE' proposals of both Frei and 
147 He states .. it is never '!d:;Y and usually not desirable to 
transform a literary description, :3Uch as a narrative sequence, into an 
explanatory scheme using abst r del concepts and categories", (.I...J.1::.., 
125) . 
139 
Thiemann in regards to llarrative identity lay in their 
analysis of where Jesus' "unsubstitutable identity" is 
revealed. Both maintain that in the "unbroken sequence" of 
the pa s s ion -cruc i f ix ion - rE' s ur rect ion narrat i ve, Jesus is 
shown to be who he actually is 148 His identity is 
intrinsically bound to his!) obedience to the Father and 2) 
his enactment of the Fath~~ r' s will via his powerlessness. 
Frei writes, 
"Jesus' very identity i rlv(lives the will and purpose 
of the Father who sent II i m. He becomes who he is 
in the story by consen l i nq to God's intent ion and 
by enacting that intent ion in the midst of the 
circumstances that d('volve around him as the 
fulfilment of God' s p\lrp()~)e" (.Ll.C., 107). 
I propose that for Fre i and 'I'h i E.'rnann to be consistent, they 
would need to put forth an dC'COIJnt which takes seriously the 
problem of the "followabilily" oE a narrative 149 . However, 
neither theologian does. 
Paul Ricoeur deals with I his issue of "followability" in 
148 Strawson states that "part l Cll! a r identification in general rests 
ultimately on the possibility of !()eating the particular things we speak 
of in a single unified spatio-temp()raJ system" (Individuals, 38). 
149 Thiemann attempts to show thdt. "the [biblical) stories are coherent 
[they illumine a followable worldl and that they function to invite the 
reader into the world of the ta 1 e" ("Radiance ... ", 38). However, his 
'close reading' of the text doe~ not have a conceptual framework to 
operate within. Though he draws From Alter's Art of Biblical Narratiye 
and takes into account Kermode' ~l concept of "peripeteia", he fails to 
propose a theory which account:; for this stated "coherence" in the 
narratives. 
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the initial volume of .Ii.rn..e.... dod Narrative (1983) In chapter 
five, entitled "Defenses ()f Narrative", he follows W.B. 
Gallie in formulating the concept of the "'followability' of 
a story [which he understands to be] a structural 
principle of narrative" (ll.N.l., 149) A story moves in a 
certain direction; towards a telos. Within this movement of 
the plot, the reader is "'pulled forward' by the development, 
as soon as we respond t () this force with expectations 
concerning the completion and outcome of this whole process" 
(T&NI, 150) . Ricoeu r' ::> theory allows the reader's 
expectations to be either the same or quite different from 
the actual outcome/ending of the story. Citing Gallie, he 
agrees that "to follow a story is 'to find [the events] 
intellectually acceptable (l f ter all t" (li.llI., 150). Thus, 
"followability" is not concerned with the "lawfulness of a 
process [but rather with] the internal coherence of a story 
which conjoins contingency and acceptability". It is not 
dependent upon "a psychology of reception [but a] logic of 
configuration" (T&NI, 151) Thus, it is the configuration 
and internal coherence of the narrative, while taking into 
account various types of "peripeteia", which allows the 
story's "followability,,150. 
Vc. Goldberg: Are the "testaments" pointing to the 
150 I will examine Ricoeur's reldtion to this notion of "followability" 
more in depth in the next section of this chapter, as it seems to be the 
linchpin in his theory of narrat.ive. 
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same God? 
Michael Goldberg also launches an incisive critique 
against those theologians wishing to use narrative as a 
central hermeneutical principle. Goldberg's critique of 
narrative theology is comprised of several major objections. 
I will focus on the three which I find most relevant for this 
study. Firstly, Goldberq focuses on the discontinuity 
between the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament. 
Secondly, li ke Thiemann, he advocate s a non-founda tiona 1 
approach which has some con:;equences differing from those of 
Thiemann. Thirdly, he reproaches Frei for his unwillingness 
to deal with the issue of "truth" and thus of historical 
factuality. I will now eXpC)\lfld each of these objections in 
turn. 
Firstly, Goldberg objects to Thiemann's study in 
Revelat ion and Theology a:3 q lossing over the real issue of 
the discontinuity in charact.er between the God of the Hebrews 
(YHWH) and the God of the New Testament who is incarnate in 
Jesus Christ. Goldberg n1a i ntains that a theology which 
claims to be Christian, mu~;t be faithful to both the Hebrew 
tradition and the Christ ian re-interpretation of that 
tradition. Moreover, a Christian narrative theology must 
"produce the speci f ic :; tory-grounded warrants- for 
example, the cont inui tic:; of story line, theme, and 
character i za t ion- tha I s how that in the stor ied 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ the 
character ultimately to be acknowledged as "God" 
coheres with the character of God previously 
manifested through certain characteristic actions 
performed on Israel's behalf, particularly those 
actions paradigmatically recounted in Israel's 
"master story" of the E:xodus"151. 
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Goldberg's analysis of Th i(~mann' s work is that although a 
base continuity may be estahlished between the "testaments" 
in terms of the depiction that. God is indeed a promising God, 
"an essential discontinuity may nevertheless remain, 
especially if the two star it':, differ markedly in their 
respect i ve depict ion s of what it is God promises and, 
moreover, how God then a(:I~s to keep faith with what he 
promises" ("God", 356). C;oldberg proposes that if this is 
indeed the case, then how much change in YHWH's character is 
allowable before one beg ins to understand YHWH to be a 
different God than the one depicted in Matthew's gospel. In 
fact, Thiemann's refusal to appropriate Frei's axis of self-
manifestation in character:- identity may be due to his 
inability to postulate "persistence" (one of the three 
categories which comprise self-manifestation) of the 
character "God" over the narrative time-sequence. Goldberg 
contends that this discontinuity in character depiction is so 
great that "the character of the work and person of Jesus 
151 Michael Goldberg, "God, Action, and Narrative: Which 
Narrative? Which Action? Which God?" in Why Narrative? 
Readings in Narrative Theology, Edited by Stanley Hauerwaus 
and L. Gregory Jones, (Gl:and Rapids: Eerdmann's, 1989), 
349. 
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Christ appears to be strikingly out of character for the 
One, who became acknowledged as Israel's Lord and God" 
("God .. " 360) . This task of unifying the "two testaments" 
is not a new one, but one which, as Goldberg rightly points 
out, has not been adequately addressed by narrative 
theologies. 
Secondly, Goldberg ch.llienges Thiemann's work from a 
philosophical position of "non-foundationalism". What he 
seems to mean here is that hermeneutically, the adjudication 
of truth-claims can only occur from within a specific 
tradition. Thus, while ah,;o Lute truth may exist, it is not 
accessible (in its pure form) to humans. Truth is always 
mediated and consequently, there is no "Archimedean point" 
for the adjudication of truth-claims outside of one's own 
tradition; hermeneutics does not, then have the status of a 
"meta-language,,152. 
Goldberg castigates Thiemann for not attempting to 
critically analyse the Matthean account. He notes that 
Thiemann, "whose articulation of Israel's prior saga seems so 
thoroughly and uncritically dependent on Matthew t stelling 
of it, seems never even to have imagined that the two 
152 Goldberg appeals to seve I il I radically different philosophers 
(Cavell, Wol terstorff, Kuhn) wll() share two common positions: "1) 
knowledge of the world is possible, but 2) such knowledge can neither be 
gained not justified from a tuLd lly unconditioned, non-perspectival 
position". Theology and NarratLve-=~Jj Critical Introduction (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1982), p.277:fn.S. 
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narratives my hold out fundamentally differing visions of the 
particular nature and the specific enactment of the 
divine promise" ("God", 356) Goldberg understands that the 
process of articulation of a narrative theology needs to 
employ a form of a "hermeneutic of suspicion,,153. For 
Goldberg, the New Testamcn t 's reading 0 f Israel's saga 
portrays a very different "god" from that of a 'Jewish' 
reading and ultimate ly, one needs to suspect Mat thew' s 
interpretation of "YHWH" I S depicted actions. If Matthew' s 
perspective is taken as accurate, then "from a Jewish 
viewpoint informed by the EXCldus story had God acted in 
the way attributed to him by the gospel, he would have in the 
process revealed the chardcter of both himself and his 
promises as be ing far from trust worthy, indeed, as be ing 
inconsistent and untrue" ("God", 364). This would then, 
undermine all that Thiemann had intended to discern about the 
characteristics of God depicted in Matthew's gospel! 
Finally, Goldberg challenges Frei's position that 
hermeneutics ought to be concerned only with "meaning" and 
not "truth" . Goldberg begins with the concession that "there 
.a..J::.e. narratives whose meaninq cannot be stated apart from the 
story, whose meaning cannot be gotten except through the 
153 Indeed, Richard Hays ha~; heen trying to reconcile the re-
contextualised use of "Old Testament" quotations in the New Testament 
[Echoes of Scripture in the Lett~~~ of Paul (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989)] and Brevard Chi lei:, has been attempting to establish 
continuity between the testam(~nts [8 Theology of the Old and New 
Testaments (Philadelphia: FortrE!:iS Press, 1992) 1. 
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story, whose meaning .i.s. tht, :3tory" (Theology and Narrative, 
242) . While this is true, Goldberg understands Frei's 
position to be untenable because of the very nature of 
theological investigation. He maintains: 
"For the biblical narratives which portray a 
histor ically condit ioned reality, the his tor ical 
facticity of the events narrated in those stories 
must affect the truth o[ any claims which have them 
as the ir bas is . For:; I-or ies such as these, the 
question of 'whether LL really happened' cannot be 
ignored without theo]"q i cal peril" (Theology and 
Narrative, 185). 
Goldberg presses Frei on til i:3 issue because he understands 
religious truth-claims to bE' hased on "factuality"; it is not 
a hermeneutically irrelevant question 154 . This is the very 
issue which I pressed Frej ()n earlier. My conclusion was 
that F re i under stood he r ltH'neU tics (not theology) to be 
interested in "meaning" not "truth" except in the 
pas sionl cruci f ixion 1 re sur rE'i:ti on sequence. It is in this 
sequence that formal identity depiction (the "storied Jesus") 
merges with factual assert ion (this is the way "Jesus" 
actually is) I concludE'd that Frei' s account does not 
satisfactorily explain why this mergence is necessary. I 
conclude then, in accordanc(' with my own conclusions, that 
154 For Frei, it does not seem to be either: n • .• the issue of reference 
is hermeneutically, though probdbly not theologically irrelevant n 
(nHermeneutics and Beardslee n , 4·-~»). Auerbach speaks out stronger than 
Frei on this issue: n ... the r:t oll i st, had to believe in the objective 
truth of the story of Abraham'.5 :3ilcrifice-the existence of the sacred 
ordinances of life rested upon IIH; truth of this and similar stories" 
(Mimesis, 14). 
Goldberg's critique holds. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
146 
In this section, I have outlined Frei' s approach to 
narrative identity and it's extension by Thiemann. Frei's 
account of Jesus' identity as "fixed" (via the two-pronged 
analysis of intention-action and self-manifestation) attempts 
to subvert accounts which p~obe into the psyche of Jesus or 
which reduce the gospel narratives into a mythical story. 
Crites' analysis of the primacy of narrative is 
strikingly similar to Ricoeur I s account and that of Hayden 
White. In the following :;cction, I will analyse just how 
different Ricoeur' s account is from that of Frei. Whereas 
Frei understands the gospel narratives to disclose the 
identity of Jesus, Ricoeu r' s account is broader and deals 
with more of the biblical narratives. Thus, his account is 
not restricted solely to the disclosure of Jesus I identity 
but also to that of the believer. 
Wiles and Goldberg both critique Frei. Wiles' objection 
that narrative is not t h(' central organising category 
appropriate to theology but rather "canon" seems misleading. 
I have argued that Frei was rH)t offering "narrative" as a new 
theological rubric but wa~; (ather attempting to redress an 
imbalance. Goldberg's critiques seem more incisive although 
147 
they are directed at Thiemann rather than Frei. However, as 
I have argued above, there is no essential methodological 
difference between the accounts. Thus, I concl ude that 
Goldberg's critique applies, mutatis mutandis, to Frei' s 
hermeneutic. 
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11/2. "Ricoeur and Narrative Identity: Is emplotment the key 
or the problem?": This chapter traces similar themes with 
Ernst Cassirer' s notion of symbolism and the Neo-Kantian 
ideals of the inexhaustibility and necessity of 
symbolisation. There is a dialogue with Hayden White on form 
and content, Peter Brooks on 'followability' in narrative, 
and John Searle's critique of intentionality (applies to 
Ricoeur's distinction between authorial intention and the 
inscription thereof) 
Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity is formulated through 
'listening' to those texts a person has focused upon. 
'Personal identity' is both formed and derived from 
'narrative identity'. I give an exposition of Ricoeur's 
not ion of 'narra t i ve ident i ty' and analyse the subsequent 
incorporation of Nietzsche via Heidegger to apply to one's 
own identity. 
I. An obsession with legitimacy? 
In Ricoeur's revised 1986 Gifford Lectures 155 , he omits 
the final two lectures which deal directly with biblical 
texts. His reasoning for doing so is three-fold; 
consideration of the length of the work, legitimacy in the 
philosophical arena, and autonomy of the disciplines. His 
"primary reason" for not including these two lectures was his 
concern to maintain "an autonomous, philosophical discourse" 
(QAA, 24) Ricoeur understands this decision to be in line 
with his previous philosophical investigations which have 
led "to a type of philosophy from which the actual mention of 
God is absent and in which the question of God, as a 
philosophical question, itself remains in a suspension that 
155 Found in Oneself As Another, [trans. by Kathleen Blarney], (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1992). 
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could be called agnostic " (QM, 24). This "agnosticism" 
allows Ricoeur to function within the philosophical arena 
without requiring the reader to make any decision regarding 
his work on biblical texts 156 . Secondly, he is concerned 
about needing to defend his work against the charge of 
"cryptotheology". If he had included the lectures on 
biblical texts in a volume dealing "solely" with philosophy, 
then the charge may be raised that he is adding to "biblical 
faith a crytophilosophical function" (QM., 24). Ricoeur 
wishes to maintain a distinction between the two disciplines 
and for the aporias of each to be worked out within their own 
frameworks 157 . He is concerned that appeals to biblical 
faith could be understood to replace the foundationalism that 
he so adamantly opposes. He understands biblical faith to be 
non-foundational because it rests on a "culturally contingent 
symbolic network" and thus, there is no "Christian morality" 
but rather a "common morality that biblical faith places in a 
new perspective, in which love is tied to the 'naming of 
God'" (OAA, 25). Ricoeur's position in the introductory 
chapter to Oneself As Another can be understood to be founded 
156 This was a concern of Ricoeur as early as 1979 when he accepts this 
as a problem arising from his work on biblical texts. He writes, .. I 
agree also with Mudge that I have not yet clearly shown how the 
intellectual integrity embodied in biblical criticism can be encompassed 
in this dialectic of testimony without any sacrificium intellectus". 
"Reply to Lewis S. Mudge, in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, (London: 
S.P.C.K., 44. 
157 Ricoeur does not advocate a "method of correlation" as we shall 
investigate below. He states in the Introduction, "It must be said that 
the schema of question and answer does not hold between philosophy and 
biblical faith" (QM, 24). 
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on his prior dealings with biblical texts. In the sect ion 
below, I will turn the investigation towards an exposition of 
the originating work upon which this qualifying factor, the 
autonomy of the disciplines, philosophy and faith, is 
founded. 
In the last chapter, I demonstrated how Ricoeur 
classifies all literary texts as poetic. Since the biblical 
narratives are literary, t.hey are thus predetermined to be 
"poetic". I maintained (along with Hans Frei) that this 
position posed a problem for the historical veracity of the 
"truth-claims" within the biblical texts. It is necessary to 
analyse Ricoeur's notion of truth as applied to biblical 
texts before giving an exposition of his theory of narrative 
identity. Ricoeur's radically altered notion of truth 
suggests a very different reading of biblical texts when 
deriving one's identity. 
II. The reformulation of truth: "truth" as revelation 
Ricoeur's central thrust in "Toward a Hermeneutic of the 
Idea of Revelation" is to develop a notion of revelation 
which is on the one hand, "a non-violent appeal" rather than 
that of a "sacrificium intellectus" and on the other hand, 
does not appeal to a certain "pretentious claim of 
philosophy", namely, "complete transparency of truth and a 
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total autonomy of the thinking subject,,158. His strategy for 
developing this "non-violent appeal" is to attack the 
privileging of philosophical discourse in reference to two 
claims of objectivity: objectivity in relation to truth and 
the objectivity of the individual. Thus he refuses to engage 
the issue of revelation on two other grounds, namely, that of 
rational theology and that of existential theology. 
Concerning rational theology, Ricoeur states that he 
will not attempt to "prove" the existence of God. Rather, he 
understands religious discourse as "fundamental" discourse. 
"Fundamental" dis cour se re La te s "cardinal exper ience s, as 
language brings them to expression" ("HR", 96)159. Ricoeur 
continues, adding, "the word, God, it seems to me, just 
belongs to the pretheological expressions of faith the 
experiences of manifestation and of dependence therefore need 
not be referred to God, and still less serve to prove God's 
existence ... " ("HR", 96) Ricoeur's assertions broaden the 
gap between his construal of narratives and the work of Frei 
(and Thiemann) . 
158 Paul Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation" in 
&E,.,;s<..is:2caay~s,----,o",-n!.L-....!B;Lld..· b~l....!i-.lc",-,a2....,hl_~I.JJnl..l.t...se"rh..p~r.s;e'-.Jt",-,a2..t.\..-di-",o'-Un , [E di ted by L. S. Mu dge 1, ( Londo n : 
S.P.C.K., 1981), 95. 
159 Ricoeur's contention would be in direct conflict with that of 
George Lindbeck who asserts, "a religion is above all an external word 
tha t molds and shapes the sel f and its world, rather than an 
expression or thematization of a preexisting self or of a preconceptual 
experience" The Nature of DQrr.£ine: Religion and Theology in a 
Post1iberal Age (Philadelphia: We~tminster, 1984), 34. 
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Frei would maintain that God is disclosed through the 
act s depicted in biblical na rra t i ves (though not necessarily 
that God discloses himself through the narratives) and thus 
attributing these experiences to encounters with God is to 
realise how these texts function within the community of 
believers. Thiemann would go further than Frei. Thiemann 
would maintain that the depictions of God in biblical 
narrative, namely God as "prevenient IY, imply that God can 
fulfil his promises. Thus, the narrative not only refers to 
God but informs the reader as to the character of the agent, 
God 160 . 
Concerning existent ii'll theology, Ricoeur re jects the 
methodology of apologetic t.heologies (Pascal, Tillich) and 
the theological investigations of Kierkegaard. However, this 
is not to say that Ricoeu l is not indebted to these 
theological investigations, but only that in reference to 
elaborating a IYnon-violent" (that is, one which requires no 
sacrifice of the intellect) construal of revelation, he finds 
these theological models inadequate. 
IIa. Revelation as Manifestation 
Ricoeur t s elaboration of revelation as a "non-violent 
160 Both Frei and Thiemann's construal of narrative and how this relates 
to "identity" is discussed fully in chapter 11/1. 
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appeal" is founded on his notion of "truth as manifestation 
which is in no way synonymous with heteronomy" ("HR", 
98) His first methodolog ieal move is to place revelation 
within a framework of the function of "scripture". Due to 
his prior decision to view all literary texts as subsumed 
within the larger prevailing category of "poetics", scripture 
performs a "poet ic function". In doing so, Ricoeur has 
allocated to "scripture" d double-function: firstly as 
poetic (by nature), secondly as revelatory (by function) . 
The Poetic Function 
The poetic function of written discourse has a tri-fold 
basis: 1) the distanciatic)fl of the author from the text 161, 
2) the fixation of discou['se into language 162 and 3) a 
breaking of the first-order reference (ostensive) to unfold a 
second-order of reference ("a way of being-in-the-world") 163. 
Thus, the poetic function ot literature is understood as "the 
inverse of the referentia] E Urlct ion understood in a narrow 
descriptive sense, then In a positive way as what in my 
161 "With writing, the verbal m"ilning of the text no longer coincides 
with the mental meaning or intenl ion of the text ... In other words, we 
have to guess the meaning of the text because the author's intention is 
beyond our reach" (TI, 75). 
162 Ricoeur sees this as a prohlem: "Because the event appears and 
disappears, there is a problem of fixation, of inscription" (IT, 26) 
163 "It is this enlarging of our horizon of existence that permits us to 
speak of the references opened up by the text or of the world opened up 
by the referential claims of most texts" (IT, 37: emphasis mine). 
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volume on metaphor I call the metaphorical reference" ("HR", 
1 0 1) . Ricoeur applies his theory of metaphorical reference 
to biblical texts in the essay, "The Bible and the 
Imagination,,164. It is both a clarification and an extension 
of The Rule of Metaphor 165 . It is a clarification in the 
sense that his theory of metaphor and tropes is applied to a 
reading of biblical texts, namely two parables 166 . It is an 
extension because it bridges the gap between The Rule of 
Metaphor and his more recent investigations in Time and 
Narrative. The essay is also self-consciously an attempt to 
re-work his earlier work in "Semeia" (1978) on "The Narrative 
Form" . 
Ricoeur begins the essay by defining imagination as "a 
rule-governed form of invent ion" which in turn "give (s) form 
to human experience" ("BI", 50-51). This dual function of 
the imagination is what he calls here, and in T..£.N, fiction. 
He maintains that "narrativ'~~;, in virtue of their form, are 
164 "The Bible and the Imagination" in The Bible as a Document of the 
University (ed. Hans Dieter Betz, trans. David Pel1auer) Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1981. pp 49-75. Ttlis essay was originally a paper given 
at the William Rainey Harper Con fe rence on Biblical Studies. The 
conference was held at the University of Chicago in 1979. 
165 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: 
the creation of meaning in language. 
Press, 1977. 
Multi-disciplinary studies of 
Toronto: University of Toronto 
166 The parables of "The Wicked Husbandmen" and "The Sower". These two 
parables were chosen because ot their position within the gospel of 
Mark; one at the beginning and one near the end. This for Ricoeur 
implies a sort of continuity, "the incarnate Word's march towards death" 
("BI", 57). 
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all fictions" ("BI", 51) Thus, all biblical narratives are 
in fact, fictions though not. necessarily fictional. 
The imagination is inventive to the extent that it 
affects reading of texts. What is signified in a narrative 
is not simply its ostensive ~eference. In fact, he proposes 
that 
"the act of reading [is] a dynamic activity that is 
not confined to repedting significations fixed 
forever, but which takes place as a prolonging of 
the itineraries of meaning opened up by the work of 
interpretation" ("BI", SO). 
However, Ricoeur is careful t () note that this dynamism is "at 
work in the text itself" ("BI", 50). As seen in his analysis 
of parables, it is the imagination which guides the reader 
in the breaking of the iniL tal signification (first-order 
reference) towards a higher level of signification (second-
order reference) . He sugge;;L:; that parables are the literary 
form par excellence by which investigation of the 
signification move is mack by virtue of their "literary 
form". He states, 
"the narra t i ve parab 1 EO is it se 1 f an itinerary of 
meaning, a signifying dynamism, which transforms a 
narrative structure intu a metaphorical process, in 
the direction of an enigma-expression the 
kingdom of God, an '?:<pression that orients the 
whole process of transq n'ssing beyond the narrative 
framework while at tht' same time receiving in 
return a content of llrov isory meaning from the 
narrative structure" ("Bl It, 52). 
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Ricoeur has advanced a theory of parable-as-metaphor without 
addressing the question, "How does one discern that parabolic 
language is metaphorical?,,167. His angle of attack in this 
essay is to assert that "the structure embedding one 
narrative in another narrative is the fundamental framework 
for the metaphorical transfer guided by the enigma-expression 
'kingdom of God'" ("BI", ')5). In this and the previous 
citation, Ricoeur is re1yj nq on a term 'enigma-expression' 
borrowed from I van Alme ida L 6 t3 . Unpacking this term, used 
exclusively by Ricoeur in l:his essay only, requires an 
analysis of his definition of metaphor. 
IIc. Metaphor 
Following Max Black, J .A. Richards and Monroe Beardsley, 
Ricoeur proposes that ml't dphor is discovered when an 
"incompatibility" is uncover-eel within the semantic range of 
meaning. He states, 
"Incompatibility is a conflict between designations 
at the primary level () f meaning, which forces the 
reader to extract frum the complete context of 
connotations the secunda ry meanings capable of 
making a 'meaninqful self-contradictory 
attribution' from a ::;l' I (-(~C)ntradictory statement" 
167 Addressing this problem wa:, d major thrust of the "Semeia" essay. 
Writing of this endeavour, RicoeuI recalls, "1 got trapped here by the 
question, 'what makes us interpret the narrative as a parable?'" (55). 
168 Cited in "Bible and Imaginat lon", 52ft. 
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(EM, 95). 
If the reader can recogni!:;e that the statement is Il..Q.t. non-
sensical because firstly, the attribution is '" indirectly 
self-contradictory'" and secondly, "'the modifier has 
connotations that could be attributed to the subject, [then] 
the attribution is a metaphorical attribution or 
metaphor'" (EM, 95). This change in meaning at the primary 
level leads to "semant ic L nnova t ion" (RM, 132). Thus, the 
metaphor can be re-introduced into language and recognised as 
intelligible and non-cont !del i ctory. Having established 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphClr ,is semantic innovation, I will 
now investigate its link with the phrase "enigma-expression". 
The "enigma-expression" is a semantic innovation which, 
like metaphor, begs interpretation. Ricoeur suggests that 
the phrase, "Kingdom of God", rather than fitting into the 
ostensive world "transgress (t's) the narrative" ("BI", 70). 
Ricoeur interprets the statt'ment of Jesus, "my kingdom is not 
of this world", as a limit-expression; it "transports the 
narrative outside the customary logic of narratives" ("BI", 
70) These expressions are recognised through "extravagance 
of the narrative", and so the enigma-expression "under the 
pressure of the extravagance () f the narrative, thus becomes a 
limit-expression which bt:'eaks open the closed 
representations" ("BI", 7L) Ultimately, Ricoeur asserts 
that it is the function of such enigmatic statements which 
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he 1 P " to con fig u r e " lim i t. - e x pre s s ion s . His use of the 
concept "limit-expression" is founded upon Kant's work169 . 
The concept "limit" is situated within the dialectic 
between reason and undec;tanding: "(t)his distance, this 
tension, between 'Reason' as the function of the 
Unconditioned and 'Undec3tanding' as the function of 
conditioned knowledge ..... 1 7 0 . The implications of our 
conditioned understanding is that "the quest for the 
unconditioned puts limits on the claim of objective 
knowledge to become absolute" (Semeia, 142). Within this 
dialectic between Reason and Understanding, the concept 
"limit" recognises t ha t all language about the 
"Unconditioned" is "indirect discourse, of symbol, parables, 
and myths" (Semeia, 143). 
169 Kant writes, " ... if we stop at [the boundary of all use of reason] 
we limit our judgement merely to the relation which the world may have 
to a Being whose very concept lies beyond all the knowledge which we can 
attain within the world" (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that can 
Qualify as a Science [Translated by Paul Carus] (LaSalle, Illinois: 
Qpen Court Publishing Company, 1902), 128). He continues, "But this 
limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary 
of experience, viz., to the reference to something which is not itself 
an object of experience, but is the ground of all experience" (.l.Qi.d, 
134). Ricoeur's appeal to "limit-language" agrees to the parameters laid 
out by Kant yet still recognises the elusive nature of metaphysics when 
combined with epistemology: by the analytical treatment of our 
concepts the understanding gains i. ndeed a great deal, but the science 
(of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least advanced, because these 
dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the 
intention is to carpenter our se: i01Ice:3" (ThiQ, 143). 
170 Paul Ricoeur, "The Narrative Form", Semeia (1975), 142. 
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Ricoeur is unclear whether limit experiences give rise 
to limit expressions or not. In his theory, he places limit-
concept s bet ween 1 imi t -exp res S ions and 1 imi t-exper ience s . 
This would be the result of the theory being rooted in the 
Kantian notion of the "categorical imperative". These 
mediating limit-concepts would allow the interpreter to gain 
an "approximation" of the meaning of any religious discourse, 
noting that any approximat i un would simply be a heuristic 
device. His pre ference fo r d pp roximat ion rather than the 
route of analogy taken tlY dmong others, Tillich (the 
"analogia entis"), is a function of the type of discourse. 
He explains: 
"Analogy contains, among other things, the notion 
of proportionality. consider my philosophical 
task to attempt tu approximate with my 
philosophical resources what I receive through 
another, non-phi losoph i ca 1 language, through the 
polyphony of all non-speculative language, but 
without ever suppres~3 i ng the differences. So I 
never say I can deduce the revelatory claim of the 
Biblical text from the poetic function in general, 
although I can approx i l11ale what is meant by the 
claim because I can f i f1d :;omething analogous" 1 71. 
Rather, than the 'truth' oj ,1 naLrative being cashed out in 
terms of verificationist lanql1age, Ricoeur appeals (twice) to 
a "commitment" ("Me", 34:) that is made by the interpreter. 
We adjudicate via a "netwoLk of criteria", "signals of 
171 Paul Ricoeur, "HermelH'ul. ic of the Idea of Revelation: 
Minutes of the Colloquy 01 1:) l"ebruary 1977" in The Center 
for Hermeneutical Studies ill Hellenistic and Modern Culture 
(Berkeley, CA. 1977, 33). pp.24-36. 
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quality", and finally an appeal to the Gadamerian category of 
"taste" (perhaps Polanyi':3 'intuitions'). Ultimately, in 
very non-foundational languagp, he concludes that "one cannot 
locate the truth claim in (>n(~ particular place. It is the 
mutual fitness, the mutual reinforcement of partial criteria 
which constitute as a whole a truth claim" ("MC", 36) 
Placed within the matrix of narrativity, Ricoeur would 
understand "truth" as a network of narrative coherence within 
which the reader picks up on its "signals of quality". This 
thought reflects the conce rns of Kant in the Critique of 
Judgement and more recent ly, in regards to "taste", the work 
of Gadamer. 
Ricoeur's exposition of metaphorical reference affects 
language in two related ways. Firstly, it eclipses the 
normal ostensive referential function of ordinary 
language 172 . In doing so, it opens up a way-of-being-in-the-
world which goes beyond tlw normal descriptive function of 
language. This is the heart of Ricoeur' s thesis: "My 
deepest conviction is that poetic language alone restores us 
to that participation-in or belonging-to an order of things 
which precedes our capacity to oppose ourselves to things 
taken as objects opposed to subject" ("HR", 101: emphasis 
1 72 Ricoeur does not hold that. in every instance, normal ostensive 
reference is eclipsed. 
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mine) . 
In the above section, have sketched the methodological 
base from which Ricoeur's proposal for a "non-violent appeal" 
to revelation works. French literary criticism gave him 
structuralist analysis and t.he category of poetics and he 
extends these disciplines \ () cln analysis of scripture. He 
subsequently allocates a d01JhLe function to scripture, namely 
a poetic one and a revelatory one. 
The analysis will now t.u~n to a distinction between the 
two functions allocated to scripture, the poetic and the 
reve la tory . Within Ricoeu r ':, de f i nit ion, in what sense does 
scripture function as reveLll. jun·;' He understands the poetic 
fun c t ion 0 f t ext s to" d:i sc:I 0 s e " 0 r It rna n i f est" way s 0 f 
understanding oneself. Th i::) t urns out to be Ricoeur' s 
definition of textual "trlJl.h": "the poetic funct ion 
incarnates a concept of trlJi il that escapes the definition by 
adequation as well as the cr j Leria of falsification and 
verification It is in It j s c,ense of manifestation that 
language in its poet ic funci i un is a vehicle of reve la tion" 
( " HR ", 1 0 2) . What the biblicdl texts disclose or manifest is 
a "proposed world, a world I Illd.::l inhabit and wherein I can 
project my ownmost possibilities" ("HR", 102: emphasis mine). 
This proposed world is rer('t~red to in biblical texts as "a 
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new creation, a new Covenant, the kingdom of God" ("HR", 
103) 
lId. Eric Auerbach on the function of biblical 
language 
An analysis of Ricoeur 1 s methodology reveals his 
equivocation, until this point, of "truth" with the 
"manifestation" of a "propu:;ed world" which one mayor may 
not choose to understand on,'se l f wi thin 1 7 3. Eric Auerbach's 
analysis of the difference h~Lween classical Greek literature 
and the biblical narratives suggests that the "Bible's claim 
to truth is tyrannical- it excludes all other claims 
Far from seeking, 1 ike Honwr, merely to make us forget our 
own reality for a few hours, it seeks to overcome our 
reality: we are to fit our own life into its world .. 174 
Thus, his analysis concludes that there is a difference in 
the authorial stance towaLclc; the material; the biblical 
writers were not suggest j DC) a way-of-being-in-the-world, 
rather they claim exclusive exposition of authentic humanity. 
It would seem then that Ri C::OClJ r 1 s theory has not adequately 
173 In an earlier essay, Ricoeur recognises that this choice is the 
choice of faith: " ... I should 1 ink the concept of faith to that of 
self-understanding in the face of the text. Faith is the attitude of 
one who accepts being interpreted at the same time that he interprets 
the world of the text". "Philosophy and Religious Language", Journal of 
Religion (volume 54 (1974) no.1), 84. 
174 Mimesis; The Representat Lnn of Reality in Western Literature, 
Translated by willard R. Trask, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1953), 14-15. 
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accounted for this difference; namely that, the projected 
world of the Bible claims exclusive interpretation of the 
self over other forms of literature. 
Within Ricoeur's biblical writings, the term 
"revelat ion" is explained as, "[ i] f the Bible may be said to 
be revealed, this must refer to what it says, to the new 
being it unfolds before us. Revelation, in short, is a 
feature of the biblical world proposed by the text" ("HR", 
104) . He feels that this non-religious definition of the 
concept of revelation, is in effect, the "non-violent appeal" 
he espouses. However, Ricoeur concedes that there is a 
rel ig ious mean ing of reve la t ion. This religious sense is 
what separates the Bible f rom other "great poems of 
existence. [The Bible] is a unique case because all its 
partial forms of discourse are referred to that Name which is 
the point of intersection and the vanishing point of all our 
discourse about God, the name of the unnameable" ("HR" , 
Ricoeur believes that this revised definition of 
175 This affirmation is reminiscent of Tillich's definition of God as 
the ground of being, the power of being, or being itself. Tillich 
concludes his definition with his rendering of the status of God-talk: 
"After this has been said, nothing else can be said about God which is 
not symbolic" (Systematic Theology, I [Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953J), 265. 
Furthermore, Brevard Childs suggests that It ••• what binds the testaments 
indissolubly together is their witness to the selfsame divine reality, 
to the subject matter, which undergirdS both collections, and cannot be 
contained within the domesticating categories of 'religion'. Scripture 
is also not self-referential, but points beyond itself to the reality of 
God" (Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 721). 
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truth as "manifestation" avoids the positivist excesses of 
truth defined within a matrix of falsification and 
verification and likewise avoids the subjective trap of truth 
as adequation. David Tracy, in his application of Eicoeur' s 
hermeneut ic wi thin a speci f i c theolog ica 1 const ruct ion, is 
not so careful 176 . 
III. The hermeneutical link; "truth" applied to biblical 
texts 
176 David Tracy, in Plurality and Ambiguity; Hermeneutics < Religion 
and Hope (San Francisco; Harper and Row, 1987), defines "Reality" as 
"what we know through our best interpretations [those] 
interpretations that have carried the right to be called relatively 
adequate or true" (P&A, 48) It seems that Tracy here has confused (not 
adequately defined) the distinction between meaning and truth. If 
reality is in no way objective and merely is the subjective decision or 
the interpretation (which is 'relatively adequate') of the "particular 
community of inquiry" (P&A, 29), then one would have difficulty in 
addressing issues such as "what actually happened in history with 
whatever degree of certitude is possible" (~, 36). 
When Barth claims that "God's revelation in its objective reality is 
the person of Jesus Christ" (CQ 1/2, 172) and that this is a "real event 
accomplished in space and time as history within history" (~ 1/2, 177), 
then this seems to exclude "consensual truths" which are "relatively 
adequate". Rather than allowing one's notion of reality to address 
issues wi thin the textual world, it would seem more plausible to 
understand the text as absorbing one's own world and thus the text 
defines the parameters of what that Reality is. This hermeneutical move 
thus sidesteps the problem of the self-referentiality of texts by 
understanding the text on its own terms. Tracy is correct in saying 
that ~ take on Reality ought to be understood as a construal, but he 
is wrong in assigning truth to an interpretation of our configured 
reali ty. This places experience as the arbitrator of truth; "truth 
manifests itself and we experience its rightness" (NA, 28). Placed 
within the framework of conversation, Tracy defines truth as, "on the 
side of the object, as the power of disclosure and concealment in the 
object itself; and that disclosure is related to truth as an experience 
of recognition on the side of the subject" (~, 28). However, truth as 
derived from Reality, is not purely subjective, y~t our configurations 
may be. If so, then objectivity in space/time would be sacrificed on the 
altar of "consent to adequacy". 
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In the preface to the co-authored Radical Theology and 
the Death of God 177 , Thomas J.J. Altizer and William Hamilton 
propose a spectrum within which the meaning of the phrase 
'Death of God' can be placed. The positions represented 
range from t radi tiona 1 art iculat ions of athe ism, through 
several versions of a recognition of the need to reformulate 
'God-talk' from within the Christian tradition (RT, xi: 
preface). Whilst one recognises the limited usefulness of 
such "spectrums", it is helpful to clarify the several ways 
in which Ricoeur uses the word "atheism" in his 1966 Bampton 
lectures on "Religion, Atheism and Faith,,178. 
I understand Ricoeur to be using "atheism" in two 
distinct senses. The overriding sense can be formulated as: 
"That certain concepts of God, often in the past confused 
with the classical Christian doctrine of God, must be 
destroyed: for example, God as problem solver, absolute 
power, neces sary be ing, the ob j ect of ultimate concern" CRT., 
xi) . The other sense coincides with Altizer's "eighth" 
definition: "That the goci~; men make, in their thought and 
action (false gods or idols, in other words), must always die 
177 Altizer, Thomas J.J. and William Hamilton. 
Death of God. Indianapolis: Bobs Merill Co., 
Radical Theoloqy and the 
1966. 
178 Found in Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. The Religious 
Significance of Atheism (Bampton Lectures 1966). New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969. ["RAF"] This "early" essay of Ricoeur's is 
curiously not mentioned in Thiselton: 1992 or Vanhoozer: 1990. 
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so that the true object of thought and action, the true God, 
might emerge, come to life, be born anew" CRT., xi)179. I 
propose that this first sense would be, for Ricoeur, the task 
of hermeneutics whereas this second sense would be the goal 
of hermeneutics. 
IlIa. The task of hermeneutics 
Ricoeur understands the significance of the work of 
Nietzsche and Freud to be their destruction of the illusions 
and subsequently, the idols of humanity. Nietzsche claimed 
the God of traditional metaphysics to be an idol; a self-
propagation of the "will-to-power". Freud's investigations 
led him to claim that the "superego" was nothing more than an 
ideal construct ion; "thu~; neither primary nor absolute" 
( "RAF " , 6 4) . Ricoeur appropriates both of these theories 
which he maintains will allow the philosopher to construct a 
hermeneutic which when applied to theology, finds its 
starting point in neither onto-theology nor in Kant I s 
necessarily ethical God. Ricoeur maintains that the 
hermeneutical insights of both Freud and Nietzsche "undermine 
this notion of a formalist foundation of ethics. Ethical 
formalism is seen to be a second-rate rationalization based 
179 Ricoeur is careful to note that "the philosopher's method is not to 
reconcile in a weak eclecticism the hermeneutic which destroys the old 
idols with the hermeneutic which retrieves the kerygma" ("RAF", 88). 
Rather, with Tillich, he maintajns that "an idol must die, in order that 
a symbol of Being may speak" ("Mf", 98). 
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on a transfer of transcendental-empirical distinctions to the 
realm of practical reason from the realm of theoretical 
reason" ("RAF", 77) 180. 
Ricoeur's method allows phi losophy (and the social 
sciences) to mediate between the questions which arise from 
theological investigation and the resulting various 
conflicting interpretations. He states, "I like to grant 
philosophy the role of arbitrator, and I have previously 
attempted to arbitrate the conflict of several hermeneutics 
in modern culture: the hermeneutics which demystifies and 
the hermeneutics which recovers meaning,,181. Walter Kaufmann 
proposes a similar reading of Nietzsche; namely that 
Nietzsche understood the role of the philosopher akin to that 
of the physician. His andlysis was applied to culture's 
values as a physician applies the knife in surgery with the 
180 Kaufmann's analysis of Niet ,~:5che agrees: "Kant, as is well known, 
seems never to have questioned the existence of the moral law as a 
synthetic judgement apriori", Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist. (Princeton: P.U.P., 1974 [fourth edition]), 
103. Consequently, Nietzsche opposed to Kant for this very reason: 
Kant assumed the very issue which Nietzsche questioned. (~103-104) . 
Nietzsche's method takes a more radical route at this juncture. 
Kaufmann notes that "(i)nstead of rationalizing current valuations which 
appear to [Nietzsche] as previous 'value creations that have become 
dominant and are, for a time, ca.lled "truths"', he offers a critique and 
thus prepares the ground for a new 'value-creation' or 'value-
legislation' in the future" (~, 109). 
181 "The Problem of Double Mean.ing" in The Conflict of Interpretations 
(Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 62. At this 
juncture, Ricoeur could be charged with privileging philosophy over 
theology. This is interesting ill light of most accusations that allege 
exactly the opposite. I investjqate these accusations below. 
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patient 182 . Ricoeur is likewise attempting to take seriously 
the implications of a deconstructive theory as applied to 
texts without losing the text itself. I will now turn to an 
analysis of Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God" 
and how Ricoeur fits this realisation into his hermeneutic. 
IIIb. Nietzsche's proclamation of the 'Death of God' 
Ricoeur does not attribute the "death of God,,183 to any 
particular form of atheism. Rather, this death is prompted 
by the "very nothingness which dwells in the Ideal, the lack 
of absoluteness and of the superego" ( "RAF" , 67) . J.P. 
Stern's reading of Niet.zsche substantiates Ricoeur's 
position: "This 'death' () E the Christian God, Nietzsche 
182 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist 
(Princeton: P.U.P., 1974 [fourth edition]), 109. Taken from Nietzsche's 
aphorism in The Anti-Christ, aphorism 7. 
183 It is necessary here to distinguish the thesis of Ricoeur via 
Nietzsche from the alternate and highly problematic thesis advanced by 
Altizer and Hamilton. This is crucial because although Nietzsche is 
used as the starting point for both investigations, they understand the 
phrase, "death of God", in radically different ways. Altizer and 
Hamilton understand the "death of God" to mean, "there once was a God to 
whom adoration, praise and trust were appropriate, possible, and even 
necessary, but that now there .Lo> no God" (RT, x). For these "radical 
theologians", the Christian God has died in time and space: "We must 
realize that the death of God is dn historical event, that God has died 
in our cosmos, in our history, in our Existenz" (RT.., 11). Kaufmann 
comments that the phrase 'God L:, Dead' (s.108) " ... even brought into 
being a predictably stillborn movement in Christian theology that 
created a short-lived sensation In the United States. But most of those 
who have made so much of Nietzsche pronouncement that 'God is dead' have 
failed to take note of its ol:her occurrences in his works which 
obviously furnish the best clue:; to his meaning" (G..S., 167: fn. 108). 
Ricoeur's use of Nietzsche COIlCU1-S with Kaufmann'S reading and J.P. 
Stern. I will expound Ricoeur's use of Nietzsche in the text. 
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identifies with the virtual end of the morality of good and 
evil, and of all forms of idealism,,184. It will be necessary 
to unpack what Nietzsche said about the "death of God" to 
understand how this proclamation fit s into Ricoeur's 
methodology. 
Nietzsche's first use of the phrase, "God is dead" is 
found in The Gay Science 18 :). In section 343, "The meaning 
of our cheerfulness", Nietzsche comments that "(t)he 
greatest recent event- that 'God is dead', that the belief in 
the Christian god has become unbelievable- is already 
beginning to cast its first. shadows over Europe" (B.S., 279). 
Walter Kaufmann contends that "(t) his clause is clearly 
offered as an explanation of 'God is dead'" (B.S., 279: fn.3). 
However, many commentators focus on the later sections of the 
work, especially "the parabLe of the madman" (s .125) 186. The 
setting of this "parable" L3 within a market place during the 
"bright morning hours". A madman lights a lantern and asks 
184 J.P. Stern, Nietzsche (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1978), 92. 
185 Frederick Nietzsche, The GaY_Science with a Prelude in Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs [trans. based on the 2nd edition of Die Frohliche 
Wissenschaft (1887) with commentary by Walter Kaufmann] (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974), section 109 (s109) "~" Citations from 
Nietzsche's works will indicate the section. 
186 Kaufmann proposes that the origin of "(t) he problem [with 
discerning the meaning of the phrase 'God is dead'] is created in large 
measure by tearing a section out of its context, on the false 
assumption that what we are offered is merely a random collection of 
'aphorisms' that are intended [01 browsing" (~, 182: fn. 20). Kaufmann 
alludes to the possibility that this failure may be due to the fact that 
only (s.125), "the parable of the madman", was translated and 
subsequently anthologized in hio; first edition of Nietzsche (1950). 
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the bystanders "Whither is c;od?". The answer comes from his 
own 1 ips, "I will tell you. We have killed him- you and I. 
All of us are his murderers God is dead. God remains 
dead. And we have killed him". Upon getting only astonished 
looks, the madman smashes his lantern on the ground and while 
leaving says, "I have come too early ... my time is not yet". 
The prophetic premise from which Nietszchean philosophy seems 
to be out-working is this: "God is dead" means that the 
morality associated with Chli~3tianity is no longer viable in 
the modern world. What erne I'qes from this "dark night", this 
"blackness" surrounding thE' loss of God is the superman, who 
is beyond the categories of good and evil. This loss of 
morality (a priori) combined with the "de-deification of 
nature" (s.109: 167-169) once again gives meaning to 
existence on earth187 . 
Nietzsche likens the c()nsequences of the loss of God in 
culture to a vast ocean, wht're the person longs for the land 
that once gave security. "Beside you is the ocean Bl1t 
hours will come when you realize that it is infinite and 
there is nothing more aweso!TIe' than infinity Woe, when you 
feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more 
187 However, as Kaufmann notes: "To escape nihilism- which seems 
involved both in asserting the existence of God and thus robbing this 
world of ultimate significance, and also in denying God and thus robbing 
everything of meaning and value- that is Nietzsche's greatest and most 
persistent problem" (.!2..£.Q, 101). 
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freedom- and there is no Longer any 'land'" (B.S., 180-181). 
Kaufmann agree s that "( i) t seems paradoxical that God, if 
ever he lived, could have died. But 'God is dead'; 'we have 
killed him'; and 'this t n~mendous event has not yet 
reached the ears of man"-that is an attempt at a diagnosis of 
contemporary civilization, not a metaphys ical speculat ion 
about ultimate reality" (£.£A, 100). J. P. Stern concludes 
that "( t) 0 understand the doct r ine [God-les sage] in the 
context of N iet z s che phi losophi zing is to realize that his 
se r ious concern with ita rise s not from any cosmo logica 1 
speculation, but from his cd L icism of contemporary ideology" 
(Nietzsche, 108). 
Nietzsche's philosophy 1· .c-.) used by Ricoeur to formulate a 
hermeneutic which destroy:; the traditional metaphysical 
starting points but then emerqes among the ruins as a guide 
to constructing a "post-re.Lig ious" faith. Ricoeur's working 
hypothesis within "Religion, Atheism and Faith" is that " 
(a)theism does not exhaust itself in the negation and 
destruction of religion; rather, atheism clears the 
ground for a new faith, a faith for a postreligious age" 
("RAF", 5 9) This postreligious faith espoused by Ricoeur is 
uncovered through a hermeneutic of suspicion which involves a 
recollection and retrieval of the symbols of Christianit y 188. 
188 His reference to the hermeneutical polarity of suspicion and 
recoverance is expounded in £L.~d and Philosophy, and specifically 
within "RAF", he credits Freud, Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
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Methodologically, Ricoeur' s hermeneutic ventures beyond the 
reductive hermeneutics of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx to become 
a creative hermeneutic though it travels directly along the 
same route. This new form of Christianity is marked by a 
Ii f e under grace and not unde r law, what he calls an 
"obedience to Being" ("RAE''', 88) Ricoeur declares, "( i) n 
destroying the shelter offered by religion and liberating men 
from the taboos imposed by religion, atheism clears the 
ground for a faith beyond accusat ion and consolation" ("RAF", 
60) . Likewise, Nietzsche's sceptical critique deconstructs 
"all religious states and processes, such as sin, 
repentance, grace, sanctification ... " (.G..S., 122). Ricoeur 
takes this challenge seriously for he maintains that "it is 
the responsibility of the philosopher to delve into the 
character of the present antimony until he finds the level of 
questioning which makes possible a mediation between religion 
and fa it h t h r 0 ugh at he i ~; rn " ("RAF" , 70) Indeed, "the 
philosophical progression f rom religion to faith through 
atheism involves a purification of man's desire for 
protection and a purification of man's fear of punishment-
[these are] inseparable processes ... " ("RAF" , 
189 It seems that Ricoeur is following Niet zsche' s analysis of the 
"problem of the origin of Christianity" (Twilight of the Idols and 1'.h.e 
Anti-Christ, translated, with an Introduction and commentary by R. J. 
Hollingdale [Baltimore, Maryli1.nd: Penguin Books, 1968]), 134. 
Nietzsche says firstly, "Christianity is not a counter-movement 
against the Jewish instinct, it is actually its logical consequence, one 
further conclusion of its fear-inspiring logic" (134: emphasis 
mine) . However, Ricoeur stops short of affirming Nietzsche's second 
"proposition": "the psychological type of the Galilean is still 
recognizable- but only in a completely degenerate form (which is at once 
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Following Freud, the renunciation of the "father image" of 
the biblical text, "recovered as a symbol would be a 
parable of the ground of love; it would be the counterpart, 
in a theology of love, of the progression which led us from a 
mere resignation of Fate to a poetic life" ("RAF", 98). A 
"post-religious faith" understands the ultimate referent of 
biblical texts to point towards a theology of love lived in 
accordance with a poetic life. In the section below, I will 
trace the origins of this main thesis from Heidegger and its 
implications on Ricoeur's theory of reference. 
IIIe. Heidegger' 5 exposition of "techne" and "poiesis" 
Ricoeur alludes to a comment made by Heidegger 
concerning a poem by Hoder lin, name ly, "in poet ic fashion 
dwelleth man upon the earth" ("RAF" , Ricoeur's 
notion of what it means to lead a "poetic life" is based upon 
an exposition of Heidegger's concept of poiesis, "the act of 
a mutilation and an overloading with foreign traits) could it serve the 
end to which it was put, that of being the type of redeemer of mankind" 
(134 ) 
Furthermore, Nietzsche I s analysis of the implications of such a 
form of religion are implied in Ricoeur' s desire to purify faith of 
, religion': "Yahweh the God of 'justice' ... becomes an instrument in 
the hands of priestly agitators who henceforth interpret all good 
fortune as a reward, all misfortune as punishment for disobedience of 
God, for' sin' (136). 
190 Ricoeur does not cite the source of the Heideggerian reference but 
it can be found in "The Question Concerning Technology" in Martin 
Heidegger, Basic Writings [edited, with a General Introduction and 
Introductions to each selection, by David Farrell Krell] (San Francisco: 
Harper Collins, 1977), 316ff. 
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creation in the broadest sense" ("RAF", 97). In his essay, 
"The Question Concerning Technology", Heidegger traces the 
shift in meaning of the word techne (technology). In ear ly 
Greek thought, the "techne" is used in the sense of a "way of 
knowing" , a II revea 1 ing" . This "revealing" was through 
"poiesis", a "bringing forth" of the essence of a thing 
through "physis", the structure inherent in the thing itself. 
Heidegger notes that "physis also, the arising of something 
from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis 
is indeed poiesis in the hi ghe s t sens e" ("QCT" , 2 93) . 
Techne was understood to imitate nature ; it had a mimet ic 
function. The "revealing" of the modern sense of technology 
is a "challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable 
demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and 
stored as such" ("QCT", 2 96). The modern understanding of 
"techne" shifted to imply an imposing 191 of a structure onto 
something rather than an exposing of an inherent structure. 
This imposing of a structure upon the world is called 
"enframing": "En framing means the gathering together of that 
setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e. challenges him forth, 
to reveal the real, in the mode 0 f ordering, as standing-
reserve" ("QCT", 302). Heidegger understands that this 
prevailing modern understanding of technology "as a destining 
191 "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the 
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of challenging-forth" ("QCT", 
297) . 
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of revealing 192 , is the danger for it blocks poiesis" 
("QCT" , 309-311) . Attached to this notion of destined 
revealing is the understanding of "technology as an 
instrument" which leads to "the will to master it" ("QCT", 
314) . Rather than technology challenging us, in the sense of 
techne as poiesis, the modern definition allows humanity to 
impose its notions of truth upon poiesis. Ultimately, 
poiesis is no longer able to challenge humanity as a 
"bringing-forth" of the truth inherent in the structure of 
nature itself. Re-capturing this initial understanding of 
poiesis would allow humanity once again to "bring the true 
into the splendor of what Plato in the Phaedrus calls to 
ekphanestaton, that which shines forth most purely. The 
poetical thoroughly pervades every art, every revealing of 
coming to presence into the beaut iful" ("QCT", 316). 
IIId. Ricoeur's appropriation of Heidegger 
Ricoeur appropriates Heidegger's work on poiesis in a 
more subtle way than simply the notion of poiesis as 
creativity. In the dialectic between the text and the 
192 Heidegger understands this notion of humanity destined to reveal 
rooted in the idea of the human as the "lord of the earth. In this way 
the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only 
insofar as it is his construct" ("QCT", 308). Although Heidegger does 
not explicitly state the reference, the above citation seems an allusion 
to Genesis 1:28: " .. . and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply, 
and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the 
sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves 
upon the earth" (RSV). 
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reader, it is the text which right ly provides the structure 
rather than the reader' s preconceived not ions concerning 
truth. In this way, it is the text which ultimately 
challenges the reader and thus evades the problem of 
subjectivity. 
For Ricoeur, there are two functions of reference in any 
given text. The first order of reference deals with what the 
text says. The second order of reference is the poetic 
function; an opening up of possibility of a way-of-being-in-
the-world. The first order of reference deals with issues of 
verification 193 , whereas the second order deals with a 
manifestation of the world unfolded for the reader. Ricoeur 
notes that the second-order of reference is primary; it is 
ontologically prior. He says, "I call it 'second order', 
but in fact it is the pr imi t i ve language, which has been 
overshadowed by 'ordinary' language" ("Me", 27) Ricoeur 
thus bypasses the problem of sUbjectivity by giving 
precedence to the world of the text: within the dialectic 
between the reader and the text, Ricoeur's hermeneutic begins 
from the world of the text which is the testimony of the 
193 Within the colloquy, a statement concerning the first-order of 
reference is fashioned around Ricoeur's theory: " .. . ultimately what we 
describe in terms of verifiability remains not 'meaningful'" ("MC" , 32). 
The upshot of this statement is to suggest that Ricoeur is not willing 
to play by philosophy's rules. He replies that the concept of revelation 
implies "I receive meaning, but I cannot construe meaning. I see the 
philosopher and the believer in an endless conflict ... The language of 
verification belongs to one sphere of discourse, and I cannot apply it 
to another" ("MC" , 33). 
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other. 
IV. Ricoeur on the relation between listening and identity 
"To confess that one is a listener is 
very beginning to break with the project 
many, and even perhaps all, philosophers: 
discourse without any presuppositions,,194. 
from the 
dear to 
to begin 
Ricoeur understands that through this "listening without 
presuppositions", the speaker will say something meaningful 
which provokes reflection and in turn opens a world in which 
the listener can project his/her ownmost possibilities. This 
concept of listening without presuppositions is central to 
the poetic function of texts for texts can expand our 
horizons only if we do not seek to impose a controlling 
interpretive framework upon them. We must allow texts to 
speak on their own terms. Being a Christian listener 
involves two commitments: firstly, Ricoeur states "I assume 
that this speaking is meaningful, that it is worthy of 
consideration, and that examining it may accompany and guide 
the transfer from the text to life where it will verify 
itself" ("NG", 217) Secondly , it involves dwell ing within 
the hermeneutic circle; "through the transfer from text to 
life, what I have risked [wagered?] will be returned a 
194 "Naming God" in Figuring the Sacred: Religion. 
Narrative and Imagination (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1985),217. 
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hundredfold as an increase in comprehension, valor, and joy" 
("NG", 217) It is Ricoeur' s reliance upon structuralist 
insights which allows the text 'to speak' and thus, the 
reader to escape the charge of subjectivity. It is the move 
from structuralist readings to the critique of ideology which 
has been traditionally challenged in his thought. 
It is my contention that Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger 
and Nietzsche influenced his development of the notion of 
Christian listening. Kevin Vanhoozer has rightly pointed out 
the strong connection with Heidegger' s project and which 
parts overlap with that of Ricoeur. He suggests that 
Ricoeur's emendations to Heidegger's thought are useful in 
that they make way for "narrative hope" (W, 32) I will 
attempt to relate Ricoeur's notion of listening without pre-
suppositions to Nietzsche's notion of the overman overcoming 
revenge by not imposing a controlling framework upon 
discussion. 
IVa . Exposition of Heidegger and Nietzsche 
Heidegger's lectures of 1951 and 1952, entitled "What Is 
Called Thinking?,,195, were to be his first since he was 
silenced by the French occupying powers and his last 
195 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?; A Translation of Was 
Heisst Denken? [translated by and with and Introduction by J. Glenn 
Gray], (New York; Harper and Row, 1968). 
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university lectures (WT, vi) The connection between 
thinking and listening is drawn out through an etymological 
analysis guided by Nietzsche's thought. Heidegger maintains 
that the common way of thinking is this: "Our own manner of 
thinking still feeds on the traditional nature of thinking, 
the forming of represen tat iona 1 ideas" (NT., 45). Yet, he 
rejects this as improper, as evidenced by his dictum restated 
throughout the first-half of the lectures: "Most thought-
provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are 
still not thinking" (WT, 6: italics his). His remedy for 
thi s sit uat ion is that "it has become neces sary to improve 
our ability to listen" (v.1T, 55) The lack of the ability to 
think is precipitated by the "dominance of ideational or 
representational thinking" (WT, 64) 
Hermeneutically, this way of thinking is a problem for 
Heidegger who proposes that "there is no universal schema 
which could be applied mechanically to the interpretation of 
the writings of thinkers, or even to a single work of a 
single thinker 196 " (WT, 71). Heidegger argues that we are 
closed to hearing because tradition teaches us that the ideas 
of history are about the past, not about the present. Thus, 
Heidegger maintains that we rarely are opened to hearing; "we 
do so only on rare occasions" (WT. 76). There are conditions 
196 Hence he argues about Nietzsche: it should be clear that one 
cannot read Nietzsche in a haphazard way; that each one of his writings 
has its own character and limits; and that the most important works and 
labors of his thought, which are contained in his posthumous writings, 
make demands to which we are not equal" (WT, 73). 
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for one to hear rightly: "We must acknowledge and respect 
every thinker's thought [because it] comers] to us as 
something in each case unique, never to be repeated, 
inexhaustible- and being shaken to the depths by what is 
unthought in his thought" OiI., 76) It is this unthought 
part of a thinker's thought which makes the thinker even 
greater. However, this greatness can be only uncovered in 
retrospect. 
From Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that the traditional 
way of thinking, of schematising, is at its core 
combative 197 : "The pursuit of thought, the formation of ideas 
of man so far is determined by revenge, the onset, the 
attack" (WT, 85). The overman, for Nietzsche, is the human 
who does not seek this revenge198. Thus, the bridge from man 
to the overman is paved with "the deliverance from revenge" 
(NT., 86). For Nietzsche, revenge is connected with the will 
to power, in a very Kantian sense of the categorical 
imperative: "The determinat ion of what is, then, is in a 
certain way at the command of a way of forming ideas which 
pursues and sets upon everything in order to set it up and 
maintain it in its own way" (NI, 92). The will imposes a 
197 "The spirit of revenge, my frieflds, has so far been the subject of 
man's best reflection; and wherever there was suffering, there 
punishment was also wanted" (Zarathuslra, 162; cited in YIT., 85). 
198 "For that man be delivered frQITL l:ey~: that is the bridge to the 
highest hope for me, and a rainbow after long storms" (Zarathust;ra, 123; 
cited in YIT., 85). 
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structure upon received sense-impressions not only to 
understand and make sense of this data but also to control 
it. Heidegger elaborates on this Nietzschean doctrine, 
"Hence the will is the sphere of representational 
ideas which basically pursue and set upon 
everything that comes and goes and exists, in order 
to depose, reduce it in its stature and ultimately 
decompose it. This revulsion within the will 
itself, according to Nietzsche, is the essential 
nature of revenge" (NT, 93). 
The overman overcomes revenge by becoming "independent of 
time in the sense of a passing away" (NT, 102). So Nietzsche 
has Zarathustra teach the doctrine of eternal recurrence of 
the same whilst teaching of the overman. Heidegger maintains 
of these 'doctrines': "in their essence they belong 
together" (NI., 106). He writes, n .•• in both doctrines there 
is thought at the same time that which belongs together from 
the beginning and thus inevitably must be thought together-
the Being of beings and its relatedness to the nature of man" 
(YIT., 106) Thinking, for both Nietzsche and Heidegger, is 
thus related to the essential nature of Being- it is 
fundamental to the Being of being. Ul t imately, "the nature 
of revenge as will, and as revulsion against the passing 
away, is conceived in the light of will as primal being- the 
will which wills itself eternally as the eternal recurrence 
of the same" (NT, 107). 
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V. Significance of Ricoeur's work in relation to Heidegger 
and Nietzsche 
Ricoeur suggests that "faith '" represents the limit of 
any hermeneutic because it is the origin of interpretation" 
(liNG", 218) Ricoeur's dual commitment to being a Christian 
listener, preserves the ontological investigations of 
Heidegger, belonging-to, while criticising a strictly 
positivist notion of truth. He writes, although changing his 
metaphor of hearing to that of seeing, 
"If we have become blind to these modalities 
of rootedness and belonging-to that precede the 
relation of a subject to objects, it is because we 
have, in an uncritical way, ratified a certain 
concept of truth, defined by adequation to real 
objects and submitted to a criterion of empirical 
verification and falsification" ("NG", 222). 
Ricoeur's hermeneutic maintains with Heidegger that the 
"phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial 
signification of this word, where it designates this business 
of interpreting,,199. The hermeneutic thus evades the problem 
of positivist excesses. 
For Ricoeur, "[1] istening excludes founding oneself 
It requires giving up the human self in its will to 
1 9 9 Ma r tin He i de g ge r , ...,B""e""i-"n""gl--s;.;a..wnc;.d'--T ........ i IDW>ce~;_--LA'--T ....... r""a .... n-""s"'"l'""au.t .. i"-'o"'-'n"----""'o'-"'f~S ... e_i .... n'--.... u ... n_d 
~, [translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson], (San 
Francisco; Harper and Row, 1962), 62. 
mastery, sufficiency, and autonomy" ("NG", 224). 
returns the participant to the hermeneutic circle. 
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Listening 
Ricoeur's notion of the Christian listener requires that 
the subject does not impose his/her will, consciously, upon 
the text. Rather, the unfolding of the world of the text is 
essential for the text to speak, initially, or anew (in the 
case of the biblical texts). This relationship between text 
and reader requires that the listener think in the sense 
Heidegger outlines and thus allows this person to begin to 
make the transition from human to overman. For Ricoeur, the 
notion of the will imposing a structure upon the text before 
the text can speak is a version of Nietzsche's notion of 
revenge as the primal instinct which must be overcome for 
the t ransi tion to the overman. Ricoeur understands the 
second naivete (the will ing suspens ion of disbe lie f) to 
facilitate this transition towards an opening of the self 
before the world unfolded by the text which ultimately 
engages and challenges the reader's worldview. It is this 
engagement with the text which allows the reader to formulate 
a "narrative identity" which in turn informs the self as to 
personal identity. 
Ricoeur's philosophical journey is one fraught with 
investigation. He began his philosophical investigations 
attempting to construct a "philosophy of the will". He came 
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to realise through this work that he had a specific problem: 
that of language. He understood that a direct reflection on 
oneself (hence the title given to his work "reflexive" 
philosophy) was not possible and self-understanding could 
only be mediated through symbols. He attempted to formulate 
a "hermeneutic of symbols" and realised that language cannot 
be deconstructed as such. Rather than symbolic language 
being the problem, it was language itself which was the 
genesis of the problem. 
subject 1 s ability to 
He then discarded the primacy of the 
reflect upon itself based on his 
linguistic investigations (distanciation, semantic innovation 
and a revised notion of "truth" as manifestation), which 
culminates in Time and Narratiye. 
The first chapter has attempted to follow Ricoeur IS 
theory of reference which has its foundations in his 
structuralist investigations onwards. In this chapter, I 
have attempted to tie his linguistic work into his work on 
biblical texts and finished the discussion with an early 
lecture on religion. In this lecture, his hermeneutical 
dependence on German philosophy comes to bear upon his notion 
of "truth", so that even biblical texts have a "non-
theological" truthfulness. This, I suggested, is due to his 
"obsession with legitimacy" within the sphere of philosophy. 
I will now turn to an analysis of how Ricoeur relates 
emplotment to the discerning of identity, what he calls 
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"narrative identity" to "personal identity". 
VI. Personal Identity derives from Narratiye Identity 
Paul Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity derives from 
his earliest work on identity from a phenomenological 
standpoint. His early work on Husserl, Marcel and Jaspers 
led him to the position that one's identity is not posited by 
one's own self but is rather mediated through a complex 
network of signs and symbols found in one's culture. This 
led Ricoeur to an analysis of these symbols in the first two 
parts of his "Philosophy of the will". Due to the need to 
interpret these symbols, Ricoeur soon carne to focus his 
attention on the problems of language and writing making 
strong inroads into hermeneutical theory. A large cross-
section of his work deals specifically with literary theory 
and its impact on the hermeneutical endeavour. It is 
absolutely necessary to understand the impact of Ricoeur's 
previous work on the invest igat ions· found in his more recent 
work. 
The most recent work of Ricoeur focuses on a more 
narrativised approach to personal identity. This approach 
derives from his position of mediated selfhood aided by a 
hermeneutic focusing on texts which are "culturally 
significant". One's identity for Ricoeur is a combination of 
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ipse-identity and idem-identit y 200, the two poles between 
which the self moves. Idem-identity is that which is 
unchanging, what he calls a 'transcendental'. Ipse-identity 
is that which is relative, what he calls the 'modalities of 
selfhood'. Ricoeur's main premise in his 1986 work, Oneself 
As Another, is that 'it is within the framework of narrative 
theory that the concrete dialectic of selfhood and sameness 
. .. attains its fullest development" (OAA, 114). This thesis 
derives from his analysis of the shortcomings of literary 
theorists who tend to consider the agent within the narrative 
impersonally. For Ricoeur, the key to narrative identity lies 
between characterisation and self-maintenance (hi s 
terminology) . 
Within characterisation, ipse- and idem-identity 
coincide. Character is described as the "set of distinctive 
marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual 
asking the same" (OAA, 119). It is within the interweaving 
of time and narrative (what he calls emplotment) that a 
character is recognised through his/her habits (the history 
of the character) and thei r acquired identifications (those 
which contribute to the recognition of the character as a 
unity) 
200 These two Latin terms are employed by Ricoeur to differentiate 
between selfhood (ipse-identity) and sameness (idem-identity) (MA, 
3) . 
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It is within this framework of temporal narrative that 
the identity of a character is discerned. It is the 
emplotment of the character and the ability to follow this 
movement which yields the identity of the character and in 
turn, mediates partial identity (the "narrative identity") to 
the reader. Ricoeur states that the "structure of 
narrativity demonstrates that it is by trying to put order on 
our past, by retelling and recounting what has been, that we 
acquire an identity,,201. I have previously looked at 
Ricoeur's analysis of emplotment which is the conceptual 
basis of narrative identity. 
In the fifth and sixth studies which constitute Oneself 
As Another, Ricoeur elaborates his notion of identity which 
is derived from a narrat i ve conception of the self. The 
fifth study, "Personal Identity and Narrative Identity" is 
defensive in nature whilst the sixth study, "Self and 
Narrative Identity" is more constructive in tone. My 
analys is of his constructL on of a theory of ident i ty will 
include these studies with additional studies which were 
included as Gifford Lecture!) but were left out intentionally 
by Ricoeur202 . 
201 "The Creativity of Language" 
contemQorary Continental thinkers 
Press, 1984), 21. 
in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with 
(Manchester: Manchester University 
202 The two essays are included in Figuring the Sacred and are entitled 
"Pastoral Praxeology, Hermeneutics, and Identity" (303-314) and "The 
Surrunoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic 
Vocation" (262-275) - (Cited hereafter as "PP" and "55" respectively). 
The later essay is not the original study given as one of the Giffords 
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Ricoeur combines an approach taken by "analytic" 
philosophies of action and his phenomenological and 
hermeneutical studies into a theory of action which he 
believes will not only expand the area of study but will 
engender a more fruitful analysis. Indeed, " ... the referent 
of narrative discourse is obvious- the order of human action" 
("eL", 23). His main premise is that "it is within the 
framework of narrative theory that the concrete dialectic of 
selfhood and sameness attains its fullest development" 
(QM., 114). This is because narrative theory considers the 
agent and not "action" impersonally, a major shortcoming of 
"analytic" theories of actLon 203 . Narrative theory occupies 
this transitional position between description and 
prescription. He understands narrative as occupying a 
mediating position because after describing and narrating, 
prescription is a necessary final step because there is no 
"ethically neutral narrative" (QhA, 115). Moreover, he 
maintains that "narrative, which is never ethically neutral, 
proves to be the first laboratory of moral judgement" 
It i:3 problematic when the move to 
but is attested to as containing much of the same material. As to the 
reasoning for leaving these two studies out of Oneself As Another, see 
above section. 
203 See studies 2-4 for Ricoeur interaction with and analysis of 
"analytic" theories of action. 
204 This strong position about the necessity of making ethical judgments 
both through and about narratives is curious because the prescriptive 
aspect of narrativity is borne out in the two Gifford lectures 
intentionally left out of Oneself As Another. They are both practically 
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prescription is ignored or dismissed as irrelevant 205 . 
Ricoeur traces the inception of this problem by an 
analysis of the problems currently confronting hermeneutics. 
Two tendencies within contemporary hermeneutics lend to the 
confusion over prescription. The first tendency is to view 
hermeneutics as discourse about discourse. Hermeneutics, 
within this view, is second-order reflection about the 
conditions present in the use of language. It is mainly a 
descriptive, though investlqative (especially when practised 
as deconst ruct ion) enterpr i :,e . Ricoeur argues that if this 
is the function of hermeneutics, then the discipline "would 
become redundant" ( "PP" , 3 0 4) . Secondly, the tendency to 
speak of a "hermeneutic of " betrays a methodology which 
tends to neglect the necessarily applicative aspect of the 
hermeneutical endeavour. Ricoeur maintains that 
"understanding and explicat ion without application are not 
interpretation [and] appLication is not some supplement 
to hermeneutics" (OAA, 301\)206. For Ricoeur, hermeneutics 
oriented and focused. 
205 This move parallels his n,ll Lon of appropriation within the 
hermeneutic circle. It is not enough for the reader to investigate the 
world of the text without maki ng some commitment to the text' s 
disclosure, either pro or con. I discuss Ricoeur's notion of "critical 
appropriation" in chapter 111/2. 
206 It may seem odd for Ricoeur to argue against a specific approach 
taken by a hermeneutician for he is known for espousing a "hermeneutic 
of suspicion". However, this is only one half of his approach to 
hermeneutics because the complementary aspect, namely a "hermeneutic of 
restoration", is equally necessary for Ricoeur's entire hermeneutic. I 
suggest that the tendency of Ricoeur:- to emphasise the former has led to 
a one-sided interpretation of hi:3 her:-meneutics. Furthermore, the charge 
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cannot simply be discourse about other forms of discourse 
which would determine it as a mainly descriptive enterprise. 
Hermeneutics, as with narratives, can not be ethically 
neutral; it must suggest ways of thinking in accordance with 
an uncovering of Being. 
The conceptual basis for Ricoeur' s insistence on the 
ethical dimension of narration can be analysed as such. All 
discourse is action (taken from speech-act theory) and 
human action can be a speak ing action (taken from action-
theory). He writes, "practice is discursive [yet is] always 
art icula ted by norms, symbo 1 s, signs, not to speak of the 
unsaid (pre judices)" ("PP", ) 0 5) Christian hermeneutics is 
an "attempt to unfold the pot.ent ial for irradiation" ("PP", 
305) of events central to the Judeo-Christian faith. The 
"privileged objects of interpretation are texts, events, 
inst i tut ions, and personages" ("PP", 306) in this quest for 
irradiation207 . From a t.heological standpoint, the " 
self is constituted and defined by its position as respondent 
to propositions of meaning issuing from the symbolic network 
in the Jewish and Chri:3tian tradition" ("SS", 262). For 
of being a crypto-theologian, has prompted Ricoeur to leave out those 
studies in Oneself As Another which deal with the applicative and 
restorative aspects of his investigations, thus lending to this one-
sided interpretation. 
207 Whilst most of Ricoeur's work focusses on textual analysis, it is 
important to note that for him, texts are only one link in a chain of 
communication; one type of va (i ous semiotic systems which influence 
humans beings. 
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Ricoeur, this constitution of the self by means other than 
the self is in opposition to the "self that absolutely names 
itself" ("SS", 262). This difference is important for it 
recognises the influence of factors external to the self in 
the acquisition of identity. Effectively, selfhood 
understood this way, dispossesses the complete autonomy of 
the will to conceive of itself and requires the person to 
recognise the influence of a complex network of semiotic 
systems in understanding one I s identity. As a Christian, 
Ricoeur privileges the formation of identity through the 
symbolic network of the biblical writings. He writes, this 
self "responds precisely to that symbolic ensemble delimited 
by the biblical canon" wh ich is informed by one of the 
"historical traditions" called the church ("SS", 263). 
Furthermore, faith is "instructed- in the sacred sense of 
being formed, clarified, and educated- within the network of 
texts that in each instance preaching brings back to living 
speech" ("NG", 218). Faith, for Ricoeur is active, it is 
that response of the self when confronted by the texts the 
self chooses to appropriate and understand itself in 
continuity with. I will now turn to unfolding the process by 
which Ricoeur understands this to happen. 
VIa. How Texts Interpret Us 
Recognising the establishment and the shaping of 
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selfhood through semiotic systems which we mayor may not be 
conscious of and that these systems are not ethically 
neutral, requires the individual to assess his/her 
relationship to those symbolic networks around him/her. 
Ricoeur suggests that for the Christian the biblical texts 
ought to be privileged for the formation of identity. He 
establishes this as a practice in continuity with Judeo-
Christian tradition. In the case of the prophetic 
narratives, the structure of the call of the prophet narrates 
a situation in which the "prophetic ego is so radically 
decentered that it is at first uprooted from its initial 
setting" ("SS", 265) This re-identification of the prophet 
concludes as the prophet is assured by God and the process of 
being made part of the tradition of the community. 
Ricoeur notes that this "tradition" (which can be 
readily analysed by a structural analysis of the prophetic 
narratives) is followed through to the practice of the early 
church. There is the Pauline metaphor of "the Christian self 
as christomorphic" (" SS", 2 68) . This notion of the Christian 
becoming more like Christ is part of a "chain of descending 
glory ... God's glory, that of Christ, that of the Christian" 
("SS", 268). Ricoeur maintains that an understanding of the 
Christian self which follows this way of thinking is well 
established traditionally in Judeo-Christ ian pract ice and 
attested to by its writings. 
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The "conscience,,208 aids in the application of this 
tradition to the self. He wr i tes, " it is to the dialogue of 
the self with itself that the response of the prophetic and 
the christomorphic self is grafted" ("SS", 271) 
discernment of the conscience is an interpretive act, for 
"the autonomy of the Kantian conscience is 
tempered by the confession of nonmastery over 
oneself [and the] kerygma may be reinterpreted 
in such a way that its transcendence is 
symmetrically tempered by the process of ongoing 
interpretation of the symbolic space opened and 
delimited by the biblical canon" ("SS", 272-273). 
This 
This act is never fully corr~]eted for the "'synthesis' is not 
given and never attained between the verdict of conscience 
and the christomorphism of faith. Any synthesis remains a 
risk, a 'lovely risk' (Plato)" ("SS", 275). This position 
reflects Ricoeur's notion of appropriation in which there is 
the "wager" of faith. 
VII. The conceptual foundations for discerning identity 
Ricoeur maintains that it is the idealism inherited from 
Kant which depersonalised the subject and thus brought the 
problem of selfhood into focus. He writes, "the problematic 
of the self emerges magnified, in a sense, but at the price 
208 The conscience for Ricoeur lS established within a dialectic of 
care (from Heidegger) and testimony (over and against accusation) ("55", 
269-271) . 
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of the loss of its relation to the person who speaks, to the 
I-you of interlocution, tu the identity of a historical 
person, to the self of responsibility" (QAA, 11). For 
Ricoeur, personal identity is best posited within a dialectic 
of selfhood and sameness (ipse- and idem-identity) Indeed, 
"Oneself As Another suggests from the outset that the 
selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate 
degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that 
instead one passes into the other [as we might say in 
Hegelian terms]" (OAA, 3). Thus, the identity of the person 
is not immediately posjted (as Ricoeur suggests is 
philosophy's inher i tance E rom Descartes' Medit at ions) but 
Ricoeur favours a mediated positing of the self 209 . 
Ricoeur argues that wh i lst idem-identity is necessary 
for simi lar i ty and cont inu L t y amongst persons, ipse-ident i ty 
is necessary for the positj ng of the self as permanent (not 
merely Hume's shifting 'bundle of perceptions') It is the 
emplotment of the charactel which establishes the framework 
necessary for the followability on the part of the reader for 
"[t]here is thus not just an emplotment of actions; there is 
also an emplotment of characters" ("PP", 209) Furthermore, 
the "thesis supported here will be that the identity of the 
209 Hume' s queries about the attribution of characteristics to a 
singular person stand out as an emphasis on the side of ipse-identity, 
especially in The Treatise on Human Nature. Ricoeur sketches this one-
sidedness in Locke and Hume (QbA, 125-129). 
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character is comprehens ib 1 e through the transfer to the 
character of the operation of emplotment, first applied to 
the action recounted; characters, we will say, are 
themselves plots" (QAA, 143: emphasis mine). It is the 
"interconnection of events constituted by emplotment [which] 
allows us to integrate with permanence in time diversity, 
variability, discontinuity, and instability" (QAA, 140). 
Ricoeur suggests that Dilthey's concept of 
Zusammenhand des Lebens (the connectedness of a life; a 
life-history) gives the historical basis for a narrative 
understanding of a life. He writes, It [i] t is this 
preunderstanding of the historical significance of connection 
that the narrative theory of personal identity attempts to 
articulate, at a higher level of conceptuality" (QAA, 141). 
A narrative identity is dependent upon this 'connectedness' 
which he calls a "narrative unity of a life210 " ("PP", 308). 
As with emplotment, "the character preserves throughout the 
story and identity correlative to that of the story itself" 
(QAA, 143) This connection is tentatively supplied by the 
reader in the phenomenon Ricoeur calls 'followability'; the 
active part of the reader in creating the plot. This 
phenomenon occurs firstly by "superimposing in some way a 
configuration with a beginning, a middle, and an end" ("PP", 
210 His reasoning depends on t he apparent obviousness of this claim: 
"Do not the identity of an actor and the objects/subjects of his or her 
intervention consist in such an unity?" ("PP", 308). 
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309: emphasis mine). He notes that this configuration is 
always conditional and thus open to revision or refiguration. 
There is continual movement between configuration and 
refiguration. It is the imagination which allows such 
"structuring and destructuring" ("PP", 311). However, Ricoeur 
is silent about 'restructuring'. It is the imagination when 
confronted with the potential of the world unfolded by the 
text that prompts this movl' Lo restructuring the identity. 
He writes, the "mediating function performed by the narrative 
identity of the character bel. ween the poles of sameness and 
selfhood is attested to primarily by the imaginative 
variations to which the nC! rrat ive submits [one's J identity" 
(QM,148). 
However, as with Gadamer's fusion of horizons, the 
creation of plot is not fu l1 y the work of the reader. He 
writes, the "narrative constructs the identity of the 
character, what can be called his or her narrative identity" 
(MA, 147-148) Furthermore, the emplotment of action and 
character has a defined bcc>qinning, middle and end which 
serves to delimit the potent tal range of interpretation on 
the part of the reader. lndeed, the "correlation between 
action and character in a narrative [leads to aJ dialectic 
internal to the character which is the exact corollary of 
the dialectic of concordanc{' and disconcordance developed by 
the emplotment of action" (Ql:J:., 147). 
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IX, The possibility of a "Narrative Theology" 
Ricoeur believes that there are gains to be made in 
pursuing a theology based on narrative, His essay on 
narrative theology states at the outset 211 that although he 
is concerned with the difficulties of a narrative theology, 
he would not exert such effort if he did not believe that a 
narrative grounding of thE'ology was "sound". A narrative 
theology is fundamentally "better" than a speculative 
theology (which rids discourse of reference to stories), a 
moral theology (which is atempora1 212 ), and an existential 
theology (which rids theo Logy of a historical basis and 
ultimately focuses too much on the individual). The 
contemporary need for a narrative theology comes from the 
loss of tradition and authority inherited from the 
Enlightenment quest coupLed with technological advances 
allowing the human will (to power) to control ,and manipulate 
the environment. This creates a situation of "an increase of 
forgetfulness, especially that of the past sufferings of 
human kind [which leads J to d loss of storytelling" ("TNT", 
238) . The conceptual basis at d narrative theology finds its 
basis in the elements of ndrratology; emplotment, narrative 
211 "Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its 
Difficulties" in Figuring the SaJ.;J::s;.Q. 
212 Ricoeur understands atempura Lity to be a major weakness of 
structuralism (see chapter I/2). 
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intelligibili ty 213, tradition which vacillates dialectically 
between sedimentation and innovation, and the focus on 
"meaning". Furthermore, the "biblical narratives intensify 
they constitute the identify (sic) of the community that 
tells and retells the story, and they constitute it as a 
narrative identity" ("TNT", 241). 
However, the disciplines of narratology and theology are 
not prima facie compa t ib 1 e . The relationship between 
biblical narratives and the status of narratives in general 
(narratology) is tenuous because biblical narratives 
exemplify different traits to most narratives 214 . 
Ultimately, the gains of a narrative theology are not based 
exclusively on narrative but work in conjunction with the 
other modes of discourse found in biblical texts. Frei was 
sceptical of Ricoeur' s "qeneral hermeneutics" ( "Literal 
Reading .. . ", 47) yet hesitates in a letter to Gary Comstock: 
"You may even disagree with my assessment that Ricoeur turns 
biblical hermeneutics into a regional case of general 
hermeneutics. Well, I'm afrailj I'd argue the case vigorously, 
despite the essay on Revelation ["Toward a Hermeneutic of the 
Idea of Revelation"] with Lts (to my mind inconsistent) 
213 "Narrative intelligibility shows more kinship with practical wisdom 
or moral judgement than with theoretical reason" ("TNT", 239). The 
emphasis on phronesis over theoria is the basis for Ricoeur's notion 
of the followability of narrative. 
214 For the various problems plaguing any construal of a narrative 
theology see the appendix "Problem of Narrativity in general". 
199 
qua1ifications,,215. 
X. Frei's critique of Ricoeur's hermeneutic 
Ricoeur's "general hermeneutic" as applied to Christian 
theology causes three inter-related problems for Frei. 
Firstly, the loss of the singularity of Jesus Christ. 
Secondly, the flow from text to world is reversed. Instead 
of theology moving from the specificity of the narrativised 
"Jesus" to speaking about the person Jesus, there is rather a 
move from a general human condition (a "way-of-being-in-the-
world") to speaking about Jesus. It is a form of 
allegorising which Frei understands to betray the Christian 
church's way of the primac:y of the sensus literalis. 
Finally, and ultimately, the v iabili ty of Ricoeur' s general 
theory ("within which biblicaL narrative becomes a 'regional' 
instance of the universally valid pattern of interpretation" 
("LR It, 125)} is under quest ion because of deconst ruct ion. I 
wish to deal with an exp()~; it ion of these issues one at a 
time. 
Loss of the singularity of Jesus Christ 
Frei maintains that Ricoeur's theory reduces 'Jesus' to 
215 Hans Frei Papers, Manuscript Group NO.76 (12), Special Collections, 
Yale Divinity School Library. 
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an " ascriptive subject chiefly in the form of 
consciousness, that is, of his selfhood as 'understanding'" 
("LR", 126). Frei argues that Ricoeur must do this because 
it is " ... consistent with, if not indispensable to, the 
hermeneutical scheme of 'meaning-and-understanding'" ("LR", 
126) . Wi thin this scheme, Jesus becomes " the verbal 
expressor of a certain preconceptual consciousness which he 
then, in a logically derivative or secondary sense, exhibits 
in action" ("LR" , 126). FIei maintains that within Ricoeur's 
idea of narrat i ve ident it y, "L i ke anyone else, Jesus is here 
not in the first place the agent of his actions nor the 
enacted project(s) that constitute(s) him, nor the person to 
whom the actions of others happen ... " ("LR", 126)216. 
The primacy of anthropology 
Frei suggests that within Ricoeur's hermeneutical 
scheme, "[wJhat narratives present (whether or not 
'literally') is not in the ficst place ascriptive selves that 
are the subjects of their pn'dicates, not even really the 
self-expressive, centered consciousness or transcendental 
ego, but the 'mode-of-being-in-the-world' which these selves 
exemplify and which is 're-presented' by being disclosed to 
'understanding'" ("LR", 127). Thus, ,,' [hJ uman reality in its 
216 This claim does not ring true of Ricoeur in Oneself as Another and 
the essay "Interpretive Narrativ('''. 
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wholeness' will in one way or another be the subject matter 
instead each time, though perhaps a bit more obliquely and 
allegorically in the case o[ the narrated ascriptive subject 
called 'Jesus', and more metaphorically and directly 
evocatively in the case of the parables and the experience 
they express" ("LR", 128). Within Ricoeur's system, Frei 
contends that the " virtual running into each other of 
'meaning' and 'truth' tends to force realistic 
description to become metaphor, so that its 'meaning' Q.J.La. 
possible ontological truth can be a transcendent, secondary 
world which is obviously .lli2L realistic" (LComstock, 3) "If 
true being is in the unity of metaphorical language, limit 
exper ience, and mean ing, j \I~;t how do you recapture the world 
of sense and things? Just what ~ that secondary world which 
is referred to by the othec part of the 'split' reference, 
the part that does not refer real i st ically?" (LComstock, 
Whilst this accusation is founded when addressing the 
"disclosure" of parables in Ricoeur's thought, is this charge 
sustainable when Ricoeur sIwd ks about "Jesus"? Does Ricoeur 
lose the "s ingular i ty" of ,J esus or does Tracy push Ricoeur' s 
thought towards this? Certainly Tracy substitutes qualities 
217 See Soskice Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1985) and Wol terstorff Divine Discourse (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) for the same critique. 
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of love, etc. for "Jesus" but does Ricoeur?218 
The problem as Frei sees it, is one of credibility. 
There is a 
"desire on the one hand to claim the 
unsurpassability of the New Testament's ascriptive 
reference to Jesus, so that they do not become 
esoteric or carnal shadows, in principle 
surpassable by a later and fuller spiritual 
'reference' or 'disclosure', but on the other to 
deny that this unsurpassability involves the 
invidious distinction between insiders and 
outsiders to the truth" ("LR", 129-130). 
Buying into this programme to have it "both ways" requires a 
method of arguing which looks like this: "they try to 
maintain that Jesus is the irreducible ascriptive subject of 
the New Testament narratives, while at the same time they 
make general religious experience (or something like it) the 
'referent' of these stor ies . It is an uneasy alliance of 
conflicting hermeneutical aims" ("LR" 130) 
Ricoeur's "general hermeneutic" 
Frei's analysis of J\icoeur's "general hermeneutic" 
concludes: ..... no mat te r how adequate or inadequate the 
theory turns out to be in actual exegetical application, the 
very possibility of read i ng those narratives under its 
218 See David Tracy Blessed Rag~ fQr Order, 221. 
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auspices has to stand or fall with the theory's own viability 
in the first place" ("LR". 130) Thus, 
" [i] f the general theory of hermeneut ics is to 
stand, it must persuade us that its appeal to a 
second naivete and to a hermeneutics of restoration 
constitutes a genuine option between reading with a 
first naivete on the one hand and on the other 
reading with that 'suspicion' which regards the 
linguistic 'world', which text and reader may 
share, as a mere ideological or psychological 
superstructure reducible to real or true 
infrastructures, which must be critically or 
scientifically adduced" ("LR", 130-131). 
Frei maintains that Ricoeur's way of fusing the horizons of 
text and the reader is to appeal to the text's ability to 
"disclose". It renders the text "normative, in fact it 
transcends present understanding ontologically, but only in 
such a way that it is in principle hermeneutically focused 
toward the latter. Textual 'disclosure I means that the 
language of the text 'refers I, but refers strictly in the 
mode of presentness [and] refers creatively without 
creating what it refers to" ("LR", 132). Yet, it is 
precisely this notion of "presence" to the consciousness 
(Ricoeur's 'understanding') which deconstruction attacks: 
"the 'worlds' that are supposedly 'disclosed' actually have 
the subversive, deconstruct ing nonreferentiali ty of pure 
metaphoricity built into them" ("LR", 135) . Indeed 
deconstruction argues that "the general bearing of 
hermeneutical theory is one for which I understanding' as 
self-presence is the indispensable and irreducible 
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counterpart to textual 'meaning' as linguistic presence, and 
vice versa" (tlLR", 135). This is why deconstruction argues 
for the priority of speech over writing because within a 
theory of text understood as discourse (Ricoeur recognises 
this in ~, 25-26), it is simply the presence of the speaker 
(in his/her absence) which is exchanged for the self-presence 
of understanding. So, deconstruction argues, in Ricoeur' s 
theory "[w]hat is already written is not a present event, as 
understanding what is written is; it must be raised to the 
level of present communicative event, and thereby the 
textuality of the text is ceconverted (in obverse form) into 
speech" ("LR", 135; also Derrida, Speech and Phenomena) . 
Frei's admonishment is 
"To realize the deconstructive susceptibility of 
this self-enclosed, presence/self-presence, scheme 
is, Deconstructionists tell us, to learn with 
metaphorical force (or, to an outsider to the whole 
argument, exaggeration) the drastic difference 
between speech and writing, and indeed- in contrast 
to the absolute connection between speech as 
linguistic origin and the mode of self-presence in 
hermeneutical theory- of the independent priority 
of writing over speech II ("LR", 135-136). 
Thus Frei recognises the 
"threat to hermeneut i cal theory is that either 
'second naivete' is no concept but simply a 
misleading term, and restorative hermeneutics 
explains or justifies no way of reading, or that if 
one is to hold out for anything like it, one had 
better invent a more adequate theory to support the 
claim ... [or] one may want to claim that a notion 
similar to 'second naivet~ (though not necessarily 
isomorphic with it) is indeed meaningful, but not 
because it is part of, or justified by, any general 
theory" ("LR", 137). 
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The question is then raised, "does Ricoeur advocate a general 
hermeneutical theory?" It would seem that he does not 
because he reads the biblical material within genre 
distinctions, thus negating any "singular" way of reading. 
This is misleading, however, for Frei's contention is not 
that Ricoeur doesn't recogn ise genre distinctions but that 
all literature (which for Ricoeur necessarily) has a poetic 
function and this function is to disclose authentic human 
being. Frei understands that this "revision" of the New 
Testament language is " ... 1 Lttle more than a literary code 
for a full-orbed Idealistic-ontological use of 'truth', and 
its residual realistic element is reduced to some kind of 
'powerful (poetic) presence'" (LComstock, 4219 ). Ultimately, 
this " kind of straightforward philosophical revision of 
New Testament claims is simply not open to me; the mode of 
New Testament truth claiming has to be more complex for me, 
i.e., more complex at the second-order philosophical-
theological leve l, not in the first-order religious 
confession" (LComstock, 3). 
Frei's unease with Ricoeur's hermeneutics can be viewed 
219 Though referring to Comstock, this critique would be equally valid 
of Ricoeur. 
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as his reaction to a form of an apologetic enterprise220 : 
This reinterpretation of Christian theology allows it to 
become a "quasi-philosophy of religion with a regional 
hermeneutics under general philosophical-hermeneutical 
governance" (LComstock, 2). Frei maintains "I'm afraid I'd 
argue the case vigorously, despite the essay on Revelation 
[Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation] with its (to 
my mind inconsistent) qualifications" (LComst ock, 1). 
Vanhoozer's assessment of l~ i coeur is less definite. He 
contends that for Ricoeur, "theological hermeneutics is 
therefore a particular case of a general hermeneutic and at 
the same time a un ique ca se" (BN, 155). I think that 
Vanhoozer's assessment of Ricoeur's position is more accurate 
than Frei' s, especially because of (not despite) the essay 
on "Revelation". 
XI. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, Ricoeu r posits that personal identity 
derives from a narrative idE'nLity, discovered within the 
matrix of the followability (If the plot (and characters are 
plots) A narrative theo logy is possible because the 
biblical narratives differ from other narratives based on 
220 Vanhoozer contends that " ... though Ricoeur disavows any apologetic 
ambitions, his whole project of dpproximating philosophy to theology may 
be seen as a large-scale apologeU c effort to show the intelligibility 
of the Christian faith" (EN, 152). 
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their subject matter and their ability to disclose a way-of-
being-in-the-world. Ricoeur calls this "revelation as 
manifestation,,221. To allow oneself to be challenged by the 
text, Ricoeur employs both Heidegger ("thinking") and 
Nietzsche (the "overman ") to substantiate his claim of 
Christian listening as the non-imposition of frameworks. 
This allows the self to be open to the other and to allow the 
mediation of a narrativised identity. 
221 I refer the reader to the section of the thesis "Ricoeur and 
Structuralism: A revised notion of 'Truth'?", 
Chapter Three: 
Critique of Methodology 
111/1 "Frei and Christian self-description: The 
possibility of an external critique?" 
111/2 "Ricoeur and external critiques: A new 
definition of the force of ideology?" 
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III/I. "Frei and Christian self-description: The 
possibility of an external critique?": An exposition (for 
the first time) of Frei's notion of theological construal. 
Frei understands religion as a language game and uses 
Auerbach ("realistic narrative") and Geertz ("thick 
description") for an exposition of the descriptive aspect. 
He rejects philosophical description in theological 
investigation because of its importation of external 
criteria, the phenomenological analysis of Ricoeur, and the 
fideistic stance of D.Z. Phillips. 
In Types, Frei favours a dual approach between Schleiermacher 
(correlation between analysis and self-description) and Barth 
(internal description and dogmatics). The analysis concludes 
that Frei's position is similar to Lindbeck's and that his 
approach is an attempt to mediate a dual approach within 
theological investigation. 
I. Introduction 
David Ford, in a recent article, states that Hans Frei 
"may well be the most significant figure in North American 
theology and religious studies during the last quarter of 
this century,,222. Ford recognises Frei's significance to be 
manifested in several ways; I wish to focus on one of those 
which he selects. Frei's career was consumed by matters of 
methodological clarification and historical enquiry into the 
roots of why such clarification was needed223 . He was 
involved in "second-order" theological exploration 
(descriptive) rather than that of the "first-order" 
(constructive) However, Fre i, unlike Ricoeur, did not 
222 David Ford, "On Being Theologically Hospitable To Jesus Christ: 
Hans Frei' s Achievement", Journal of Theological Studies (NS, Vol. 46, 
Pt.2, October 1995), 532. 
223 David Ford, 533. 
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always publish his thoughts on and/or interactions with 
disciplines outside of theology. It has been surmised by 
some that this is due to his focus on the meaning of biblical 
narrative rather than its truthfulness 224 . In light of the 
newer posthumous publications, much of this dialogue 
concerning this relationship is becoming clearer. In this 
chapter, I wish to explore the relationship between an 
intensive focus on Christian self-description and the 
possibility of this way of construing theology engaging with 
that of an external critique. My contention is that 
Christian self-description is not immune to external critique 
and I wish to explore the ways in which the force of such a 
critique could be understood. 
It is important, at the outset, to note that Frei 
understood his work to be descriptive rather than a positive 
unfolding within theology. In the "Proposal for a 
Pro j e ct ,,225, he states "[t] his is a piece of conceptual 
analysis- that is, in principle an exercise chiefly about 
rather than in theology, although in practice the distinction 
will not always be clear" (Types, 1). The latter clause is 
telling, for Frei also maintained that The Eclipse of 
224 As does Gary Comstock, "Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on 
Biblical Narrative", The Journal of Religion (1986), 116-140. I will 
discuss Comstock' s article and Frei' s response to it later in the 
chapter. 
225 In Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992). 
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Biblical Narrative was merely, as its subtitle indicated, "A 
Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics". 
However, it is clear that Frei was not simply interested in 
description but also he was equally interested in prescribing 
a cure for that very eclipse of narrative within theology, 
which he so successfully describes. The title suggests 
nothing less. Once again he writes: 
"Part of what I want to suggest is that the 
hermeneutical option espied but not really examined 
and thus cast aside in the 18th and early 19th 
centuries was that many biblical narratives, 
especially the synoptic gospels, may belong to [the 
type] for which their narrative rendering, in 
effect a cumulative account of the theme, is 
indispenSable"226. 
His caveat concerning typologies is equally revealing; " 
the really important thing is to know that even such 
distinctions are not prescriptive, that their sometimes 
quite natural violation in practice says nearly as much about 
them as the distinctions say themselves" (Types, 21). I 
suggest that whilst Frei wishes his work to be understood as 
"second-order" reflection within theology, it often slips 
over into "first-order" theological statements 227 . This 
recognition is necessary not only to expand Frei's importance 
226 The Eclipse of Biblical Narratiye: A Stud¥ in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1974), 13. 
227 Frei understands "first-order" theology to be involved in "'witness' 
and 'confession' of 'specific beliefs' that seem on the face of it to be 
talking about acknowledging a state of affairs that holds true whether 
one believes it or not" (~, 20-21). 
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(by extens ion from Ford's comments) but to evaluate his 
hermeneutic in light of recent challenges. 
Frei's work on biblical narrative is mainly an 
exploration of how contemporary problems within current 
theological exploration arose. Because of this focus, he 
spends little time on "positive" theological construction. 
However, Frei was not wary of aligning himself with 
particular theologians and their ways of construing theology. 
In particular, Frei 'agrees' with (and sometimes 'expands') 
the work of Karl Barth, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Austin 
Farrer. His sublated 'constructive' thought, in many areas, 
lies in agreement with two other theologians, George 
Lindbeck 228 and David Kelsey. In the recently published 
Theology and Narrative and Types of Christian Theology, one 
gets a glimpse of how Frei would have gone about construing 
theology founded upon his prior work in the Eclipse and the 
Identity. The importance of this material lay in this 
glimpse into what a constructive theological proposal might 
look like; the work within Types on Christian self-
description is how Frei envisaged construing theology229. 
228 Lindbeck states in the "Forward" to The Nature of Doctrine: "lowe 
more than I can tell to [Hans Frei' s] ... encouragement and to his 
thought" (12-13) 0 Placher suggest that within Lindbeck's book, "Frei 
was a much more important influence in its development than the 
relatively sparse references to him might suggest" (I£N, fnol, 20-21) 0 
229 I will argue below that Frei's "Christian self-description" is not 
dissimilar to Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic model". In fact, he is 
said to have taken a "cultural-linguistic" turn in his later writings. 
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I now turn to an analysis of this material, focusing on 
its roots and engagement with Barth's theology, Geertz's 
sociological analysis and his continued use of Auerbach. I 
will then analyse how Frei's construal of "Christian self-
descr ipt ion" could engage with "first-order" theological 
construals (particularly Carl Henry's) and external critiques 
applied or lodged against such a construal, including those 
of Gary Comstock and Michael Goldberg. I maintain that the 
force of external critiques is of decisive importance for a 
theology focusing on narrative. 
Firstly, the concerns of the "first-order" theologian, 
Carl Henry, will be addressed. Frei engages Henry's theology 
in the "Tr ini ty Journal" 2 3 0 and also discusses him within 
Types. Henry challenges Frei on the truth-status of 
theological statements. He contends that theological 
statements are not merely assertions, but are "true" 
regardless of who is making them. For Frei, the problem with 
Henry's formulation is that "he adduces a set of a priori 
criteria of accuracy and appropriateness, of meaning, 
meaningfulness, and truth,- all of them explicitly 
"What is clear is that a 'cultural-linguistic' turn, under the influence 
of George Lindbeck, has been ef fected in Frei 1 s thought" (George 
Hunsinger, "Afterword" in Theology and Narrative, 259). 
230 This issue of the "Trinity Journal" (Spring 1987) has one Carl 
Henry's lectures that he gave at Yale Divinity School in 1985. Following 
the lectures is a "Response to "Narrative Theology: An Evangelical 
Appraisal" in which Frei addresses Henry's lecture of the same title. 
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philosophical and independent of application" (Types, 24). 
Frei wishes the "rules" of Christian theology to be governed 
internally, that is, no privileged status ought to be given 
to philosophy or any theoretical discipline. Frei 
understands second-order theological discussion to be 
involved in issues such as "the logic, or grammar, of the 
faith, which may well have bearing on the first-order 
statements, an endeavour to bring out the rules implicit in 
first order statements" (Types, 21). Following 
Schleiermacher's method, Frei advocates theology as "critical 
or normed self-description" (Types, 21). Thus, Henry's 
construal is wrong-headed in that it looks outside of 
theology for a standard by which to measure rather than using 
philosophy as a "tool" and not the "yardstick". Frei is 
opposed to the privileging of philosophy within the "doing" 
of theology. 
Secondly, Ricoeur's hermeneutic (a "hermeneutic of 
suspicion") attempts to discern ideology within the text, 
especially within a hermeneutic which maintains that a 
narrative conveys what it "means". Not to do so would be 
blind and thus decisively harmful to the proposed 
hermeneutic. If this is the case, then this would be a valid 
critique of Frei's hermeneutic. Frei often refers to his 
hermeneutic using the phrase, "the text means what it 
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says,,231. This is radically different from a hermeneutic 
which maintains that the "author said more than what he or 
she was trying to say". A hermeneutic employing suspicion, 
such as Ricoeur' s or in a more drastic form "ideology-
critique", would abhor such a claim. Often a text means more 
than it says and, indeed, it is proposed that what the text 
does not say is more important than what it does say. 
A further crucial distinction to construing theology in 
a self-descriptive way is that the investigation can take 
either a phenomenological or a social-scientific route. Frei 
advocates the latter whilst arguing against the former. It 
is at the juncture where the hermeneutics of Frei and Ricoeur 
follow separate paths 232 . I now turn to an exposition of 
Frei's approach to "Christian self-description". 
Ia. Christian self-description aided by the Social 
Sciences 
Frei relies on the work of the social sciences, 
specifically the work of Clifford Geertz, in his analysis of 
the ways theologians have construed theology233. He argues 
231 "Response" in Theoloqy and Narrative, 208. 
232 I will take this issue up in the concluding chapter after I have 
unfolded Frei' s position in relation to first-order theological 
statements and a "hermeneutic of suspicion". 
233 Types of Christian Theology is a an analysis which positions 
theologians on a scale in relation to how they understand theology to be 
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that "Christianity is a religion, a social organism. [Thus] , 
its self-description marks it typically as a religion in a 
way similar to those descriptions given by sociologists of 
religion or cultural anthropologists" (Types, 22) Theology 
undertaken within this rubric argues that its self-
description is likewise more distant from its traditional 
partner, philosophy. This is because "the grammar [of the 
faith] (use according to rules of such a construct) is more 
readily exhibited or set forth than stated in the abstract" 
("Remarks", 33). He, there fore, advocates philosophical 
investigation into one 1 s hermeneutic more akin to that of 
Wittgenstein rather than that of "the Idealist tradition,,234. 
Herein lies the substance of the ever-increasing divergence 
of his hermeneutic from Ricoeur's. 
construed. Frei discerns five types: 
Type 1 "substitutes a general meaning for the specific ascriptive 
subject Jesus ... ", 
Type 2 substitutes meaning [as in Type 1] while attempting to maintain 
the specificity of Jesus, 
Type 3 is the corre1ationist enterprise engaging the Jesus of History 
with the Christ of Faith, 
Type 4 "asserts the unity of the Christological subject at the 
hermeneutical level but cannot specify the mode or manner in which 
Christological statements are 'historical', while nonetheless asserting 
that they are", 
Type 5 reiterates scripture while proposing that understanding the 
meaning of scripture involves correct usage of them, (~, 5-6). 
234 "In regard to understanding, (remember: for this particular 
exegetical task!) I find myself influenced increasingly by Wittgenstein 
and J. L. Austin rather than by the Idealistic tradition that has 
dominated the field for so long, whether in its pure form (e.g., in 
Dilthey), in existentialist form, in a more historical form like that of 
Pannenberg, or in a more ontological form like that of Heidegger, 
Gadamer, among theologians Fuchs and Ebeling" ("Remarks", 33). 
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Frei maintains that the Reformers (he has in mind 
Calvin, Melanchton, and Luther) understood theology as 
"involved at one and the same time a set of belief assertions 
and a confidence that all Christian language, including those 
assertions, is self-involving language, and not neutral or 
informational language" (Types, 26). In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, theologians viewed this "dual aspect of 
Christian self-description as a problem" (Types, 26). Thus, 
Frei perceives the dilemma within modern theology to be how 
can one hold these two in tandem; namely Christian assertions 
which are 'truthful'. 
Frei contends that this area of concentration which by 
and large consumes modern theological investigation is 
misguided. He proposes that 11 [p]erhaps the very logic of the 
self-description of Christianity as a religion is that these 
two things [truth-claims and assertions] don't need to be 
explained for their harmony. There is no need to explain, 
but only to describe them, distinctly and together" (Types, 
27). This harmony is best described within a Christian 
construal of theology as "thick description", a term borrowed 
from the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz 235 . "Thick 
description is an attempt to describe the nuances within a 
235 Geertz borrows the term from Gilbert Ryle but Frei's appropriation 
of its content and its reference within The Interpretation of Cultures 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973) aligns itself with Geertz. 
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cultural system rather than explain them236 . Within a 
culture, thickly described, " the essential task of theory 
building here is not to codify abstract generalities but to 
make thick description possible, not to generalize across 
cases but to generalize within them" Cl.e., 26). 
Frei recognised the usefulness of such a method of 
description rather than explanation for it focused on the way 
Christianity functioned rather than apologising for its 
claims. It is here that one can see the close affinities to 
both Lindbeck and Kelsey. Lindbeck also understands the 
doctrines of a religion to function as rules or 
"regulatively,,237. Kelsey focuses his attention in The Uses 
of Scripture in Recent Theology on the way Scripture 
functions within a particular theologian's way of construing 
theol ogy 238. Frei also maintains that Christian self-
236 "As interworked systems of construable signs ... culture is not a 
power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or 
processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within 
which they can be intelligibly- that is, thickly- described" (.I..h..e. 
Interpretation of Cultures, 14). 
237 [d] octrines regulate truth-claims by excluding some and 
permitting others, but the logic of their communally authoritative use 
hinders or prevents them from speci fying positively what is to be 
affirmed" (The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
~P~o~s~t~l~i~b~e~r~a~l~A~g~e~ (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), 19). 
238 He writes, the way in which any particular theologian 
concretely takes biblical texts as "scripture" and uses them as 
"authority" in actually doing theology will vary with the way he decides 
to construe scripture's functioning in the church's common life as the 
occasion and mode of God's presence" (The Uses of Scripture in Recent 
Theology (London: SCM, 1975), 183). 
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description is properly done within the context of the 
Christian community (this includes the church and the 
academy) . Christian doctrines are thus debated internally. I 
now turn to his debate with the theologian Carl Henry over 
"first-order" theological statements. 
II. Frei opposed to a strictly context-invariant 
hermeneutics 239 
In an article entitled "Narrative Theology: An 
Evangelical Appraisal ,,240, Carl Henry rejects Hans Frei' s 
hermeneutics. He maintains that Frei's theory invalidates 
itself because "it offers no objective criterion for 
distinguishing truth from error and fact from fiction ... " 
(19) . My contention is that it is not clear that Henry is 
reading Frei correctly. As George Hunsinger points out, 
... for Frei, the category 'fiction-like' is 
strictly a formal category which as such remains 
non-committal about the narrative'S truth or 
fiction. To say "fiction-like" is thus not quite 
the same as saying 'fictional yet true', especially 
239 "[Barth] claims that for theology, 
general context-invariant criteriology, 
conservatives like Henry" (~, 45). 
there is no such thing as a 
certainly in contrast to ... 
240 Carl Henry, "Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal" in 
Trinity Journal [8NS (1987)], 3-19. Hans Frei's "Response to 'Narrative 
Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal''', (21-24). Reprinted in Theology and 
Narrative, 207-213. 
if the latter could 
'historically fictional, 
241 
be construed as 
yet theologically 
meaning 
true''', 
219 
That is, Frei does not necessarily believe that the 
narratives which do not deal with the passion and 
resurrection are fictitious 242 . His disagreement with Henry 
is in the categories that Henry wishes to employ. Henry 
wants to use the terms "factual", "historical reality", 
"reference", and "truth" to describe the narratives in the 
Biblical texts. Frei maintains that these terms are not 
"privileged, theory-neut ral, trans-cultural [and] an 
ingredient in the structure of the human mind and of reality 
always and everywhere"243. This leads Frei to reject Henry's 
terminology and to insist on maintaining the Biblical 
language which is the only way to faithfully express the 
Biblical truth244 . 
241 George Hunsinger, "Hans Frei as Theologian: The Quest 
for a Generous Orthodoxy" in Modern Theology (8: 2, April 
1992), fn. 12. 
242 Frei contends that the genre of the passion-cruccifixion-
resurrection narratives are "realistic narrative". That is, he contends 
that in the "third and last stage in the story's structure ... this part 
is most generally agreed to reflect actual events with considerable 
(though not absolute) accuracy" (~, 132-133). Furthermore, the genre 
"realistic narrative", ..... at the crucial climax of the resurrection, 
fictional description, providing direct knowledge of [Jesus'] identity 
in, with and through the circumstances, merges with factual claim, 
whether justified or not" (~, 145). For the problems associated with 
such a claim, see chapter 2 above. 
243 "Response" in Theology and Narratiye, 211. 
244 However, Frei's use of the categories "realistic narrative" and 
"history-like" betrays his dependance upon literary terminology and 
negates his refusal to employ "non-Biblical" terminology. 
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Frei maintains that "realistic narrative" renders the 
identity and characteristics of personal agents through the 
depictions of action-intentions which are part of a process 
of self-manifestation245 . This identification occurs within 
a narrative framework similar to that of ordinary time 
experience. For Henry, there is no distinction between a 
historical report and realistic narrative, they are 
necessarily the same. However, Frei distinguishes between 
history and realistic narrative yet admits that the Biblical 
texts written in realistic narrative may (but not 
necessarily) also contain historical facts. For Frei, the 
relationship between historical fact and realistic narrative 
is necessary only in the passion and subsequent resurrection 
narratives. However, as Henry contends, the literal sense of 
the narrative is associated with logical and grammatical 
rules. Henry, as Frei contends, is guilty of what he had 
traced in the Eclipse; historical-critical methods of 
biblical reading took over the old realistic method of 
reading. Frei notes the result as, the "meaning of the 
stories was something different from the stories or 
depictions themselves although this is contrary to the 
character of a realistic story" (E..aN., 11) As a result of 
historical-critical exegesis, the meaning and authority of 
245 A full discussion of how Frei applies this method to discerning the 
identity of Jesus in found in chapter 11/1. 
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the Biblical texts became associated with historical 
factuality. In the wake of modernity, this linking of the 
biblical narrative with historical claims led to the 
discarding of the biblical narrative as historically 
unreliable and thus "untrue". 
IIa. Frei and Carl Henry on referentiality 
Frei proposes that the synoptic gospels begin with Jesus 
viewed as representative of the whole of Israel. In these 
infancy narratives, he maintains that Jesus is depicted as a 
symbol of Israe1246 . It is in the baptismal narratives where 
the change from a symbolic narrative to realistic narrative 
occurs. In these narratives, Jesus becomes a person in his 
own right rather than merely a representative of Israel by 
performing "miracles and signs of the kingdom". Frei cites 
Luke 4: 21 as the summation when Christ proclaims that "the 
Scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing". 
Frei points to a problem which occurs when a person 
tries to determine "What actually happened"? He maintains 
that the infancy narratives are "proliferations of legend and 
246 In the gospel of Matthew, this is emphasized by the events early in 
Jesus' life which parallel those of Moses' life. 
1) Jesus' family called out of Egypt (Hosea 11:1) 
2) Herod kills all the male infants in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. 
3) Although not explicitly pointed out, the further parallels with 
Moses' birth and his near escape. 
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stylized tales" (..Ll.C.., 132) and therefore, the term 
"historicity" does not apply to them. However, the third and 
last stage of the Jesus story is generally agreed upon to 
recount the actual events that occurred with "considerable 
accuracy" 132). He suggests that the claim of 
historicity can be (and should be) applied to the passion 
narratives and resurrection because of their importance for 
the historic Christian faith. 
While it may seem that Frei is interested in preserving 
the historicity of the biblical narrative, it is of key 
importance to note that he distinguishes between "historical 
factuality" and "history-likeness". Nicholas Wolterstorff 
comments that 
"Indispensable to understanding Frei's ... argument 
is the recognition that the history-likeness of the 
literal sense of text implies nothing whatsoever as 
to the truth or falsity of the propositional 
content of that sense. From the history-likeness 
of the literal sense of some work of history one 
can conclude nothing whatsoever as to its accuracy" 
247 
Thus, one can say that the biblical narrative may be 
"history-like" but this has no bearing on whether or not the 
narrative is "historically factual". For Frei, the literal 
247 From an unpublished paper entitled, Is Narrativity the 
Linchpin? Reflections on the Hermeneutic of Hans Frei, 
given for the 1992 Hester Seminar at Wake Forest University 
on "Relativism and Religious Knowledge". 
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sense of a realistic narrative does not mean that the 
narrated event has actually occurred; the only exceptions 
being the narratives of the passion and resurrection of 
Jesus. These are factual occurrences reported closely to the 
way they happened. However, it is important to note that Frei 
maintains that one assumes historical factuality of the other 
narratives unless evidence is given to the contrary. Thus, 
Frei's understanding of the Bible as realistic narrative does 
not necessitate a view of all of its texts as 1) historically 
accurate or 2) historically actual. 
By "historically accurate", I mean that the biblical 
narrative conveys an accurate historical account concerning 
the narrated story. Applied to a realistic narrative, when 
Matthew wrote that Jesus was in the desert fasting for "forty 
days and forty nights .. 2 4 8, this mayor may not be 
historically accurate. The use of forty days and forty 
nights could be a literary device alluding to Moses' 40/40 
fast on Mount Sinai in Exodus 34. For Frei, the realistic 
nature of the narrative does not necessitate factuality; 
Jesus could have been in the desert for ten days. The 
redactor may have changed the facts of the narrative to suit 
his aim which would be, within this model, to draw an analogy 
between Jesus and Moses. 
248 Matthew 4:1-2, "Then Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert to 
be tempted by the devil. After fasting forty days and forty nights, he 
was hungry". 
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"History-likeness" also does not necessitate "historical 
actuality" (what Frei calls "historicity"). By "historical 
actuality", I mean that the Biblical narrative actually 
happened in history (that is, it is not purely fictional). 
That is, while the facts of the Matthew 4 narrative may not 
be historically accurate, it may also have never actually 
occurred in history. 
The theory of "history-likeness" maintains that one can 
never know, in an absolute sense, what really happened in the 
first century. Henry contends that advocating this theory is 
disastrous for theology because it undermines its authority. 
He claims that the implications of such a theory are obvious; 
if nothing def ini te can be known about the life of Jesus, 
then how can we be sure of the historicity of the passion and 
resurrection of Jesus (as Frei does seem to appeal to)? It 
seems as if Henry has a valid point here. Paul does appeal 
to the resurrection (as a historical fact and actuality) as 
the basis for Christian faith. He states, "if there is no 
resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been 
raised. And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is 
in vain and so is your faith" (I Corinthians 15:13-14). 
Howeyer, it is essential to note that Frei would agree. The 
event of the resurrection is the basis of Christian faith. 
It is at this point, however, that the Christian would have 
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to base this assertion on faith, not in a theory based on 
the ostensive referencing of the Biblical texts. Frei says 
of his assertion, 
"at [this] point, a judgement of faith concerning 
the inspiration of the descriptive contents and a 
judgement of faith affirming their central factual 
claim would have to coincide for the believer. He 
would have to affirm that the New Testament authors 
were right in insisting that it is more nearly 
correct to think of Jesus as factually raised, 
bodily if you will, than not to think of him in 
this manner" CLE, 150}. 
He re-asserts his claim that "faith is not based on factual 
evidence or inherent historical likelihood,,249. Frei is 
proposing that one's belief cannot be likened to a rational 
acceptance of a set of "true" (as in "historically accurate" 
or "historically factual") propositions. Rather, it is by 
faith that the Christian accepts the event of the 
resurrection. He finishes The Identity of Jesus Christ by 
affirming that "no matter what the logic of the Christian 
faith, actual belief in the resurrection is a matter of faith 
and not of arguments from possibility or evidence" CI .. !l . c., 
152} 
Frei outlines his theory of reference in this way. " 
[U]sing the term 'God' Christianly is in some sense 
referential. But that doesn't mean that I have a theory of 
249 Frei, ~, 151 and following quote, 152. 
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reference to be able to tell you how it refers" ("Response", 
210) . He maintains that the biblical narrative is adequate 
to describe what is being referred to, though it doesn I t 
explain how it refers: "The truth to which we refer we 
cannot state apart from the biblical language which we employ 
to do so The narrative description there is adequate. 
'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself' is an 
adequate statement for what we refer to, though we cannot say 
uni vocally how we refer to it" ("Response", 210) Henry's 
unease is due to this uncertainty as to the referential 
status of the Biblical language. However, Frei maintains 
that Jesus being raised from the dead is not a fact like 
other "facts" and thus cannot be subsumed into that larger 
category. He writes, "Is Jesus Christ a "fact" like 
other historical facts? Should I really say that the eternal 
Word made flesh, that is, made fact indeed, is a fact like 
any other? I don't think so, just as I don't think that I 
can say 'God created the world' and mean by that a factual 
referent like any other" ("Response", 211). Frei is careful 
to note that his view of reference is not that of Ricoeur. 
Whilst he cannot specify how language about "Jesus Christ" 
refers, he admits, "[i]t is historical reference (to use our 
cultural category) but it is not historical reference in the 
ordinary way: nor of course is it metaphor25 ° " 
250 In another place, he writes "we analogize more on the basis of our 
l.iteral. reading of the gospel story than on the basis of something 
more nearly metaphorical. We start from the text: That is the language 
pattern, the meaning-and-reference pattern to which we are bound, and 
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("Response", 212: italics mine). 
Frei makes an enigmatic statement directly after dealing 
with the issue of reference. He states that using the word 
"God" in a "Christian" way, refers. However, he extends this 
admission to say that this If is also true in some sense 
other than a referential one: It is true by being true to 
the way it works in one's life, and by holding the world, 
including the political, economic and social world, to 
account by the gauge of its truthfulness" ("Response" 210). 
Frei recognises that warranted belief allows one to act and 
think appropriately in the knowledge of Christian claims. 
This hearkens back to a similar proposal from Lindbeck: "The 
significatum of the claim that Jesus truly and objectively 
was raised from the dead provides the warrant for behaving in 
the ways recommended by the resurrection stories even when 
one grants the impossibility of specifying the mode in which 
those stories signify" (NJl, 67). The question raised is 
whether or not Frei can affirm the "truthfulness" of 
Christian claims without appealing to any sort of 
"propositions concerning states of affairs in the world"? In 
other words, is it sufficient to claim that the coherence of 
Christian faith is enough to substantiate Christian faith? 
which is sufficient for us. We cannot and do not need to 'transcend' it 
into 'limit' language and 'limit' experience" (ttResponse", 209). This 
statement clearly disassociates Frei's hermeneutic from that of Ricoeur 
and this relationship is explored in more detail below. 
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I believe that Frei would answer negatively to this 
question. He affirms that "the resurrection of Jesus from 
death has always been central to Christian faith,,251. Indeed, 
"the miracle of the resurrection in particular- is a real 
event; however, it is one to which human depiction and 
conception are inadequate, even though the literal 
description is the best that can be offered, not to be 
supplanted or replaced by any other and therefore itself not 
simply metaphorical in character" ("Resurrection", 203). 
Frei's view privileges neither the text nor the reality but 
understands the text as providing an "adequate testimony" 
rather than any form of "accurate report". His reasoning is 
that the resurrection is unlike any other event and therefore 
categories such as "evidence" and "factual/accurate report" 
cannot be employed. To submit the text to historical 
scrutiny is to miss the point of the attestation of biblical 
narratives. The biblical narratives testify to a miraculous 
event; they do not report an historical event. 
maintains, 
"to take the account of the empty tomb (for 
example) to have primarily the status of a factual 
report used as evidence is from this point of view 
to mistake its textual function. It is to turn it 
from a witness of faith into a report, from 
testimony to the truth of the mystery that unites 
the divine and the human into a report of a simply 
and solely natural-type event that is supposed to 
demonstrate its divine character by running counter 
Frei 
251 "Of the Resurrection of Christ" in Theology and Narrative: Selected 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 201. 
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to customary natural experience" ("Resurrection" , 
203) . 
Frei contends that Henry' s enquiry into the historical 
veracity of the biblical narratives reduces their testimony 
to the level of common historical narrative. However, Frei 
maintains that these stories, especially of resurrection, do 
not belong to a normal understanding of history. This is not 
to deny that "the story of the empty tomb may have the 
tentative secondary role of rendering historical evidence" 
("Resurrection It, 203) but rather that this position is 
tenuous at best. In Fre i I s view, it would be just as 
plausible to argue the contrary position that the texts do 
not derive from early accounts. Yet, "the message and the 
miracle of faith are accounted for by the very character, and 
are therefore a function of, Jesus' being and his 
resurrection from the dead; and so, Jesus and faith, as well 
as reality and text, belong together as the miracle of 
resurrection" ("Resurrection" , 2 0 5) . Ultimately Frei 
attributes faith in the resurrection to be 1) testified to by 
the biblical accounts and 2) founded upon the very being of 
Jesus himself. 
III. Frei on Christian self-description 
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Criticism external to "Christian self-description" could 
be potentially devastating for Frei's construal because his 
depiction of the theological enterprise requires an internal 
explication. I will now turn to analysis of how Frei t s 
depiction of such description could engage such a critique. 
Following Kelsey's analysis, Frei maintains that a text 
is accorded the status, Scripture, "through the functions it 
performs within 'the community for which it is a common 
text'" (TYVes, 57). This does not mean that the aforesaid 
community is the only viable interpreter. Frei maintains 
that "[ cJ lear ly, there is no such thing as a community's 
assuming dictatorship of interpretation principles" (Types, 
57) . A more balanced view, he suggests, would be modelled on 
Schleiermacher's theology which attempted to correlate 
theology within the academy with that of the church252 . In 
this correlative enterprise, the 
"New Testament is simply an authoritative or 
normative expression of the pious Christian self-
consciousness of the first Christians, and 
indirectly the self-communication of the perfect 
God-consciousness of Jesus Christ through that 
252 The current problem within literary theory is in the trespassing 
between the boundaries between exegesis of a text and the application of 
the methodology employed. The "multiplication [of literary theories] 
has tended to make complex matters more so, sometimes only at the 
(second-order) level of the theories themselves, sometimes in the actual 
reading of texts, when theory, as often happens in contemporary academic 
discussion, claims entry rights into (first-order) exegesis, and the 
line between 'literary' and 'interpretive' activity becomes deliberately 
blurred", (Hans W. Frei, ", Narrative' in Christian and Modern Reading" 
in Theology and Dialoque: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 154). 
derived communal God-consciousness before, within, 
and after Scripture" (Types, 65). 
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The problem, as Frei analyses it, is that many theologians 
have been misled by attempting to explain how narratives 
, re fer' , instead of focusing on what those narratives 
'mean,253. Frei 's theological investigations attempt to 
bypass this modern theological agenda. This can be seen most 
clearly as Frei dialogues with the literary-critic, Gary 
Comstock and the Jewish theologian, Michael Goldberg. 
IlIa. Gary Comstock on "truth" and "meaning" 
Gary Comstock sets up a dipolar relationship between 
Frei's and Ricoeur's thought using the terms "meaning" and 
"truth" as the reference points. His query is pertaining to 
the status of biblical narratives and their relationship to 
philosophical truth-claims. He asks, "[i]s it enough to say 
that the biblical narratives are meaningful? Or are 
Christians also committed to saying that they are true? Frei 
thinks that the answer to the first question is yes, so he 
does not pursue the second. Ricoeur thinks the second 
demands an answer, and he tries to show how and why we should 
answer it affirmatively,,254. I believe that Comstock IS 
253 A major contemporary issue not mentioned by Frei is the current pre-
occupation within literary theory with the Derridean question of 
"deferral of meaning". 
254 Gary Comstock, "Truth or Meaning: Frei versus Ricoeur on Biblical 
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"analysis" of Frei' s position betrays his affinity for 
philosophical privileging. The question is raised, does 
Comstock have a valid point and has Frei's work facilitated 
this reading of him? In his 1967 Harvard lecture, Frei 
argued that "[t]heology has to validate the possibility and, 
hence, the meaning of Christian claims concerning the shape 
of human existence and the divine relation to it, even though 
the actual occurrence- and thus the verification of the 
claim -is a matter of divine, self-authenticating action and 
revelation It (Remarks, 30). Furthermore, Frei asserted that 
"I believe that it is not the business of Christian theology 
to argue the possibility of Christian truth any more than 
the instantiation or actuality of that truth" (Remarks, 30). 
It would seem that Comstock's analysis has some basis in 
Frei's work 255 , yet I will argue that his analysis is based 
on a faulty understanding of what "second-order" theological 
investigation is concerned with and that Comstock ultimately 
privileges philosophical language over any other form of 
language which, in turn, has helped to create this quandary. 
In addition to a close analysis of Comstock's argument and 
Narrative", The Journal of Religion (1986), 118. 
255 "As it stands, Frei's account can seem to collapse the revealed Word 
into into [sic] written word, a written that witnesses to nothing beyond 
itself. The problem may be that, in the absence of any general theory 
of truth and reference, readers will tend to carryover our cultural 
assumptions about what is real and how texts in general mean. When Frei 
approaches the question of the reference of these texts so cautiously, 
then against the background of the rather simple empiricism that still 
dominates much of our thinking, he seems to undercut their claim on 
reality" (William C. Placher, "Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A 
Conflict of Interpretations", Modern Theology (4:1) 1987, 48). 
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the faultiness of its claims, I will use a letter written to 
Comstock by Frei concerning this article to substantiate and 
expand the argument 256 . 
Comstock's thesis is this: "I will argue that Ricoeur's 
is the more consistent position, and I will suggest that 
[his] 'impure narrativism' is more faithful than [Frei's] 
'pure narrativism' to the testimony of the scriptural 
stories" (nTvM", 119) His argument pertaining to Frei runs 
like this. Firstly, Frei's use of the category "realistic 
narratives II allows "no separation of meaning and reference" 
("TvM", 119) in the biblical narratives. This suggests that 
readers It come to understand that story's meaning not as 
'il.l.ustrated (as though it were an intellectually 
presubsisting or preconceived archetype or ideal essence) but 
constituted through the mutual, specific determination of 
agents, speech, social context, and circumstances that form 
the indispensable narra t i ve web'" ("TvM" , 120: cited from 
Eclipse) . Due to this inseparability, Comstock suggests that 
this necessitates secondly, the position that "[t]he meaning 
of these narratives is autonomous; they refer only to 
themselves. Mark means what it says and not another thing" 
("TvM", 120) His conclusion is this: "As Frei puts it, 
scripture 'simultaneously depicts and renders the reality (if 
256 "Letter to Gary Comstock" (Hans Frei Papers, Manuscript Group No. 76 
(12: 184). Special Collections, Yale Divinity School) found in the 
appendix. 
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any) of what it talks about'; its subject matter is 
'constituted by or identical with its narrative '" ("TvM", 
However, this is not what Frei says. In fact, the full 
remark made by Frei is this: "Literal depiction 
constitutes and does not merely illustrate or point to the 
meaning of the narrative and theme it cumulatively renders: 
and simultaneously it depicts and renders the reality (if 
any) of what it talks about" ( E..EN, 27: emphasis mine) . For 
within Frei's hermeneutic, this is only one of the ways that 
scripture works, it is not the only way. To say that the 
Bible refers in only one way is misguided; this would imply 
that Frei advocates a "general hermeneutic", a position which 
would be in complete contradiction to Frei's. Rather, this 
section in the Eclipse is comparing literal depiction with 
figural interpretation in Calvin's theology, it is not 
advocating a "general hermeneutic". Frei's reply to Comstock 
is that theologically, only in the case of Jesus Christ and 
the depictions of him, "a straigtforward referential truth 
inference is to be made from a formal coherence description" 
(LComstock, 6). 
257 He acknowledges that these quotes are taken from Eclipse 27 & 33. 
However, the second quote is not from page 33 (as he claims), but rather 
is found somewhere else (I have yet to find it) . 
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Comstock's analysis of the problem with Frei' s 'pure 
narrativism' is that "it rests on certain foundational 
principles. And they are ill suited to the narrative reading 
of the gospel" ("TvM", 121). Here, Comstock I s argument 
against Frei once again shifts from scripture to the 
gospel.. 
Comstock continues, "As I have said, Frei does not 
appear interested in developing the philosophical foundations 
of ' narrative hermeneutics'" ("TvM", 122). This is correct 
but not strong enough. Firstly, as argued above, Frei is not 
a narrative theologian. Secondly, he 'does not appear 
interested' because, in fact, he is opposed to developing 
foundational claims for a "narrative hermeneutics". Comstock 
recognises that "Frei has no use for all-encompassing 
hermeneutic foundations. But this is not to say that he is 
an antifoundationalist" ("TvM", 122) 
As with Moore, Comstock seems to misunderstand the 
polemical stance of the New Critics when he writes, "[o]ne of 
Frei's literary foundations is that the meaning of a 
realistic narrative is autonomous. Meaning is tied neither 
to author's nor to its reader' s beliefs, intent ions, or 
practices One of Frei' s philosophical foundations is 
related. The narratives of the Bible are self-referential, 
not referring to anything other than themselves ("TvM", 123). 
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It is an unusual interpretation of Frei to suggest that he 
believes that the gospel stories refer to nothing external to 
the text. Frei' s response to Comstock is this: " the 
matter is far more complex for me than your exposition of my 
supposed stance of "autonomous meaning" of realistic 
narrative makes it appear" (LComstock, 5: emphasis mine). 
Furthermore, "[pJ hilosophically, the gospel narratives are 
not self-referential ... " (LComstock, 6) • In fairness, 
Comstock adds this caveat, "If I am right to think that these 
are Frei's conceptual foundations ... " ("TvM", 123) which 
suggests that if the conditions he has outlined above are 
wrong, then his conclusions cannot follow from the faulty 
analysis. 
Comstock continues to attack Frei's apparent refusal to 
engage the issue of how texts correspond with external 
reality. He claims that "[p lure narrati vists [Frei 1 are 
content to except narratives from the rigorous debate about 
truth conditions. Stories, they tell us, do not make 
assertions about the world. Narratives are not interested in 
'corresponding' to some reality outside them. Thus, we have 
no need to ask about their 'truth'" (nTvM", 123). Indeed, he 
recognises that "Frei' s narrativism is reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein. Any quest ion about the 'truth' of biblical 
narrat i ve is an unfort una te category mistake 2 5 8" ("TvM" , 
258 George Hunsinger's analysis suggests that Frei's position is more 
subtle than Comstock allows: "To suppose that the meaning of these 
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128) . He concludes with the charge that to ignore the issue 
of the narrative's truthfulness II does not seem to do 
justice to the intentions of just those believers who tell 
and retell the scriptural stories as their own" ("TvM", 129). 
IIIb. Critique of Comstock 
For all of the criticism levelled at Frei on the issue 
of the text's correspondence with reality, Ricoeur escapes 
relatively unscathed though Comstock recognises that "[l]ike 
Frei, Ricoeur denies that realistic narratives refer 
ostensively to real objects, agents, or events behind the 
text" ("TvM", 133) As I have argued above, Ricoeur has a 
powerful theory of truth. He does not abandon all notions of 
ostensive reference though the theory places primacy on the 
second-order of reference (the poetic function) within 
literary works. However, to claim that Frei denies the 
possibility for texts to ostensively refer is a mistake. 
Frei replies that, 
"Philosophically, meaning cannot be identified with 
truth but must be kept distinct: What these 
stories refer to or hQli they refer remains a 
philosophical puzzle, but it has to be in a way 
congruent with their realistic, history-like 
character (and history-likeness of course means 
that the ministry, death and resurrection 
narratives resides in their factual historicity would be to commit a 
category mistake. The question of factual historicity, although 
directly posed by the narratives themselves, is simply not a question 
of their meaning. It is the question of their truth" ("Hans Frei as 
Theologian", Modern Theology (8:2) April 1992, 110). 
narratives are the chief topics, 
of the kingdom of God', which is 
fictional or historical, item in 
these others)" (LComstock, 5-6). 
not the 'mystery 
not a realistic, 
the same sense as 
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Frei's thought on the relation between "truth" and "meaning" 
and "sense" and "reference It is much more nuanced than 
Comstock's account allows. 
"It's the complexity of that interrelation [between 
"truth" and "meaning"] that you reduce to far too 
systematic and simple a shape. If I suggest that 
philosophically, 'meaning' and 'truth' should 
be sharply distinguished in a hermeneutics of 
realistic New Testament narrative, and hermeneutics 
[is] confined to the level of meaning, I'm supposed 
to be implying that Christians don't make truth 
claims for their beliefs. But of course I'm saying 
nothing of the sort: I'm s imply saying that the 
virtual running into each other of 'meaning' and 
'truth' in philosophical systems such as Ricoeur's 
is dangerous and does not allow realistic 
narratives a genuinely realistic status" 
(LComstock, 2). 
Of course, Comstock did not need Frei's letter to be able to 
understand this. This is, after all, one of the reasons 
which, Frei argued, led to the eclipse of biblical narrative! 
Frei wants a philosophically non-foundational way of 
understanding the relationship between world and text. 
"As for my view of the relation between meaning and 
truth and the character of the gospel narratives' 
t ruth claims: For me, , d i vine truth' is at least 
in part a referential statement, but I do not have 
a correspondence theory and description with which 
to back it in this 'odd' instance. Rather it is 
backed by a coherentist procedure ... " (LComstock, 
6) . 
The status of "reference" in theological language 
is ambiguous: 
"Philosophically, the gospel narratives are not 
self-referential; their reference is indeterminate, 
and that indeterminacy is exactly what they share 
with realistic fiction But even if it is so 
ambiguous, so difficult to pin down, we do not 
therefore declare such fiction to be either 
pr i vate, pure ly autonomous, or self-referent ial" 
(LComstock, 6). 
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I suggest that the abandonment of the doctrine of 
revelation by Frei (in the Preface to ~), does not allow 
for a "correspondence theory" between truth and text. The 
relationship between them becomes, instead, an issue of 
analogy and of faith. 
"The textual universe of the gospel is that perfect 
coherence of reference and meaning, albeit always 
imperfectly and partially glimpsed, which allows us 
to analogize from there to the imperfect, secondary 
and analogous coherence or cohesion of the two in 
other cases ... For me this is the risk Christian 
theology has to take if it is to recapture its 
character as theology of faith, and specifically of 
incarnation-oriented theology" (LComstock, 7). 
Frei appeals to the "phi losophical oddness" of Anselm's 
argument which he understands helps to bridge the gap between 
meaning and truth. 
"Anselm's distinctively Christian version of 
the ontological argument has always been 
philosphically puzzling-- but private? It seems to 
me that that argument and the status of discourse 
about the resurrection of Jesus Christ belong 
together. I'm suggesting that in this case and 
this case only a straightforward referential truth 
inference is to be made from a formal coherence 
description" (LComstock, 6: emphasis mine) . 
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Ul timately, the difference between Frei and Comstock 
(and by extension Ricoeur) is that philosophy does not hold a 
"privileged" position over theology in the discussion. 
Whilst there is a need for theology to use philosophy, this 
relationship is not foundat ional (he refers to himself as 
"mildly antifoundational") . 
"Mildly? Yes: I am a Christian theologian and do 
not regard philosophy as ever having achieved that 
clearly demonstrated set of even formal certainties 
(and agreements) in 2500 years which would allow it 
the kind of authoritative status you seem to want 
to accord it; and yet I believe that theology 
cannot do without philosophy. Furthermore theology 
cannot even invest so much in the 
foundational/antifoundational debate as to come out 
(~theology) in principle on the antifoundational 
side" (LComstock, 1). 
IIIc. Michael Goldberg's critique of Frei 
Goldberg argues that one of the difficulties with a 
"narrative theology" is the question of the direction of 
"projection" in terms of understanding oneself. He questions 
Frei's "narrative theology": "Can new 'facts' or 
'experiences' even force us to reshape or revise our stories, 
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and if so, how?"259. This is a fair question260 , for Frei 
suggests that 
"The direction of the flow of intratextual 
interpretation is that of absorbing the 
extratextual universe into the text, rather than 
the reverse (extratextual) direction. The literal 
sense is the paradigmatic form of such intratextual 
interpretation in the Christian community's use of 
its scripture: The literal ascription to Jesus of 
Nazareth of the stories connected with him is of 
such far-reaching import that it serves not only as 
focus for inner-canon ica 1 typology but reshapes 
extratextual language in its manifold descriptive 
uses into a typological relation to these stories" 
( "LR", 147). 
Citing Hauerwas, Goldberg agrees that "[Frei' s] suggestion 
would be disastrous if it is an attempt to make irrelevant 
whether Jesus in fact did not exist and act in a way very 
much like the way he is portrayed in the gospel accounts" 
(Theology and Narrative, 185) . He extends Hauerwas' 
critique by stating " ... the question of 'whether [the story] 
259 Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narratiye: A Critical Introduction 
[2nd edition] (Philadelphia: Trinity Press, 1991), 184. 
260 Goldberg's critique is, in content, the same as Thiselton's critique 
of Lindbeck. "I am extremely cautious about George Lindbeck's tendency 
to locate the meaning of biblical texts in intralinguistic or 
• intratextual' categories to the exclusion of presuppositional and 
extra-linguistic contextual factors about states of affairs in the 
world" Ulllli., 557). Thiselton' s correction of this imbalance is to 
recognise that "... didactic texts, narrative texts, poetic texts, 
boundary-situation texts, apocalyptic texts, promissory texts, and so 
forth, perform different, though often overl.apping, 
hermeneutical. functions, especial.l.y in rel.ation to different 
reading-situations" (Nllii, 557-558). Thiselton' s hermeneutic allows 
the text to speak and inform the reader whilst accounting for the input 
of the reader in the "reading-situation". It is a model owing to 
Gadamer's notion of the "fusion of horizons" where the world of the text 
merges, fuses, with that of the reader. 
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really happened' cannot be ignored without theological peril. 
Frei 's answer remains ambiguous" (Theology and Narrat iye, 
185) . Goldberg is thinking here of primarily of Frei I s 
category of 'history-likeness'. However, the distinction 
"history-like" does not mean non-historical. It is merely 
used as a means to read the "meaning" of a particular text. 
Frei writes, 
" . the literary parallel between history writing 
and history-like writing is perfectly clear: in 
each case narrative form and meaning are 
inseparable, precisely because in both cases 
meaning is in large part a function of the 
interaction of character and circumstances 
[and] this meaning through instantiation is not 
illustrated but constituted through the 
mutual, specific determination of agents, speech, 
social context, and circumstances that form the 
indispensable narrative web" (EEN, 280). 
Thus, Hauerwas' criticism would be founded if Frei did indeed 
claim the irrelevancy of 'history', but he doesn't. His 
distinction helps to locate the 'meaning' of the text rather 
than being an assertion of the irrelevancy of 'historical' 
questions 261 . Frei writes, 
" .. I want to affirm my belief that 'hermeneutics' 
has to do with 'meaning', i.e. with criteria and 
rules for sound interpretat ion of texts, rather 
261 George Hunsinger's note is once again relevant here, "for Frei, the 
category 'fiction-like' is strictly a formal category which as such 
remains non-committal about the narrative's truth or fiction. To say 
'fiction-like' is thus not quite the same thing as saying 'fictional yet 
true I, especially if the latter could be construed as meaning 
'historically fictional, yet theologically true" ("Hans Frei as 
Theologian: The Quest for a Generous Orthodoxy" in Modern Theology 
(8:2, April 1992), fn. 12). 
than with 'truth'. And I want to stress that even 
the limited use of 'truth' as true interpretation 
of a text rather than relation of the text to true 
reality is only secondary for me, though I won't 
deny that I puzzle about it" ("HB", 3-4). 
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Frei is dealing with rules for interpretation, not an 
analysis of the linking up of text with reality. In fact, he 
asserts that " ... the issue of reference is hermeneutically, 
though probably not theologically, irrelevant" ("HB", 4-5). 
For Frei, the issue of linking text and reality is resolved 
in a similar fashion to Barth's understanding of Anselm's 
ontological argument which Frei restates in The Identity of 
Jesus Christ as "presence,,262. 
Goldberg recognises that Frei's critique in The Eclipse 
is precisely that thinkers from Locke to Moltmann have 
"adopted the flawed theological strategy of separating 
truth from meaning and narrative from 'reality,263 n (Theology 
and Narrative, 159) . Frei concludes from this 'strategy' 
that those thinkers found a new centralising category which 
he calls "way-of-being-in-the-world". However, this new 
category merely replaced one 'story' (the Christian story) 
for another, more 'public' story (human anthropology) For 
262 For the problems surrounding this category "presence", see chapter 
1/1. 
263 He cites E..B.N., 129: "They have all been agreed that one way or 
another the religious meaningfulness (as distinct from demonstration 
of the truth) could, indeed, must be perspicuous through its relation to 
other accounts of general human experience" (Theology and Narratiye, 
159) . 
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Frei, the Bible as 'realistic narrative' is one where 
"descriptive shape and meaning cohere" (EEN, 27). This leads 
Goldberg to claim that Frei' s account "contends that the 
veracity of biblical narrative lies in its faithful depiction 
of the structure of reality. Shape of story and shape of 
experience ultimately go hand-in-hand" (Theology and 
Narrative, 164) . I find this claim by Goldberg misleading 
on two counts. Firstly, Frei never engages this issue of the 
'veracity' of the biblical narrative. And moreover, Frei 
never appeals to revelation to substantiate the 
"truthfulness" of the narrative. Secondly, whilst the second 
half of this quotation is a correct analysis of Frei' s 
hermeneutic, it is not correct because of the first half of 
the statement. It is true because the structure of the 
narrative "coheres with" ("suggests a") its meaning. 
Goldberg concludes that 
"while the narrat i ve theologies of Frei and 
McFague were to some extent justifiable at the 
primary level through their attention to the 
meaning entailed by the specific narrative kinds 
involved, they were nevertheless inadequate at the 
representative level due to their failure to 
address adequately the question of the truth-claims 
stemming from those stories, and that furthermore, 
their theological proposals will to that extent 
stand unjustified, no matter what might be their 
merits on the remaining affective, 'transformative' 
plane" (Theology and Narratiye, 245). 
Once again, Goldberg's critique is off-centre for Frei is not 
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advocating a "narrative theology n2 64. Frei writes, "I am 
deeply concerned about the specificity of narrative texts. 
There are all sorts of texts, and the Bible includes all 
kinds of texts to which different hermeneutical rules apply 
In other words, I hope nobody thinks of something called 
'narrative sense' as a kind of hermeneutical absolute" (nHB", 
4) . Frei does not deal with the issues Goldberg is 
interested in; that is, the relation between truth-claims 
and their reference to reality. Rather, Frei maintains that 
" [e] qually clearly it is once more a case of 
putting the cart before the horse if one 
constructs a general and inalienable human quality 
called 'narrative' or 'narrativity', within which 
to interpret the Gospels and provide foundational 
warrant for the possibility of their existential 
and ontological meaningfulness. The notion that 
Christian theology is a member of a general class 
of ' narrative theology' is no more than a minor 
will-o'-the-wisp" ("LR", 148). 
This evidence effectively renders Goldberg's critique (and 
Comstock's) of Frei on this issue irrelevant. 
IIId. Frei' s exposition in "LComstock" and "LR" 
Frei 's way of approaching the issue of 'meaning' in 
biblical narrative is from a non-philosophical stance. 
264 One of the folders in 
"Problems of Narrativity 
Papers, Manuscript Group 
Divinity School Library). 
the Frei archives contains a "list" of eleven 
in general: often Theologians" (Hans Frei 
No. 76 (19:281). Special Collections, Yale 
This is found in the appendix. 
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"Meaning" is understood through 
"1) the communal-religious interpretive tradition and what fr 
has seen as their primary meaning, 
2) the fact that the tra'di t ion has given primacy to their 
realistic, ascriptive sense', 
3) that outside of that tradition there is no reason to think 
of any single interpretive move or scheme as THE meaning of 
these stories, 
4) and within it there is room for other's [interpretations], 
provided they do not conflict with the primary, realistic or 
literal sense, 
5) that subordination of understanding to the text, within 
the descriptive schema expl icat io/medi tat io/ applicatio (see 
Charles Wood's book) is in no way the same as the elimination 
of interpretive understanding and of a possible multiplicity 
of interpretations" (LComstock, 5). 
Within this model, the way the Christian moves from the 
meaning of the text to the truth of it is through analogy: 
"The textual universe of the gospel is that perfect coherence 
of reference and meaning, albeit always imperfectly and 
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partially glimpsed, which allows us to analogize from there 
to the impe rfect, secondary and analogous coherence or 
cohesion of the two in other cases" (LComstock, 7). This 
achieves the "publicness" which "truth-claims" aspire to 
become: "In an admittedly exaggerated fashion one might say 
that this is the only perfectly 'public' case of truth which 
allows all out other limited and private truths to become at 
least semi-public" (LComstock, 7) His way of analogising is 
philosophically non-foundational for he admits that, 
" I have no philosophical warrant for this 
claim, since I have proposed that it is not backed 
by any general theory: Hence its status must 
remain extemely awkward, at once grandly if not 
ludicrously imperialistic, and yet totally mired in 
collectively private Christian discourse in the 
eyes of those for whom philosophy is a foundational 
and, in respect of formal canons for meaning and 
truth, THE universal, normative discipline" 
(LComstock, 7). 
Frei maintains that to bow at the altar of philosophy steals 
from Christian theology one of its defining characteristics, 
faith in the incarnation. 
The strong emphasis on the role that the Christian 
tradition has played in the interpretation of the "meaning" 
of Scripture is a central aspect of Frei' s theological 
method. His exploration of the Church's hermeneutic came to 
be the centre of his own method. In his essay, "The Literal 
Reading of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: 
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Does It Stretch or Will It Break?", Frei argues that" the 
tradition of the sensus literalis is the closest one can 
come to a consensus reading of the Bible as the sacred text 
in the Christian church ... " (LR, 118). His exposition deals 
with the problems associated with literal readings of the 
Bible and as such is a "strictly second-order affair" ("LR", 
119) . 
Frei's contention is that " ... it was largely by reason 
of this centrality of the story of Jesus that the Christian 
interpretative tradition in the West gradually assigned clear 
primacy to the literal sense in the reading of Scripture ..... 
("LR", 121)265. It is simply this "traditional reading" 
which gave primacy to the "literal sense", not something 
inherent in the text it se 1 f, nor it is something which is 
necessary. The "hermeneutical rule" of the Church focused on 
the primacy of this "literal sense" because " ... it is the 
story of Jesus taken literally that unveils this higher 
truth, the 'literal' sense is the key to spiritual 
interpretation of the New Testament" (nLR n , 122). Thus, 
the literal sense was "not to be contradicted by other 
legitimate sense- tropological, allegorical, and analogical" 
("LR", 121) because "the 'literal' reading in this fashion 
265 Furthermore, ..... Christian tradition tends to derive the meaning of 
such regulations- for example the sacraments, the place of the 'law' in 
Christian life, the love commandment- directly from (or refer them 
directly to) its sacred story, the life, teaching, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus the Messiah" ("LR", 120). 
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became the normative or 'plain' reading of the texts. 
[However] There is no a priori reason why the 'plain' reading 
could not have been 'spiritual' in contrast to 'literal' and 
certainly the temptation was strong" (ftLR", 122) 
Frei suggests that new developments in literary theory 
(deconstruction, the breakdown of biblical theology, and 
post-structuralism) have led to a loss of the notion of the 
perspicuity of Scripture which once authorised Protestant 
readings 266 . Ultimately, Frei suggests, "[t]his destruction 
of 'normative' or 'true' reading means an end, among other 
things, to the enterprise called 'hermeneutics'" ("LR", 124). 
His analysis and subsequent suggestion is this: 
" current hermeneutical theory defends a revised 
form of [sensus l.iteral.is], but I also believe 
that the defence is a failure ... One may well hope 
that the sensus l.i teral.is, a much more supple 
notion than one might at first suspect, has a 
future. If it does, there will be good reason to 
explain what it is about with a far more modest 
theory- more modest both in its claims about what 
counts as valid interpretation and in the scope of 
the material on which it may pertinently comment" 
("LR", 118-119). 
He maintains that "[it] is doubtful that any scheme for 
reading texts, and narrat i ve texts in particular, and 
biblical narrative texts even more specifically, can serve 
globally and foundationally, so that the reading of biblical 
266 "Not until the Protestant Reformation is the literal sense 
understood as authoritative- because perspicuous- in its own right, 
without authorization from the interpretive tradition" ("LR", 123). 
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material would simply be a regional instance of the universal 
procedure" ("LR", 137). His challenge is for theologians 
lito consider seriously the possibility that the 
present cultural situation is among other things a 
post-hermeneutical and no longer a hermeneutical 
situation, and to frame their hermeneutical outlook 
in accordance with it, both for the sake of the 
technical credibility of hermeneutical theory and 
for the broader purpose of the cultural credibility 
of the theology itself" ("LR", 138). 
Frei believes that the revival of the sensus literalis can 
happen under certain conditions. "The less entangled in 
theory and the more firmly rooted NOT in a narrative 
(literary) tradition but in its primary and original context, 
a religious community's 'rule' for faithful reading, the more 
clearly it is likely to come into view, and the stronger as 
well as more flexible and supple it is likely to look" ("LR", 
139). His proposal holds that 
"the Gospel stories as well as large portions of 
the Old Testament narrative are indeed 'realistic', 
but that the issue of their making or not making 
factual or, for that matter, other kinds of truth 
claims is not part of the scope of hermeneutical 
inquiry. 'Meaning' in this view is logically 
distinct from 'truth' ... [thus] the factuality or 
non-factuality of at least some of these 
narratives, important as it is no doubt in a larger 
religious or an even more general context, involves 
a separate argument from that concerning their 
meaning" ("LR", 139-140). 
This proposal suggests firstly, what constitutes 'truth' has 
not been universally agreed upon nor has it been established 
251 
as a 'normative' way of speaking about textuality in this 
post-hermeneutical situation. Secondly, it allows 'meaning' 
to be accessible by following certain literary 'rules' in 
discerning the type of literature being dealt with. This 
second suggestion in practice would look like this: "One 
appeals first to a qualitatively distinct genus of text (and 
meaning) called 'literary' and then argues both historically 
and in principle that within it there is a [distinct] species 
called 'realistic narrative' " ( "LR " , 140). Then, 
following the work of Eric Auerbach267 , one argues that the 
biblical narratives belong to this species. Indeed, they are 
examples of this species, par exce11ence. 
The advantages of such a way of reading biblical texts 
is that firstly, it is specific reading (because of the need 
to discern the species) and not a general theory about texts 
or textuality. Secondly, this type of reading "belongs first 
and foremost into [sic] the context of the soiciolinguistic 
community, that is, of the specific religion of which it is 
part, rather than into a literary ambience" ("LR", 143-144). 
Therefore, as he argued at the outset, it allows the 
continuation of a process which has been overlooked, that the 
"[e]stablished or plain readings are warranted by a 
267 Frei seems to concern himself only with Auerbach's exposition the 
relationship of biblical literature with classical literature (Homeric), 
specifically chapter one of Mimesis (Odysseus' Scar). However, it has 
been suggested by Gerry Shepherd that Auerbach's discussion of "figural 
interpretation" could have been used by Frei to bolster his argument. 
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community's rules for reading its sacred text" ("LR", 144). 
Frei suggests that this "informal set of rules under 
which the [Bible] has customarily been read in the community" 
involves three aspects, 
"Christian reading of Christian Scriptures must not 
deny the literal ascription to Jesus no 
Christian reading may deny either the unity of Old 
and New Testaments or the congruence (which is not 
by any means the same as literal identity) of that 
unity of with the ascriptive literalism of the 
Gospel narratives [and] any readings not in 
principle in contradiction with these two rules are 
permissible ... " ("LR" , 144-145). 
Within this way of reading, Frei wants to resist the 
"generalizing tendency that raises theory from the 
descriptive to the explanatory power" ("LR", 146). He 
suggests that .. [t]he descriptive context, then, for the 
sensus literalis is the religion of which it is a part, 
understood at once as a determinate code in which beliefs, 
ritual, and behavior patterns, ethos as well as narrative 
come together as a common semiotic system, and also as the 
community which is that system in use ... " ("LR", 146) This 
frees the observer because the process of understanding "a 
religion or a culture to which one is not native does not 
demand a general doctrine of the core of humanity, selfhood, 
and the grounds of inter-subjective experience" ("LR", 147). 
Citing Lindbeck approvingly, "[The 'high' religions] have 
relatively fixed canons of writings that they treat as 
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exemplary or normative instantiations of their semiotic 
codes. One test of faithfulness for all of them is the 
degree to which descriptions correspond to the semiotic 
universe paradigmatically encoded in holy writ" ("LR", 
Frei suggests that if the Bible is read in this 
fashion, that is, adhering to these "informal rules ", the 
"literal sense" of biblical narrative will continue to remain 
faithful to the Christian tradition and will indeed "stretch 
and not break". 
Frei maintains that biblical truth-claims "are part of 
the sense and not a matter of their sense turning into 
reference even if by combined force of style and 
substance they seem to be characterized by an urgent or 
imperious claim to truth, and exclusive truth at that" 
("Narrative", 156). He suggests that this is, at the same 
time, both an advantage and a drawback of Lindbeck's Nature 
of Doctrine; his discussion (or lack thereof) of the issue 
surrounding the status of truth-claims. It is in his 
discussion of Lindbeck's book that his position is clarified. 
Furthermore, Frei' s own position is not dissimilar to the 
cultural-linguistic view of religion espoused by Lindbeck. I 
will now turn to an analysis of Frei's comments on this book 
and draw out the implications for his own work. 
268 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1984), 116. 
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I propose that Frei' s depiction of Christian self-
description (outlined above) is what he perceives to be, an 
extension of, Lindbeck's depiction of a cultural-linguistic 
view of religion. There are three significant areas which 
Frei explicitly parallels (with some minor caveats) with his 
own: by definition, by affiliation with the theologies of 
Schleiermacher and Barth, and on the issue of truth. In a 
speech given by Frei, which was included as an "Epilogue" in 
Theology and Dialogue, these parallels are drawn out 269 . 
Frei notes that Lindbeck I s depiction of theological 
construal is in agreement with his own: "Academic theology 
is that second-order reflection which is an appropriate, 
albeit very modest instrument in aid of the critical 
description and self-description of specific, religious-
cultural communities, in our case the Christian church,,270. 
Frei caveats this remark by stating that " ... I hope I'm not 
subverting Lindbeck's agenda and substituting my own, 
Christian theology is a discipline both in the non-
ecclesiastical academy and in the church" ("Epilogue", 278). 
269 Bruce D. Marshall writes, "This essay was originally given as a talk 
at Yale Divinity School several years ago, at a gathering convened to 
celebrate the publication of The Nature of Doctrine" ("Introduction" in 
Theology and Dialogue, 4). The timing of the speech by Frei is critical 
for it occurred prior to the avalanche of criticism which was directed 
at The Nature of Doctrine and the subsequent mis-interpretations of the 
work (both of which Frei prophetically forecasts). 
270 Hans W. Frei, "Epilogue: George Lindbeck and The Nature of 
Doctrine" in Theology and Dialogue, 278. 
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Secondly, Frei charges, like his own Christian self-
description, that a cultural-linguistic theory combines 
aspects of both Schleiermacher and Barth's theologies: 
" [b]etween them they best exhibit both the possibilities and 
the problems of significant second-order restatement of the 
tradition of the major hermeneutical and theological 
consensus in Western Christianity" (Types, 6). This is the 
area of focus with Frei' s Types and he suggests that 
Lindbeck I s cultural-linguistic view focuses on the same 
issues. Furthermore, this is the position in which Frei 
identifies himself most closely and suggests that somewhere 
between the methods of these two theologians, theology is 
done most coherently. 
Finally, Frei notes that on the issue of 'truth 1 , 
Lindbeck fails to address it adequately. He suggests that 
"moderate propositionalists 271 ... will tell [Lindbeck] that 
what he says about doctrines as second-order rules is 
sufficiently kin to doctrines as first-order propositional 
statements ... " ("Epilogue", 278). Furthermore, the moderate 
propositionalist272 will argue that if people are taught "how 
271 Lindbeck defines "propositiona1ist" as any theological model which 
"stresses the way in which church doctrines function as informative 
propositions or truth-claims about objective reality" (The Nature of 
Doctrine, 16). 
272 Frei I s use of "moderate" distinguishes between those which will 
dismiss Lindbeck t s book as speaking of an illusory reality. These 
"traditional propositionalists" will object "[i]f you take doctrines to 
be normative, you must take them to be unvarying or perhaps slightly 
varying statements about recognizably unvarying truth" ("Epilogue", 
279) . 
256 
to use Christian language properly ... that will take care of 
the question of truth. There is no special question of that 
kind" ("Epilogue", 279) Frei exhorts Lindbeck to stick with 
his own agenda in the book, that is, its ecumenical role for 
prompting dialogue within Christian communities. However, at 
the same time, he "confess [es] to some qualified sympathy 
for the moderate propositionalist" ("Epilogue", 279). This, 
I suggest, is due to the way in which Frei understands 
Barth's hermeneutic to function. For Barth, " dogmatics 
is a second-order redescription of the normative text of the 
church, in effect the gospel narratives, the church's 
paradigmatic story and the paradigm of its life and language" 
("Epilogue", 280). As Frei reads him, Barth bypasses the 
question of "truthfulness" by "articulating both the unity 
and the central significance of the ascriptive subject at the 
textual leve1 273 , but [Barth] cannot specify the manner or 
mode in which the textual statements are historical, while 
nonetheless assert ing that they are" (Type s, 90). Barth 
asserts the historical nature of the text without explaining 
how. Thus Frei's continued reference to Kelsey's analysis of 
Barthian gospel exegesis 274 : "Indeed, it is as though Barth 
took scripture to be one vast, loosely structured non-
273 An allusion to Kelsey's analysis of Barthian exegesis: "The 
characteristic patterns in the narrative guide what the theologian says 
about the agent/subject of the stories, in much the way that patterns in 
a novel might guide what a literary critic may say about the characters 
in the novel" (~, 48-49). 
274 Cited in ~, 90 & 135. 
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fictional novel" (~, 48 275 ). 
As I argued above, Frei finds much of his own 
theological concerns to be exhibited in Lindbeck's book. 
However, I suggest that Frei recognised his own work to be an 
extension of this model. He writes: "Without the 
absolute priority of that Christian-ecumenical 
reality, without its reality, forget the 'rule' or 
regulative approach, forget the cultural-linguistic 
theory- forget the book" ("Epilogue", 278: italics Frei). 
He recognises the concerns of a cultural-linguistic model to 
be bound up in the desire for an explanation of what occurs 
when ecumenical dialogue leads to reconciliation between 
churches without any change in doctrine: 
"The cultural-linguistic theory or approach to 
religion is there solely for the service it can 
render to the ongoing description or self-
description of the Christian community and, by 
extension, to conversation in which members of 
various religions would be making grammatical 
275 Kelsey again on Barth's view of Scripture, "Reading and, indeed, 
understanding a passage of scripture does not necessarily bring man into 
an encounter with God. But it may. Sometimes, when used in church as 
the basis of preaching and worship, the texts may provide the occasion 
on which the revelatory event occurs here and now and God 'speaks as I 
and addresses as thou'. On such occasions the stories • work' . The 
agent they render is truly made present to the worshiper in a revelatory 
encounter" (~, 47). Kelsey refers to this as a functiona1 view of 
the way Scripture is understood as being authoritative. For Barth, the 
biblical "texts are authoritative not in virtue of any inherent property 
they may have ... but in virtue of a function they fill in the life of 
the Christian community. To say that scripture is 'inspired' is to say 
that God has promised that sometimes, at his gracious pleasure, the 
ordinary human words of the biblical texts will become the Word of God, 
the occasion for rendering an agent present to us in a Divine-human 
encounter" (~, 48). 
remarks to each other about living, believing, and 
ritually enacting what their religion is about" 
("Epilogue", 277). 
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I suggest that Frei extends Lindbeck's theory to encompass 
theological method for self-description not solely for the 
purposes of dialogue but for self-consciousness of what is 
occurring when one begins theological investigation. Whilst 
this may be a subtle extension, it is one nonetheless and 
more significantly, Lindbeck appears not once in Frei' s 
Types. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Frei' s sympathies 
with what he calls "moderate propositionalists" are not 
founded in Lindbeck's own work. 
IV. George Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic" model 
I propose to investigate whether or not Lindbeck is entirely 
faithful to his own 'model' or whether a cultural-linguistic 
approach smuggles in a form of "propositionalism". 
Investigating such a proposal would allow the affinities 
between Frei and Lindbeck on the issue of how "truth" may 
function within the Christian community. 
Lindbeck notes that "one of the major inadequacies of 
the 'propositionalist' model is that it "emphasizes the 
cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in which 
church doctrines function as informative propositions or 
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truth claims about objective realities" (NIl, 16). Thus, when 
this model is applied to doctrines, citing Hans Kung, "if a 
doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once 
false, it is always false" (.N..Il, 16). Conversely, the 
cultural-linguistic model views doctrines as functioning like 
rules ("regulatively") not propositionally ("describing 
states of affairs"). Thus, on Lindbeck's model, "[d]octrines 
regulate truth-claims by excluding some and permitting 
others, but the logic of their communally authoritative use 
hinders or prevents them from specifying positively what is 
to be aff irmed" (Nll, 19). My enquiry will focus on what is 
necessary and sufficient for religious statements to have 
ontological truth within Lindbeck's model. 
At the outset, Lindbeck distinguishes between the 
meaning ("intrasystematically true") and the truth 
("ontologically true tt ) of a statement. Meaning is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for statements to be 
ontologically true and thus carry propositional force. The 
sufficient condition is alluded to by Lindbeck as n if the 
form of life and understanding of the world shaped by an 
authentic use of the Christian stories does in fact 
correspond to God's being and will, then the proper use of 
'Christus est Dominus" is not only intrasystematically but 
also ontologically true", (ll.ll, 65). Yet, how does one 
distinguish between 'authentic use' from 'non-authentic use'? 
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Lindbeck, cites Aquinas as a good example of a moderate 
'cognitivist' or 'propositionalist' whose theory fits into a 
cultural-linguistic approach. 
Aquinas distinguishes between the significatum (the 
signified) 
signifying) 
and the modus significandi (the mode of 
Following Aquinas, Lindbeck proposes that if we 
understand that human language about God is inadequate, that 
is, it may not correspond directly to God's being, it will 
fit into a cultural-linguistic approach. Yet, he is not 
satisfied with this. He asserts that the "significata can 
be affirmed: it is possible to claim that the intellectual 
judgement "God is good" 
real.ity even when 
signigicandi . .. ", (ND., 
refers or corresponds to objective 
one cannot specify the modus 
67). How is this possible? Through 
'warranted belief'. "The significatum of the claim that 
Jesus truly and objectively was raised from the dead provides 
the warrant for behaving in the ways recommended by the 
resurrection stories even when one grants the impossibility 
of specifying the mode in which those stories signify", (ND., 
67) . "Thus, propositional truth and falsity characterize 
ordinary religious language wh~n it is used to mold lives 
through prayer, praise, preach i ng, and exhortation", (l:ill, 
69) . It is through these speech acts (which are the 
authentic uses of religious language) that religious 
language is both meaningful ("intrasystematic") and (in fact) 
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ontologically true. Lindbeck's model rejects doctrines as 
carrying propositional force because they are "second-
order discourse" about first-order uses of religious 
language. Assertions with propositional force can only be 
made when speaking authentically religiously. Yet he 
concedes the possibility of doctrines 
wi th ontological import", (N.I2, 69). 
anti-propositionalist, Lindbeck's 
"making affirmations 
Thus, far from being 
model incorporates 
statements which carry 1) propos i tional force because they 
are 2) ontologically true. 
Whilst 
ontologically 
he is 
"true" 
sceptical about doctrines being 
if they are authentically used by the 
Christian community, they are "onto logically true". They 
would not have propositional force if they are not used 
authentically. Yet, most of the time, it would seem that 
doctrines are used in this fashion. In fact, by Lindbeck's 
own model, it would hold that if a person skilled in "how to 
use [the religious system's 1 language and practice its way 
life" (this is very close to Frei' s depiction of the 
"moderate propositionalist" who says "Go on, show people how 
to use Christian language properly and that will take care of 
the question of truth" ("Epilogue", 279» and who is capable 
of determining the propositional meaning of its affirmations, 
would also be capable of rna king second-order statements 
(doctr inal aff irmat ions 1 ike "Christ is Lord") which are 
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ontologically true. 
Lindbeck actually concedes that "there is nothing in the 
cultural-linguistic approach that requires the rejection of 
the epistemological realism and correspondence theory of 
truth which ... is implicit in the conviction of believer's 
when they right1y use a sentence such as 'Christ is Lord'; 
they are uttering a true first-order proposition", (Nll, 69). 
In conclusion, rather than being anti-propositionalist, a 
cultural-linguistic view of reI igion, I maintain, smuggles 
ontological truth into religious systems via authentic use of 
speech acts by the community. Whilst cultural-linguistic 
models seem to be interested in truth within the system only, 
I concur with Placher's analysis that Lindbeck " ... seems to 
sympathize with appropriately modest cognitive claims" and is 
rather a "crypto-cognitivist n)/6. He admits that this 
"reading" of Lindbeck only occurred to him after he read the 
book a second time (~., 47). 
Now that it has been demonstrated 1) that Frei's model 
of Christian self-description is sympathetic to (and is not 
dissimilar to and may well employ) Lindbeck I s model of a 
cultural-linguistic theory of religion and 2) that this 
theory smuggles in a "weak" form of propositionalism- founded 
276william C. Placher, "Paul Ricoeur and Post liberal Theology: A 
Conflict of Interpretations", Modern Theology (4:1) 1987, 47. 
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only during "authentic" use by the community, I will now turn 
to an analysis of how an external critique might look when 
lodged against this way of construing theology. 
IV. Final Critique 
The challenge of a hermeneutic employing suspicion is 
seemingly bypassed by Frei's prior theological and 
methodological commitments. On the one hand, this could be 
seen as authorised. David Demson argues that Frei's position 
is located in his interpretation of the doctrine of 
creation277 . The doctrine celebrates the inherent "goodness" 
of all that which is created, including human beings. "The 
Christian doctrine of creation, Frei indicates, affirms that 
body and human language, (the t.wo modes of self expression) 
are good. So language is not alienated,,278. 
On the other hand, David Kelsey argues that "however 
277 He finds Frei arguing this position in The Identity and "The Literal 
Reading" essay. Two things need to be noted: Firstly, Demson's is an 
interesting interpretation of The Identity since it is usually seen as 
an investigation into the doctrine of Christology. Kelsey cites Frei's 
work in The Identity as such"In recent theology, this type of claim 
[authority of narrativity] has been worked out in varying degrees of 
detail in regard to a number of traditional theological loci: 
Christology ... " {"Biblical Narrative and Theological Anthropology" in 
Scriptural Authority and Narratiye Interpretation (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1989), 121). Secondly, and more importantly, nowhere in 
The Identity do I find Frei appealing to the doctrine of creation to 
justify the perspicuity of scripture. 
278 David Demson, "Response to Walter Lowe" in Modern Theolog-y (8:2) 
April 1992, 146. 
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basic scripture may be to other theological loci279 , in its 
narrativity it cannot serve to authorize a theological 
anthropology" ("TA", 121). Indeed, he argues, that by their 
very logic, narrative appeals to scripture do not allow for 
the construction of an authoritative theological 
anthropology. This runs counter to what George Stroup 
considers to be the advantages of a "narrative theology" 
which maintains that 
"Christian faith is rooted in particular historical 
events which are recounted in the narratives of 
Christian Scripture and tradition, that these 
historical narratives are the basis for Christian 
affirmations about the nature of God and the 
reality of grace, and that these historical 
narratives and the faith they spawn are redemptive 
when they are appropriated at the level of 
personal identity and existence"280. 
Kelsey does allow for a modified understanding of the 
relationship; "[t]heological remarks are related to biblical 
narratives, to be sure, but it is not a relation of 
'authorized by'" ("TA" , 133) He argues that Frei's appeal 
to narrative identity based on unsubstitutable identity is 
not a "theoretical description"281. Rather, he attempted to 
279 He cites the doctrines of Christology (Frei), Revelation (Thiemann) 
and God (Thomas Tracy, Goldberg), ("TA", 121). 
280 39 George W. Stroup, The Promise of Narratiye Theology 
(London: SCM, 1984), 17. 
281 It is dogmatic assertion: the self-involving quality of 
religious statements is the indispensable logical condition or 
interpretive setting for the intelligibility of the doctrine that Jesus 
is the crucified and risen Saviour. It is to affirm, very simply that, 
unlike other cases of factual assertion, that of the resurrection of 
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"show that the concept ua 1 schemes employed by various 
theoretical descriptions of human personhood all fail to 
grasp the unitariness of a personal identity precisely in its 
unsubstitutability" ("TA", 133). Narrati ve depictions of 
persons, it. is argued, are he lpful for they 1) focus on a 
single individual and not the individual in abstraction and 
2) identify that individual in action, not as a series of 
related characteristics. Kelsey concedes that "realistic 
narrative is the mode of discourse uniquely suited to 
describe an individual person's unsubstitutabl.e 
uni tariness" ("TA", 134). Yet, he maintains that this is not 
the basis for a theological anthropology for its focus is 
confined to part icular ind i v iduals, in Frei' s case Jesus 
Christ, rather than human beings as such. 
If the appeal is made that the particular characters of 
the narrative are "types" which we then come to identify 
with282 , then also the distinctiveness of the narrative is 
lost. Kelsey writes, "when the biblical story is mined for 
archetypes in the service of Lheological anthropology, it is 
precisely its narrativity that is set aside" (tlTA" , 136) In 
Christ shapes a new life" (L:!:1:, xiii). 
282 This is what George Stroup seems to imply when he writes: 
"Traditionally Christians have claimed that anyone who makes [the] 
confession [that Jesus is the "only begotten Son of God"] is led to 
reconsider what kind of person one is and how one lives in the world ... 
What a person believes about Jesus Christ cannot be separated 
from how one lives in the world without tearing apart the 
fabric of Christian faith", (The Promise of Narrative Theology 
(London: SCM, 1984), 15). 
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conclusion, Kelsey's analysis of appeals to human identity 
based on biblical narratives seems decisive. These appeals 
can be of only one sort; specific individuals who are 
portrayed in the narrative, in a way similar to character 
depictions in a nove1 283 . 
Is Frei justified then in dismissing the whole 
phenomenological-hermeneutical investigation into personhood 
carried on by Ricoeur and others? Is it essential for 
hermeneutics to recognise the possibility of human self-
deception or might one plausibly accept the "goodness" of the 
human based on narrative appeals to scripture? Furthermore, 
Frei's analysis of Christian self-description could be 
challenged as has been Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model; 
the same critique may hold, mutatis mutandis. Lindbeck has 
been charged with abdicating genuine conversation external to 
Christian ways of speaking. As one dubious commentator 
characterises the position, "a hedgehog curling up before the 
advancing lorry"284. Is it adequate for Christianity to be 
satisfied with self-description or cannot external critiques 
to the systems have legitimate force? 
283 Of course, this is the way in which Kelsey reads Barth's 
hermeneutic. 
284 Mark 
Doctrine' 
Theology, 
Corner, "Review of George A. Lindbeck's: 
Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
(3:1) 1986, 113. 
The Nature of 
Age" in Modern 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
I have attempted within this chapter to sketch Frei's 
own position concerning Christian self-description. I have 
then compared this with that of Carl Henry, Gary Comstock, 
and Michael Goldberg on the issues of history & reference and 
truth & meaning. I have then sketched the position further 
in relation to George Lindbeck's and offered a suggestion 
that not only are these positions similar (with Frei 
understanding his own as an extension of Lindbeck's agenda) 
but that criticism from a hermeneutic of suspicion applied to 
Lindbeck could, mutatis mutandis, be equally as harsh 
applied to Frei. The interesting fact is that nowhere in the 
literature do I find ~ critique or discussion of Frei' s 
model for theological self-description. 
Frei's exposition of Christian self description depends 
heavily upon a reading of the biblical narrative which is 
informed by literary theories of reference, history, and the 
genre "realist ic narrat i ve" . Though Frei breaks his ties 
with the New Critics for pract. ising a "disguised Christian 
reading" of texts, literary theory still remains a crucial 
aspect of his theological investigation. 
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111/2. "Ricoeur and external critiques: A new definition of 
the force of ideology?": Ricoeur takes a mediating position 
between Gadamer and Habermas regarding the nature of the 
person reading the text ('understanding') and the necessity 
of uncovering ideologies in texts to subsequently overcome 
them (' ideology-critique ') . Ricoeur' s notion of 
distanciation (based on authorial intention inscribed in the 
textual form which is not necessarily in the content- "the 
text is a ship which breaks its moorings") gives 
hermeneutical distance ( 'critical instance ') whilst 
participation (Gadamer's 'belonging') in the texts of one's 
culture is preserved (principle of "no unmediated 
reflection") . Ricoeur challenges Habermas on the non-meta-
hermeneutical positioning of ideology-critique due to its 
status as non-scientific. For Ricoeur, all texts are 
ideological, thus critique is valuable to uncover these 
ideologies. Yet, since identity is always mediated and texts 
are, par excellence, 'identity-formulating'; they are 
necessary. 
The chapter engages Ricoeur in dialogue with William Rogers 
on 'wagering' of texts as scriptural, Said on ideology of 
distinctions (us/them), and Thompson who sees Ricoeur' s 
critique of Habermas as invalid (distanciation and textual 
identity formulation misguided). However, Ricoeur does seem 
to extend his theory to all semiotic systems, not simply to 
texts. 
I. Introduction 
"To be forced to spend years in the concentration 
camp of a highly civilized yet warlike and confused 
enemy is to feel oneself invited to make a new 
examination of what is termed civilization and its 
basis in experience and thought. Professor Paul 
Ricoeur accepted the challenge of this invitation 
by setting for himself the task of mastering and 
expounding just that German philosophy which seeks 
a new and unprejudiced view of life at its 
foundations. Upon achieving possession of this 
phenomenological philosophy, Ricoeur undertook to 
develop it further and appropriately enough, in 
just the direction designed to throw light upon 
that strange division or fault in human nature 
which from time to time is manifested in such 
phenomena as Nazi concentration camps285. 
285 Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree in Paul Ricoeur, 
Husserl; An analysis of his phenomenology (Evanston; 
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This citation is, I believe, an appropriate introduction to a 
study of Ricoeur's stance toward ideology and its subsequent 
critique. His intellectual journey was precipitated by this 
very phenomenon of ideology manifested by the sheer power of 
language to affect the human being. Ricoeur's distinctive 
contribution to the study of ideology286 is to recognise that 
ideology is-not necessarily a negative condition of social 
being. Indeed, he argues that "the phenomenon of ideology is 
susceptible of a relatively positive assessment"287. Ricoeur 
understands this to be an essential task due to our 
inheritance from the Enlightenment failure to find a meta-
perspective which would help humanity to fashion a utopic 
society. The ultimate gains of the Enlightenment project 
lay, rather, in the recognition of human situatedness within 
history and the inability to transcend this condition of 
historical understanding288 . Indeed, in advancing this 
Northwestern University Press, 1967) [translated by Edward 
G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree), xiii. 
286 The critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik) is best represented by 
Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas of the Frankfurt School for 
Social Research. For a full discussion of the major figures involved, 
see Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: It's History. Theories. and 
Political Significance [Translated by Michael Robertson] (Cambridge, 
Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1994). For a discussion of the significance of the 
Frankfurt School for theology see Thiselton: 1992, chapter XI, "The 
Hermeneutics of Socio-Critical Theory". 
287 "Science and Ideology" in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, [edited and translated by John B. Thompson] (Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1981), 222. 
288 Thus, the modern ref lect ion on the properly historical 
condition of understanding history" (SI, 224). 
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thesis, Ricoeur hopes to break down the traditionally 
understood opposition between science and ideology without 
collapsing one into the other. Ricoeur proposes that his 
approach to a critique of ideology incorporates a more sound 
epistemological framework than that of Mannheim or Habermas 
(two figures Ricoeur dialogues with extensively289) and thus, 
is in a better position to deal with the phenomenon. His 
methodological stance towards ideology is to situate the 
critique "within the framework of an interpretation which 
knows itself to be historically situated, but which strives 
to introduce so far as it can a factor of distanciation into 
the work that we constantly resume in order to interpret our 
cultural heritage" (S I, 224) . His approach to the 
understanding of ideology is thus closely linked to 1) his 
contention that there is no unmediated reflection of the 
person from within the consciousness (all reflection is 
mediated through the semiotic systems of culture) and 2) his 
interpretative theory (mainly of texts) in which 
distanciation is a key element. I will spend the next two 
sections unpacking what is involved in Ricoeur's theory that 
there is no unmediated reflection and its implications for 
textual interpretation, focusing on his theory of 
distanciation. It is necessary to grasp the importance of 
these two elements if one is to understand Ricoeur's unique 
289 Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. [edited by George H. 
Taylor] New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Mannheim is discussed in chapters 10 & 16 whilst Habermas is discussed 
in chapters 13 & 14. 
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contribution to the discussion surrounding ideology. 
Furthermore, this debate is of utmost importance for 
theological discussion for if one is to recognise that 
ideology affects reading, then one's reading of a text is 
likewise influenced by ideology. One only needs to look at 
the history of Christianity (especially Christian missions) 
to recognise the enormous impact of latent ideologies having 
disastrous effects 29o • There is a need to formulate a theory 
of critical distance (Ricoeur's "critical instance") between 
texts and readers which would allow readers to discern the 
ideologies of both the text and themselves. If so, then the 
hope is that the reader will not be merely projecting one's 
ideologies onto a text which would distort not only the 
meaning of the text, but the text's ultimate significance, 
namely its ability to challenge and transform the person. 
Rather the text would be free to operate, as scripture, to 
challenge and evoke a response from the reader. Ricoeur's 
intentions are similar to that of any theologian construing 
the biblical texts as scripture. As David Kelsey observes, 
" the way in which any particular theologian concretely 
takes biblical texts as 'scripture' and uses them as 
'authority' in actually doing theology will vary with the way 
he decides to construe scripture's functioning in the 
290 A good survey of this material can be found in Stephen Neill, A 
History of Christian Missions (New York: Penguin Books, 1984). 
272 
church's common life as the occasion and mode of God's 
presence" (Uses of Scripture, 183). Ricoeur's decision to 
note the presence of ideology in both the text and the reader 
makes way for his "second naivete" which would allow 
scripture to function as scripture. He shares Kelsey's 
observation that "[t]o say that scripture is normative for 
Christian theology is to say that there is something in it 
determinate enough to impose some controls on what 
theologians may say in the name of elucidating Christian 
faith and life" (~, 192). 
II. The phenomenological guest 
William E. Rogers' critique of Ricoeur291 centres around 
the privileging of texts, specifically when one construes a 
text as scriptural. His critique is two-fold. Firstly, he 
contends that Ricoeur' s theory cannot account for any 
difference between the interpretive process as applied 
respectively to Scripture and literature. This attack is 
well-founded for Ricoeur clearly distinguishes between 
Scriptural texts and those which are not. Ricoeur refers to 
his decision to view some texts as Scriptural as a "wager". 
Thus, Rogers maintains that within Ricoeur's theory, 
privileging will only be warranted if 1) an account is 
291 William E. Rogers, "Ricoeur and the Privileging of Texts: Scripture 
and Literature" in Religion and Literature 18:1 (Spring 1986). 
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developed which allocates for a difference (of a "type") 
between Scripture and literature or 2) Ricoeur asserts that 
the interpretive process is the same in both cases. The 
latter assertion would then lend itself to the criticism that 
the privileging is subjective and thus irrational. 
Rogers' analysis of this issue focuses on Ricoeur's ~ 
Symbolism of Evil (1960). In this work, the theory of 
appropriation parallels that of a wager when construing a 
text as scripture. 
"I wager that I shall have a better understanding 
of man and of the bond between the being of man and 
the being of all beings if I follow the indication 
of symbolic thought. That wager then becomes the 
task of verifying my wager and saturating it, so 
to speak, with intelligibility. In return, the 
task transforms my wage r: in betting on the 
significance of the symbol ic world, I bet at the 
same time that my wager will be restored to me in 
power of reflection, in the element of coherent 
discourse,,292. 
Rogers contends that n[t]he metaphor of the 'wager', in fact, 
seems to hint at a certain arbitrariness in choosing a 
particular symbolism for privileging293. Nor does Ricoeur 
292 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Translated by 
Emerson Buchanan), (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 355. 
293 Meeting this objection head-on, Kelsey would argue that no 
position is "neutral" in respect to granting privileged status to a 
text: "Theologians, however, do offer much more elaborate and 
systematic 'reasons' for taking biblical texts as 'authority' ... these 
reasons are never 'theological-position-neutral'. They always derive 
their force from a logically prior imaginative judgment about how best 
to construe the mode of God's presence. That is, they always presuppose 
a prior decision about what it is to be a Christian" (~, 166). 
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say exactly what difference it makes in interpretation when 
one symbolism is appropriated over one" (Rogers 1986: 7). 
Ricoeur's "explanation" for this "wagering" is rooted in the 
"contingency and restrictedness of a culture that has hit 
upon these symbols rather than others" (SE., 367). Although 
Rogers recognises that Ricoeur grounds his wager upon this 
explanation, he dismisses it as completely arbitrary. I will 
argue, however, that this explanation is an essential aspect 
within Ricoeur's theory which is not unpacked fully with Tha 
Symbol i sm of Evi 1. Unde r stood in its fullest sense, I 
maintain that Ricoeur' s "wager" is neither irrational nor 
arbitrary, as Rogers contends, but rather based on the 
phenomenological investigations which have preoccupied 
Ricoeur for over thirty years. 
IIa. Reflexive Philosophy 
Kevin Vanhoozer sums up Ricoeur's position succinctly: 
"One's very selfhood is a gift of language and 
literature n294 . Ricoeur maintains that due to the 
impossibility of pure self- reflection, self-understanding is 
mediated through the symbol systems of a particular culture. 
He maintains that it is these semiotic systems we are 
acquainted with, not those from another culture. This is due 
294 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ~B~i~b~l~i~c~aul~n~a~r.r~a~t~i~v~e~iun~ktlih~e~p~h~i~l~o~s~o~p~huy~~ouf~P~a~u~l 
Ricoeur: A Study in hermeneutics and theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 275. 
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to Ricoeur' s recognition that these are the symbols which 
affect us unconsciously from birth and would be in line with 
the Wit tgensteinian proposa 1, "form of life". However, 
Ricoeur's theory stops short of maintaining immediate 
appropriation of the symbols. He maintains that there can be 
a "critical instance", an analysis of the efficacy of those 
symbols from within a culture. Only after this critical 
analysis would one be entitled to appropriate the proposed 
symbols as one's own. Rogers does not seem to recognise this 
critical investigation which Ricoeur requires prior to 
appropriation 295 . However, I maintain that this is the 
crucial part of the theory because it allows Ricoeur to 
maintain a "soft" condition of critical participation in the 
symbolic systems. In doing so, he holds the line between the 
idealism of pure reflection which would allow non-ideological 
discourse (if it could be re-formulated) and the reality of 
the effects of one's culture upon the consciousness, which 
Gadamer and Heidegger stress too strongly. The crucial 
moment within Ricoeur's theory for addressing Rogers' 
objection, occurs between the critical analysis and the 
appropriation of the symbol system. 
lIb. Critical participation 
295 In terms of Locke's notion of maximal concernment, Ricoeur would 
recognise that religious issues fall into this category. Therefore, 
after a hermeneutic of suspicion is employed in the investigation of 
this semiotic system in particular, then one may be entitled to 
appropriate that particular religion as one's own. I will investigate 
this process in depth below. 
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Some of Ricoeur I s earliest work begins by looking at 
myths as symbol systems. He maintains that some myths are 
better than others ("a higher level of elaboration") based on 
the myth I s addressing issues of both particularity and 
universality. He has, therefore, created a scale by which 
some myths are more adequate than others296 . For example, the 
"Adam myth ", Ricoeur argues, is more adequate because it 
"concentrates the event of the Fall in one man, one act, one 
instant, [and] likewise dispere>es it over several characters 
and several episodes [tlhe conflict of the myths is thus 
included in a single myth ,,297 . The "Adam myth" is superior 
to the other myths [Orphic, Babylonian] because it 
incorporates aspects of other construals of evil within a 
schematic both interiorised and exteriorised. That is, Adam 
is represented as a particular individual whilst he is 
incorporated into a narrative encompasing a universal scope. 
"Thus the biblical schema of deviation, opposed to the Orphic 
schema of affecting exteriority, receives its rational 
equivalent in the Kantian idea of the subversion of the 
maxim" ("HS:I, 303"). 
296 I demonstrate in section IlIa. of this chapter the structural basis 
for such a decision. 
297 "The hermeneutics of symbols: In in Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of 
Interpretations [Edited by Don Ihde, Translated by Dennis Savage] 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 295. 
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Ricoeur maintains that symbols can also be subjected to 
philosophical reflection. "Hence I do not take the concept 
of original sin to be a theme extraneous to philosophy but, 
on the contrary, to be a theme subject to an intentional 
analysis, to a hermeneutics of rational symbols whose task is 
to reconstruct the layers of meaning which have become 
sedimented in the concept" ("HS:I", 305). For Ricoeur, this 
"breaking through" the initiaJ signification of the symbol, 
leads to a "second naivet~" which unleashes the power of the 
symbol anew. The hermeneutical method allows the symbol to 
speak once again and "it is by interpreting that we can 
hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol's 
gift of meaning and the endeavour to understand by 
deciphering are knotted together" (SE, 351). This passionate 
engagement with the symbol, what I have called critical 
participation, Ricoeur refers to as entering the 
"hermeneut ical circle". He says of this phenomenon, "This 
circle is not vicious [i]t is quite alive and 
stimulating. You must believe in order to understand. No 
interpreter in fact will ever come close to what his text 
says if he does not live in the aura of the meaning that is 
sought" ("HS:I", 298). Entering the hermeneutical circle 
requires that the individual engage with the symbol. This 
engagement (if it leads to the appropriation of the symbol as 
adequate) enables a "second naivet~" which opens up the way 
for belief, fresh and new: "I believe that being can still 
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speak to me, no longer indeed in the pre-critical form of 
immediate belief but as the second immediacy that 
hermeneutics aims at" ("HS:I", 298) 
Yet, there is still a need to elaborate the 
justification of the gradation of symbolic systems. However, 
Ricoeur argues, this is precisely the limitation of any 
phenomenology of symbols, for the quest ion of truth is 
bypassed and the question of warranted appropriation still 
needs to be addressed. Ricoeur writes of this impasse, 
"If a phenomenologist should give the name truth to 
internal coherence, to the systematization of the 
world of symbols, it is a truth without belief, 
truth at a distance, reduced truth. From such 
truth this question has been eliminated: Do I 
myself believe that? What do I personally 
make of these symbolic meanings?" ("HS:I", 
297)298. 
Since appropriation of the symbol is crucial, Ricoeur' s 
stance towards the symbol systems needed to be "emotionally 
intense and at the same time critical" ("HS:I", 297)299. He 
maintains that this critical participation with the symbol 
allows one to "be long to" yet al ienate the symbol-system 
298 Ricoeur writes in a similar fashion, "Although the 
phenomenologist may give the name of truth to the internal 
coherence, the systematicity, of the world of symbols, such 
truth is without belief, truth at a distance, reduced, from 
which one has expelled the question: do I believe that? 
what do I make of these symbolic meaning, these 
hierophanies?" eSE., 353-354). 
299 He writes elsewhere, "It has been necessary to enter into a 
passionate, though critical, relation with the truth-value of each 
symbol" (.s.E, 354). 
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concurrently. "It is only by participating in this dynamics 
that comprehension can reach the strictly critical dimension 
of exegesis and become a hermeneutic; but then one must 
abandon the position-or rather, the exile- of the remote and 
disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case 
a particular symbolism" (SE, 354). 
IIc. Critical Appropriation 
Appropriation of a symbolic system first involves 
recognition of the text as other. He argues, "to understand 
is not to project oneself into the text; it is to receive an 
enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which 
are the genuine object of interpretation,,300. The 
relationship between the "efficacy" of the symbols and their 
"truth" would be the abi 1 it Y of the symbols to disclose 
"authentic selfhood" (see chapter II). It is this 
"objectification" of the text (the text as "other") which 
complements the act of appropriation. Likewise, thi s 
objectification is possible because of the inherent 
distanciation that necessarily accompanies the inscribing of 
a text. John B. Thompson states that Ricoeur's argument is 
that "hermeneutics can no longer treat problems of method as 
secondary and derivative, as Gadamer tends to do; for we 
300 
"Appropriation" 
Sciences , [edited and 
C.U.P., 1981), 182-183. 
in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human 
translated by John B. Thompson] (Cambridge: 
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belong to a tradition only in and through a distance which 
implies the possibility of objective analysis and 
critique,,301. Thus, Ricoeur sets out to amend Gadamer' s 
work- what he refers to as a "supplementation to the 
hermeneutics of tradition,,302. This "correction" of Gadamer 
invol ves the recogn it ion of distanciat ion which, Ricoeur 
contends, will lead to an "emancipation of the text" (from 
the complete participation of the individual) and thus, 
allows space for the "critical instance". 
III. The Prominence of Distanciation 
Ricoeur's literary theory meshes with his earlier work 
on phenomenology and symbolism. I will now sketch some of 
the major aspects of his 1 i terary-theoretical framework. 
Ricoeur maintains that with the inscription of discourse, at 
least two phenomena occur: autonomy of the text which leads 
to distanciation and a certain degree of fixation of meaning. 
The autonomy of the text refers to the three "eclipses" 
of a piece of written discourse (though he contends that the 
"seeds" of distanciation are also present in spoken 
301 John B. Thompson, "Editor's Introduction", in Paul Ricoeur, 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, [edited and translated by John B. 
Thompson] (Cambridge: C.U.P., 19810), 20. 
302 "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" in Paul Ricoeur, fi.Qm 
Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II [Translated by John B. 
Thompson] (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern, 1991), 298. 
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discourse) The written text eclipses 1) the author's 
intention, 2) the conditions which produced the text and 3) 
the original addressee/so Thus, if one questioned the author 
as to what was meant by a certain phrase, Ricoeur would 
maintain that this would make no difference, since the text 
is now part of the public world and interpreted as such. He 
contends that "the text's career escapes the finite horizon 
lived by its author. What the text says now matters more 
that what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds 
its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has 
broken its moorings to the psychology of the author"303. A 
similar situation occurs in relation to the addressee. 
Ricoeur argues, with Gadamer, that the text eclipses this 
original "intended" audience and becomes part of the public 
domain. "If the meaning of a text is open to anyone who can 
read, then it is the omni-temporality of meaning which opens 
it to unknown readers; and the historicity of reading is the 
counterpart of this specific omni-temporality" 
("Appropriation", 192). Ricoeur also contends that "the work 
decontextualizes itself, from the sociological [conditions 
of the production of the text] as well as the psychological 
point of view, and is able to recontextualize itself 
different ly in the act of reading" ("HI", 2 98) It is this 
tri-fold autonomy of the text which produces distanciation 
303 "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" in 
Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, [edited and 
translated by John B. Thompson) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 201. 
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from the author, the original addressee, and the sociological 
conditions which facilitated the production of this 
particular text. 
Gadamer's addition of 
the 
textual 
lingual 
distance 
dimension (Schriftlichkeit) to 
(Sprachlichkeit) was supposed to account for this distance 
between text and reader. 
further for he maintains, 
distanciation revealed by 
discourse itself, which 
Ricoeur pushes this distance 
following Hegel, that "the 
wr it ing is already present in 
contains the seeds of the 
distanciation of the said from the saying" ("HI", 299). 
However, the autonomy of the text does not mean that the text 
has an infinite number of meanings (as it does for some post-
structuralists) Rather, there is a certain fixation of 
meaning that occurs with the inscribing of a discourse. It 
is the text, not the reader, which presents a limitation of 
the number of potential interpretations. These potential 
interpretations would be delimited by the author's choice of 
words (and in this sense, the author stands as a spectre over 
the text), which in turn, fix the parameters of possible 
interpretations. He writes, " ... if it is true that there is 
always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true 
that all interpretations are equal" (il, 79: emphasis mine). 
Moreover, 
only be 
following Karl Popper: 
probable, but more 
"An interpretation must not 
probable than another 
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interpretation" (il, 79). Ultimately, it is the phenomenon 
of distanciation which is productive and a central point in 
Ricoeur's theory building toward a critique of ideology for 
it creates space for that "critical instance". The 
distanciation between text and reader achieves this critical 
distance which creates the conditions for a detachment which 
allows Ricoeur's theory to escape the charges of subjectivity 
and thus irrationality when one "wagers" on appropriating a 
symbolic system as one's own. 
Ricoeur then turned his enquiries to the discipline of 
structuralism304 where his method of scaling the adequacy of 
mythic-symbolic systems might find justification. Rogers 
acknowledges Ricoeur' s turn to structuralism: "Ricoeur' s 
strenuous efforts to incorporate the insights of French 
structuralism into his theory show, I think, his concern for 
constructing a hermeneutics that can claim to produce 
understanding at some level through explanation on the 
linguistic model" (Rogers 1986: 13). 
IIIa. Explanation and Understanding 
Ricoeur maintains that interpretation is not the 
synthesis of the dialectic between "explanation" and 
304 However, as noted in the last chapter (Ricoeur and Structuralism: A 
revised notion of truth), Ricoeur's recourse through structuralism met 
with minimal gains and he now prefers to refer to his work as "post-
structuralist". 
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"understanding". He understands this distortion to have its 
origins in Dilthey's extension of the method305 found in the 
"natural sciences" to the "human sciences" ("HI ", 299) 306. 
This extension placed "explanation" in the "natural 
sciences,,307 as a process of "understanding" dissimilar to 
that of the "human sciences,,308. However, for Ricoeur, the 
locus of the problem is not in the methodology of the types 
of enquiry, but rather in the failure to recognise that 
explanation arises from the use of language. Hence the 
recourse to a structural analysis of language: "Discourse 
can be produced as a work displaying structure and form 
the production of discourse as a work involves an 
objectification [which] 'takes hold' in structures 
305 Gadamer disagrees with Ricoeur as the origins of the problem lying 
with Dilthey. In speaking of "why Heidegger's advance over Dilthey is 
valuable for the problem of hermeneutics ... [Gadamer states] [t] rue, 
Dilthey had already rejected applying the methods of the natural 
sciences to the human sciences ... " (Truth and Method (second revised 
edition) [Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall], (New York: Continuum, 1993), 261: emphasis mine). 
306 Gadamer also makes this point: "The experience of the 
sociohistorical world cannot be raised to a science by the inductive 
procedure of the natural sciences historical research does not 
endeavor to grasp the concrete phenomenon as an instance of a universal 
rule" (Truth and Method (second revised edition) [Translation revised by 
Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall], (New York: Continuum, 1993), 
4) . 
307 "When there are external facts to observe, hypotheses to be 
submitted to empirical verification, general laws for covering such 
facts, theories to encompass the scattered laws in a systematic whole, 
and subordination of empirical generalizations to hypothetic-deductive 
procedures, then we may say that we 'explain'" (il, 72). 
308 By contrast, "understanding ... relies on the meaningfulness of such 
forms of expression as physiognomic, gestural, vocal, or written signs, 
and upon documents and monuments, which share with writing the general 
characteristics of inscription" (il, 72-73). 
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calling for a description and an explanation that mediate 
'understanding'" ("HI", 299). Thus , it is the "task of 
understanding to bring to discourse what is initially given 
as structure" ("HI", 299) It follows that rather than a 
choice between "truth" and "method" (as Gadamer maintains), 
there exists a dialectic309 . Ricoeur's theory of fixation of 
meaning supplements the methodological investigations which 
uncover the range of possible meanings and how one comes to 
understand a text. This detour through structuralism is 
inescapable: "It is necessary to have gone as far as possible 
along the route of objectification, to the point where 
structural analysis discloses the depth semantics of a 
text, before one can claim to 'understand' the text in terms 
of the 'matter,310t hat speaks therefrom" ("HI", 299). 
IIIb. The revised notion of truth 
Ricoeur's distinction between "sense" and "reference" 
opened up the path to a revised notion of truth. Following 
Frege, the "sense" is the internal organisation within the 
text itself, while the "reference" is the world opened up by 
the text (what Gadamer calls the "matter of the text"). It 
309 "Explanation, then, will appear as the mediation between two stages 
of understanding ... from guess to validation" (il, 75). 
310 This word "matter" is what Ricoeur sometimes calls 'Sache·. "The 
Sache is the referent of human experience" and the referent of the 
parables is "common human experience" (Semeia 4: 92). 
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is at this juncture that Ricoeur's methodological tools of 1) 
mediated reality and 2) textual autonomy (which culminates in 
distanciation) allow a critique of ideology. These tools 
allow 1) "recourse against any given reality" (because 
reality is construed) and thus 2) "the possibility of a 
c r it i qu e 0 f the rea 1 " ( "H I " , 3 0 0 ) Adding Heidegger' s 
"projection of my utmost possibilities ... is the mode of the 
... power to be: therein resides the subversive power of the 
imaginary" ("HI", 300) . Ricoeur maintains that the 
imagination combined with the poetic function of the text 
(the reference being the world unfolded by the text) allows 
the self to be challenged by the possibilities configured 
within the text. Thus, viewing the text as unfolding a world 
displaces the subjectivity of the reader because "authentic 
self-understanding is something that ... can be instructed by 
the I matter of the text'" ("HI", 301). The possibility of 
critique of oneself occurs due to the privileging of the text 
for the formation of self-identity. 
"To understand is not to project oneself into the 
text but to expose oneself to it; it is to receive 
a self enlarged by the appropriation of the 
proposed worlds that interpretation unfolds 
[Only then] it is the matter of the text that gives 
the reader his or her dimension of subjectivity; 
understanding is thus no longer a constitution of 
which the subject possesses the key" ("HI", 301). 
In sum, in the choice (the 'wager') to appropriate the text, 
the self is dispossessed of its understanding and challenged 
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by this world unfolded by the text 311 . It is thus, the 
poetic function of the text and the wagering of the 
individual on this disclosive power of the text, which 
ultimately provides the warrant for supplanting purely 
ideological readings of texts. 
David Kelsey's analysis of differences within 
theological construals suggests that 
"[theological positions] are the result of 
irreducible differences among imaginative 
construals of the mode of the presence of God; and 
they are evidence that this act of the imagination 
is decisive for the particular characteristics that 
give a theological position its particular 
specificity and most deeply separates it from other 
'theological positions'" (~, 163). 
Thus, Ricoeur' s decision to view the disclosive power of 
scripture as primary for building Christian identity is 
derived from his prior inversion of the Aristotlean primacy 
of the ostensive referential function of a text to that of 
poetics. Kelsey's observation is relevant here as an 
analysis of Ricoeur's prior literary-theoretical commitment: 
" theologians' decisions about which role in an 
argument supporting a theological proposal ought to 
be filled by scripture is largely determined about 
how best to characterize the subject matter 
theological proposals are chiefly to elucidate ... 
Theologians decisions about how to use scripture, 
311 "Distanciation from oneself demands that the appropriation of the 
proposed worlds offered by the text passes through the disappropriation 
of the self" ("HI", 301). 
like their decisions about how to construe the 
scripture they use, are determined by decisions 
that are literally pre-text, i.e., logically prior 
to any attention to any particular text taken as 
authority for any particular theological proposal" 
(~, 169-170). 
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Kelsey suggests that one of the "range of limits to a 
theologian's freedom of imagination" is that it "has its 
ground in features of the common life of the church to which 
the imaginative act is accountable" (Uses, 170). The 
proposal "must be possible to formulate self-consistently, 
not only the proposal itself, but the data on which it is 
grounded, the warrant licensing the move from the data to the 
conclusion, and the backing on which the warrant is grounded" 
(Uses, 171). This creates several problems for Ricoeur. 
Firstly, he denies being a theologian and thus is not 
interested in construing his theological proposals within the 
context of the church. This creates, secondly, the problem of 
proper warranting. Since the context of the church is absent, 
his decision to view biblical texts as "scriptural" lacks 
proper warrant. Thus, there can be little distinction between 
texts held as scriptural without the prior commitment of 
faith. 
IIIc. Edward Said on power within semiotic construals 
Edward W. Said, a Palestinian literary critic, writes 
extensively about the latent power within semiotic systems, 
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especially texts. Said's critique is thus forceful for it 
addresses Ricoeur I s system directly at its centre, the 
privileging of texts. However, unlike Habermas' theory of 
distorted communication, Said does not subscribe to any 
critique as meta-critical. Like Ricoeur, he understands even 
the most critical scholar to be temporally situated. He 
writes, 
"No one has ever devised a method for detaching the 
scholar from the circumstances of life, from the 
fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) 
with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, 
or from the mere activity of being a member of 
society. These continue to bear on what he does 
professionally,,312. 
Said maintains that texts function as defining mechanisms, 
usually helping to define those in power rather than those 
overpowered. In the case of European domination of Asia, 
"[t]he Orient is '" one of [Europe's] most recurring images 
of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped define 
Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, 
personality, experience" (Or ientalism, 1-2). Said maintains 
that the labelling of the Other as Other creates distinctions 
between the powerful and the weak which in turn gives control 
to the powerful. "I have begun with the assumption that the 
Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely 
there, just as the Occident is not just there either" 
312 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the 
Orient (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 10. 
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(Orientalism. 4). He argues that the creation of Europe, 
most importantly through literature, has led to Europe's 
domination of Asia. The logic of Said's critique is as 
follows. An interpretation of a text gains a traditional 
reading through a consensus which, in turn, subdues other 
readings 313 . The failure to recognise power interests in 
human relations usually blinds one to the reality of this 
occurrence. Ultimately, this leads to the creation of 
distinctions between this/that, us/them, etc. which one 
understands as difference without the recognition that this 
distinction is perspectival and not necessarily true314 . 
Said contends that his critique allows the critic the 
freedom to recognise the underlying power structures. He 
contends that "my whole point is to say that we can better 
understand the persistence and durability of saturating 
hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their 
internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were 
productive, not unilaterally inhibiting" (Orientalism, 14). 
Thus, an analysis of a culture's literature is productive 
because one's own culture impresses one to think in a certain 
313 This premise is based on the principle of hegemony; namely that 
certain cultural forms predominate as certain ideas are more influential 
than others. 
314 "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the 
time) 'the Occident'" (Orientalism, 2). 
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way (us/them). These impressions channel creativity through 
a specific cultural grid which, in turn, produces a certain 
way of thinking. Alternative thinking attempts to avoid the 
cultural grid I S premises and is truly creative because it 
challenges the "traditional" ways of thinking31S. Thus, for 
Said, alternative ways of thinking help the process of 
understanding one I s own culture and, in turn, help to 
formulate a critique of its values. "Indeed, my real 
argument is that Oriental ism is- and does not simply 
represent- a considerable dimension of modern political-
intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the 
Orient than it does with 'our' world" (Qrientalism, 12) . 
This powerful critique of textuality can be further 
extended to religious texts. "Like culture, religion 
therefore furnishes us with systems of authority and with 
canons of order whose regular effect is either to compel 
subservience or to gain adherents. This in turn gives rise 
to organized collective passions whose social and 
intellectual results are often disastrous"316. The 
implications of Said's theory are two-fold; firstly, there is 
no meta-situatedness, no Archimedean point of reference from 
which to adjudicate among competing interpretations and 
315 Said's argument here is founded upon Michel Foucault's analysis in 
The Archeology of Knowledge. 
316 Edward W. Said, The World, The Text, and The Critic (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 290. 
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secondly, there is no meta-beginning point, the hermeneutical 
circle is always entered while moving317 . Both of these 
points are also made forcefully by Ricoeur, especially in 
reference to Habermas 318 . Ricoeur could also employ them to 
counter Rogers' criticism. 
It must be noted, however, that Said is wary of 
embracing Ricoeur's investigations, specifically on the issue 
of reference. He contends that Ricoeur I s suspension of 
ostensive reference leads to confusion in the sphere of 
action. He writes, 
"Ricoeur assumes circumstantial reality to be 
symmetrically and exclusively the property of 
speech, or the speech situation, or what writers 
would have wanted to say had they not chosen to 
write. My contention is that worldliness does not 
come and go The point is that texts have ways 
of existing that even in their most rarefied form 
are always enmeshed in circumstance, time, 
place, and society- in short, they are in the 
world, and hence worldly" (The World, the Text 
and the Critic, 34-35). 
Said wishes to deconstruct the text as inscribed intention. 
317 "There is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, 
starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a 
way as to enable what follows from them" (Orientalism, 16). 
318 As the theory is applied to "meta-critical" non-hermeneutical 
systems of analysis, Said writes "Once an intellectual, the modern 
critic has become a cleric in the worst sense of the word. How their 
discourse can once again become a truly secular enterprise is, it seems 
to me, the most serious question critics can be asking one another" (~ 
World. the Text. and the Critic, 292). Said attributes this to the 
shift in contemporary thought towards a greater degree of specialization 
which leads to an overemphasis on the "private and hermetic over the 
public and the social" (The World. the Text, and the Critic, 292). 
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Rather than gaining access, via a hermeneutics of suspicion, 
to the interiority of a hidden message in the mental life of 
the author, he focuses on the "exteriority" of the text- what 
it describes and how the description is made. After all, 
domination of the Other is achieved as the Western author, 
"renders [the Orient's] mysteries plain for and to the West" 
(Orientalism.21) . Ricoeur's description of the dialogic 
situation is a "simplified idealization, and far from being a 
conversation between equals, the discursive situation is more 
usually like the unequal relation between colonizer and 
colonized, oppressor and oppressed" (The World. the Text and 
the Critic.48)319. Ultimately, Said's objections require 
Ricoeur to state why one ought to privilege the text in 
regards to identity formation? Said concludes that "[m] y 
thesis is that any centrist, exclusivist conception of the 
text, or for that matter of the discursive situation as 
defined by Ricoeur, ignores the self-confirming will to power 
from which many texts can spring" (The World. the Text and 
the Critic. 50) . 
It would also seem that the force of Said's critique can 
be extended to Ricoeur' s "space" between the subject and 
object which he contends will allow for the necessary 
critical distance. Said's theory of "power interests", which 
319 Citation taken directly after a reference to Foucault, Archeology of 
Knowledge: "Speech is ... [the] very object of man's conflicts" (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 216). 
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are always manifested in the texts of the dominant culture, 
is critical of those very texts and thus, the texts 
invalidate themselves as to their usefulness for the 
formation of human identity. He contends that "[t]oo often, 
literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even 
historically innocent, it has regularly seemed otherwise to 
me, and certainly my study of Oriental ism has convinced me 
that society and literary culture can only be understood and 
studied together" (Orientalism.27). 
The agenda which then needs to be addressed concerning 
Ricoeur's construal of how ideological critique is possible 
is as follows; firstly, why privilege the text in the 
formation of self-identity rather than human understanding, 
etc. and secondly, does the phenomenon of distanciation 
create the necessary "space" [or critical distance between 
the subject and the object (the text)? Rogers' critique 
addresses this first point whilst the second issue is the 
centre of the critique of Said320 . 
IV, A new understanding of "ideology" 
320 I propose that the force of Said's critique is that the subject and 
object (culture and its literary productions) are bound in such a way 
that the recourse to "states of affairs" in the world accessed by human 
understanding would not be a viable option. Like many feminist critics, 
Said's theory suggests that a reformulation of language is necessary 
which would exclude inculturated self-understanding as the central 
control. However, Ricoeur would deny the possibility of such a 
reformulation for it is based on an "ideal of unrestrained and 
unconstrained communication" ("HI", 303). 
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Ideology-critique looks for the sub-text that 
This manipulates the reader through the writer's interests. 
leads to Said's, Foucault's and Habermas' understanding of 
all social interaction as a play of power. Ricoeur's 
"hermeneutic of suspicion" is suspicious of reading texts on 
both a communal and a personal level because structuralism 
ultimately collapses into post-structuralism. When the 
layers of meaning in semiot i c systems become apparent, 
Ricoeur moves from the symbol to the word, and from metaphor 
to narrative. The role of hermeneutics is expanded to 
include the interpretation of systems such as linguistics 
(his studies on the double-meaning of metaphor) and psycho-
analysis (Freud) However, instead of resting content with 
this unmasking of the idols of power inherent in language, 
Ricoeur moves to the secondary aspect of hermeneutics, 
restoration. 
IVa. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
Gadamer's hermeneutic rna intains with Heidegger that 
within human existence Dasein is the basic mode of being-in-
the-world through participation and involvement. Authentic 
selfhood is positioning oneself ("projecting one's own 
possibilities") toward the future; as Gadamer sees it, the 
exchange of Husserl's "consciousness" for "care". However, 
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unlike Husserl, Heidegger recognises the interpretive act as 
central to being, not as a secondary act 321 . Heidegger 
"placed hermeneutics in the center of his analysis of 
existence in showing that interpretation is not an isolated 
activity of human beings, but the basic structure of our 
experience of life" ("HS", 317) This led Gadamer to posit 
that n[l]anguage is the fundamental mode of operation of our 
being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the 
constitution of the wor ld" 32 2. Furthermore, Heidegger' s 
phenomenological analys is "s uggest s very well what I would 
have in the place of 'foundation'. I would call it 
'participation' because we share a common world of 
tradition and interpreted human experience" ("HS", 322). 
This allows the hermeneutician to ultimately become a "better 
phenomenologist" ("HS", 32 J) . For Heidegger, "the 
authenticity of Dasein emerged as human finitude,,323. As a 
positive extension of Jaspers, Heidegger "sought instead to 
understand finitude positively as the real fundamental 
constitution of Dasein. Finitude means temporality and thus 
the 'essence' of Dasein is its historicity" ("PF", 125) This 
temporality and situatedness conditions understanding which 
321 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "The Hermeneutics of 
Phenomenolo~y and the Human Sciences [Edited by 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 318. 
Suspicion" in 
J. N. Mohanty] 
322 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Univer-sdlity of the Hermeneutical Problem", 
in Philosophical Hermeneutics (CA: Berkeley, 1976), 3. 
323 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, "The Phi losophical Foundations of the 20th 
Century" in Philosophical Hermeneutics (CA: Berkeley, 1976), 125. 
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never allows for pure, unmediated reflection on the part of 
the interpreter. 
With the philosophical basis of participation overcoming 
the problems associated with linking the Person, text and 
world, Gadamer recognises the "real act of work is 
appropriation in the common being of the speakers" (fiRS", 
322) . Gadamer embraces the Heideggerean hermeneutical 
circle: "The fact that erroneous interpretations also arise 
from anticipation and, therefore, that the prejudices which 
make understanding possible also entail possibilities of 
misunderstanding could be one of the ways in which the 
finitude of human nature operates" ("PF", 121). 
IVb. Relationship between Gadamer's and Ricoeur's 
thought 
Gadamer maintains that prejudice functions positively 
within the interpretive process: "It is not so much our 
judgements as our prejudices that constitute our being ... I 
am using [this formula] to restore to its rightful place a 
positive concept of prejudice ... ,,324. Prejudice is required 
for the experience of Dasein: "The consciousness that is 
effected by history has its fulfilment in what is linguistic 
324 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem" 
in Philosophical Hermeneutics (CA: Berkeley, 1976), 9. 
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(sic) ... and that provides an initial schematization for all 
our possibilities of knowing" ("UHP", 13). Prejudices ..... 
constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to 
experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the 
world. They are simply condi t ions whereby we experience 
something- whereby what we encounter says something to us" 
( "UHP " , 9 ) Gadamer's hermeneutic employs prejudice to 
function as the pre-conditions to experience Dasein. 
Gadamer comments on hermeneutical schemes which employ 
Nietzsche's concept of the nwill-to-power" as the 
hermeneutical key to understanding that human interests are 
at the basis of the commun ica t i ve act. He suggests that 
these hermeneutical schemes n ... [change] completely the idea 
of interpretation; it is no ]onqer the manifest meaning of a 
statement of a text, but the text I s and its interpreters 
function in the preservation of life This radical 
position forces us to attend to the dichotomy between the 
belief in the integrity of texts and the intelligibility of 
their meaning, and the opposed effort to unmask the 
pretensions hidden behind so-called objectivity (Ricoeur 's 
'hermeneutics of suspicion')" ("HS", 317). He maintains that 
"[t]his dichotomy is too sharp to allow us to rest 
content with a mere classification of the two forms 
of interpretation, as either simply interpreting 
statements following the intentions of the author 
or as revealing the meaningfulness of statements in 
a completely unexpected sense and against the 
meaning of the author I can see no way of 
reconciling the two [a hermeneutics of suspicion 
and a hermeneutics of restoration]. I think even 
Paul Ricoeur must in the end give up attempts to 
bring them together, because we have here a basic 
difference involving the whole philosophical role 
of hermeneutics" ("HS", 317). 
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Gadamer's critique of Ricoeur has merit, for if 
structuralism collapses into post-structuralism, language 
seems to be at the center of the problem: language which 
"hermeneutics of suspicion" can never bypass. I will explore 
an extension of this problem below. 
IVc. Jurgen Habermas 
Habermas writes, "[t]he only knowledge that can truly 
orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere human 
interests and is based on Ideas- in other words, knowledge 
that has taken a theoretical attitude,,325. Habermas 
understands Gadamer I s work to be within the sphere of the 
"historical-hermeneutic sciences". These sciences "which 
are concerned with the sphere of transitory things and mere 
opinion, cannot be linked up so smoothly with [the empirical-
analytic sciences]- they have nothing to do with cosmology" 
(lilil., 303). This is because "access to the facts is provided 
by the understanding of meaning, not observation ... Thus the 
rules of hermeneutics determines the possible meaning of the 
325 Jurgen Habermas, ~K~n~o~wul~e~d~g~e~~a~o~d~~Huuilmwa~n~~I~n~t~e~r~e~s~t=s 
Jeremy Shapiro] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 301. 
[translated by 
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validity of statements of the cultural sciences" (.KH.L, 309). 
However, the empirical-analytic sciences "develop their 
theories in a self-understanding that automatically generates 
continuity with the beginnings of philosophical thought II 
(.KH.L, 302-303). Habermas shares with Gadamer an interest in 
finitude, the "methodological consciousness of describing a 
structured reality within the horizon of the theoretical 
attitude" (Kill, 303) However, he contends that the 
"severance of knowledge from interests" (.KH.L, 303) leads to a 
"value-freedom". 
In his critique of Gadam('r' s notion of the fusion of 
horizons, Habermas focuses on the crucial role of the subject 
in the interpretive process. "Hermeneutic knowledge is 
always mediated through [the interpreter's] pre-
understanding, which is derived from the interpreter's 
initial situation. The world of traditional meaning 
discloses itself to the interpreter only to the extent that 
his own world becomes clarified at the same time. The 
subject of understanding establishes communication between 
both wor lds" (Kill, 309-310). Habermas recognises the 
inability of the subject to critique itself (within this 
fusing process) and thus "hermeneutic inquiry discloses 
reality subject to a constitutive interest in the 
preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of 
possible action-orienting mutual understanding" (.KH.L, 310). 
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Habermas understands general hermeneutics to suggest "laws of 
acting" whereas ideology-critique critically analyses, 
through a process of self-reflection, those very laws 
constituted by hermeneutics. Thus, the value of ideology-
critique is that it " ... sets off a process of reflection in 
the consciousness of those whom the laws are about II (KliL, 
310) Within Habermas' "theory of interests n, "self-
reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive 
interest [which] releases the subject from dependence on 
hypostatized powers" (KHI, 310). 
IVd. Relationship between Habermas' and Ricoeur' s 
thought 
Ricoeur maintains (with Cadamer) that "hermeneutics" 
focuses on "preunderstanding [which] is fundamentally a 
hermeneutics of finitude" ("HI", 302-3) whereas the critique 
of ideology "raises its claim from a different place than 
hermeneutics, namely, from the place where labor, power, and 
language are intertwined" ("HI", 303). Ricoeur recognises 
the complementary nature of the two approaches (hermeneutics 
and the critique of ideology). Their concerns intersect at 
the point of a hermeneutics of finitude, both are concerned 
about human being and authentic existence. This recognition 
"secures a priori the correlation between the concept of 
prejudice and that of ideology" ("HI", 303). 
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Ricoeur contends that Habermas' "theory of interests" is 
directed towards "emancipation"; the critique supposedly 
uncovers the distortions which would then pave the way for 
reaction and subsequent correct action. Indeed, Habermas 
contends that " the approach of the critically oriented 
sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest 
that was at the root of traditional theories" (KH.l, 308). 
I noted earlier that Ricoeur amended Gadamer by 
insisting that there is not an option between truth or 
method, thus the theory can never account for the 
distanciation of the text from the reader. I will now turn 
to his critique of Habermas on the issue of the possibility 
of a meta-hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur suggests that in the act of appropriating a text 
to expand one's conception of the self, the author and the 
reader engage in "play,,326 where an "imaginative variation of 
the ego" is explored. Thus, " it is always a question of 
entering into an alien work, of divesting oneself of the 
earlier 'me' in order to receive, as in play, the self 
conferred by the work i tse 1 f" ("Appropriation", 190). For 
Ricoeur, it is this "divestment of the self" which plays with 
326 Taken from Gadamer, "What is e!,sential is the 'to and fro' (Hin 
and Her) of play" (Appropriation, I fl6) . 
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"imaginative variations of the ego" which allows the text to 
critique the self and its illusions. There is a commitment 
on the part of the reader for, "[i]n entering a game we hand 
ourselves over, we abandon ourselves to the space of meaning 
which holds sway over the reader" ("Appropriation", 187). It 
is, likewise, the universality of the reality of hermeneutics 
which requires the reader to recognise all knowledge as this 
play between tradition and creaLivity. 
Ricoeur maintains that for a critique of ideology to be 
made on properly scientific grounds (which Habermas 
maintains), one needs to adhere to two principles; firstly, a 
non-ideological point of view rind secondly, an autonomy from 
other disciplines. Howeve L, he contends, that the escape 
from subjectivity (which would allow for a meta-perspective) 
is not possible because theories in the human sciences cannot 
escape attempts at falsification while maintaining sufficient 
explanatory force. This is due to the nature of enquiry in 
the human sciences which do('~:; not deal with issues of 
(scientific) falsification 327 . Likewise, maintaining 
autonomy from other disciplines would strengthen the claim of 
scientific rigor. However, in the "ideology-critique" as 
327 Ricoeur's position is articulated theologically by Louis Dupre who 
writes, "The believer does not refuse to submit his faith to the 
criterion of falsifiability, but only to scientific falsifiability. 
The test of faith must be administered in accordance with the nature of 
the religious experience itsel f, not with the standards of the 
scientific experience", {Louis Dupre, The Other Dimension: A Search for 
the Meaning of Religious Attitudes (New York: Seabury, 1979), 70). 
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practised by the Frankfurt School (Habermas in particular), 
"we witness a crossing between the social theory of ideology 
and psychoanalysis" ("SI", 234). Ricoeur contends that 
neither of these two conditions are met and thus the claim of 
objectivity is invalidated. Ultimately, "ideology-critique" 
cannot be classified as "scientific" for "a non-ideological 
discourse on ideology ... comes up against the impossibility 
of reaching a social reality p r lor to symbolisation" ("SI", 
237)328. "(AS [Habermas I vocabulary itself suggests, 
ideological delusion and its critique both belong to the same 
sphere of self-reflection, which, must be as primitive as 
productive action itself. Again this implies that we must 
give up the distinction hetween infrastructure and 
superstructure) ", ( .L..IJ.!.., 22 "7) • Ricoeur suggests that 
Habermas' own language on "human interests" betrays its 
dependence on the human being, thus it is not capable of 
achieving that complete and scientific "objectivity" which 
Habermas desires. The "self-II is a crucial component in 
Ideology-kritik. 
The governing principle for Habermas is "recognition II 
within relation. Ricoeur relates this "framework" to the 
aims of Ideology-kritik. "This framework of recognition is 
328 "Such is the fundamental reason why social theory cannot entirely 
free itself from the ideological condition: it can neither carry out a 
total reflection, nor rise to a point of view capable of expressing the 
totality, and hence cannot abstract itself from the ideological 
conditions to which the other members of the social group are subsumed" 
("SI", 239). 
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important for Habermas becau~;e it situates his theory of 
interaction as a 'dialogic relation I (MHl., 56) 
However, Ricoeur suggests that communication is at the heart 
of the problem. 
"The situation of excommunication, which 
recognition must overcome, is a disease of 
communication. Ideology is therefore itself a 
disease of communicat ion. Ideology is not the 
accidental but the systematic distortion of the 
dialogic relation. We cannot speak of the dialogic 
relation except through the process of recognition, 
and ideology is the system of resistances to the 
restoration of the dialog i c relat ion", (L.Ill, 228). 
Ricoeur suggests that t hE' value of Marxist critiques, 
such as Habermas', is to point out the pervasiveness of the 
ideology of the "market-place It • If this shift from the 
ideological use of religion has been transferred to that of 
the market-place, then Ricoeur believes that religion is once 
again liberated to perform a critique of ideology. 
"Religion may act not only as an ideology but 
as a critical tool to the extent that ideology has 
emigrated from the religious sphere to the 
marketplace and to science and technology. If the 
market and science and technology are the modern 
ideologies, then the present ideological role of 
religion may be less a burning issue. Religion 
still has an ideologica I role of the market and 
technology. We may t hen place religion in a 
dialectical position between ideology and utopia. 
Religion functions as an ideology when it justifies 
the existing system of power, but it also functions 
as a utopia to the extent that it is a motivation 
nourishing the critique. Religion may help to 
unmask the idol of the market" (1.Ill, 231). 
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Ricoeur proposes a new understanding of ideology which would 
recognise "discourse of a hermeneutical character on the 
conditions of all historical. understanding" ("SI", 242). 
The problem inherent in Habermas I approach is " the 
critique of ideology is of interest insofar as it is a 
nonhermeneutical discipline situated outside the sphere of 
competence of a science or philosophy of interpretation and 
marking the fundamental limit of the latter (hermeneutics)" 
("HI", 2 71). Ricoeur want s to maintain the autonomy of the 
two approaches because they complement each other in the 
process of critique. "The gesture of hermeneutics is a humble 
one of acknowledging the historical conditions to whicp all 
human understanding is subsumed in the reign of finitude; 
that of the critique of ideology is a proud gesture of 
defiance directed against the distortions of human 
communication" ("SI", 294). Ricoeur contends that since 
there can be a "critical instance" (due to distanciation) 
within hermeneutics, the potential exists for the possibility 
of an internal critique. This would then allow a critique of 
ideology to allow the balance to be restored329 . He refers to 
this complementary view as "the dialectic between the 
experience of belonging and alienating distanciation" ("HI", 
2 97) . Ricoeur's mediating position opens up the way for 
hermeneutics to acknowledge the usefulness of a critique of 
329 On the value of ideology critique, he writes, the "theory of 
Ideology adopts a suspicious approach, seeing tradition as merely the 
systematically distorted expression of communication under 
unacknowledged conditions of violence" ("HI", 271). 
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ideology whilst recognising the tradition-situatedness of the 
individual: "Though ideology-critique may have some 
therapeutic results, its purpose is still critique. Psycho-
analysis [which Habermas' theory utilises], on the other 
hand, includes both critique and cure. The function of 
therapy is to cure, but virtually no one is cured by the 
process of ideology-critique. Many are wounded but very few 
are cured" CL .. IJl, 249). Here, Ricoeur seems to be a making a 
moot point. I will explore Thompson's critique below on the 
issue of Ricoeur's synthesis of problems into a dialectic. 
Ricoeur suggests that Habermas uses "communicative 
competence" in a utopian fashion. "Communicative competence 
is a utopian construction, an ideal speech situation, the 
possibility of undistorted communication Communicative 
competence [for Habermas], however, is not something at our 
disposal but rather something that must appear as a Kantian 
Idea, a regulative idea" (L.1.!1.., 250). Ultimately, the idea 
of utopia "is supported first by the not ion of self-
reflection. This is the main n()tion of utopia, and it is the 
teleological component of all critique, 
all restoration of communication. 
transcendental component. This factor 
between ideology-critique ana the 
of all analysis, of 
I call it the 
preserves the unity 
whole tradition of 
philosophy in spite of Haberrn(ls' claim that we have broken 
with theory for the sake of praxis" (L..lll, 251) 
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Ricoeur's analysis of Habermas' "theory of interests330 " 
concludes that it is neither "empirically justifiable" (for 
this would prejudice the method of the natural sciences) nor 
"theory" (for this would be an instantiation of a meta-
criticism) . Habermas' theory, therefore, does not gain the 
(or indeed, claims). Ricoeur "universality" which he desires 
proposes, rather, that Habermas' "theory of interests" relies 
"upon a philosophical anthropology" which is hermeneutical in 
nature. Habermas' appeal to fIl('La-hermeneutics is located in 
his pre-supposition that 
hermeneutics of discourse, 
life" ("HI", 302) Ricoeur 
"hermeneutics is primarily a 
indeed an idealism of lingual 
sllqgests, however, that "[t] he 
interest in emancipation would be quite empty and abstract if 
it were not situated on the same plane as the historic-
hermeneutical sciences, that is, on the plane of 
co mm un i cat i v e act ion" ( " HI" , 3 0 3) . Thus, the force of 
Habermas' critique is lost precisely because his theory needs 
to be communicated. The need to use language, language which 
Habermas contends distorts "communicative competence", 
undermines the meta-hermeneutical claim of the critique of 
ideology. This same objection could also be levelled against 
Said. Habermas wishes ideology-critique to be universally 
valid (a "science") yet his idea.lised subject as unprejudiced 
by his/her own tradition does not exist. In fact, Ricoeur 
330 Ricoeur refers to Habermas' theory as the "theory of interests". 
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proposes that ideology-critique is 1) a tradition (extending 
from Marx) and 2) linked to the "most impressive tradition, 
that of liberating acts, of the Exodus and the Resurrection" 
("HI", 306). Ricoeur understands the critique of ideology to 
be both liberating yet dependent upon the events the 
community recalls 331 . He concludes by surmising that if a 
cult ure disposed of this "1 ibe rat ing tradit ion" (" if the 
Exodus and the Resurrection were effaced from the memory of 
mankind"), then "[p 1 erhaps t he n~ would be no more interest in 
emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom" ("HI", 306). 
Ricoeur suggests that ultimate I y the issue of difference 
between Gadamer and Habermas boils down to a philosophical 
one; they 
"do not have the same tradi tions. Gadamer relies 
more on the t radi t ion 0 f German idealism and 
romanticism, whereas for Habermas it is more the 
Enlightenment plus German idealism. That Habermas 
and Gadamer are both sit uated historically is 
inevitable; no one is outside all tradition. Even 
emphasis on self-reflection has a certain 
tradition. Self-reflection has both an ahistorical 
factor, what I have called its transcendental 
component, and a cultural component, a history" 
(1..I.ll, 252). 
IVe. Thompson's Critique of the theory 
John B. Thompson trans la Led many of Ricoeur' s essays 
331 Here a parallel could be drawn with Mircea Eliade's discussion of 
the phenomenon of the "Eternal Return", the recurrence through re-
enactment of significant events within a culture. 
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into English332 and produced a postgraduate thesis comparing 
the thought of Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas 333 . He is 
critical of Ricoeur' s work on the relationship between 
hermeneutics and the critique of ideology334. His critique 
follows the same pattern as Ricoeur's essay and focuses on 
the section in which Ricoeur attempts a mediating position. 
In all fairness, Ricoeur aligns himself most closely with 
Gadamer, although the position he espouses is an emendation 
of Gadamer whilst attempting to listen to the concerns of 
Habermas. The force of Thompson's critique is two-fold; 
firstly he contends that Ricoeur's recourse to the "text as 
other" creates more philosophical problems than it solves and 
secondly, he maintains that Rjcoeur's assertions in regards 
to Habermas' theory of "communicative competence" are merely 
this, assertions, and are thus, hollow. 
Ricoeur's first attempt at mediating contends that 
critical distance is possible because the reader confronts 
the text as other (this is due to distanciation within his 
theory of interpretation) Thompson contends that this model 
332 Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, [edited and translated by John 
B. Thompson]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
333 The thesis was worked into the book entitled Critical Hermeneutics: 
A study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
334 This essay is an attempt to mediate a "middle position" between the 
perceived excesses of Gadamer and Habermas. There had been an ongoing 
debate within the literature between the two Germans which Thompson 
gives a brief history of in a footnote ("HI", 345: fn.1). 
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of interpretation based on distanciation effectively 
"displaces the primordial bond between subject and object 
which underlies the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer" 
(Critical Hermeneutics, 163). The net result of Ricoeur's 
recourse to distanciation opening up this critical distance 
is that " the primitive hermeneutical phenomenon is no 
longer belonging as such, but rather the interplay between 
participatory belonging and alienating distanciation" 
(Crit ical Hermeneut ics, 163). Thompson maintains that this 
disassociation between subject and object raises anew the 
problem of adjudicating among the conflict of 
interpretations. Ricoeur's recourse to the "world opened up 
by the text" (which produces his revised notion of truth), 
fails to give reason for the phenomenon of the text 
critiquing perceived "reality" rather than perceived 
" reality" critiquing the text 335. Thompson contends that 
Ricoeur privileges the text at the expense of human 
perception about the way things are without giving 
justification for this privileging. The force of this 
critique allows Thompson to accuse Ricoeur of not adequately 
addressing Habermas' theory (and his concerns about 
distortions in human communication) and thus, Ricoeur's 
335 Thiselton's reservations concerning Lindbeck's theological model 
parallel Thompson' s critique of Ricoeur. He writes, "I am extremely 
cautious about George Lindbeck's tendency to locate the meaning of 
biblical texts in intralinguistic or "intratextual" categories to the 
exclusion of presuppositional and extra-linguistic contextual factors 
about states of affairs in the world", New Horizons in Hermeneutics; 
The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, (Grands 
Rapids, M1: Zondervan, 1992), 557. 
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"mediating" position collapses. Habermas' very contention is 
that which Ricoeur fails to challenge, namely, that semiotic 
systems (texts included) convey distortions within human 
communication and thus mask their intentional abuse of power. 
Ultimately, Thompson's critique maintains that Ricoeur 
"trust s" (or "wagers on i') the very system that Habermas 
maintains is a distortion. 
v. Are we left with Foucault? 
Michel Foucault traces the origins of modern post-
structuralist hermeneutics back to the work of Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud336 : " the nineteenth century, and 
quite singularly Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, placed us once 
again in the presence of a new possibility of interpretation. 
They founded anew the possibility of a hermeneutic337 ". He 
suggests the radicalness of their critiques to have "changed 
the nature of the sign, and modified the way in which the 
sign in general could be interpreted n ("NFW', 61). They 
336 Louis Dupre suggests that ..... each of the three great critics 
focused on one of the components of the onto-theological synthesis. 
Marx denounced the distorted relation of the person to the natural 
world, which has resulted in alienation from both the natural and the 
social environment. Freud focused on the predicament of the modern 
self. Nietzsche both denounced the Platonic-Christian idea of 
transcendence and feared its departure" (Passage to Modernity: An Essay 
in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 5). 
337 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud and Marx" [Translated by Alan 
D. SchriftJ in Transforming the Hermeneutic Conte~t: From Nietzsche to 
Nancy, edited by Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (New York: SUNY 
press, 1989), 61. 
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introduced a hermeneutic which focused not only on the 
surface meaning of the sign but also it's depth: " ... signs 
are themselves stages in a much more differentiated space, 
according to a dimension that we could call depth, on the 
condition that one understand by that not interiority but, on 
the contrary, exteriority" ("NFM", 62) 
This new interpretive scheme is to be found in the 
hermeneutical rule of Nietzsche, "[t]here are no moral 
phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of 
phenomena" (aphorism, 108) 338. Nietzsche radicalised all 
interpretation as simply that, an endless array of 
interpretations: "Against positivism, which halts at 
phenomena-'There are only facts'- I would say: No, facts are 
precisely what there are not, only interpretations" (aphorism 
481)339. Foucault suggests that "[p]erhaps this 
preeminance of interpretation in relation to signs is what is 
most decisive in modern hermeneutics" ("NFM", 65). He 
maintains that taking seriously Nietzsche's claim meant that 
II interpretation at last became an endless task From 
the nineteenth century on, signs were linked in an 
inexhaustible as well as infinite network, not because they 
338 Basic Writings of Nietzsche [Translated and Edited, with 
Commentaries by Walter Kaufmann] (New York: Modern Library, 1967). 
339 The Will To Power [A New Translation by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Ho11ingdale; Edited, with Commentary by Walter Kaufmann] (New York: 
Random House, 1967), 267. 
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rested on a resemblance without border, but because there are 
irreducible gaps and openings" ("NFM", 63). 
Foucault works Nietzsche' s maxim into a system which 
negates the "original" text: "The incompleteness of 
interpretation, the fact that it is always fragmented and 
initially remains suspended on itself, is met with again 
in the form of the denial of origination" ("NFM", 63) 3 4 0 . 
Modern post-structuralist hermeneutics finds itself coming to 
two separate yet connected conclusions. Firstly, " if 
interpretation can never be brought to an end, it is simply 
because there is nothing to interpret. There is nothing 
absolutely primary to interpret, because at bottom everything 
is already interpretation [tout est deja interpretation]. 
Each sign is in itself not the thing that presents itself to 
interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs" 
("NFM" , 64) . This leads hermeneuticians to assert the 
aptness of their interpretations which, at root, are the 
power interests of the interpreter. "Moreover, insofar as 
the sign is already an interpretation which is not given as 
340 Foucault suggests that within this scheme, approximating madness 
with agressive interpretation and losing oneself for n ••• the further 
one goes in interpretation, the closer one approaches at the same time 
an absolutely dangerous region where interpretation is not only going to 
find its points of no return but where it is going to disappear itself 
as interpretation, bringing perhaps the disappearance of the the 
interpreter himself. The existence that always approached some absolute 
point of intepretation would be at the same time that of a breaking 
point [point de rupturel" (nNFMn, 63). Furhtermore, "[tlhis 
experience of madness would be the penalty for a movement of 
interpretation which approached the infinity of its center, and which 
collapsed, calcinatedn ("NFM", 64). 
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such, signs are interpretations which try to justify 
themselves, and not the reverse" ("NFM", 65-66) To combat 
this move, this cycle of positing and assertion, post-
structuralist hermeneutics " finds it sel f before the 
obligation of interpreting itself endlessly" of always 
correcting itself" ( "NFM" , 6 6) . Thus, "one does not 
interpret what there is in the signLfied, but one interprets, 
fundamentally, who has posed the interpretation" and 
"interpretation always has to interpret itself, and it cannot 
fail to return to itself" ("NFM", 66). 
Ultimately, for Foucault, taking Nietzsche seriously 
means that 
"hermeneutics and semiology are two ferocious 
enemies. A hermeneutic that in fact winds itself 
around a semiology, believing in the absolute 
existence of signs, gives up the violence, the 
incompleteness, the infinity of interpretations, so 
as to create a reign of terror where the mark rules 
and suspects language On the other hand, a 
hermeneutic that envelopes around itself this 
intermediate reign of madness and pure language 
enters into the domain of languages that never stop 
implicating themselves ... " ("NFM", 67). 
Although Jacques Derrida maintains that behind their 
differences, Ricoeur and Foucault (his ex-professors) are 
involved in a "pseudo-metaphysics", I maintain that they are 
engaged in very opposite enterprises. 
Firstly, Ricoeur does not adhere to the Nietzschean 
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maxim that all there is, is interpretation. Ricoeur's notion 
of "fixity" maintains room for "valid" interpretations: "all 
interpretations are not equal". Secondly, Ricoeur's desire 
to move from a hermeneutic of suspicion to a hermeneutic of 
retrieval requires an idealised notion of "communicative 
competence", not simply egoistic assertions. Finally, and 
perhaps most curiously, I argued above that Ricoeur allows 
for certain texts to have an ostensively referring function. 
That is, these texts do not break all references to the "real 
world" and do not seek to create worlds for the reader to 
inhabit. My concern is that if one reads Ricoeur as breaking 
ostensive referentiality in all texts, then deconstruction 
and Foucaultian "new Historicists" will have proper grounds 
for appealing to Ricoeur. However, while I admit that 
Ricoeur allows for this breaking of ostensive reference in 
certain types of texts, those with a poetic function, I 
maintained that this does not include all texts. 
In the final analysis, I believe that the real issue is 
ll.Q.t.. whether Ricoeur allows [or ostensively- referential 
texts. Rather, the problem with Ricoeur's notion of 
referentiality is that he classifies the biblical texts as a 
category of poetic texts which non-ostensively refer yet have 
a descriptive function By doing this, he affirms the 
ability of sacred texts to "re-contextualise" themselves and 
317 
speak anew to success i ve gene rat ions 3 41 . However, the 
greater question is "Do the bibl.ical. texts have any 
ostensive referential function?" This is the issue which 
Frei and Ricoeur debated. While Frei argued for the "history-
likeness" of texts, he stopped short of allowing the 
resurrection narratives to be non-ostensive. Furthermore, 
David Tracy's limit-language strips the text and distils the 
"truths" of the biblical texts from the narrative, another 
point disputed by Frei 342 . The "real" argument between Frei 
and Ricoeur is over the status of the resurrection 
narratives. Ultimately, one must decide on the referential 
function of these texts. That is, do they have a poetic 
function (Ricoeur) or do they ostensively refer to spatio-
temporal events (Frei)? 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
I began this chapter with an objection raised by William 
Rogers concerning Ricoeur' s privileging of texts in the 
formation of self-identity. I objected that what Rogers 
341 Ricoeur states, "an essential characteristic of a literary work ... 
is that it transcends its own psycho-sociological conditions of 
production and thereby opens itself to an unlimited series of readings, 
themselves situated in different socio-cultural conditions" (~, 139). 
342 Whether or not David Tracy is properly appropriating Ricoeur's work 
at this point is also suspect. Ricoeur does not allow for the 
narrative to be eclipsed in the sense of stating the meaning of a text, 
propositionally, in the framework of limit-propositions. This is due to 
the concepts of 1) the surplus of meaning created by the use of symbol 
and metaphor and 2) the need for narrative; demythologization not 
demythization (SE, 352ff). 
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understood as Ricoeur' s special pleading (the difference 
between interpreting a text and interpreting a text as 
scripture) was only to be understood within a larger 
philosophic-literary framework. Ricoeur's position of non-
immediacy to one's own consciousness requires a detour 
through the symbols of culture, of which texts are the medium 
par excellence. He combines this with his contention that 
texts are distantiated from both author and reader in a 
phenomenon that does not occur in a normal dialogic 
situation. This distanciation opens up a path for the 
critique of the subject via the text in a way which Ricoeur 
understands as impossible in Gadamer's work. The symbolic 
construction of the consciousness is thus both necessary yet 
open to critique. 
I then turned to more incisive critiques by Thompson and 
Said on the issue of this gap opened up via distanciation 
between subject and object. The discussion here was 
conducted as one explicitly stated by Ricoeur in his critique 
of Habermas. Ricoeur's contention is that the critique of 
ideology is not meta-hermeneutical and thus does not have the 
objectivity claimed by those following the Marxist critique, 
namely the Frankfurt School. However, Ricoeur does not 
dismiss the critique of ideology. Rather, he embraces it as 
a tool to be used alongside hermeneutics; incorporated as a 
strand of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" (which he contends is 
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inevitable) . The force of Habermas' argument is not 
lessened, only re-directed into a dialectic with that of 
hermeneutics. By comparison, I propose that the force of both 
Thompson's and Said's arguments follow. The agenda laid out 
would then focus on a discussion of whether or not it is 
possible to reformulate language from within a culture. 
However, Ricoeur comments that "we do not currently have at 
our disposal a non-ideological notion of the genesis of 
ideology ... [this] concerns the impossibility of exercising 
a critique which would be absolutely radical- impossible, 
because a radically critical consciousness would require a 
total reflection" ("HI", 238) Ricoeur opts for the 
integration of the critique of ideology until a theory is 
formulated which can account for the transcendent critique 
needed to justify such claims to objectivity. Yet, for him, 
this will never (because it can never) materialise. 
Conclusion 
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Final Conclusion 
The literary-theoretical basis 
"Hans Frei and the New Criticism" 
I argue in chapter one that theories of literary-
criticism were utilised by both Frei and Ricoeur in their 
respect i ve approaches to he rmeneut ics . I began with an 
exposition of what has been called "New Criticism". I have 
focused on, for the purpose of indicating Frei I s (and 
Ricoeur's) association with the "New Criticism", several 
major tenets advocated by the New Critics; close readings, a 
rejection of authorial intention, and an insistence on the 
indispensability of the literary work. 
The conceptual foundations of New Criticism are found in 
the work of I.A. Richards and T.S. Eliot. They re-directed 
the study of literature upon the work itself rather than on 
the prevailing models of biography, philosophy or history. I 
argue that New Criticism neither rejects the value of 
external approaches to literature as useful nor does it hold 
the view that the text is an authorless entity (two common 
"misinterpretations" of the New Critical enterprise) From 
this principle, the exposition focuses on the polemical 
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works of several critics. The "intentional fallacy" becomes I 
I 
a centralising focus, for the New Critics were addressing 
what they had perceived to have become an imbalance in 
literary studies. The focus on the work itself allows the 
critic to place the study of literature within the public 
realm rather than within the realm of privatised 
interpretation. The "heresy of paraphrase" focuses on the 
indissoluble relationship between the structure and the 
content of the lite rary work. At tempts to paraphrase a 
literary work (especially a poem) conflict with its meter and 
is not possible due to a notion of all language as metaphor. 
If all language is metaphorica I, the translating of a work 
into another form (the exchange of metaphor for propositional 
content) is an illusion. Furthermore, this translating loses 
the metrical structuring of literary works (plays and poems) 
which ultimately creates a different work. 
Frei advocates using New Criticism as a tool for helping 
to uncover the meaning of biblical texts early in 1967. 
However, as early as 1979 and definitively in 1986, he 
rejects New Criticism for reasons not associated with the 
"intentional fallacy" or the "heresy of paraphrase". Frei 
was wary of general hermeneutical schemes and he was 
disturbed by what he perceived to be a hidden agenda; the New 
Criticism as a hermeneutic which viewed literary works as 
moral enterprises. I concluded that Frei's relationship with 
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the New Criticism was that he utilised its insights 
polemically. That is, his work in The Identity of Jesus 
Ch r i s t , was a New Cr it ical way of reading applied to 
theological investigation. 
"Paul Ricoeur and Structuralism: 
of truth?" 
A new meaning of the notion 
Ricoeur's hermeneutics also utilises the New Critical 
tenets of the "intentional fallacy" and the "heresy of 
paraphrase". He rejects authorial intention as providing the 
meaning of a literary work and his notion of the "surplus of 
meaning" combines a theory of language as metaphorical with 
the indispensability of form and content. 
Ricoeur was also heavily influenced by French 
Structuralism; I focus on his work founded upon Gerard 
Genette's theory of "narrative discourse" and A.J. Gremias' 
theory of "discourse analysis". Ricoeur recognised the 
limitations of Genette's structural analysis as an inability 
to connect the world of discourse to that of temporality. 
This required Ricoeur to bracket a notion of "truth" until a 
proper theory of temporal emplotment could be expounded. 
Ricoeur and Genette advocate the "close reading" of texts and 
assume the meaningfulness of the text which, Ricoeur 
maintains, allows the reader to arrive at a correct reading 
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of a text. Ricoeur emends Genette by adding "real time" to 
"story time" and "narrative time". This allows Ricoeur to 
re-position the storied, textual world within the "real 
world". This emendation, placed within an expanded notion of 
narratology (the "guiding concept" is the mimesis of action) 
which allows the interpreter to focus on emplotment 
(structural analysis of the literary work within 'real 
time' ) . 
Ricoeur's placing of both history and fiction within the 
discipline of narratology broadens the scope of his 
investigation. The recognition of the narrative basis of 
both forms of literature shifts the locus of Ricoeur' s 
investigations to the issue of emplotment. I discuss 
Ricoeur's use of the "mimes is of action" as the central 
"guiding concept" and the application of this to the problem 
of emplotment which is expanded to account for several forms 
of anachrony. Ricoeur's distinction between the genres, epic 
and novel, is now accounted f or in terms of the narrator. 
So, the result is that Ricoeur can maintain that the novel, 
as well as a 'history' or an epic poem, enriches reality 
through its mimetic function. 
Ricoeur's engagement with A.J. Gremias is on the problem 
of temporality in narratives. Ricoeur's move from 
structuralism to post-structuralism is related to this 
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problem; a problem Gremias also faced. Ricoeur extends 
Gremias' conclusions by investigating the phenomenon he calls 
the "illusion of sequence". Ricoeur, unlike Gremias, does 
not equate sequence with chronology. Thus, Ricoeur 
incorporates Heidegger's definitions of time which relocate 
the issue within emplotment. 
both the key and the problem. 
For Ricoeur, emplotment becomes 
The issue of truth within narratological investigation 
has been bracketed in Time and Narrative until the problem of 
time has been dealt with. Ricoeur proposes that fiction is 
"richer in information about time" than history. This is 
because fiction uses anachrony (whereas historical writing 
avoids this) and does not attempt to stylistically maintain 
the same chronological "speed". Thus, Ricoeur has allocated 
a place to the reader within the process of emplotment. 
Truth is a projection from the text which discloses 
information about the textual world and transforms the world 
of the reader. It is at this intersection of the world of 
the text and that of the reader where the proposal of 
truthfulness is met. Historical narrative and fictional 
narrative intersect on the issue of the disclosive power of 
the text; the primary ostensive reference is eclipsed to 
allow the text to expand the reader's worldview. 
The discipline of poetics is the link between Ricoeur's 
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work on fiction and scripture. Poetics recognises all 
literature as humanly created modes of significations and the 
interpretat ion of a text is only one way of treating the 
text. Poetics recognises that meaning is not to be equated 
with interpretation but that texts, which have disclosive 
power, are "true" by offering possibilities to the reader for 
understanding oneself. Ricoeur asserts that the biblical 
texts are, par excellence, disclosive and true. 
The chapter then turns to various construals of the 
issues Ricoeur engages with in Time and Narrative. Peter 
Brook's analysis of the problem of emplotment with reference 
to time parallels and supplemc'nts the work of Ricoeur. He 
shares three concerns with I{icoeur; the plot is at the 
intersection of time and narrative, time is essential for 
narrative, and structuralism has under-estimated the role of 
the reader in the formation of the plot. Hayden White, who 
shows up often in Time and Narrative, discusses the problem 
of emplotment in relation to historical narrative. I am not 
persuaded by White's analys is and discuss how Ricoeur' s 
notions of "fictive history" and "historicized fiction" are 
more tenable views of the relationship between history and 
fiction. White's radical "hermeneutic of suspicion" also 
lacks Ricoeur' s dialectical counterpart, a "hermeneutic of 
retrieval", making his theory seem too theoretical and 
ultimately, untenable. John Searle suggests that authorial 
326 
intentionality is the key to the interpretation of a text. I 
discuss Searle for Ricoeur is opposed to authorial intention 
as supplying the necessary interpretative framework for 
understanding a text. However, Ricoeur' s discussion of 
"textual intent" seems to be sublated in Searle's thought and 
it would seem that Ricoeur' s rules for the interpretive 
process, at the initial level, cohere with Searle's. 
These are the issues my exposition of Ricoeur has dealt 
with prior to an exploration of his construal of narrative 
identity. Ricoeur has suggested that structuralism has not 
dealt adequately with the place of the reader or the place of 
temporality in narrative. He suggests that emplotment stands 
at the intersection of time and narrative and that the reader 
is involved in the construal of emplotment (the "synthesis of 
the heterogeneous"). He also suggests that to confuse 
interpretation as the goal of reading a text is to overlook 
the non-ostensive capabilities of a text, what he calls its 
disclosive power. Thus, thE" issue of "truth" is not a 
question of correspondence to factual claims (if these sorts 
of claims could be made and proven) but is rather an issue of 
the reader responding to the world unfolded by the text. 
Application of the methodology to narrative identity 
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"Frei and Narrative Identity" 
Chapter two is an exposition of Frei and Ricoeur's 
notions of "narrative identity". Both thinkers have placed 
the close reading of the text and the indispensability of the 
text in the center of their hermeneutic. Both have also 
rejected appeals to authorial intention (understood as the 
mental intention of the author) as a way of accessing the 
meaning of a text. Ricoeur adds a hermeneutic of suspicion 
which requires the reader of biblical texts on the one hand, 
to address the analysis of Nietzsche, and with Heidegger on 
the other hand, to retrieve the meaning of the text as 
disclosing possibilities. 
Frei's construal of narrative identity within the 
biblical writings focuses on the person of Jesus Christ. His 
work in The Identity of Jesus Christ is a piece of dogmatic 
theology in the tradition of Karl Barth. Significantly, and 
unlike Barth, Frei avoids discussing the doctrine of 
revelation. He relies on the work of Strawson and Ryle to 
provide the framework for discussing what Jesus' narrative 
identity is and what it is not. Thus, Frei refuses to 
discuss what "personhood" is and focuses on Jesus' identity 
as conveyed through the biblical narratives. He also avoids 
reconstructing Jesus' identity in reference to his 
intentions. Rather, his investigation focuses on the identity 
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of the narrativised Jesus. Frei maintains, with Barth, that 
the person of Jesus and the narrative portrayal of him 
coincide. 
Frei's approach to the biblical narratives referring to 
Jesus is founded upon a genre recognition. He maintains that 
the passion-crucifixion-resurrection sequence in the gospels 
are an instance of "realist ic narrat i ve" and thus , it is 
appropriate to ask questions concerning the historical 
factuality of the account. I argue that Frei's approach to 
the passion narratives based on his genre analysis seems 
logically unfounded and I suggest that it may be an instance 
of special pleading. 
I then introduce the work of Ronald Thiemann and Stephen 
Crites into the discussion. My reasons for investigating 
these theologians is two-fold. Firstly, they both focus on 
construing theology within the rubric of narrative. 
Secondly, and more importantly to my overall project, 
Thiemann's analysis parallels that of Frei with an important 
emendation; his narrative proposal is based on a close 
reading of the Gospel of Matthew whereas Frei's observations 
are not specifically focused on any particular Gospel 
account. Likewise, Crites' analysis begins from the similar 
claim of Ricoeur; namely that through narratives, human 
beings relate their experiences. 
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This chapter deals with three critiques of theologies 
construed within narrative. Maurice Wiles' objects that 
narrative is an inadequate rubric for construing theology for 
it is too "constricting" and thus cannot adapt to the 
changing needs of theology. I also deal with the problem of 
the "followability" of a narrative and suggest that neither 
Frei nor Thiemann deal with this issue adequately. I suggest 
in the following chapter that Ricoeur' s investigations in 
Time and Narrat i ve are an attempt to deal with this 
phenomenon which he calls "discordant concordance". The 
final objection to Frei's construal of narrative identity is 
directed at the foundations of Christian theology; namely, 
the continuity between the testaments. Frei argues that the 
Gospel narratives disclose the identity of Jesus whereas 
Thiemann's extension of Frei's work argues that the Gospels 
disclose the identity of God. Goldberg's critique 
anticipates a problem Frei may have noticed and thus is 
hesitant to extend the disclosure of Gospel narrative 
identity to God. I conclude that Frei's analysis never deals 
with the problems associated with the followability of a 
narrative sequence (including both the reader and the text) 
nor does he provide an account of the legitimacy of including 
the Hebrew scriptures within the realm of Christian theology. 
I also conclude that Wiles' objection to a "narrative 
theology" may be cogent but is not relevant to Frei t s 
investigations. 
"Ricoeur and Narrative Identity: 
the problem?" 
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Is emplotment the key or 
Ricoeur's work on biblical texts is pre-determined by an 
obsession with legitimacy. Firstly, he insists on his work 
as philosophical, not theological. Ricoeur classifies all 
literary texts as "poetic". 
"disclose" or "reveal". 
That is, they have the power to 
I then turn to his essay on 
"revelation" to analyse how an emended structural analysis 
combined with an expanded narratology provides Ricoeur IS 
notion of "truth". Ricoeur maintains that the "poetic" 
function of discourse is founded upon three principles; 
distanciation, fixation of discourse, and a dual reference. 
What is signified in a text is not simply its ostensive 
referent (first-order) , but more importantly, its 
metaphorical referent. He maintains that metaphor is a form 
of "semant ic innovat ion" which requires the reader to make 
sense of the meaning. Within biblical texts, this innovation 
is called an "enigma expression". These enigmatic 
expressions (he cites the 'kingdom of God' and parables) are 
limit-language which in turn are "indirect discourse". Thus, 
the primary, ostensive signification is eclipsed and 
metaphorical discourse allows a disclosure of the world 
signified within the text. However, the world of the reader 
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merges with that of the text when the reader allows him-
/herself to imagine the possibilities opened up by the text. 
The "truth" of the text is in its power to disclose and the 
reader engages this truth through a "commitment" to the world 
opened up by the text. 
I then turn to Auerbach's analysis of biblical 
literature and his subsequent discussion of the function of 
its language. Auerbach's thesis, which is wholly supported by 
Frei, is that the projected world of the bible does not 
cohere with other "narrative worlds". Rather, the world 
disclosed by biblical literature claims exclusive 
interpretative rights. Ricoeur's "non-violent appeal" to an 
understanding of the doctrine of revelation as non-religious, 
avoids the falsification/verification discussion but in doing 
so, seems to do an injustice to this Christian doctrine. 
For Ricoeur, any engagement with a text must first 
detour through a "hermeneut ic of suspicion". Applied to 
biblical texts, this hermeneutic requires the reader to 
reckon with the work of both Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
Nietzsche's proclamation of the "Death of God" is a 
recognition that the classical notions of God must be 
challenged so that "true" not ions of God may be retrieved. 
Nietzsche's proclamation becomes for Ricoeur a guiding 
hermeneutic which destroys t he traditional metaphysical 
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starting points but then emerges from among these ruins as a 
guide for constructing a "post-religious faith". This "post-
religious faith" is guided by the work of Heidegger. It is a 
"poetic theology". Heidegger's poiesis ("the act of creation 
in the broadest sense") requires the reader to engage the 
text as expounding creative possibilities of understanding 
oneself. Ricoeur's methodological appropriation of 
Heidegger's exposition of physis allows the world of the 
text primacy. His theory avoids the problem of subjectivity 
for the reader, though involved in a "synthesis of the 
heterogeneous", is not fully responsible for the 
interpretation of the text. Structuralism provides some of 
the clues for interpretation and Ricoeur's insistence on the 
primacy of second-order reference allows engagement with the 
non-ostensive disclosive power of the text. 
There have been many discussions of the significance of 
Heidegger within Ricoeur' s thought. There is, however, 
little discussion of the influence of Nietzsche, even though 
the lecture "Religion, Atheism, and Faith" firmly fixes his 
place within Ricoeur' s hermeneutic. I investigate this 
relationship even further by suggesting that Ricoeur's notion 
of Christian listening, listening without frameworks or 
revenge, is an extension of both Nietzsche's and Heidegger's 
work. I suggest that wi thin Ricoeur' s hermeneutic, the 
notion of the wi11 imposing an interpretive structure upon 
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the text does not allow the text to speak on its own terms. 
This is linked to Nietzsche's notion of revenge as the 
primal instinct which must be overcome before the transition 
to the overman. This suspension of controlling interpretive 
frameworks allows the text to challenge the reader and 
ultimately can contribute to the formation of a "narrative 
identity" which informs the self as to personal identity. 
In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur's construal of "narrative 
identity" within texts focuses on the way in which a reader 
derives personal identity from this "narrative identity". 
Ricoeur defines identity as the combination of the unchanging 
(Idem-identity) and the changing (Ipse-identity). His work 
on identity parallels the investigations within Time and 
Narrative on the "followability" and the phenomenon of 
constructing a plot. It is within the interweaving of time 
and narrative (emplotment) that a character is recognised 
through his/her habits (the history of the character) and 
their acquired identifications (those which contribute to the 
recognition of the character as a unity). It is this 
emplotment of the character and the ability to follow this 
movement which yields the identity of the character and in 
turn, mediates partial identity (the "narrative identity") to 
the reader. 
Within biblical texts, Ricoeur maintains that the 
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Christian responds to the portrait of Christ by recognising a 
tradition-inspired continuity between God, Christ and the 
Christian (a "chain of descending glory"). The "conscience" 
aids in the application of the Judeo-Christian tradition to 
oneself. For Ricoeur, the imagination, when confronted with 
the potential of the world unfolded by the text, prompts a 
restructuring of one's identity. This is only possible if 
the person challenged by the text, "wagers" on the validity 
of the world disclosed. This hermeneutic effectively 
recognises that the reader cannot escape from within the 
hermeneutic circle. The reader must "trust" the narrative's 
disclosive power, whilst that disclosure challenges the 
reader's worldview. 
Ricoeur proposes that pursuing a "narrative theology" 
may prove to be worthwhile. This proposal suggests that 
biblical narratives are unique from other narratives due to 
the subject matter (they attempt to "name God" and refer to 
that "name") and due to their status as literary works, have 
disclosive power. However, a narrative theology as construed 
by Ricoeur would embrace various disciplines including many 
elements of narratology. These disciplines do not seem prima 
facie compatible. Yet, an investigation into what Ricoeur 
sketches a narrative theology may look like, reveals that 
Ricoeur may be involved in a "qeneral hermeneutics", an issue 
Frei raises in regard to Ricoeur's work. 
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The final section of this chapter deals with Frei I S 
critique of Ricoeur. It is important, for Frei engages 
Ricoeur on the issue of a "general hermeneutical theory". 
Frei suggests that subsuming theological investigation under 
a general theory, three inter-related problems arise. 
Firstly, the singularity of Jesus Christ is lost. Secondly, 
the flow from text to world is reversed. Our "common human 
condition" informs the text rather than the text informing 
our world. Finally, current literary theories (especially 
"deconstruction") have challenged the "self-presence" of the 
individual. 
Theological Methodology and Critique 
"Frei and Christian self-description: 
external critique?" 
The possibility of an 
This chapter is an exposition of Frei' s notion of 
Christian self-description as a way of construing theology. 
My contention is that theological construal is not immune to 
external critiques and I explore what the force of external 
critique would be within Frei I s system. I suggest that 
Frei I s descriptive theological construals often fulfil a 
prescriptive function; thus his distinction between first-
and second-order theological investigation does not always 
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stand. 
A distinctive contribution of Frei to theological 
description is his exposition of Christianity as a cultural-
linguistic system. He argues that a religion can be 
described in fashion similar to the way cultural 
anthropologists describe any form of social interaction. 
Frei understood the benefits of such a construal to be this: 
to understand a religion is to effectively describe it, not 
to engage in any form of an apologetic enterprise. He 
utilises the work of Clifford Geertz who proposed that "thick 
description" (the describing of a religion) is "not to 
generalize across cases but within them". For Frei, 
Christian self-description is necessary for the Christian 
community to help those within it understand their faith. 
The radicalness of Frei' s "second-order theological 
statements" become apparent in the debate with Carl Henry. 
As I argue, the central problem with Henry's construal of 
Christian "facts" is that Frei feels that Henry's enquiry 
into the historical veracity of the biblical narratives 
reduces their testimony to the level of common historical 
narrative. Frei wonders if Jesus' resurrection can ever be 
classified as a historical "fact"; resurrections are not 
recurring events which can be tested. However, he does want 
to maintain that the resurrection is a "real event" and is 
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therefore, not a metaphorically representative state of 
affairs. 
I conclude that Frei's model of Christian self-
description has difficulty in engaging with criticisms 
external to the system. Frei's attempt to avoid discussing 
"how" the biblical narratives refer whilst focusing on what 
they "mean", has drawn criticism from both literary critics 
and theologians. 
Gary Comstock maintains that Frei' s engagement with 
biblical texts excludes (prior to the question) the issue of 
their truthfulness. I argue that Comstock has misunderstood 
Frei's work and I verify my claim by citing a letter in which 
Frei responds to an article written by Comstock. I conclude 
that Comstock's critique of Frei is better understood as an 
argument over the status of philosophy within the theological 
arena. Frei 's maintains that philosophy (as well as any 
other discipline) does not hold a privileged position within 
the discussion. Comstock wants to allocate that position to 
philosophy (Ricoeur does as well and this is the essence of 
the dispute) . 
Michael Goldberg arises once again to critique Frei's 
"narrative theology", suggesting that Frei's theology 
separates truth from meaning and narrative from reality. I 
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argue that Goldberg's critique is unfounded for 1) Frei does 
not frame the discussion wi thin the relationship between 
"truth-claims" and bibl ical narra t i ve and 2) Frei never 
advocates a "narrative theology"; in fact, he opposes it. 
I then turn within the exposition to Frei's dependence upon 
George Lindbeck for his notion of Christian self-description 
and argue that Frei perceived his work to be an extension of 
Lindbeck's. 
The chapter turns to a discussion of an external 
critique which employs a "hermeneutic of suspicion" and how 
effectively a model of Christian self-description might 
engage it. I suggest that Frei' s prior theological and 
methodological commitments seemingly bypass the issues raised 
by such a hermeneutic. The difficulty in Frei' s construal 
arises when one moves from a "narrative identity' (in this 
case, Jesus' identity) to one's personal identity. I 
conclude that Frei's construal is lacking in an explanation 
of how this move occurs whereas Ricoeur' s discussion of 
identity attempts to grapple with this issue. 
"Ricoeur and external critiques: 
force of ideology?" 
A new definition of the 
Ricoeur's exposition of theological hermeneutics takes 
serious ly the critique of ideology. However, Ricoeur' s 
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distinctive contribution to the study of ideology is to 
suggest that since ideology is present in all forms of 
communication and cannot be completely eradicated, one must 
not necessarily understand ideology as a negative phenomenon. 
His discussion assumes that 1) all reflection is mediated and 
2) distanciation is a key component within textual 
communication. 
The discussion centres around three critiques. William 
E. Rogers contends that Ricoeur' s hermeneutic fails to 
distinguish between texts which are scriptural and those 
which are not. Furthermore, since Ricoeur's theory fails to 
substantiate such a distinction, any "wagering" on texts must 
be considered as arbitrary. Edward Said's cr it ique of 
Ricoeur also hinges on the decision to privilege texts in the 
process of identity formation. Said maintains that texts can 
not be employed in the process for textuality is necessarily 
ideological. Said maintains that Ricoeur's "hermeneutic of 
suspicion" is not sufficient to dismantle the necessarily 
ideological production of these texts. Furthermore, Said 
critiques Ricoeur's notion of distanciation, querying whether 
this phenomenon "creates" sufficient "space" for the 
interpreter to gain a "critical distance" from the text. 
Ricoeur enters into the discussion on ideology taking a 
dialectical position between the thought of Gadamer and 
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Habermas. From Gadamer, Ricoeur recognises 1) the 
participation of humanity with the products of the culture 
(including texts), 2) the temporality and situatedness of the 
individual which does not allow for unmediated reflection and 
3) the necessity of prejudice in the informing of the 
consciousness. From Habermas, Ricoeur recognises the value 
of a system which intends to unmask distortions within human 
communication. His attempt to mediate a position between 
these two thinkers intersects at the point of a hermeneutics 
of finitude. Since there can be no meta-critical positioning 
of the subject, Ricoeur dismisses Habermas' Ideology-Kritik 
as neither 1) scientific nor 2) non-ideological. Rather, he 
suggests that Habermas' theory is valuable as a tool to be 
used alongs ide hermeneut ics; a type of hermeneutic of 
suspicion. Furthermore, the critique of ideology can employ 
religion within the critique for religion no longer holds a 
dominant role within society. This eclipse of the power of 
religious critique, once valuable, has now become free to re-
exercise its role within society. His attempt at discovering 
a mediatory position led Ricoeur to suggest that the 
fundamental difference between Gadamer and Habermas is one of 
adherence to differing philosophical traditions. 
This leads to the final critique of Ricoeur by John B. 
Thompson. Thompson contends that Ricoeur' s attempt to 
mediate a position between Gadamer and Habermas fails. The 
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reasons are two-fold; firstly, Ricoeur's recourse to the text 
as "other" creates more philosophical problems than it solves 
and secondly, Ricoeur fails to engage the issues Habermas 
raises. The prominence of distanciation destroys the gains of 
Heidegger and Gadamer as to the participatory nature of human 
belonging. Also, Ricoeur I s lack of proper warrant for 
privileging certain texts seems to "trust" the very texts 
Habermas (and Said) suspect are ideological. Ricoeur 
reformulates the discussion of ideology to give a positive 
notion of ideology and thus, only seemingly dissolves the 
problem. 
I argue that the suggestion of Gadamer that a 
"hermeneutic of suspicion" cannot be reconciled with a theory 
which attempts to interpret statements as to their 
meaningfulness (one intended by the author) is relevant. I 
suggest that if structuralism ultimately collapses into post-
structuralism, then language is at the centre of the 
reformulation of the problem. I then investigate the 
relevance of Michel Foucault's suggestion that hermeneutics 
and semiology are irreconcilable alternatives to a common 
problem; that of the infinite interpretation of the sign. I 
argue that Ricoeur's agenda does not follow that of 
Foucault's, though he recognises the problems which have 
arisen in hermeneutical theory. Firstly, Ricoeur's notion of 
"fixity" maintains room for "valid" (and thus "invalid") 
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interpretation. Secondly, Ricoeur's move from the 
hermeneutic of suspicion to that of a hermeneutic of 
retrieval hinges on an idealised form of "communicative 
competence" and is not simply based on egoistic assertion. 
Finally, Ricoeur's notion of split reference, while focusing 
on the disclosive power of reference, does not completely 
dismiss ostensive reference. Ricoeur recognises that there is 
a "referential and descriptive function of ordinary language" 
and ostensive reference is not obliterated in scientific 
discourse. My suggestion is that Ricoeur has made room for 
the tools which do not require him to follow Foucault's path 
down to infinite interpretation. However, his theory of the 
poetic function of all literary texts has put him in a 
quandary concerning the ostensive references made in those 
texts. 
Final Remarks 
This thesis has investigated Frei's and Ricoeur's 
construals of Biblical identity. I conclude that whilst both 
approaches expand an understanding of Christian identity, 
Ricoeur's work in the field of human action allows for the 
transition from a "textual identity" to personal identity. 
This is significant for several reasons. 
Firstly, on the one hand, Ricoeur has never "formally" 
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abandoned the value of a structuralist approach to the 
initial hermeneutical enterprise. He has always defended the 
value such an approach brings to the interpretation of the 
text and his "post-structuralism" is an emendation of 
structuralism. Frei, on the other hand, rejects his New 
Critical roots in his "final essay" ("LR"). However, Frei's 
major work on Biblical identity, The Identity of Jesus 
Chri st, relies heavily upon a formalist hermeneutic. An 
abandonment of New Critical insights would undermine the 
significance of this work. In the analysis of the final 
essay, I proposed that Frei's rejection of New Criticism was 
a rejection of the "Christian" reading of texts. So his 
contention with the New Critics does not centre around a 
problem with formalist tools of analysis but rather around 
their seemingly disingenuous methodology. He could have 
maintained the value of these "tools" whilst rejecting their 
masked "Christian" readings. He does, however, recognise the 
significance of Derrida' s deconstruction and in the essay 
"Hermeneutics and Beardslee", he does maintain a relationship 
with his "structuralist friends". 
Secondly, this study points to parallels with the 
difficulties which arose between Barth and Bultmann: " . .. as 
the published controversies between Barth and Bultmann 
suggest, what is most basically at issue between the two 
kinds of 'theological position' they each represent may not 
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be so much what either side actually says on any given 
theological topic, but rather the order in which they are 
taken up" (.Il..s..e..s., 163). 
The difficulty with Ricoeur' s approach to identity is 
that he focuses primarily on the identity of the reader 
rather than the identification of the character ostensively 
referred to within the text. His "split reference", though 
not allowing for the eclipse of the ostensive referent, 
emphasises the disclosive power of the text, seemingly at the 
expense of its ostensive reference. Ricoeur's newer work on 
biblical texts seems to redress this imbalance and indeed, 
incorporates some of Frei's insights. 
So, the question which arises from Ricoeur's newest work 
is this: "How would Frei react to the development of 
Ricoeur's thought which has incorporated the identity of 
Jesus into an interpretation of biblical texts?" Would he 
feel compelled to abandon formalist tools if he had read the 
newest work of Ricoeur? 
Ricoeur 
structuralist 
has not abandoned 
hermeneutic; the 
the procedure of a 
benefits of employing 
structuralist analysis were always incorporated within 
Ricoeur's hermeneutic. I argue that the difficulty which 
Frei recognises is not that Ricoeur' s notion of "split 
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reference" disregards all ostensive reference. Rather, his 
theological agenda 343 requires the interpreter to make 
"meaningful", once again, the biblical narratives. However, 
his early work on the parables moved too quickly from 
interpretation to "meaningfulness". Thus, it seemed as if 
the text itself was lost; the text became a projection of a 
way-of-being-in-the-world. His newer work has proved this 
objection to be somewhat misleading. 
Within the arena of hermeneutics, Frei deals with the 
meaning of the texts, whereas Ricoeur inverts the 
Aristotelian order of ostensive reference and poetics. Frei 
recognises that the text conveys reality through a form of 
the perspicuity of the text; the 'how I is deferred by 
appealing to a Barthian hermeneutic. For Ricoeur, the 'text 
says what it means' yet there is a danger in not attributing 
'truth' outs ide of the text. Thus, the 'text' becomes a 
'pointer' which discloses a reality beyond itself. This 
places Ricoeur within post-structuralism through his 
incorporation and extension of structuralist insights. 
There are differences within construing identity within 
343 Kelsey's analysis may point to a significant part of the problem 
between Frei and Ricoeur: "[Theological positions] are the result of 
irreducible differences among imaginative construals of the mode of the 
presence of God; and they are evidence that this act of the imagination 
is decisive for the particular characteristics that give a theological 
position its particular specificity and most deeply separates it from 
other 'theological positions'" (~, 163). 
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narratives. Frei works intratextually, internally, 
dogmatically and descriptively in formulating the identity of 
Jesus. The problem arises in moving from narratological 
description to human action; Frei is not clear on how the 
move from a character in a story to one's personal identity 
is made. Ricoeur works both internally and externally 
(guided by a phenomenological analysis), recognising the 
effects of ideologies bearing on texts. He opts for a 
hermeneutic which accommodates both a hermeneutic of 
suspicion and one of retrieval. 
The later work of Fre i ("LR") advocates a form of 
Christian Midrash which would 'de-center' any textual 
interpretation thus not giving authoritative status to any 
'fixed' interpretation. There is a strong emphasis on the 
role of the church in determining the 'meaning' of the 
biblical texts. Ricoeur's notion of textual inscription 
(' fixity ') gives the interpreter structural parameters for 
adjudicating between conflicting interpretations. 
Frei and Ricoeur began their investigations as 
"formalists" but both have shifted their positions, even if 
only slightly. Frei advocates discerning 'meaning' 
intratext ually, 'meaning as immanent', and this 'meaning' is 
I truth' ("Anselm's logically odd formula"). Ricoeur employs 
both phenomenological and textual analysis to conclude that 
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the text 'points' towards 'truth' (ideologies inherent in 
text and the necessity of a hermeneutic of suspicion do not 
allow for the text to be 'truth'). Thus, literary-theory has 
had an enormous impact within the theological construals of 
both of these thinkers and, subsequently, upon Christian 
theology as a whole. 
APPENDIX 
& 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1 
Hermeneutics and Beardslee (n.d.): transcribed 09/08/93 76(12)189 
There is a tenacious sense that all of us have, even those of us who 
most apologetically have to confess barely knowing the difference between 
causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, that our descriptive 
concepts refer1 , that all statements are propositions, and propositions 
are cast in the shape of assertions under the form of judgments. In other 
words, even for those of us who are not philosophers or philosophical 
theologians and therefore blunder foolishly [view2] process hermeneutic 
groups because a wiser man than ourselves has kindly made a passing 
reference to a book we may have written once in a foolishly reckless 
moment- I say even for those there is a tenacious hold of the sense that 
the ladder from logic through experience to the most refined speculation 
is one in which self and reality, mind and nature belong together, that 
the dualists, both metaphysical and epistemological are wrong. We may, 
for example, say that [the] mind is the mirror of nature after all, 
against those who with Richard Rorty (p. 113) claim that the only 
reason the 17th century did not 'misunderstand' the mirror of nature 
or the (inner) eye otherwise was that they COUldn't misunderstand it, 
since after all they have revealed it. What an irony Rorty's claim would 
be-- if I may simply entertain it as a hypothesis for a moment-- for the 
cutting edge of the suggestion is that (any) one who moves in to heal 
dualist splits is bound to play the game on his opponents' grounds, since 
they invented the game, or the problem and the revisers, try as they 
might, can't do more than change some of the rules, i.e. the conceptual 
descriptions, by which it is played: it's still the same game. 
1 scratched out ... "or that the mind is the mirror of nature" 
2 Word illegible 
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But that is indeed no more than a tempting hypothesis for the 
moment, a momentary if elemental, sudden and therefore frightening state 
of affairs, and we return to one tenacious native sense that mind and 
reality belong together. And certainly we look with something like pity--
no, that's wrong, with reverse sympathy-- on those who seem to have the 
very opposite elemental reaction. They say that the best way to get out 
of the problem or the dualistic game is not to become (solipsistic) 
Idealists but to pursue an option such as speaking of the social character 
of language-- in a sociological rather than parasychic sense of the term 
social-- and to say that language as a social construct is the very 
condition of experience, rather than vice versa, that communal languages 
have their own irreducible integrity even as they are (poems) and open in 
time and therefore have their own natural history. There are of course 
those who experience this kind of persuasion, including the consequence 
that reality as a social construct, as a relief, a therapeutic release 
from what they regard as hypostatized3 and therefore insolubly generalize 
problems like "reference", as though that were a single, univocal term or 
truth as though that term had a single universal status which is given 
conceptual content by referring it to another universal which is termed 
"meaning". Against this kind of globali (zation) the irreducibly social, 
particular form of language comes to some people as a relief. But others 
regard that possibility with a fear well expressed in the like of Frederic 
Jamesons's book, "The Prison House of Language". 
May I confess to being torn hopelessly both ways? The muting of 
"reference" as a single, universal, rather than concepts or rather people 
referring by means of concepts in various ways comes as a relief-- since 
3 ... "generalizations of families" 
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referring to God, to my Dachshund, to the way I love my children, to the 
self that loves them, to the nuclear structure of genes and to the 
biography of Leopold Bloom which has just been written despite or because 
of the fact that hitherto he had never existed apart from James Joyce's 
Ulysses-- since referring may not be the same thing in all these cases. 
And the relief from logical and trans-logical universalism may go on to 
cover the very systematic preoccupation with the thinking procedure that 
has the conceptual name-tag, truth or reference, to say nothing of 
'reality' . But on the other hand, the prison house of language image 
comes up, and relief and fear live side by side when I deny that elemental 
sense that I am an embodied mind, subject or superject, in a.real world of 
which I actually am a social and temporal location or series of locations. 
But relief or fear aside, sometimes the native affirmation of the sense of 
being able to know the true character of reality is to the fore, sometimes 
the sense that all speculative thinking to demonstrate the referential 
character of words and concepts is futile. 
It is obvious then that I am neither determinedly antagonistic to 
nor wholly ardently committed to the problematic that preoccupies 
Professor Beardslee. If I do have to use large-scale technical language I 
want simply to affirm my belief that 'hermeneutics' has to do with 
'meaning', i.e. with criteria and rules for sound interpretation of texts, 
rather than with 'truth'. and I want to stress that even the limited use 
of 'truth' as true interpretation of a text rather than relation of the 
text to true reality, is only secondary for me, though I won't deny that I 
puzzle about it. Hermeneutics has to have breathing space: don't move in 
on it too quickly with (trans.) hermeneutical concerns, e.g. character of 
symbolization: Christian theological hermeneutics is a second-order 
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discipline on a practice, a practice that is communal, and the relation 
between signifier and signified in that practice is a semantic matter, so 
that premature reference to how symbols may be reality-laden through 
mutual participation of symbol and reality only had to get us back into 
that representationalism all of us want to avoid. 
I am deeply concerned about the specificity of narrative texts. 
There are all sorts of texts, and the Bible includes all kinds of texts to 
which different hermeneutical rules may apply. For example, I may want to 
read a letter in a different way from the way I read a story--
non-narratively, that is-- even if the same person crops up in the tale 
and in the correspondence, viz. Jesus Christ. In other words, I hope 
nobody thinks of something called "narrative sense" as a kind of 
hermeneutical absolute. On the other hand, take Bul tmann to whom 
Beardslee refers, who takes personhood as a kind of root concept. He then 
identifies a specific person-- Jesus of Nazareth-- as irreducibly himself. 
Now the way we identify specific human agents in their specificity (we can 
do other things with them too, we can use them as illustrations of 
microcosmic organic wholes or as non narrative, repeatable textual 
structures or as deconstructionist (misprisions) of the interpreter) is 
to take them in theirs irreducible specificity and we can only do it by 
telling their specific self-enactment in their specific context, whether 
historical or fictional, so that the issue of reference is 
hermeneutically, though probably not theologically irrelevant. I think 
that's the hermeneutical rule for irreducible identification of a person 
in a narrative text: you follow the diachronic, not the synchronic line, 
you narrate him or her because he/she is not a separable subject/substance 
from his/her depiction in or as his/her story. Now what Bultmann wants to 
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do is both to identify the specific person, if you will, Jesus' 
scandal of particularity, and to dismantle the narrative-- as Professor 
Beardslee rightly remarks (pp.4f)-- is simply not to play by the rules 
that govern this game; he has a lousy, indeed an impossible hermeneutics. 
More than that I don't want to say. I am not saying narrative is all, or 
even that narrative texts can't be dealt with by other rules of exegesis. 
And by the way, whether or not the narrative depiction claims that the 
"transcendent is encountered beyond the ethical rather than the aesthetic" 
(Beardslee, p.7) is a moot question for me. Hermeneutically, once again, 
I'd rather leave that aside; I don't know what the transcendent is doing 
in the first place messing around in my modest second-order rules 
exhibited in the first-order use of language, and nothing but language. 
But if I do have to deal with that kind of sweeping generalization, I 
suppose I'd say that some people long before Frank Kermode-- to whom all 
honor-- have thought of narratives as more nearly aesthetic language play 
and others (F.R. Leavis the most scary example) as moral enterprises. I 
thought of a limited type of narrative in a limited hermeneutical context: 
realistic narrative as the mode of personal identification: who is this 
person in and from this story. Identity depiction of that sort is ethical 
yet also aesthetic, you could even call it the ontologization of the 
irreducibly particularist warn against well-intentioned endeavors to 
restore to ethical character. 
I am neutral about how to integrate this approach with that of 
narrative as an aesthetic linguistic world in which strong readers find 
irradiating moments in discontinuous quanta. I am not sanguine about 
finding a global hermeneutics to cover these and other narratives-- as 
well as non-narrative texts, since I believe the variety of 
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phenomenological hermeneutics may be far worse that either structuralist 
or deconstructionist procedure. Nor however do I regard this as a matter 
of distress as I gather Professor Beardslee does. Hermeneutics in 
general, yes, not sacred or tailored to the uniqueness of the Bible. But 
there is no one general hermeneutics. The only way to get one is to have 
a general philosophical theory or system foundational of the general 
hermeneutics, so that all seemingly divergent elements of general 
hermeneutical approaches may be harmonized by having their specific places 
in the total scheme assigned to them. But that foundational endeavor I 
mistrust deeply. I want my hermeneutics to allow me to mean with my texts 
in independence from the reality-bearing of the texts and the 
hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics, though general, is, I believe, context-specific. And 
that goes for the tools as well as the textual stuff on which they work. 
Do I want to leave it at that? Didn't I confess a yearning for 
interconnection and, more, a common transcendent reference that could 
function as a common norm or truth for what is right interpretation? Half 
of me agrees with Professor Beardslee's dream, and I doubt that it comes 
closer to realization than in today's western world. 
In the meantime I find that Professor Beardslee encourages me most 
kindly in my (corrective sense) as does Paul Ricoeur to the 
phenomenologists, to persist in "rediscovering the reality of 'the 
narrative sense'" as part of "the self-construction of an entity", one in 
which the function of a proposition is(focal). I am grateful to both, but 
want to do so hermeneutically, i.e. with the option of having my narrative 
interpretation-- on which I don't rest everything in any case-- and thus 
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my narrative hermeneutics without appeal to foundational thinking. And so 
I take off my hermeneutical hat to Professors Beardslee and Ricoeur, but 
at the same time wave an equally friendly yet arms-distance maintaining 
hello to my structuralist, poststructuralist, and deconstructionist 
companions. 
All that that means is that at the risk of looking utterly 
relativist to some and utterly reactionary to Professors Beardslee and 
Kermode, I want to do hermeneutics in the tradition of Christian theology 
as reflections on the use of Christian communal language and that as a 
language that has an irreducible integrity of its own, is not 
systematically grounded by reference to a systematic pre-understanding or 
pre-linguistic experience (or expression) of reality in general. 
Yale University 
November 5, 1984 
Professor Gary Comstock 
Iowa State University 
Religious Studies Program 
411 Ross Hall 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
Dear Professor Comstock: 
1 
Here is the paper I promised you. I imagine your essay 
is by now on some editor's desk; but even if it isn't, I want 
to request that you not use this paper for quotation. 
However, I did want you to look at it. 
I fear that it will not only confirm your worst suspicions 
but make you think that conversation with me is worse than 
useless. Still, I hope not (in a forlorn kind of way). Which 
reminds me: will you be in Chicago for the AAR meeting? If 
so, I hope there'll be an opportunity for us to talk. 
But now to our disagreements. I'm afraid you won't find 
much to agree with in the present essay. You may even 
disagree with my assessment that Ricoeur turns biblical 
hermeneutics into a regional case of general hermeneutics. 
Well, I'm afraid I'd argue the case vigorously, despite the 
essay on Revelation with its (to my mind inconsistent) 
qualifications. A 'pure narrativist' I think I'm not, and I 
hope that will be, clearer than before, but at least mildly 
anti-foundational I am in philosophy. Mildly? Yes; I am a 
Christian theologian and do not regard philosophy as ever 
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having achieved that clearly demonstrated set of even formal 
certainties (and agreements) in 2500 years which would allow 
it the kind of authoritative status you seem to want to 
accord it; and yet I believe theology cannot do without 
philosophy. Furthermore theology cannot even invest so much 
in the foundational/antifoundational debate as to come out 
(qua theology) in principle on the antifoundational side. 
Christian theologians will have to make use of philosophy, 
whichever way philosophers decide that particular issue is to 
be resolved. In other words, I'm saying two things 
simultaneously: First, Christian theology is quite distinct 
from philosophy; it has a kind of distinctness that Ricoeur, 
despite his good will, cannot see, so that -- again despite 
his (and your) disavowels [sic] theology becomes for him 
at least a quasiphilosophy of religion with a regional 
hermeneutics under general philosophical-hermeneutical 
governance. Second, despite their mutual distinctness, 
theology as a second-order discipline cannot dispense with 
philosophy, and their relation remains complex and has 
constantly to be worked out, rather than being of one 
invariable shape. 
That leads me to my main criticism of your criticism of 
me: It's the complexity of that interrelation that you reduce 
to far too systematic and simple a shape. If I suggest that 
philosophically, 'meaning' and 'truth ' (themselves not the 
only philosophical categories one may want to use for 
purposes of interpretive clarification) should be sharply 
distinguished in a hermeneutics of realistic New Testament 
narrative, and hermeneutics confined to the level of meaning, 
I'm supposed to be implying that Christians don't make truth 
claims for their beliefs. But of course I'm saying nothing of 
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the sort: I'm simply saying that the virtual running into 
each other of 'meaning' and 'truth' in philosophical systems 
like Ricoeur' s in which semantic sense and ontological 
reference are embraced together under the common category of 
meaning an ironic obverse to the logical positivists I 
running together of sense and verifiability under the 
category of meaning as pure ostensivity -- is dangerous and 
does not allow realistic narratives a genuinely realistic 
status. Instead, Ricoeur' s view tends to force realistic 
description to become metaphor, so that its 'meaning' qua 
possible ontological truth can be a transcendent, secondary 
world which is obviously not realistic. I say that's in its 
own way as bad as the positivists' obverse, which insists 
that any realistic description refers ostensively and 
univocally. Both Ricoeur and the logical positivists unite 
'meaning' and 'truth' prematurely when it comes to realistic 
narrative, whatever may be the case in other hermeneutical 
situations. 
Suppose I distinguish 'meaning' and 'truth', that still 
leaves open to me several possible explorations about the 
relation between them in regard to the realistic New 
Testament narratives, for example, the tradition of 
analogical predication which has been so common in the 
Christian tradition from St. Thomas to Barth. Again, it's no 
perfect answer, if for no other reason than that 
'analogizing' is one thing, whereas having a watertight 
theory of analogy is another and less likely one. St ill, 
perfectly 
watertight (philosophical) theories are hard to come by 
anywhere, and in the meantime the use of analogy may keep us 
from a dreaded referential, fundamentalistic literalism on 
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the one hand and from a (to at least some of us) equally 
dreaded dissolution of realistic meaning into a non-realistic 
secondary or second-order world of truth on the other 0 
Ricoeur often tells us that he wants to dare to be a Kantian, 
and hermeneutically that is doubtless the case 0 But his 
hermeneutics and his ontology are obviously on intimate 
terms, if indeed not systematically united, and am I 
completely wrong if I see a far more Hegelian than Kantian 
slant in the ontology (even though perhaps in Heideggerian or 
even Schelling-like garb) which he thinks goes appropriately 
with his hermeneutics? If true being is in the unity of 
metaphor ical language , limit experience, and meaning, just 
how do you recapture the world of sense and things? Just what 
is that secondary world which is referred to by the other 
part of the 'split' reference, the part that does not refer 
realistically? How is it different from that sublation of 
realistic reference in which the latter is at once stored up 
and left behind, that Aufhebung which seemed to be the 
triumph of ontology under Hegel's auspices? 
And if I am at least partially right in my suspicion at 
this point, would you tell me what 'God's action' really 
means in such a context? And would you really want to tell me 
that this is how Christians intend to refer when they greet 
each other on Easter morning with "He is risen"? (po 15) You 
tell me that I wrongly interpret that statement purely 
intramurally; but even if you were right (which you are not), 
I don't think that's any more incorrect than your apparent 
identification of the meaning of that text with the 
statement, "Jesus's life reveals the mystery of the Kingdom 
of God" (p 0 20) I especially when that phrase may be little 
more than a literary code for a full-orbed 
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Idealistic-ontological use of 'truth,' and its residual 
realistic element is reduced to the level of some kind of 
'powerful (poetic) presence. I 
To retrace in order to go on: I think I have good 
reasons for distinguishing sharply at the philosophical level 
between the meaning and truth of realistic narrative: I want 
to avoid both the reduction which A. J. Ayer and Christian 
Fundamentalists share on the one hand and the ontologically 
non-realist dissolution of New Testament realistic narrative 
that you and Ricoeur undertake on the other. That kind of 
straightforward philosophical revision of New Testament truth 
claims is simply not open to me; the mode of New Testament 
truth claiming has to be more complex for me, i. e., more 
complex at the second-order philosophical-theological level, 
not in the first-order religious confession. 
As for the character, then, of the truth claim, I admit 
quite candidly that it is logically, theoretically or 
philosophically 'odd' (which is not the same as 'meaningless' 
so far as I'm concerned). That seems to make me some kind of 
privatizing 'fideist' in your view. It is precisely at this 
point where the philosopher can apparently apply reductionist 
cliches (which allows him to stop thinking right there), that 
the theologian has to utilize most strenuously what Hegel 
called die Anstrenqung des Begriffs and think both hard and 
delicately about the distinction but also the interrelation 
of Christian faith and philosophy. I admit I have so far not 
done very well there, but I know the issue has to be tackled, 
and that it is a very complex one which, for someone like 
myself who cannot be reductionist on the theology/philosophy 
matter, cannot be an either/or choice, especially since I 
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also believe that the very alternative, publici private 
discourse, in which you couch the issue,is erroneous. For me, 
'meaning I in the gospel narratives is more and more a 
combination of 1) the communal-religious interpretive 
tradition and what it has seen as their primary meaning; 2) 
the fact that the tradition has given primacy to their 
realistic, ascriptive sense (see the accompanying paper); 3) 
that outside of that tradition there is no reason to think of 
any single interpretive move 
these stories; 4) and even 
or scheme 
within it 
as THE meaning of 
there is room for 
others, provided they do not conf lict with the primary, 
realistic or literal sensei 5) that subordination of 
understanding to the text, within the descriptive schema 
explicatiolmeditatiolapplicatio (see Charles Wood's book) is 
in no way the same as the elimination of interpretive 
understanding and of a possible multiplicity of 
interpretations. (Again, the matter is far more complex for 
me than your exposition of my supposed stance of "autonomous 
meaning" of realistic narrative makes it appear.) 
Philosophically meaning cannot be identified with truth but 
must be kept distinct: What these stories refer to or how 
they refer remains a philosophical puzzle, but it has to be 
in a way congruent with their realistic, history-like 
character (and history-likeness of course means that the 
ministry, death and resurrection narratives are the chief 
topics, not the "mystery of the Kingdom of God," which is not 
a realistic, fictional or historical, item in the same sense 
as these others). When I ask the question of their truth I am 
much more clearly (more than that I cannot say) on 
theological ground, but even there not without a reshaped 
philosophical form. As for my view of the relation between 
meaning and truth and the character of the gospel narratives' 
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truth claims: For me, 'divine truth' is at least in part a 
referential statement, but I do not have a correspondence 
theory and description with which to back it in this 'odd' 
instance. Rather, it is backed by a coherence procedure: It 
is contrary to Jesus's very identity in the stories to be 
conceived of as not having been raised from the dead; 
therefore he really and not merely in the stories 
lives. I admit the oddity and believe it is due to the 
uniqueness of the case. Is this the same as 'private I 
meaning? Anselm's distinctively Christian version of the 
ontological argument has always been philosophically 
puzzling-but private? It seems to me that that argument and 
the status of discourse about the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ belong together. I'm suggesting that in this case and 
this case only a straightforward referential truth inference 
is to be made from a formal coherence description. Further, 
this cannot be an instance of a general procedural rule, and 
yet the procedure should not violate general procedure in 
relating meaning and truth: It is therefore imperative at the 
philosophical level to suspend judgment about their relation, 
i.e., to keep them separate at least in this case, perhaps 
even generally. Philosophical] the gospel narratives are not 
self-referential; their reference is indeterminate and that 
indeterminacy is exactly what they share with realistic 
fiction. The referential status of the latter is notoriously 
difficult to determine (except if one cancels its character 
out in effect by Idealist or quasi-Idealist Aufhebunq). But 
even if it is so ambiguous, 
not therefore declare such 
so difficult to pin down, we do 
fiction to be either private, 
purely autonomous, or self- referential. 
Many of these things are at least hinted at, though not 
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fully expounded in the accompanying paper. I suppose these 
last remarks may have alerted you to the fact -- which, I 
suspect, will horrify you most of all that I believe 
strongly in a careful, restrained and almost aesthestic [sic] 
applicability of typology or analogy to the relation between 
di vine and more general 'truth' for Christian theological 
reflection. The textual universe of the gospel is that 
perfect coherence of reference and meaning, albeit always 
imperfectly and partially glimpsed, which allows us to 
analogize from there to the imperfect, secondary and 
analogous coherence or cohesion of the two in other cases. In 
an admittedly exaggerated fashion one might say that this is 
the only perfectly 'public' case of truth which allows all 
our other limited and private truths to become at least 
semi-public. But of course, I have no philosophical warrant 
for this claim, since I have proposed that it is not backed 
by any general theory: Hence its status must remain extremely 
awkward, at once grandly if not ludicrously imperialistic, 
and yet totally mired in collectively private Christian 
discourse in the eyes of those for whom philosophy is a 
foundational and, in respect of formal canons for meaning and 
truth, THE universal, normative discipline. For me this is 
the risk Christian theology has to take if it is to recapture 
its character as theology of faith, and specifically of 
incarnation-oriented faith. If it aims at less, is it worth 
having? Does it do justice to the gospel that commands the 
life and language of the Christian community? Does it do 
anything that a good philosophy of religion -or perhaps even 
better a sympathetic and restrained interpretive social 
scientific view of religions as distinctive religions, like 
that of Clifford Geertz --could not accomplish instead? 
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As I read through all this it is not only terribly 
repetitious but equipped with every possible sign of haste, 
and it sounds irascible - which it is not meant to be. I 
suppose it is also not a direct reply to your article but 
more nearly a gloss on some of your points, mainly in light 
of the enclosed essay. Well, no use starting over, so I hope 
this may get us into conversation one way or another. 
Sincerely yours, 
Hans W. Frei 
Chairman 
Problem of Narrativity in general- often Theologians 
19 (281) (transcribed August 1996) 
1 
1) Can "narrative" theology re-establish connection between 
existential and historical dimension- what kind of history? 
2) Can the account be non-flat- linear, given the sense of 
temporality which a thought of memory or hope. And don't we 
have to resort to it as "meta-story" (p12, 6, 4). 
3) In view of 2, can some variety in the multiplex be avoided 
in a 'narrative' view of the Bible's "sacred" or "communal" 
character? 
4) What is the forestructure for a "narrative" reconstruction 
of theology". Is it the capacity to tell stories, isn't it 
something more profound? 
5) Doesn 't" emplotment" force us to do something like 
salvation history? 
6) Reception of text contributes to its meaning- The sense of 
temporality of the story! The reader is inside the text. 
How can we reverse the flow of "sense" or meaning fully from 
our thought to the first. 
7) (P10) The Christian tradition is a community of story 
tellers. Is that the basic thing? 
8) Second discrepancy- the "truth" question. 
unsurmountable? (Our common problem!) 
Isn't this 
9) Why is third feature more difficult than second problem? 
Non-narrative/narrative dialectic (wisdom). 
-only most difficult if "narrative" given a privileged 
status- In Judaism no need. Isn't this a Christian problem 
and/or argument against? 
10) Is the shift from narrative to image vocabulary not the 
clue that in 
a) phenomenology 
b) referentiality 
we deal with something more basic than "narrativity" in 
II narrative theology". Is it a misnomer? 
11) Biblical theology will have to prove its uniqueness in a 
general arena. Can it? 
"Equally clearly it is once more a case of putting the cart 
2 
before the horse if one constructs a general and 
inalienable human quality called 'narrative' or 
'narrativity', within which to interpret the Gospels and 
provide foundational warrant for the possibility of their 
existential and ontological meaningfulness. The notion that 
Christian theology is a member of a general class of 
'narrative theology' is no more than a minor will-o'-the-
wisp" ("LR", 148). 
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11/3/86 
Dear Bill (Placher), 
I have just written the brief letter to Herring, 
chiefly trying to tell him why or how I thought the issue 
you're tackling is crucial within the field (relevance to 
external matters is a different problem) and that you are 
the man to work on it. 
Of course, I was not surprised by your 
proposal, but nonetheless I was intrigued by the 
particular shape or direction it took. I do wish we might 
get together some time and talk about it,and I'd promise 
to be a better listener and less of a talker. Let me ask 
you a few questions. 
1) I find myself (and to my surprise Dave 
Kelsey--for whose and Buckley's paper I thank you) 
reaffirming the hoary but respectable notion of 'critical 
realism' once again. It's early Farrer that I think of 
when I think of what kind of truth claims I would want to 
support, and how I would like to support them. Is that 
sort of view, with its affirmation of analogical 
predication and substance assertion, congenial to you? I 
would think so, from some long-past conversations. Yet I 
do recall that when you first wrote about my stuff in the 
Reformed Journal you wanted to make the truth assertions a 
bit more straightforward and less analogically qualified 
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(is my remembrance right?) . 
2) But whether or not such is the ultimate aim of 
your inquiry, I wonder how the particular discussion and 
group of people in terms of which you frame your project 
fits in with it. Are you moving to another level of 
generalization from 1) above when you move to the question 
of the nature and rules of rationality as applied to 
various disciplines and look for the heart of the debate 
among Kuhnians, Popperians, and Lakatos in-between, and 
then all their progeny too (including, I might hope, 
Habermas)? If you are,can you then come back to the sort 
of thing implied in 1) without really giving yourself an 
enormous agenda? 
3) I haven't made much progress, I regret to say, on 
my typology, but I do hope you'll at least discuss the 
possibility I tried to raise in it, viz. that theologians 
may have a range of possibilities for relating theological 
(or Christian) to other instances of rational argument, 
other instances of 'truth', and not simply one. Can one 
not say that 'Christian religion' is a distinctive form 
of discourse, that even the concept 'truth' becomes 
remolded in it, i. e. becomes part of "proposi tions 
borrowed from. "as our mentor Schleiermacher would 
have said (Qid say), without thereby cutting all ties 
to--and possibilities for discovering parallels 
in--other fields? If we don't do that, if we don't allow 
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the possibility of analogy to reach even into the 
character of the formal concepts we use--and not simply 
into their content, e. g. 'God purposing' rather than 
'natural selection'--aren't we apt to get entrapped 1n a 
liberal rather than a post-liberal outlook on truth? 
Another way of saying the same or at least a similar thing 
would be to ask if one should not extend the" already 
developed strategies for finding a middle ground between 
Cartesian rationalism and radical relativism" into a view 
of'truth' that is rather more various and philosophically 
open-ended than has often been the case? 
4) Suppose one goes at the issue of how to make truth 
claims also from the theological rather than from the 
philosophical side alone i I ask myself increasingly 
whether the way the rules operate in Christian religion as 
a cultural system isn't pluralistic. A) Our languages 
refers to a real God, and that fact clearly implies a 
correspondence view of truth? (I believe rules can't be 
simpliciter but only complexly at second level separated 
from assertions.) B)At the same time, we can't talk or 
read intratextually except by taking our texts, our 
'narrative', not only to refer trans-linguistically or 
representationally but to the textual world in which we 
live. The text is adequate; if it is a 'witness' by 
virtue of that indirect coherence in it of truth and 
meaning, which is directly present in the gift of the 
grace incarnate in Jesus. Hence the literal sense 1S the 
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articulation of the identity of the ascriptive logical or 
narrative subject 'Jesus Christ' with the real subject 
Jesus Christ. At that point of ascriptive literalism 
which is the reading of the Lord's identity, and at that 
point only, the truth affirmation is logically entailed by 
the text's meaning. To understand who Christ is, is to 
affirm that he is.Well, this is old stuff to you and the 
point at which you are most skeptical about (not Lindbeck 
but) me. But ask yourself if without some coherence view 
of truth one can still have the narrative component in 
post-liberal theology, if without it one is not going back 
to a pre-liberal propositionalism or foundationalism? I 
am not saying that such ascriptive literalism and the 
coherence view of truth consequent upon can take the place 
of a correspondence view of Christian truth; I am saying 
that the two must co-exist, without reduction or priority 
of one to the other. I would plead the tradition's 
complex unity here: At its best, pre-critical scriptural 
[word illegible] and the sensus literalis never denied the 
possibility of explanatory (even if not necessarily 
justificatory) use of the theistic proofs as part of fides 
quarens intellectum, and thus they cannot [word illegible] 
the place of the cosmological argument (as if the 
ontological argument could be substituted for it. In 
other words, I believe it can It. ) We simply have to 
accept the fact we don't have the super-theory to 
integrate an intra-textual and an extra-textual 
understanding of truth or of God as truth. C) Doesn't 
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the same irreducible complexity go for the pragmatic or 
subjective or existentialist view of truth in Christian 
faith? To know that these statements are true is truly to 
live (and/or be forgiven for not living) them,to learn to 
use them as instruments of grace? People like Pietists and 
Bultmann, Kierkegaard and the Wittgensteinian fideists 
(Holmer,D. Z. PHillips) have tried to make A and B a 
function of C, but that's bad. 
equally bad to reverse matters. 
On the other hand it's 
What I'm asking is, don't we have to have three views 
of Christian truth claims when we "borrow" the concept 
'truth' from philosophy? And if that's a possibility, 
isn't the parallel between theology and other 'fields' one 
of complex relation-and-distinction rather than 
straightforward parallel? And the reason is simply that if 
one goes at the truth issue from the theological side it 
has, like many other topics, a Trinitarian shape. By a 
use of the doctrine of appropriation we have to say that 
"the one God is the truth" is a statement in which (A) 
"The Father is true" is a statement about God qua real 
being; (B) "The Logos is true" is a statement about the 
same, real God ~ ground and guarantor of the adequacy of 
depictive Christian language, paradigmatically that of the 
Bible--the indirect parallel to the unity of linguistic 
[illegible word] and real world In the incarnation of the 
Word. (C) liThe Spirit is true" lS a statement about the 
same real and linguistically articulable God gyQ guarantor 
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and initiator of performative certainty or ground of 
living Christian truthfulness, the Enabler of our 
conceptual capacities through Christian nurture to be true 
to God's grace, to enact in our lives what we depict 
narratively and assertorically. 
But in all of these, A, B, C, it is the 
same God--inconceivably?--being true? 
Well, I really didn't mean to go on at such length, 
but you and I have never really talked about this matter 
sufficiently.Given the fact that "transcendental 
philosophy" or Wissenschaftslehre and theology should be 
(from my point of view) regarded as logically 
independent yet interrelated or interrelatable--one 
may hope in a non-foundational way--it seems tome that one 
could try simultaneously from both sides to see how that 
task of interrelation might be plotted out on the inquiry 
into truth. That's what I was trying to suggest here, and 
that still leaves open the question whether one wants to 
do that correlation in a more even way--correlating 
theology and philosophy as ~ partners dialectically, 
without giving priority to the one over the other--or 
whether one wants to say that if you do one, that involves 
the other in a subordinate position, even if the process 
of super- and subordination is done unsystematically 
(Barth, subordinating philosophy to theology without 
eliminating the former). Your worry about me, I suspect, 
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lS that 'truth' would either be a totally esoteric notion 
for me or disappear altogether in favor of 'description.' 
Mine about you is a possible temptation to use the 
concepts 'rationality' and 'truth' univocally, 
non-analogically, so that 'Christian' truth will be 
simply, rather than complexly--or non-residually rather 
than puzzle-remainingly--one single further instance of 
how a middle ground between rationalism and relativism, 
worked out (e.g.) in philosophy of natural science,in 
(soft rather than hard) parallel with explanation on the 
social sciences, can be extended to cover adequately the 
use of the concept in theology. 
Well, enough for the day! I'm eager to continue 
discussion!You may find a dissertation done here (in R.S. 
and Phil. Depts.) by Philip Clayton very useful. 
"Explanation from Physics to the Philosophy of Religion. 
Continuities and Discontinuities." Not only he is 
sympathetic to your general position re theology's task 
about argument and truth, but Lakatos is for him the most 
promising general model. 
Cordially, 
Hans 
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